China’s cadre evaluation system – the personnel management system used to assess the performance of government officials in the party-state – is considered an important tool for upper-level governments to supervise and regulate lower-level agents.
This process of target implementation follows a cascading structure, with the information on target enforcement reported back up the chain. As government performance is the basis for the legitimacy of the CCP, the major function of cadre evaluation is to improve government performance.
Defects of the cadre evaluation system begin to emerge by the end of the 1990s whereby the distorted incentive structure led to the blind pursuit of GDP by local cadres, and local governments were engaged in unrealistic projects to boost their image rather than in substantial work.
It is accepted that the cadre evaluation system strengthens state capacity to monitor, control, and secure the compliance of local agents. 16 On the other hand, scholars highlight many defects of this system. Excessive weight was placed on GDP-related targets 17 leading to the ‘blind pursuit of GDP’ on a local scale.