[PDF] COUP ATTEMPT IN TURKEY - SETA

28529_4July15Book.pdf JULY 15 COUP ATTEMPT IN TURKEY: CONTEXT, CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES MUHÍTTÍN ATAMANJULY 15

MUHÍTTÍN ATAMAN

COUP ATTEMPT IN TURKEY

CONTEXT, CAUSES AND

CONSEQUENCES

T urkey's democracy has historically su?ered from con- tinuous coup attempts which aimed directly to over- throw the elected governments of the time. At least four successful coups have occurred in a period of 50 years and in July 15 2016 the latest attempt was executed. However, un - like the previous coups, the plotters failed to achieve their goals on the night of July 15, resulting in a triumph for Turkish unity and democracy. As such, the July 15 coup attempt can be considered as an example per se of people power which is worth studying. July 15 Coup Attempt in Turkey: Context, Causes and Consequences presents di?erent perspectives focusing on political, economic, so- ciological and psychological aspects of the factors leading up to, the events during and aftermath of this historic date. Academicians and journalists have aimed to examine in detail the coup attempt and to present an accurate account of July 15. History and cur - rent events are analyzed through an academic perspective, creating a fuller picture to better understand this most recent attempt to compromise the will of the Turkish people.MUHÍTTÍN ATAMAN ATÍLLA YAYLA ŞENER AKTÜRK NEBÍ MÍŞ SADIK ÜNAY

ŞERÍF DÍLEK

FARHAN MUJAHID CHAK GLORIA SHKURTI GAMAL NASSAR

9789752459182

JULY 15

COUP ATTEMPT IN TURKEY

CONTEXT, CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES

MUHTTN ATAMAN (ED.)

JULY 15

COUP ATTEMPT IN TURKEY

CONTEXT, CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES

SETA

MUHTTN ATAMAN

After graduating from Ankara University (Department of International Relations, at the Faculty of Political Science) in 1992, Dr. Ataman completed his Masters Degree at University of Central Oklahoma and his Doctorate at University of Kentucky. He taught Middle Eastern Politics at Abant zzet Baysal University, Department of International Relations, from 1993-2014. He worked as the General Secretary of Inter-University Board of Turkey and Advisor to the President of the Higher Educational Council (YÖK) between 2012-2014. Dr. Ataman worked as Deputy General Coordinator and Direc- tor of Education Department at SETA Foundation between 2014 and 2017. He is the editor-in-chief of one of the leading academic journals in Turkey, Insight Turkey and professor of International Relations at Ankara Yldrm Beyazt University. His aca- demic studies mainly concentrate on Turkish foreign policy and the Middle Eastern politics, the Gulf politics in particular. His articles are published in leading academic journal such as Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, Middle Eastern Studies, Insight Turkey and Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations.

SETA Publications 23

First Published in 2017 by SETA

ISBN: 978-975-2459-18-2

© 2017 SET Vakf ktisadi letmesi All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical or other means, without permission in writing from the publishers.

Cover : Erkan Söüt

Layout: Hasan Suat Olgun

Printed in Turkey, stanbul by Turkuvaz Haberleme ve Yaynclk A.., November 2016

SETA Publications

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INTRODUCTION

MUH Í TT Í

N ATAMAN 9

JULY 15: THE GLORIOUS RESISTANCE OF TURKISH DEMOCRACY AT Í

LLA YAYLA 19

TURKEY"S CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT AND

THE REACTIONARY COUP: SEGREGATION,

EMANCIPATION, AND THE WESTERN REACTION

ENER AKTÜRK 67

MEASURING SOCIAL PERCEPTION OF

THE JULY 15 COUP ATTEMPT

NEB

Í MÍ 103

JULY 15: POLITICAL ECONOMY OF A FOILED COUP

SADIK ÜNAY, ER

Í F D Í

LEK 147

CULTURE, SOCIAL CONTESTATION AND TURKEY"S

FAILED COUP: THE RIVALRY OF SOCIAL IMAGINARIES

FARHAN MUJAHID CHAK 185

COUP D"ÉTAT RECORD OF THE WEST AND

THE WESTERN REACTION TO THE JULY 15 COUP ATTEMPT MUH Í TT Í

N ATAMAN, GLORIA SHKURTI 219

COUP IN TURKEY AND EGYPT:

INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL DYNAMICS

GAMAL NASSAR 251

TABLE OF CONTENTS

This book is dedicated to the Turkish people,

especially to all the 249 martyrs of July 15 who resisted against the coup attempt to protect the national will and heroically sacriced their lives for their country.

Muhittin Ataman*

e Republican Turkey, declared in 1923 under one-party rule, opted to transform its political system into a multi-party one as a reac- tion to the emerging bilateral world in the wake of the Second World War. Since then, Turkey has experienced several direct and indirect mil- itary coups and ruptures in its democratization process. e military, which declared itself to be the principal protector of the secular repub- lic, did not allow many popular politicians to rule the country, despite the support they had. erefore, the military backed by other bureau- cratic institutions created a tutelage by which they controled almost every aspect of political life. Moreover, whenever the military came to power they pursued policies in line with those of theWest and institu- tions such as NATO and the EU. As a consequence, it is widely be- lieved that the West has been a crucial force behind the numerous forms of military coups that have taken place in Turkey. e Turkish military intervened in politics on the pretext of a per- ceived deviation from the main principles of the secular Republic. Its rst intervention into politics occurred in 1960; at that time, the coup plotters hanged the prime minister and two ministers after a ctitious judicial process. is military coup was followed by two others in 1971 and 1980, which curtailed political participation and the democratiza- tion process. ousands of civilians lost their lives during political in- stability and the military campaigns in the 1970s and 1980s. In 1997,

INTRODUCTION

* Ankara Yldrm Beyazt Unversty, Turkey

10 / INTRODUCTION

the military indirectly intervened in political life for the fourth time, forcing the conservative government of Necmettin Erbakan to resign. When the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) came to pow- er in 2002, it promised to normalize the country by initiating a process of democratization, demilitarization and civilianization. e AK Party governments took signicant steps in this regard which allowed the arena of civil society to expand and increased diversity in social and political life. us, it gradually inhibited the power of the military and other bureaucratic structures which in response tried to shut down the ruling party through various channels, in order to curtail the restruc- turing of the country. Starting in 2013, there have been several dier- ent attempts to overthrow the AK Party government. e Gezi Park protests in June 2013 were an attempt to change the government through social unrest; while the events on December 17 and 25 were overt judicial interventions to force the democratically elected govern- ment to halt its reform and development programs. July 15, 2016, dierent in many aspects from previous coups, was the latest attempt to overthrow the legitimate government of Turkey and to reverse the changes it had implemented. When compared with previous coups, July 15 dierentiates in terms of the rationale, agents, tools and results. First of all, the reason behind the above mentioned coups (i.e. 1960, 1971, 1980 and 1997) was always related with the “protection of the secular principles" of the Turkish Republic. e mil- itary, a self-declared guardian of these principles, intervened in the po- litical aairs of the state arguing that due to the Islamist perspectives of the politicians in power the secular principles were being violated. Nev- ertheless, this was not the rationale behind the July 15 coup attempt. While the coup plotters tried to use such a discourse -as can be seen in the coup statement broadcasted under duress on national television-

JULY 15 COUP ATTEMPT IN TURKEY / 11

the real reason behind the coup attempt was to replace the AK Party with an alternative political grouping. Overthrowing the government would allow the coup plotters and the mastermind behind them to gain power and replace the democratically elected government. Secondly, the agents that undertook the coup attempt of July 15 were dierent from those of previous coups. While only the military was openly responsible and active in these events, in the July 15 coup attempt the military was not the main agent. More specically, the coup attempt was masterminded by Fetullah Gülen, the leader of the Fetullah Terrorist Organization (FETÖ), and it was brought to life by his sup- porters inside the military and a number of other governmental institu- tions. It can be argued that the civilian element of the coup plotters was a novelty in the history of Turkish coups. Moreover the tools used and the targets of the plotters were also divergent when compared with the earlier coups which only targeted the politicians. e coup plotters of July 15 not only targeted the politicians and the governmental institu- tions, they did not even spare the life of the innocent civilians who took to the streets to protect the democratically elected government. Last but not least, unlike the other coups, the July 15 coup was not successful. As will be discussed below and through the chapters of this book, the reasons behind the failure of the July 15 coup attempt are twofold: 1. e strengthening of the Turkish democracy, especially the consolidation of the democratic institutions, 2. e democratic awareness and the unication of the Turkish citizens under the same ag, leaving aside their dierences. In brief, the coup attempt on July 15, 2016 was the most dramatic link in the chain of anti-democratic and illegitimate interventions that

12 / INTRODUCTION

Turkey has experienced. July 15 is a watershed in the history of democ- racy as well as in the history of Turkey. On the night of July 15, the world witnessed an exceptional and historic event. e Turkish people, who had been subjected to several military coups, heroically stood up against the brutal coup plotters. us, they became an example for other peoples on how to defend their nation and on what is the real meaning of national self-determination. At the same time, they gave a valuable lesson to the Western governments on how to support a dem- ocratically elected government. But more than anything, Turkish peo- ple proved to themselves that it is they who decide for themselves, for their future. After all, isn"t that what democracy is all about? On the night of July 15, the world saw the real face of FETÖ, a chimera hidden behind the façade of religious discourses. In the late hours of Friday night, the coup plotters started to block the main streets in stanbul and Ankara. Afraid of a possible terrorist attack peo- ple began to go home and follow the situation through the media. Soon it became clear that this was a coup attempt to overthrow the le- gitimate government. As the people responded by pouring out in to the streets, especially after the call of President Erdoan, the coup plotters realized that their plan was about to fail. Nevertheless, at this point, they started to bomb the governmental buildings such as the Grand National Assembly (TBMM), the Presidential Complex, the National Intelligence Organization (MT), the Special Forces Headquarters, the Turkish National Police, the AK Party Headquarters and some televi- sion channels. Furthermore, the coup plotters shot at civilians in cold blood, killing more than 240 people and wounding more than 2000. e coup plotters betrayed their people and used the nations own weapons against them. However, this did not stop the Turkish people, who with an admirable bravery stayed on the streets until the last unit

JULY 15 COUP ATTEMPT IN TURKEY / 13

of coup plotters had surrendered. Íe coup attempt was then followed by a 25-day long “democracy watch" where people gathered every night in the city centers of every single province of Turkey to condemn the coup attempt and protect democracy. e July 15 coup attempt is more than a failed coup, it is a process that is still going on and needs to be analyzed thoroughly. After one year, it is fair to ask what does “July 15" mean for Turkey. First and foremost, it was the struggle of the people and the national will against tanks. Turkish people from all ranks, ages, genders, classes, ethnicities and reli- gions took to the streets on the night of July 15 to protect their demo- cratically elected government. Many people who had no time to change their clothes were in pyjamas and wearing slippers. ose standing in front of tanks did not think twice about leaving their families at home and going out in to the streets to defend their nation. On the other hand armed soldiers, pointed their guns towards civilians, who had no armor but their Turkish ag to claim their rights and protect their lives. July 15 was the triumph and consolidation of Turkish democracy. e coup plotters intended to kill the President of Turkey and over- throw the democratically elected government. However, it was the peo- ple -both supporters and detractors of the AK Party- who did not al- low the coup plotters to achieve their aim. Moreover, the main political parties, leaving aside their political dierences, united with each other and condemned the coup attempt. e mass demonstration of more than 4 million people on August 7 at Yenikap, stanbul was clear evi- dence of the national unity. It was the victory of the world"s most non-violent resistances against one of the most brutal coup attempts. Turkey has suered from many coups; however, none of them directly targeted the civilians. Ironically, the July 15 coup attempt became the bloodiest one in Turkish history

14 / INTRODUCTION

with more than 249 people being killed. Some of them were killed by tanks and with the heavy artillery however had the coup attempt been successful, the bloodshed would have been greater. July 15 has demonstrated the democratic awareness and further in- creased the political consciousness of Turkish people. Now Turks are aware of their power and how they can make their will clear. On the night of the July 15 coup attempt the people chose democracy against a military regime, which would have symbolized the end of democracy for Turkey as it has done in other states of the region. It was not only the societal groups, but also the main body of the armed forces, the police forces, the judiciary, all political parties and media, who resisted against the coup attempt. Furthermore, it shows that Turkey has become a success story in the face of military coups, and a symbol of peaceful democratic resistance. Turkey not only broke the cycle of coups internally but also, unlike the other states in the region, it showed that military regimes are no longer welcomed. After strengthening the Turkish society and democracy, a large-scale process of state reconstruction was initiated. Most signicantly for the Turkish people who upto now have looked to the West as an ally in their pursuit of democracy and human rights, the July 15 coup attempt has revealed that the West does not sincerely care about democratic developments in countries they wish to inu- ence. Western states, which did not condemn the anti-democratic coup attempt, not only immediately started a campaign against the demo- cratically elected government but also tried to protect the coup plot- ters. An example of this is the U.S., which continues to keep the mas- termind of the July 15 coup attempt, Fetullah Gülen, under strict protection. Similarly some of the coup plotters who escaped to Greece have not been extradited to Turkey.

JULY 15 COUP ATTEMPT IN TURKEY / 15

THE CONTENT OF THE VOLUME

Íis edited volume about the coup attempt, was intended to pres- ent dierent perspectives of the events focusing on political, economic, sociological and psychological aspects of July 15. At a time when the West has failed to present the coup attempt objectively, this volume aims to present accurately what July 15 was about. History and current events are analyzed through an academic perspective, creating a full picture to better understand the July 15 coup attempt. is compilation brings together eight chapters, which were previ- ously published in dierent journals. Seven of these articles were pub- lished in Insight Turkey"s special issue (Vol. 18, No. 3, Summer 2016). e article authored by Ataman and Shkurti was published in ADAM Akademi journal (Vol. 6, No. 2, 2016, pp. 51-73) originally in Turkish. Atilla Yayla"s article oers a comprehensive analysis of the coup at- tempt. Yayla focuses mainly on FETÖ and its leader Fetullah Gülen and how this terrorist organization in several cases plotted against the democratic government and President Erdoan. For Yayla what people did on the night of July 15 will never be forgotten and he calls this historical moment as a Glorious Resistance. ener Aktürk, remarkably postulates that after the “silent revolu- tion" of the AK Party, which created an equal citizenship and ended the longtime segregation of the Kurds and religious conservatives in Tur- key, terrorist organizations such as PKK and FETÖ lost their raison d"être and each encountered an existential crisis. Íese two organiza- tions tried to change the political orientation of the country by exploit- ing domestic and regional conjuncture. In this case, violence becomes the main and sole strategy of these terrorist organizations. Aktürk also criticizes the Western media"s deliberate Islamophobic representation and its ambiguous reaction to the coup attempt.

16 / INTRODUCTION

Another standpoint is presented by Nebi Mi in his article, which focuses on the social perception of the coup attempt. Based on semi-structured in-depth face-to-face interviews conducted with 176 people throughout the democracy watch, Mi analyzes the social per- ception of Turkish people about the coup attempt. He argues that love for their nation, the call of President Erdoan and the media had a high impact on the way in which the people reacted during the coup at- tempt and afterwards. Mi concludes that people view this coup at- tempt dierently from previous ones, since during the latest attempt the coup plotters deliberately opened re on the people. Increased self-condence and political awareness of the people motivated them to take to the streets in order to thwart the coup attempt. When analyzing coup attempts, economic factors are largely over- looked. Sadk Ünay and erif Dilek in their article present in detail FETÖ"s colossal economic power amounting to billions of dollars and they conclude by stating that the 15 July coup attempt was perpetrated to maintain an uninterrupted ow of nancial resources into a murky network of business enterprises around a messianic cult. Farhan Mujahid Chak argues that the failed coup d"état is the result of a clash of social images, in which the Gülenist social image was van- quished by the AK Party"s social imagery. erefore, as it became clear that FETÖ was acting secretly with a general disdain for millions of Turkish citizens, it failed to establish dominion of its social image. On the other hand AK Party"s inclusivity attracted people from all seg- ments of Turkish society into its fold. According to Chak, this was the main reason behind the failure of the coup attempt in Turkey. Muhittin Ataman and Gloria Shkurti criticize the Western percep- tion of the July 15 coup attempt. First, they summarize the Western involvement in military coups in dierent continents at dierent times.

JULY 15 COUP ATTEMPT IN TURKEY / 17

Íe global Western powers attempt to change regimes of any “native" and “nationalist" political leadership. Ataman and Shkurti analyze the statements of a number of Western politicians and the coverage of the mainstream Western media. ey demonstrate that Western political elites and media do not criticize the coup plotters who attempted to illegally end the democratic structure in the country, but prefer to tar- get the legitimate democratically elected government. Lastly, Gamal Nassar analyzes the coup attempt in Turkey by pre- senting the coup in terms of Middle Eastern politics. Nassar compares the coup attempt in Turkey with the one in Egypt and analyses how dierent elements such as the political actors, religious actors, media and members of the public contributed to the promotion and success of the coup in Egypt while in Turkey, all these forces united against the coup attempt.

JULY 15: THE GLORIOUS RESISTANCE OF

TURKISH DEMOCRACY

Atilla Yayla*

INTRODUCTION:

TURNING POINTS IN THE HISTORY OF TURKISH COUPS

Íe history of Turkish coups is a long one. Turkey experienced sever- al military interventions in the Ottoman era, which either resulted in the elimination of colleagues close to the Sultan and meeting the demands of the rebels, or the dethroning of the Sultan. While some of the de- throned Sultans were put away to prison, others were killed. And even though the old military was replaced with a military of European stan- dard during the reign of several sultans, this still did not prevent military interventions. Indeed, in 1876, at a time when it was said that a coup was not possible, Sultan Abdülaziz was dethroned by a military coup. According to some historians, this was the rst coup of modern Turkey. 1 e dissolution period of the Ottoman Empire totally removed polit- ical authority from some areas and diused it in others, placing the cur- rent lands of Turkey, namely Anatolia and race, into a political author- ity vacuum. England, France, Italy and Greece invaded some parts of Turkey. However, with the War of Independence that started in 1919 on 1 For a brief overview of the coups in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey see: Süleyman ǡDzͳͶͲǡdz Derin TarihǡȋʹͲͳ͸ȌǡǤʹ͸Ǧ͵ͻǢ

.