1 июн. 2004 г. Consider because. It is obvious that we could not fill out a truth table for the sentence P because Q. How would we fill out the value of P.
For the present purposes the question need not be settled. A minimal condition for the truth of 'p because q' is that the truth of 'q' is explanatorily
Now since Q ⊆ NN P ⊲ NG P
Q of R is a maxima1 t-ideal. Let. xERQ.ForanyP~r(Q
7 Yet for the sake of lin- guistic convenience I will feel free to read statements of type 'p because q
6 сент. 2008 г. Then
person A knows proposition P because he has evidence Q what conditions must Q satisfy? Armstrong contends the Q must be known by A: "If I claim to know
(q)1 and because of p 1 iq/ there exists a 6 E IBr
Since p ↔ q ⇔ (p → q) ∧ (q → p) the latter statement is also a tautology. Using the reasoning in the first paragraph of this section
This was accomplished when q = p or q = p2 with p odd in. Theorem 3.1 of [3] Because a ⩽ 2 and p is an odd prime then p = 3 and a = 2
1 juin 2004 Consider because. It is obvious that we could not fill out a truth table for the sentence P because Q. How would we fill out the value of P.
Laws. Page 51. Logical Equivalence. ? Because ¬(p ? q) and ¬p
for $1<q$ $r<infty$
The disjunction of p and q (read: p or q) is the statement p ? q which “(1 < 2) ? (52 < 0)” is false because the hypothesis is true and the.
Since the appearance of the public key cryptography in the famous Diffie- Since ? is between 1 and Q(n)
P~Q. 0. P 6 e. (1). In general we would expect Q to be fairly complicated. For example
every hyperplane tangent to the sphere is strictly convex (because E i p Since we are using normal coordinates p?q = distM (p
https://www.kurims.kyoto-u.ac.jp/~kyodo/kokyuroku/contents/pdf/1037-4.pdf
Since q has three M-lines in. Page 10. 334. DAVID SACHS t containing it we conclude that p' has the same property. Hence every point in t is contained in three
condition: P only if Q means that the truth of Q is necessary or required in order for P to be true That is P only if Q rules out just one possibility: that P is true and Q is false But that is exactly what P ? Q rules out So it’s obviously correct to read P ? Q as P only if Q
First all reasons are explanatory in this sense: whenever S believes that p for a reason one can say that S believes that p because q where “q” refers to S’s reason Second it always follows from this schema that it is a fact that q and that the fact that q is S’s reason
(6) P because Q i (i) it is true that Q (ii) the fact that Q entails the fact that P (iii) the fact that Q has at least one law of nature as a conjunct and (iv) the fact that Q would not entail the fact that P if the laws were removed A more traditional way to state the DN model is to say that “explanations are ar-guments” of a certain
The biconditional connective p ? q is read “p if and only if q ” Here's its truth table: T F F T p q p ? q F F T T F F T T One interpretation of ? is to think of it as equality: the two propositions must have equal truth values One interpretation of ? is to think of it as equality: the two propositions must have equal truth values
propositions of the form ‘ (p because q)’ What model propositions (e g unrealistic assumptions) do is to give reasons to believe in the truth of the possibilityclaim InotherwordstheyprovideevidenceforHPEs(cf Claveau andVergaraFernández2015) TheprimafacieissueofviewingmodelsasHPEs
3 The fact that q makes it the case that p 4 The fact that q grounds the fact that p In recent years it has become customary to use the term ‘grounding’ as the chief way of designating the form of dependence at issue here but don’t let that label mislead you ‘Grounding’ is not a technical term referring to a recently discovered