CONSTITUTIONAL LAW EXAM MODEL ANSWER - St Mary's University




Loading...







CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I - Answer to Practice Question 2

Constitutional Law Analysis extraterritorial regulations on out-of-state activities) Conversely, the findings of the legislature indicate that the law’s goal is to promote environmentally friendly energy sources, which could reduce air pollution and generate other significant local benefits (e g , less use of water in elec­ tricity production)

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW EXAM MODEL ANSWER

that will best prepare you for a Constitutional Law exam are rarely susceptible to one-paragraph answers In the end, we have tried to balance brevity with the need to provide the student with realistic, useful questions Our practice has been to err on the side of usefulness, resulting in somewhat longer discussions

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW EXAM MODEL ANSWER - St Mary's University

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW EXAM MODEL ANSWER DAVID DIYITFURTH SPRING, 1998 [The following model answers were taken largelyfrom students’ responses to the exam questions 1 have added and subtracted material as Ideemed necessary ] 1 The Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment (EPC) prohibits government from denying anyperson equal protection of

Student Exam Number Final Examination Constitutional Law

University of Houston Law Center May 10, 2010 1 to 5 p m THESE EXAMINATION QUESTIONS AND THE CONSTITUTION MUST BE RETURNED AT THE END OF THE EXAM This examination is CLOSED BOOK, NO NOTES You may not consult any other materials or communicate with any other person You are bound by the Law Center’s Honor Code

Constitutional Law Spring 2013 - New York University

department to say what the law is” • Went out of its way to needlessly strike down the law, establish the power of judicial review and do it in a way that would give the President what he wanted, averting a constitutional crisis • The Supreme Court has the ability to review the judgments of state courts and the constitutionality of

le d-ib td-hu va-top mxw-100p">legal guide for police constitutional issues - Free 2-day Shipping w/ Prime

2 3 3 Hypotheticals and Questions: Constitutional Interpretation 4 Why did it take so many pages for the Court to essentially define “necessary and proper” as “appropriate”? One answer may be that the issue of the relationship of state power to federal power was still such a contentious issue,

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW EXAM MODEL ANSWER - St Mary's University 63314_10DittfurthConstitutionalLawSpring1998FinalExam_answerKey.pdf

CONSTITUTIONALLAWEXAM

MODELANSWER

DAVIDDIYITFURTH

SPRING,1998

[Thefollowingmodelanswersweretakenlargelyfromstudents"responsestotheexam questions.1haveaddedandsubtractedmaterialasIdeemednecessary.]

1.TheEqualProtectionClauseofthe14thAmendment(EPC)prohibits

governmentfromdenyinganypersonequalprotectionofthelaws.Asdevelopedbythe SupremeCourt,equalprotectionchallengestogovernmentactionareanalyzedon differentlevels,dependingonthenatureoftheclassification. [Thebackgroundmaterialinthenexttwoparagraphstendstobelongerthanis necessary,butIleftitin.] Courtsapplystrictscrutinytosuspectclassifications;thisstandardrequires governmenttohavedesigneditslawsothatitisnecessarytoachieveacompelling interest."Necessary"meansthattherearenolessdiscriminatorybutequallyeffective alternatives.Courtsalsopresumethatsuspectclassificationsareunconstitutional,and governmenthastheburdenofrebuttingthispresumption.Whenstrictscrutinyis applied,thelawisrarelyupheldbecausethestandardsaresostrict. Whengovernmentdoesnotdiscriminateonthebasisofaclassificationwhichis suspectbynatureorbyhistory(andwhennofundamentalconstitutionalrightis affected),courtswillupholdalawifitmerelyrationallyrelatedtoalegitimateend,On this"bottomtier"ofequalprotectionanalysis,courtspresumethatthechallengedlawis constitutional,andgreatdeferenceisgiventothegovernment"schoiceoftheinterestto beservedandthemeansbywhichitisachieved,Socialregulationsandeconomiclaws generallyfallinthiscategorysolongasnosuspectclassorfundamentalrightis involved. Themid-levelscrutinytest,whichwilllikelybeimplicatedhere,isreservedfor quasi-suspectclasses,suchasgender.Towithstandanequalprotectionchallenge,the NJlawatissueheremustbedesignedtoachieveanimportantobjective;NJcontends thatitsendisthesavingoftaxmoney.Inaddition,themeans(removingpaidpregnancy sickleavefromthebenefitsavailabletolevel1employees)mustbearasubstantial relationtothatend.Apresumptionofunconstitutionalityappliestosuchlaws,butthe strengthofthatpresumptionisnotasgreatasitwouldbewhenstrictscrutinyisapplied. InBoren,theCourtstruckdownastatelawwhichprohibitedthesaleof3.2beer tomalesunder21whileallowingfemalestopurchaseitbeginningatage18.The 1

CONSTITUTIONALLAW,FINALEXAMINATION

SPRING1998,SectionBDavidDjttfurth

WestVirginia.Approximately90%ofWestVirginia"scoalissoldininterstate commerce.Theminingcompanieswhichproducethiscoaldosoonlandleased fromthelandowners.Fivemajorminingsitesexistinthestate;fourareownedby privatecitizensandoneisownedbythestate.Threeminingcompanieshaveleased thesesitesfortheminingofcoal.OneoftheseminingcompaniesisaWest Virginiacorporation,buttheotherswereincorporatedandhavetheirheadquarters inotherstates. Recently,WestVirginiapassedtheCoalTonnageTaxActof1997(the "Act").ThisActprovidesforpaymenttotheminingcompaniesofasum calculatedattherateof$25pertonofWestVirginiacoalwhichissoldinthestate. Thesepaymentscomefromthegeneralrevenuesofthestate.Agrowing nationwideshortageofcoalhasgraduallyincreasedthepriceofcoalonthe interstatemarket.HigherpricespromptedtheWestVirginialegislaturetopassthis lawtoassistlocalresidentswishingtobuycoalproducedinthestate. Anumberofout-of-statecompaniesandgovernmentalentitieswhich routinelypurchaseWestVirginiacoalhavechallengedtheActinfederalcourt claimingthatisunconstitutional.TheycontendthattheActdiscriminatesagainst interstatecommerceinpurposeandineffect.Thechallengersnotethatlocal residentshavebeengivenacompetitiveadvantageoverout-of-statepurchasers.In thistimeofshortage,out-of-statepurchaserscancompeteforthelimitedquantityof WestVirginiacoalonlybypayinghigherprices.WestVirginiahaseffectively givenlocalpurchasersadiscountedpricethroughtheuseofstatetaxmoney. Thestatearguesthatthetaxdoesnotdiscriminateagainsttheinterstatesale ofcoal.Furthermore,WestVirginiaarguesthattherefundsareasubsidyandare, therefore,immunefromaconstitutionalchallenge.Thestatealsoarguesthatitcan ~dowhatitwisheswiththecoalminedfromthelanditowns.

MAKETHEBESTARGUMENTTOSHOW

THATTHEACTISCONSTITUTIONAL.

3.(20points:36minutes)

In1997,CongresspassedtheFederalProductsLiabilityReformAct("Act"). Inthislaw,Congresslimitsthegrantbyanycourt,federalorstate,ofdamagesfora productsliabilityclaim(orformultipleclaimsarisingfromthesametransaction). 3

CONSTITUTIONALLAW,FINALEXAMINATION

SPRING1998,SectionBDavidDittfurth

Thestatuterestrictsthegrantofpainandsufferingdamagestoanamountequalto triplethemedicalexpensescausedbytheinjuryor$250,000,whicheveristhe largeramount.Thestatutealsorestrictspunitivedamagestoanamountequalto tripletheactualdamages(alldamagesotherthanforpainandsuffering)or $350,000,whicheveristhelargeramount. Congressfailedtoincludeanyfindingswhichindicatedtheeffectofsuch damageawardsoninterstatecommerce,andnohearingswereheldtodetermine thateffect.However,oncesuithadbeenbroughttochallengetheconstitutionality oftheAct,thelawyersfortheUnitedStatescontendedthattheuncertaintycaused businessesbytheallowanceofunlimitedpunitiveandpainandsufferingdamages hinderedinterstatecommerce.Problemswerecausedinterstatecommercebecause corporationshesitatedtoselltheirproductsinstateswhichhadnolimitsonthese damages.Inaddition,theU.S.argued,thepriceofgoodsmovingininterstate commercehasbeenunnecessarilyincreasedbytheaddedcostofinsurance.This insuranceisrequiredtoprotectbusinessesfromtheuncertaintygeneratedfromthe possibilityofhugeawardsbasedonpunitiveorpainandsufferingdamages.

MAKETHEBESTLEGALARGUMENTSUPPORTING

THECONSTITUTIONALITYOFTHEACT.

4.(15points:27minutes)

TheStateofMontanarecentlypassedalawwhichrequiressinglewomenof child-bearingagetohavethebirthcontrolimplantknownasNorplantiftheywish toobtainorcontinuetoreceivestatefundsthroughtheAidForDependent Children("AFDC")program.Astatecanreduceitsparticipationintheprogram ~.eventhoughfederalfundswouldstillbeavailable. Agroupofsinglewomenhavechallengedthislawasaninfringementof theirrighttomakeprivatedecisionsaboutprocreation.Theyareallofchild- bearingageandareinneedofAFDCfundstosupporttheirchildrenbutdonot wishtosubmittoforcedbirthcontrolinordertoobtainthemoney. [Eventhoughnoonehasaconstitutionalrighttowelfarepayment,thestate cannotrequireonetosurrenderaconstitutionalrightinordertoobtainthatsupport. Inotherwords,assumethatthelawdoesinfringewhateverrightthecourtconsiders 4

CONSTITUTIONALLAW,FINALEXAMINATION

SPRING1998,SectionBDavidDittfurth

toexist,Thesolequestioniswhetherthereisarighttobefreefromcoercedbirth control.] Thestatedefendsitspositionbynotingthatithaslimitedfundstospendon theAFDCprogram,andthislawseekstoprotectitslimitedresourcesby discouragingwomenfromhavingmorechildrenwhomustbesupported.By preventingnewbirths,moremoneywillbeavailableforthosechildrenwhoarein theprogram.

DOESTHEMONTANALAWVIOLATE

THESEWOMEN"SRIGHTOFPRIVACY?

Explainyouranswer.

5~(15points:27minutes)

TheStateofAlaskaownsmorelandthananyotherstate,Muchofthisstate-

ownedlandisinthestatessouthernportionwherethetemperaturesaremore(moderate,atleastforAlaska.However,veryfewAlaskanshavechosentolive

outsidethecitiesandtown.Torelievethecrushonlimitedmupicipalservicesand topopulatethesouthernpartofthestate,Alaskapassedalawprovidingforthesale ofstate-ownedlandinthisarea. Thelawrequiresthestatetoestablishthemarketvalueofsalableland throughanindependentappraisal.ItthenrequiresthestatetogiveanyAlaskan domiciliaryaonepercentreductioninthatmarketpriceforeveryyearthatperson hasbeendomiciledinAlaska.Inotherwords,a10-yearresidentwouldreceivea

10%reductioninthepurchaseprice,a20-yearresidentwouldreceivea20%

~reduction,andsoforth.["Resident"and"domiciliary"areusedinterchangeablyin thisproblem.BothrefertosomeonewhohasmadeAlaskahisorherhome.] ThisAlaskanlawhasbeenchallengedbyamanwhowishestopurchase someofthislandbuthasbeenadomiciliaryofthestateonlyfortwoyears.He complainsthattheprimeareaswillbepurchasedbylong-termdomiciliaries becausetheyenjoysuchacompetitiveadvantageinpayingfortheproperty.He alsocomplainsthatlong-termdomiciliariesreceivemuchlargersubsidiesinthis programthanshort-termdomiciliaries.Thestatedefendsbyarguingthatitcan assumethatlong-termresidentshavemadeagreatercontributiontothestateand 5

CONSTITUTIONALLAW,FINALEXAMINATION

SPRING1998,SectionBDavidDittfurth

are,therefore,moredeserving.

MAKETHEBESTARGUMENTTOSHOWTHATTifiS

LAWVIOLATESTHEEQUALPROTECTIONCLAUSE.

End 6

CONSTITUTIONALLAW,FINALEXAMINATION

SPRING1998,SectionBDavidDittfurth

1.(25points:45minutes)

TheStateofNewJerseyhasestablishedfivecategoriesfortheclassification ofstateemployees.Thecategoriesarereferredtoas"levels"andrunfromLevefl toLevel5indescendingorderofimportance.Level1employeesreceivethe highestrateofpay,andthiscategoryincludesallofthesupervisoryandmanagerial employeesofthestate.Level5employeesarethelowestpaid. TheStatehasestablishedalawwhichallowsallstateemployees,regardless ofthelevel,amaximumof25daysperyearatfullpayforsickleave,Thelaw allowsLevel2through5employeestoearnsickleaveforillness,physicalinjury, orphysicalincapacity.Level1employeescanobtainpaidsickleaveonlyfor illnessorphysicalincapacity.Statecourtshaveinterpreted"physicalinjury"to includeinjuriesresultingfromparticipationinsports,buthaveconsistentlyheld thatneither"illness"nor"physicalinjury"coverspregnancy.Pregnancyiscovered asa"physicalincapacity"forLevel2through5employees,butLevel1employees cannotobtainpaidsickleaveforphysicalincapacity.[Federallawsrequire employers,includingthestates,toallowpregnancyormaternityleavewhich protectsawoman"sjob,butthisrequiredleaveneednotbewithpay.] SeveralwomenwhoareemployedasLevel1employeesofthestatehave beendeniedpaidsickleavefortheirpregnancies.Theyhavenowsuedthestate officialsresponsibleforadministeringthelawforbackpayanddamages.They contendthattheNewJerseylawisinviolationoftheEqualProtectionClause. Priorto1984,alllevelswereallowedsickpayforpregnancy.Inthatyear,the legislaturerecognizedthatasmorewomenobtainedthesehigh-payingLevel1jobs paidpregnancyleavewouldstrainthestate"slimitedfunds.Thechangetothe presentlawwasmade,inpart,tosavemoney.Inaddition,thepreambletothelaw

includesthefollowingstatement:"ByremovingpaidpregnancysickleavefromthebenefitsavailabletoLevel1employees,thestateannouncesitsrecognitionthat

suchemployeeshavetobededicatedprimarilytotheircareersasprofessional supervisorsandmanagers."

MAKETHEBESTCONSTITUTIONAL

ARGUMENTFORTHECHALLENGERS.

2.(25points:45minutes)

Thirty-fivepercentofthecoalproducedintheUnitedStatesisminedin 2

ST.MARY"SUNIVERSITYSCHOOLOFLAW

CONSTITUTIONALLAW,FINALEXAMINATION

SPRING1998,SectionBDavidDittfurth

Instructions

1.Thisexaminationconsistsofsix(6)pages,includingthisone.Beforebeginning,make

certainthatyoupossessacompleteandlegiblecopy.Theexaminationconsistsoffive(5) questions.Youwillhavethree(3)hoursinwhichtocompletetheexamination.

2.Ihaveassignedapointvalue(percentageof100points)toeachofthequestions,andfor

eachIhavesuggestedatimeallotment(percentageof180minutes).AVOIDSPENDINGA DISPROPORTIONATEPERCENTAGEOFTITS€ONANYQUESTION.

3.Intakingtheexamination,youarenotallowedtousebooks,notes,oranyotheraid

(exceptwritingortypingmaterials).

4.Intakingtheexaminationyoumay:

a.markonthiscopyoftheexamination, b.respondtothequestionsinanysequence, c.useunderstandableabbreviations,or d.leavespaceafterananswerincontemplationofadditions.

5.Ifanypartofaproblemisambiguous,explainyourconfusionandusewhatyouconsider

tobethemostreasonableinterpretationunderthefactsinrespondingtothequestion.

6.Whenyouhavecompletedtheexamination,placethiscopyinsideyourbluebook(s)(or

attachittoyourtypedpages)andturninboth.Placeyourexamnumberonthefrontofyour bluebooksortypedpagesandinthespacebelow.Also,write0CONSTTJHONAI...LAW"on thefrontofyourfirstbluebookoronthefirstpageofyourtypedanswers.

7.Byhandingintheexaminationwithoutcomment,youareassumedtohavesworntothe

following: IHAVENEITHERGIVENNORRECEIVEDUNAUTHORIZEDAIDINTAKING

THISEXAMINATION,NORHAVEISEENANYONEELSEDOSO.

EXAMNUMBER

I discriminationagainst18-21maleswasdeemedunconstitutionaleventhoughthestate contendedthatitspurposewastoreducedrivingwhileintoxicated.Thestate"s discriminationagainstyoungmaleswasallegedlybasedonastatisticshowing2%of maleswerearrestedfordrivingwhileintoxicated,asopposedtoamuchsmaller percentageoffemales.TheSupremeCourtheldthatthesestatisticsdidnotestablisha substantialrelationtotheobjectiveoftrafficsafety.Inessence,theCourtcouldnot escapetheconclusionthatthestatepunishedyoungmalesbecauseofastereotypical viewofyoungmalesaswildandunrulydrinkers,incontrasttothestereotypeitmust havehadofyoung"ladies."TheCourtwasleftwiththisconclusionbecauseitcouldnot believethatthestatewouldbelievethatalawwhichpreventedthepurchase,butnotthe consumption,ofasupposedlynon-intoxicatingbeveragewasneededbecause2%of youngmaleswerearrestedforDWI.Ifthatwerethestate"sconcern,whydiditallow youngmalestoconsume3.2beerlegally.Inreality,youngmalesneededonlytohavean

18yearoldgirlfriendwhowouldbuyitforthem.

AnalysisofthechallengetotheNJlawyieldresultssimilartothosefoundin Boren.First,savingtaxpayermoneyshouldbeanimportantobjective.However, allowingpregnancysickpayforlevel2-5employeesandnottolevelIseemstobea veryinefficientwayofsavingtaxmoney.Ifthestatewastryingtoexclude"sickpay" fromanyphysicalincapacitywhichresultedfromvoluntarilyactivity,whydidn"titdeny sickpayforsportsrelatedinjuries.Remember,thestatewasnotfiringpeopleforthese sortsofincapacities;itwasonlydenyingthempayforthedaystheyneededtorecuperate. Inaddition,thestatehadnondiscriminatoryalternatives,suchasthereductionfor allworkersofthedaysforwhichtheycouldreceivesickpay.Why,onewouldask,did thestatechoosetopunishonlywomen--andonlywomenwhohad"invaded"theupper levelpositionsthathadpreviouslybeentakenexclusivelybymen. IntheYMIcase,theCourtheldthatgenderdifferencesdidnotprovidea sufficientbasisforretainingtheall-maleenrollmentofastatecollege.Generalizations abouttheabilities,wishes,androlesofmenandwomendidn"tshowthataprohibition againstenrollmentbywomenwassubstantiallyrelatedtotheendofprovidingtheVMI formofboot-campeducation.InthecaseofthisNJlaw,thestatesuggeststhatwhena ~'omanemployedonlevel1becomespregnantsheprovesbythatvoluntaryactherlack ofdedicationtohercareerasaprofessionalsupervisorandmanager.Again,whydoesn"t alevel1maleprovethesamebyplayingbasketballandtwistinghisknee? InVMI,thestatecontendedthattheall-malecollegeshouldbepermittedto continuebecausetodosoprovideddiversityineducation.Furthermore,VMIclaimed thatallowingwomenintheprogramwouldmateriallychangethespecializedformof educationitprovided.ThisjustificationwasrejectedbytheCourtlargelybecausethe state"sgeneralizednotionsaboutwomenfailedtoprovidethe"exceedinglypersuasive" justificationforablatantdiscriminationagainstanhistoricallyvictimizedclass. Oneminordifficultymustbeovercomebythechallengersbeforetheycanobtain 2 mid-levelscrutiny.TheNJlawdenieslevel1employeessickleavepayforpregnancy. Inastrictsense,thislawdoesnotexpresslydistinguishonthebasisofsex(I"mbeing overlycautioushere).Ifoneacceptsthatargument,thedecisioninWashingtonv.Davis wouldrequirethechallengerstoprovethatNJintentionallydiscriminatedagainst women.Theeffectsfallsolelyonwomeninlevel1,andthissatisfiesthefirst requirementofDavis. Oneshouldnoteatthispointthatthediscriminationoccursbetweenmenand womenemployedonlevel1.Thechallengerswouldberelegatedtotherational relationshipanalysisiftheyonlyproveddiscriminationbetweenwomenatdifferent levels;theymustshowdiscriminationagainstwomenandinfavorofmen. Thestateratherclearlyannounceditsintenttodiscriminateagainstwomenin level1civilservicejobsbystatingthatpregnancyatthatlevelprovedtheemployeewas notseriousabouthercareer,Pregnancycanonlyoccurinwomen.Therefore,theeffect onwomen(butnotonmen)hadtobeknownbythestatebeforeitenactedthislaw, Furthermore,theno-dedicationjustificationoperatesonlyagainstwomen.Alogicalleap isnotrequiredtoconcludethatthestateknewitwasaffectingonlywomenandthatit intendedtodojustthat.Attheveryleast,theevidenceavailableshowsthatamotive wastodiscriminateagainstwomen. Menwhosufferinjurywhileengaginginsportsarenotlabeledasnot-dedicated, andtheyretainthesickpaybenefit,Asnoted,bothpregnancyandsportsinjurieswould, ordinarily,bedisabilitiescausedbyvoluntaryactivity,Ifso,whydoesthestatedeny benefitsonlytowomen?Thisdiscrepancyshowsthatthislawwouldnot,indeedcould not,havebeenenactedhadnodiscriminatorypurposeexisted.Infact,thestateindulges thestereotypewhichsuggeststhatwomencannotbereliedoninresponsiblepositions becausetheywilldecidetohavechildrenandstayhome.Thisgeneralizationfailsto provideanexceedinglypersuasivejustificationforthediscrimination.Inreality,the reasonforthediscriminationarisessolelyfromthestereotypicalviewofwomenandof their"proper"role--asmothersandhomemakers. Acourtshouldbeskepticalaboutthestate"sclaimthatbytakingpregnancy benefitsawayfromlevel1employeesitwillsavetaxmoney.Noevidenceshowsthat ~istbecausewomenmaybeobtainingmoreofthesehighpayingjobstheywillbecome pregnantinlargenumbersandstrainthestate"slimitedfunds.Thetotalnumberof womeninlevels2-5maybemorethanallthesewomenpre9nantinlevel1,thereby allowingverylittlesavings.Furthermore,ifthestateisseriousaboutsavingmoney,why doesitnotdenysickleavebenefitstoallvoluntarilycauseddisabilities. Insummary,thestatehasfailedtoshowanexceedinglypersuasivejustification foritsdiscriminationagainstwomeninlevel1jobs.Indeed,itsonlyreasonseemstobe onewhichiswhollyillegitimate--preventingwomenfromenjoyingbothafamilyanda career.Nolevel1manisseenasundedicatedtohiscareerwhenheproduceschildren, 3

2.TheCommerceClausegrantsCongressthepowertoregulatecommerceamong

thestates.ThemereexistenceoftheCommerceClausehasbeenconstruedtorestrictthe statesfromenactinglegislationthatdiscriminatesagainstorundulyburdensinterstate commerce(IC).Thisrestrictionisreferredtoasthenegativeeffectthe"dormant"

CommerceClause(DCC).

Ifthestate"ssubsidyisseenasdiscriminatory--becauseitoffersmoneytocoal producersonlywhentheysellthatcoalinthestate--itmustbeanalyzedunderthe compellingtest.However,WestVirginiahasacompellinginterestinassistingits residentstobuycoalduringatimeofshortage.Thequestionbecomeshow"necessary" isthemeansusedtoachievethatinterest.ThiscaseisunlikeCarbon,becauseinthat casethecitywasattemptingtohoardallthetrashproducedinthatparticulartownfora localprocessor.Indoingso,itwasseekingtofinanceitssubsequentpurchaseofthe processingplantandtoprovidethecurrentprivateownerwithasufficientprofit.Itwas accomplishingtheseendsattheexpenseofcompetingprocessingplantsbothinthestate andoutsidethestate.However,inthiscase,out-of-statepurchasersofWVAcoalarenot preventedfromcompetingforthatcoal.Theiraccessisnothinderedbythestate;they cancompetewiththesubsidizedWVApurchasersbypayingmore. InCarbon,thegovt,wasattemptingtopayforthewastestationbyinsuringthe privateownerasufficientprofituntilitspurchase;thisprofit--attheexpenseofout-of- statecompetitors--wasreallypartofthecity"spurchaseprice.Ineffect,thecitywas providingalocalbusiness(anditself)asignificantbenefitattheexpenseofout-of-state, aswellasin-state,competitors,Thecitycouldhaveaccomplishedthesameresultby usingitscitizens"taxmoneytopurchasethelocalprocessingplant.Ifthecityhaddone so,itwouldhavereapedthesamebenefitbutwouldhavedonesowithoutexportingthe costs.Underthatalternative,thecitywouldhaveborneallofthecostsforthebenefitit reaped,and,astheCourtindicated,wouldhavesurvivedtheconstitutionalchallenge. WestVirginiahasdonejustthatbygivinglocalpurchasersadiscountedprice throughtheuseofstatetaxmoney--taxmoneywhichcomesfromthegeneralrevenues ofthestatenotfromadiscriminatorytax.Inessence,WVA.hasusedtheleast discriminatorymeanstoachieveitscompellinginterest.Therefore,ifitwas

4iscriminating,ithasdonesoinawaywhichplacestheleastburdenoninterstate

éornmerce.IftheCourtweretoprohibitthissortofdiscrimination,itwouldpreventthe statefromprotectingitsowncitizensbecausenolessdiscriminatory,andtherefore constitutional,meansexists. Byerroneouslyarguingthatitcandowhatitwisheswiththecoalminedfromthe landitowns,WestVirginiaisinvokingthemarketparticipant(MP)exceptiontothe DCC.WestVirginiaisactingasaparticipantandnotasaregulator,butitisdoingso onlyinrespecttothemarketdefinedbythelocalpurchaseofWVAcoal.TheDCCdoes notapplytoitsdiscriminationintheuseofitstaxmoney(onlytobenefitlocal purchasers)becauseWestVirginiaisnotattemptingtoregulateanydownstreamactivity. 4 Forinstance,itdoesnotregulatewhatthecoalproducershavetodowiththeircoal. WestVirginia,asamarketparticipant,hasthepowertobuyandsellwithoutconstraint, anditisdoingjustthatwhenitusesataxsubsidytoinduce(notcoerce)producerstosell localcoallocally.AsanMP,WestVirginiacandiscriminateagainstout-of-state competitors. WestVirginiaownstheminingsites/theland,justasdidAlaskaownthetimberin Wunnicke.InWunnicke,theCourtheldthatAlaskawasnotamarketparticipant becauseitattemptedtoparticipateinamarketofwhichitwasnotapart;thatwhatitdid ineffectwastostopICatitsborders.Thatisnotthecasehere.Thestate"sMPstatus comesfromthesubsidytransactionsnotfromitsownershipofoneoftheminingsites. ThestatecouldnotusethatownershiptoestablishMPstatusbecauseitssubsidyaffects thecoalproducedatminesownedbyotherpartiesandbecauseitwouldbeengagedin downstreamregulationifitsoughttoregulatethecoalithadalready"sold"tocoal producers. Here,however,WestVirginiaisfinancingthepaymentsfromgeneralrevenues andisusingstatetaxmoneyto"buy"coalforitsresidents.WestVirginiaismerely choosingwhoitwantstocontractwithinthecoalbusiness--thatis,itdealsonlywith producerswhosellWVAcoallocally.Thereisnoregulationaftertheexecutionofthe contract.Iftheproducerschoosenottopartakeinthetransaction,theyarefreetosell theircoaloutsidethestate.Iftheyareinducedtoselllocally,theircontractwiththestate isconsummated. Acompetitormightarguethatbecausecoalisanaturalresourceitcan"tbe replicatedatwillandalsothatnoinvestmentorlaborgoesintotheprocessingofit, unlikethecaseinReeveswherethestateinvestedinaplanttomakecement.However, thestatehasnothoardeditscoal,andotherstatesç~jcompeteeffectivelyagainstthis subsidybyprovidingasubsidyoftheirown.Ineffect,otherstatescanreplicatethe inducementprovidedbyWVA,unliketheWunnickecasewhereotherstatescouldnot competewithAlaskafortheirtimberprocessingcompanies.Thissubsidydoesnot, therefore,placeotherstatesatthemercyofastateinwhichanaturalresourceis produced. TheActalsoisnotprotectionistinnature.Italsowillnotleadtotheeconomic balkanizationofthestates.Itwon"tawaken"Statejealousies"orcausedangerous retaliatorymeasures.OtherstatesarefreetoprotecttheirownresidentsinthesameWest Virginiaseekstoprotectitsresidents,andsomemaychoosetodoso.However,because WestVirginia"ssubsidyplanplacesthefinancialburdenofthesubsidyonitsown citizensandvoters,otherstatesmightthinktwiceaboutdoingthesame.Thepolitical checkontheproliferationofsuchlawsarisesbecauseeachstatewouldplacetheburdens (aswellasthebenefits)whollyonlocalvoterswhomaynotwishtheirmoneyusedin thismanner.Iftheburdenswereexportedtoout-of-stateinterests,however,thevoters wouldhavenoincentivetoreinintheirelectedofficialsevenifthesubsidywasabad 5 idea.Evenifeverystateenactedthesamesortofsubsidytoprotectitsresidents,the nationaleconomywouldnotbedamaged.

3.Thepowertoregulatecommerceisofparamountimportancebecauseitisthrough

thispowerthatmostofCongress"smostimportantlegislationwasenacted.The interpretationofthatpowerwasexpandedinGibbonstoallcommercialintercourse,and notjusttothebuyingandsellingofgoods. ThroughoutmostofthehistoryofourConstitution,however,Congresshas encounteredproblemsinsatisfyingtheCourtthatitsactionswerewithinthecommerce power.Ithadlessdifficultyregulatingthechannelsandinstrumentalitiesofinterstate commere(IC)becausetheseappearedmorereadilyauthorizedbytheCommerceClause. However,whenCongressbegantoenactbusinessregulationsofactivitiesthatappeared intrastateinnature,itwasfacedwithmanyconstitutionalchallenges.TheCourtused varioustests,includingtheimpactldirectnesstestandthestream-of-commercemetaphor todistinguishtheconstitutionalfromtheunconstitutionalexercisesofthecommerce power. BeginningwithJonesandLaughlin,theCourtbegantoexpandthecommerce powertoallowCongressgreaterauthorityoverintrastateactivity.In1~L.theCourt upheldtheFLSA,notingthatalthoughthemanufactureofsteelwasanintrastateactivity, stoppageofsteelproductionwouldhaveasubstantialeconomiceffectonIC.In Wickard(thewheatcase),afederalquotawasupheldagainstachallengethat,asapplied toonlyoneperson,itcouldnotbeseenasregulatinglocalactivitieswhichhada substantialeffectonIC.There,thechallengerproducedmorethanhisquotaofwheat, butcontendedthattheexcesswasproducedforon-the-farmandhomeconsumption. TheCourtfoundthat,althoughasinglefarmer"soverproductionmaynotaffectIC substantially,allowingthatfarmertooverproducewouldencourageallotherwheat farmerstodothesame,Theoverproductionofthousandsofwheatfarmerswould,inthe aggregate,haveasubstantialeffectonIC. Thepreciseconnectionbetweenthefederalquotaonwheatandinterstate commercewasrecognizedbytheCourtthroughtheapplicationofsimpleandrespected tjilesofeconomics.Congress"spurposewastoraiseandmaintaintheinterstatepriceof wheatinordertoallowwheatfarmersareasonableprofit.Inordertoregulatethatprice, Congresscouldeitherreducesupplyorincreasedemand.Asapracticalmatter,itcould bestattainitsgoalbyreducingthesupplyofwheat,and,assumingdemandremained stable,thepricewouldrise.Itsoughttocontrolsupplybyimposingaquotatolimiteach farmer"sproduction.However,iffarmerscouldexceedtheirquotasbyclaimingthatthe excesswasforhomeconsumption,theywouldfrustrateCongress"seffortsintwoways. First,bycreatinganexcesstocoveralloftheirownneeds,farmerswouldremove themselvesfromthemarketaspossiblepurchasersofwheat.Inreality,allowingthe growingofwheatinexcessoftheirquotaswouldmeanthatfarmerswouldnotneedany 6 ofthewheattheygrewwithintheirquotaforpersonalneeds,Hence,theycouldsellall ofthewheatgrownundertheirquota.Thiswouldincreasethesupplyofwheatwhile reducingwhatwouldotherwisebeahigherdemand.Second,ifthousandsoffarmners werefreetogrowasmuchwheatastheywishedbylabelingtheexcessashome- consumptionwheat,thatexcesswaslikelytofloodthemarketwhenevertheinterstate pricerosesohighastobeatemptation.AstheCourtputit,theexcesswould "overhang"themarketandtendtoflowintointerstatecommercejustasCongresswas abouttoachieveitsgoalofraisingthepriceofwheat, TheCourtbegantolimittheCommercepowerinLopez,anditdidsobyrequiring thatafederalregulationofintrastateactivitymustdealwithanactivitywhichwas commercialinnature.Thelocalactivityregulatedinthiscasebythefederallawisthe usebystatecourtsofstatelawsallowingunlimiteddamagesinproductliabilitycases. Damagesuitsofthissorthavearatherdirectconnectionwiththecommercialactivity representedbytheinterstatesaleofproducts.Ifproductliabilitysuitsarenotcommercial inthepurestsenseoftheadjective,theydohaveanobviousandimmediateconnectionto commerce.Onecouldsaythat,unliketheGun-FreeSchoolZoneActdeemed unconstitutionalinLopez,thisfederallawseemstohaveafarmoredirecteffectonthe interstatesaleofproducts--amarketendangeredbytheriskofunlimitedtortdamages. InLopeznosimpleandauthoritativeprinciplesorrulesprovedtheconnectionbetween thelocalactivity(gunpossession)andtheallegedburdenonIC.Inthiscase,onedoes notneedtocobbletogetheraseriesofquestionableinferences.Theconnectionis obvious. Also,theinsurancecostsneededtoprotectbusinessesfromtheuncertaintyof limiteddamageswillsubstantiallyaffectIC.Productliabilitylawsuitsnaturallyinvolve andaffectthebuyingandsellingofproducts.Thesearecommercialexchanges,butin Lopezthepossessionofgunsalonewasregulated,regardlessofwhetherthosegunshad movedinICorwhethertheirpossessionhadanydirecteffectonIC. Becauseofthecloseconnectiontocommercialactivity,theCourtwillinthiscase findthatlimitsonproductliabilitydamageswouldhavearealandsubstantialeffecton IC.And,asinWickard,theaggregateofunlimitedliabilitycasescanbeseentohavea ~,ubstantialeconomiceffectonIC.TheU.S.arguesalreadythatthepriceofgoods 'movinginIChasbeenincreasedbytheaddedcostsofinsurance.Ifanystatewere allowedtoenforceunlimitedliabilitylaws,businesscostswillincreasebecauseofthe increasedneedforliabilityinsuranceandbecauseoftheevergrowingcostofthat insurance.Theseadditionalcostswould,ofcourse,bepassedontotheconsumersof thoseproducts,orthosecostsmaydetercompaniesfromcreatingnewproductsorfrom usingICforthesaleofthoseproducts. Additionally,wearenotdealingherewithmatterstraditionallyreservedtothe states,suchasthepolicepoweroverhealth,safety,ormorals.Assuch,givingCongress thepowertoregulateproductliabilityclaimswillnotusurpstatesovereignty. 7 Congressalsoisnot"commandeering"thelegislativebodiesofstatesinorderto forcethemtoregulateasthefederalgovernmentdesires.(NewYork)Congressalsois nottakingcontrolofstateexecutiveoradministrativeofficialsinawaywhichconfuses accountability(Printz)EventhoughCongresswillregulatewhatstatecourtsdo,thathas neverbeenaproblemundertherecentcasesinterpretingthelimitsoftheTenth Amendment.Indeed,theSupremacyClauseexpresslyrecognizesthatfederallawmust controltheactionsofstatejudges.

4.TherighttoprivacyisnotarightwhichisexpresslyprotectedintheConstitution.

However,theCourtinGriswoldheldthataconstitutionallyprotectedzoneofprivacy encompassestherightstomarry,tobearchildren,and(ofamarriedcouple)topurchase andusecontraceptives.Montana(M)isviolatingthesewomen"srighttoprivacyby requiringsinglewomenofchildbearingagetogetNorplantinordertoreceiveAFDC benefits.IfMisviolatingafundamentalconstitutionalright,itmustusetheleast intrusivemeansforachievingacompellinginterest. ByrequiringNorplant,Mintrudesonawoman"srighttomakeessentiallyprivate decisionsabouthavingornothavingchildren.Thesewomenshouldbeabletomake decisionsconcerningintimatematterswithoutgovernmentcoercion.Andalthoughthe state"sinterestinprotectinglimitedresourcesiscompelling,lessdiscriminatory alternativesexist,suchassendingwomentobirthcontrolclassesorprovidingfreeaccess tootherbirthcontrolmedicines.OnceNorplanthasbeensurgicallyimplanted,awoman loseshercontroloverherreproductivesystem;ineffect,thestatehastakencontrolof thatpartofawoman"slife.Shecannotchoosenottousebirthcontrolbecauseshecan"t removeNorplantwhenshewishes.Thestatehasusedthemostintrusivemeanssothata womancannoteasilyregaincontroloverherownreproductivedecisions. Therighttoprivacyisfundamentalinthesensethatitisimplicitintheconceptof orderedlibertyandisrootedinoursociety"straditionandcollectiveconscience.In Bowers,theCourtheldthathomosexualsodomywasnotafundamentalrightbecause sodomyhadnotbeentoleratedorprotectedinourhistory.Infact,justtheoppositewas true;almosteverystatehadlongprohibitedhomosexualsodomy,oftenthroughits 4 riminallaw.Therefore,theCourtreasonedinBower,therighttohomosexualsodomy couldnotbefoundinourtraditionsandthereforecouldnotbediscoveredasa constitutionalright.However,whencomparedtohomosexualsodomy,allowingwomen todecidewhethertobearchildrenislessrepugnanttooursenseoftradition.Sincethe majorityinBowersdefinedthepurportedrightverynarrowly,itmightaskherewhether asinglewoman"srighttohavechildren(ortomakesuchdecisions)hasbeenprotectedin oursociety.Askedinthisway,onemightanswerthatsucharighthasnottraditionally beenprotected.Oursocietyhasgenerallyevidencedahostilitytounwedmothers, thoughlesstowardunwedfathers.Thus,establishingtherightasanewonethroughthe

Bowersanalysismayencounterthisbarrier.

8 AsacountertoBowers,wewouldstresstheCourt"sseemingturnaroundin Romer.Inthatcase,theCourtheldthatanimustowardaclassisnotenoughtosustaina lawevenunderrationalrelationship,equalprotectionanalysis.Somepeoplemaybelieve thatunwedmotherhoodisimmoral,andtheymaywishtopreventunwedmothersfrom receivingAFDCbenefits,butRomerseemstoholdthatmoraljudgmentsalonearenot sufficienttojustifydiscrimination,evenwhennotvisitedonasuspectorquasi-suspect class.ThatrejectionofmoralityunderminesBowers,whichacceptedsociety"smoral judgmentsassufficientundertherationalbasistest. TheCourtinCaseyrecognizedtherighttohaveornottohaveachildisa personalonetothewoman.Assuch,thisrightisfundamentalandshouldbeprotected. LikeCasey,thesewomenshouldbefreetomakesuchintimatedecisionsfreeofthe coercionofthestate.TheCourtalsohasrecognizedtherighttoprocreateintheSkinner decision.There,theCourtheldthatthestatecouldnotimposeinvoluntarysterilization againstmenthriceconvictedofaparticularclassofcrimes.However,theCourtspokeof therighttomanyandprocreate.Anothercasethatsupportsthesewomen"srighttoenjoy AFDCbenefitswithoutsufferingfromcoercivebirthcontrolisCruzan.Althoughthe Courtassumed,butdidnotdecide,thatapersonhadaconstitutionalrighttorefuse medicaltreatment,sucharightbecomesimportantinthiscase,Thestatewillcontend thatitcangiveitsmoneytowhomeveritwishes(ornottowhomeveritwishes). However,ifthestatehasuseditsfinancialpowertoinfringeafundamentalconstitutional right,thefactthatthestateis,inaddition,seekingtocontroltaxmoneywillnotsavethe law. IftheCourtweretoimposestrictscrutinyonthisstate"slaw,itwouldsurelyfail becauselessintrusivealternativesexisttoaccomplishthemoney-savinggoalsofthe state.Forexample,thestatecouldsetamaximumthatitwillcontributeforaidto children;onceamotherreachesthatmaximum,noextracompensationwouldbeearned fornewchildren.Thisapproachgivesthestateabsolutecontroloveritsfinanceswithout intrudingonawoman"sintimatechoices.

5.ThiscasepresentsaproblemundertheEqualProtectionClause,eitherbecauseof

.a~ninvidiousclassification(againstnewresidentsandinfavoroflong-termones)or becauseofdiscriminationinregardtoafundamentalright. Therighttomigrateisfundamentalbecauseitmustexistinorderforourstobea freesocietyandasafurtherwayofbindingtheindividualstatestogether.Therighthas beenlocatedintheCommerceClause,inotherspecificprovisions,andinthestructureof theConstitution.TheimportantpointtounderstandisthattheCourthasrecognizeditas afundamentalconstitutionalrightwhetheritisexplicitlyorimplicitlyprotectedbythe

Constitutionitself.

Ifthestate"spreferenceforlong-termresidentsinfringesthisright,Alaskacan sustainitslawonlybyshowingthatithasacompellinginterestandthattherearenoless 9 discriminatoryalternativesavailable.Equalprotectionanalysismightalsoshowthatthe discriminationbetweennewandlong-termresidentsissoirrationalthatitwouldnot surviverationalbasis"withabite"review. Thiscaseissimilartothedurationalrequirementinthecase(Shapiro)involving receiptofwelfarebenefits.Inthatcase,therighttotravelacrossstatelineswas burdenedbyalawwhichpreventedanyonefromobtainingwelfarebenefitsuntilthey hadbeenaresidentforayear.TheCourtheldthatlawunconstitutionaleventhough indigentpersonswereallowedtotravelortoestablishnewhomesinwhicheverstatethey mightchoose.Thestatein~jmpjrodidnotdirectlypreventmigrationasdidthestateof CaliforniaintheEdwardscase.Inthatdecision,theCourtheldunconstitutionala Californialawwhichimposedcriminalpenaltiesonanyonewhobroughtanindigent personintothestate.However,thestatedurationalrequirementdidpenalizetheexercise oftherighttomigrate.Ineffect,thestateintheShapirocaseexactedatollonindigent personsbecausetheyweretheoneswhomightbedeterredbyaninabilitytoobtainlife- sustainingwelfarebenefitsforanentireyear.Itwasalsoclearthatthestatedidnotneed adurationalrequirementtodeterminewhetherapersonwasreallyadomiciliaryofthe state. Inthiscase,thestateofAlaskahasimposedapenaltyonthosewhodidnotmove tothatstatemuchearlier.Eventhoughshort-termresidentsstillreceivesomediscountin regardtothepurchaseofstatelands,thegrantofsuchasignificantlylargerdiscountto long-termresidentsmaymeanthatthosewhohavemovedtothestaterecentlywilltruly bedeniedtheabilitytopurchasewhatmaybevaluablestatelands.Byweightingthe competitionforstatelandsagainstshort-termresidents,thestatemaybedenyingthem theabilitytobuystateland.Thatdenialdoesnotpreventanyonefrommigratingto Alaska,butitdoesimposeapenaltywhichcoulddeterthosewhowouldotherwisewish tomovethere.Thedeterrencemayflowfromtherecognitionthatthestateseemingly operatesforthebenefitoftheold-timers. IftheAlaskalawdoesinfringetherighttomigrate,thestatewillbeforcedto satisfythecompellinginteresttest.Asindicatedbelow,Alaskacannotsatisfythattest, Evenifthestatehasnotpenalizedtherighttomigrate,thediscriminationamong cesidentsbasedonthelengthoftheirresidencedoesnotsurviverationalrelationship review.Here,themererationalitytestappliesbecausethelawiseconomicinnature,and noquasi-suspectorsuspectclassificationappearsonthefaceofthelaw.Therefore,a presumptionofconstitutionalityisgivenandthecourtmustdefergenerallytothe judgmentsofgovt. However,inCleburneacityordinance(oritsapplication)wasstruckdown becausetheCourtbelievedthatcitizenbias,ignorance,ordislikewastheprimarymotive fordiscriminationagainstanon-suspectclass(thementallyretarded).Here,Alaska"s prejudicetowardthosewhohavenotlivedinAlaskaaslongisinsufficient.Thus,even underamererationalitytest(especiallyone"withbite"),thislawcouldnotsurvive. 10

C"Hiro-~~ICHY

LOO~-~EAAMIM~

Ir~T~_~~~~:

ii II IT iit::~~~I~:~±i~ ~ rç-'I) _L~ ~

T~T~J2IT5cAI:IIIIE~TITI

r~__ iii.~"~~~ -~--~-~ t _~_________ I~ ~

1..iT.ii.F..-.'~''~--~.~i,1rYflT"-'

LI:1_____~I~)~_II

ITTI ~~ ~WJJ~~vc,jI ~ 1111

III112ti~±~JI~MS~IEI1I

ciaC, I~16 :4,.... __Iiit~L~±Lk~I S~ -'"tn:L~--nt:~±t- ~L ~ ~--~

WVLD~EA~~P,

2 C~~ ~

T1T1~IT1~~

I C -~-cz-~z-''L_~Ltfl----- - :R~~~~" -

I:-~"~

~ ~--:----:~--- ~e AS-a

AAL~.O~

---~-

ICC~b4LSTtLC"rV~tfl4c~

-I1IThT±~±L~II ~~III31~TTTTIIITTIITT~JV11111 ~ ~

TII~±11I~~II~TT~~tII

if

I1IIII~IliIIJLIII~~iiTT.TT

111111€_~TT~TTALIJ~IJJTTITj

III1I~I7T4;3III~4:~I2CILzTzJ1

I - -- L- I~ ~ tgIIJIILIrlILLIIIrlr~ftlIIuILJIIIrlnyIIIIIIrrIIlrLIIEhIJUII~I11tI ~ -4

F--~r~-~-~

TL I I -~_t- - : -

IIIII~IflI13EflII~LaJ4tj1.

Eç~

D ~IIII11111111111liii111HIhulLILI zI~T -----___________------ I ::~n~

Tli~s~

~:T 1W

Lt~--i~w

-_s__~__h0 ~~ __i~_

II~usiJII~IISIIIIIIIt

- ~ - ~ --~-~ I -i /fr.,~DP L ~,-a 'I

11-..44•i~J~1-

-~•_~~-- -- ~I~JI1~I1I1IZTTII1 ~-~-tJ wa

TT4~J~&~a~__

~TT~IT~IIILIT~JII~

TIlIIIIIIIJiIIIIII~1I~IIIIILE~III

~IiI~ 1.~ ~ITT1Lfl~a~fillL:imH

TTIT~~c~~:IL~JA±JL-~liIII]

I

IITIiJ&LE~4II-

P~(_JI-en

-____--_-- -~e________________

I----_--

ISI~flIJ~4flII

_II~I~cftT

4~~~LI~If~Ii1ITT

IIIL~-_~fl~IIIIfl~

IITTI~I~I~ITT1

II~~LiL~~

-I-----------------------______________--___ Loo~- ~~II ~ ------U-------~f1~ ~4ITfl~II,II,,LIIIIIIIII:III"L4~_-~

IIITI~I~

IIii11111~IIIIII~IIIITITIIIDft1W11111I~l~~T~Ill~IITtfl~ a: ~41~JL~±t~±21 -. -

F------

IIIIIT~II3E~TI~

I~c~~Itm____

~ ~ ~J~~.~L~~ ~~ -.....,,...t.....- --

III.I1IJçI~a~TT~IIIII

~~1111- ~ ~flt~li~ --

Hr~~t~eJii,~42a


Politique de confidentialité -Privacy policy