Do you think knowledge requires something other than reliably produced true belief?
Those who think knowledge requires something other than, or at least more than, reliably produced true belief, something (usually) in the way of justification for the belief that one’s reliably produced beliefs are being reliably produced, have, it seems to me, an obligation to say what benefits this justification is supposed to confer….
What is a reliable theory of knowledge?
Reliabilist theories of knowledge incorporate this idea into a reliability condition on knowledge. [ 23] Here is an example of such a view: S ’s belief that p was produced by a reliable cognitive process. Simple K-Reliabilism replaces the justification clause in the traditional tripartite theory with a reliability clause.
Should a justification condition be included in an analysis of knowledge?
As we have seen, one motivation for including a justification condition in an analysis of knowledge was to prevent lucky guesses from counting as knowledge. However, the Gettier problem shows that including a justification condition does not rule out all epistemically problematic instances of luck.
Do true beliefs still fall short of knowledge?
There seem to be cases of justified true belief that still fall short of knowledge. Here is one kind of example: Imagine that we are seeking water on a hot day. We suddenly see water, or so we think. In fact, we are not seeing water but a mirage, but when we reach the spot, we are lucky and find water right there under a rock.
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