We also discuss correct and incorrect infer- ences about population majority preferences extrapolated from sample data. This allows the collective decision
the effect of interest groups on legislators' behavior depends on the clarity of the majority's preferences in a district. When the electorate is narrowly
a transitive preference ordering defined over the elements in a set of then simple majority rule does yield a social preference ordering which is both.
relations it is sufficient for transitive majority preferences that a given strict weak order has a net majority (on a given triple). We provide a
give necessary and sufficient conditions for majority rule to define a transitive social preference ordering. In their model the ith voter's preferred
then simple majority rule does yield a social preference ordering which is both transitive and satisfies Arrow's five conditions.
It is considered the majority preference relation as a cone relation constructed upon the cones of the DMs' preference relations.
majority rule by focussing the attention on the shape of the distribution of individuals over the set of preference relations. The purpose of this note is
9 sept. 2019 We show that a majority binary relation is among all conceivable binary relations
Sen [9] has also examined the relationship between preferences and voting when the utility or disutility of voting is introduced into the analysis in order to
Voters are constrained to express their preferences in general elections by voting for one of the parties – and its policy programme Party votes are the
Recent research has examined the distortionary effects of lobbying activities on this representational linkage Here I argue that the effect of interest groups
We study majority rule both in a statistical sampling and a Bayesian inference framework Based on any given paired comparison probabilities or ranking
majority rule by focussing the attention on the shape of the distribution of individuals over the set of preference relations The purpose of this note is
A multicriteria group choice problem is considered in the paper The model includes a set of feasible alternatives a vector criterion and n preference
Fishburn [7] shows that by combining the concepts of single-peaked and single-troughed preferences (which are them- selves examples of value restriction) it is
Majority Rule: This concept means that the candidate (choice) receiving more than 50 of the vote is the winner But what happens if there are three candidates
We show that a majority binary relation is among all conceivable binary relations the most representative of the profile of preferences from which it
1 déc 2020 · Electoral systems in which voters can cast preference votes for individual candidates within a party list are increasingly popular