Long‐Term Contracting With Time‐Inconsistent Agents
Gottlieb long term contracting published
Lapse-Based Insurance
25 févr. 2021
Lapse Based Insurance
Long-Term Contracting with Time-Inconsistent Agents
9 mai 2020 Daniel Gottlieb. † and Xingtan Zhang ... †London School of Economics and Washington University in St. Louis d.gottlieb@lse.ac.uk.
gottlieb
A Theory of Fair CEO Pay
Daniel Gottlieb. LSE. March 15 2022. Abstract. This paper studies optimal executive pay when the CEO is concerned about fairness –.
edmans paper
An Example of Non-Existence of Riley Equilibrium in Markets with
An Example of Non Existence of Riley Equilibrium in Markets with Adverse Selection
Moral Incentives in Credit Card Debt Repayment: Evidence from a
28 mai 2019 Daniel Gottlieb. Washington University in St. Louis. Martin Kanz. World Bank and Centre for Economic Policy Research.
MoralIncentives
How Should Performance Signals Affect Contracts?
Daniel Gottlieb. LSE. Review of Financial Studies forthcoming. Abstract. The informativeness principle demonstrates that a contract should depend on infor-.
chaigneaedmansgottliebfinal
When Is (Performance- Sensitive) Debt Optimal?
Pierre Chaigneau Alex Edmans and Daniel Gottlieb 2022. All rights reserved. LBS
optimalfinal
When Is (Performance-Sensitive) Debt Optimal?
Daniel Gottlieb. LSE. July 29 2021. Abstract. Existing theories of debt consider a single contractible performance measure (“out-.
chaigneauedmansgottliebfinal