' The problem lies in motivating the agent to act in the principal's interest rather than simply in the agent's own interest Viewed in these broad terms, agency
Kraakman
The agency theory addresses this relationship between owners (shareholders) and the custodians of their wealth, that is the management of a firm If
Hall Agency
agency problem Alternative Approaches to Executive Compensation Our focus in this paper is on publicly traded companies without a controlling shareholder
1976) A well-documented agency problem is managerial ''empire building'', which refers to managers' tendencies to grow the firm beyond its optimal size or to
car CLS
Kitch, The Theory and Practice of Securities Disclosure (working paper on file with U Chi L Rev) ' See Michael C Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow,
agency problem. Alternative Approaches to Executive Compensation. Our focus in this paper is on publicly traded companies without a controlling shareholder.
Indeed directors' behavior is also subject to an agency problem
The first is the agency problem that arises when (a) the desires or goals of the principal and agent conflict and (b) it is difficult or expensive for the
agency theory. The canonical agency problem can be posed as follows. Assume that both the agent and the principal possess state in-.
agency problem. Alternative Approaches to Executive Compensation. Our focus in this paper is on publicly traded companies without a controlling shareholder.
on the problem dates back at least to Berle and Means (1932). classical theory the agent who personifies the firm is the entre-.
Keywords: Corporate governance managers
League (NFL) we are able to identify the necessary data on output costs
Optimal Capital Structure: Theory and. Evidence. Connie X. Mao*. Abstract. Does more leverage always worsen the debt agency problem? This paper presents a
Meck- ling Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior
Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem