[PDF] Cannon Law : French Power Politics in the Bidasoa Border and

1"CannonLaw":FrenchPowerPoliticsintheBidasoaBorderandtheCrisisoftheCustomaryLawofNationsintheTimeofthePolitiquedesréunions[VioletSoen(ed.),BarriersandBordersintheHabsburgWorld:Atransregionalperspective,Brepols,Turnhout(inpress)]FernandoChavarría-Múgica*IPRI,UniversidadeNovadeLisboaI.Theso-calledtimeofthepolitiquedesréunionsisconsideredamomentousperiodinthelongreignofLouisXIV.ItmarkedtheapparentlyunstoppableriseofFrancetoEuropeanhegemony,butalsoitsfallintohubris.Thestoryiswellknown.In1679thePeaceofNijmegenhadputanendtotheFranco-DutchWar,butLouisXIVdidnotfeelsatisfiedwiththeoutcomeofthenegotiations.Thusafterthesigningofthetreatyhetookadvantageofhissuperiorpowertoproceedtotheannexation(réunion)ofcertainterritoriesonthenorthernandeasternbordersofhiskingdom.Inordertogiveanappearanceoflegitimacytowhatbasicallywereactsofarbitraryaggressioninpeacetime,heestablishedanumberofspecialcourts(chambresderéunion)withtheonlypurposeoffabricatinglegaljustificationsfortheoccupations.ThisdisplayofforceendedupalienatingmostEuropeanpowers.TheresultwasthecompletediplomaticisolationofFrance.TheNineYearsWar,alsoknownastheWaroftheLeagueofAugsburg(1688-1697),madetheSunKingreturntoamoreprudentforeignpolicy.Inthissense,thepolitiquedesréunionsmarkedthepeakofhispowerbutalsohislimit.Thepolitiquedesréunionshaspuzzledhistoriansforalongtime.ItisgenerallyacknowledgedthatitwasamilestoneintheincreasinglyassertiveforeignpolicyofLouisXIVsincethebeginningofhispersonalrulein1660.However,contrarytotheremarkableachievementsoftheFrencharmiesonthebattlefield,theréunionscouldhardlybeamotiveforcelebration.Theannexationsthemselveswereproblematictosaytheleast.Theywerenottheresultoflegitimatesuccessionrightsorspoilsofajustwar,1butratherofchicaneryandaggressionexecutedinpeacetime.Ontheotherhand,inspiteofitsinitialsuccessthepolitiquedesréunionsendedupinfailure.LouisXIV'spowerpoliticsprovokedalong,costlywarattheendofwhichhewascompelledtorenouncethevastmajorityofhisterritorialacquisitions.Itisnocoincidenceifresearchershavededicatedmuchmoretimetoitscondemnation(or *BolseirodePós-doutoramentoFundaçãoparaaCiênciaeaTecnologia,IPRI,UniversidadeNovadeLisboa.Thisresearchhasbeenpossiblethankstovariousgrantsawardedalongtheyears,particularlyaMarieCurieIEFellowshipatCNRS-EHESS,France,andaEURIASFellowshipattheUniversityofCambridgesponsoredbyCRASSH/ClareHallandtheEuropeanCommission7thFrameworkProgramme-COFUNDAction.IamverygratefultoRuthMackayforreviewingapreliminarydraftofthispaper.1JamesQ.Whitman,TheVerdictofBattle:TheLawofVictoryandtheMakingofModernWar(CambridgeMA:HarvardUniversityPress,2012),p.95-132.

2justification)thantothestudyofitsrealhistoricalimplications.FormanyhistoriansitremainsthemostintriguingandembarrassingepisodeofLouis'sXIVreign.IfforBluchetheréunionswereunproblematic,2forLosskytheyweretheconsequenceofsomekindofstateoftransitorymentalconfusion;3forsometheywereasortofwarcrimes,4whileforothersitwasmoreaquestionofmannersthanoflegitimacy.5Inanattempttosavetheking'sreputationsomeauthorshaveoptedtoblamesomebodyelseforwhatwasabrutalanddishonourablestrategythatendedbadly.ThisistheoriginoftheFrenchhistoriographicalobsessionwithattributionofresponsibility.Louvois,theministerofwar,andCroissy,theministerofforeignaffairs,aretheusualsuspects.6ButsinceLouisXIVtookpartinallrelevantdecisionsandapparentlyalltheseissueswerewidelydiscussedamonghigh-rankingministersandsenioradvisors,thesejudgementsadpersonamseemquitepointless.7Beyondthismoralisingapproachtherehavebeensomeattemptstoexplaintheréunionsonmoregroundedbases.Militaryhistoriansconsideredthemaby-productofthestratégiedecabinet-thatis,thetightcontrolandcentralplanningofallmilitarymattersfromtheFrenchcourt.8Themostwidelyacceptedexplanationisthatitwasadefensive(evenifaggressive)policyintendedtoimposesomeorderonthe,supposedlychaotic,northernandeasternfrontiers.9InthissensetheréunionsseemlinkedtoVauban'sdoctrineoftheprécarré-theplanenvisagedbyLouisXIV's 2FrançoisBluche,LouisXIV,(Paris:Fayard,1986),p.412-429.3AndrewLossky,"TheIntellectualDevelopmentofLouisXIVfrom1661to1715",inLouisXIVandAbsolutism,ed.byRagnhildHatton(London:Macmillan,1976),101-29(p.114-15and117-18)4JohnB.Wolf,LouisXIV,(London:VictorGollancz,1968),seechapter25:"Apolicyofviolenceandterror".5WilliamF.Church,"LouisXIVandReasonofState",inLouisXIVandthecraftofKingship,ed.byJohnC.Rule(Columbus:OhioStateUniversityPress,1969),362-406(p.388-89)6 Camille Rousset, Histoire de Louvois et de son administration politique et militaire depuis la paix de Nimègue, 4 vols. (Paris: Didier et Cie, 1861-1863; 1863), I, p. 1-6. Émile Bourgeois, "Louvois et Colbert de Croissy (les Chambres de réunion)", Revue historique, 34 (1887), 413-18. Gaston Zeller, "Louvois, Colbert de Croissy et les Réunions de Metz", Revue historique, 131 (1919), 267-275.LouisAndré,LouisXIVetL'Europe,(Paris:AlbinMichel,1950),p.188-190.Interestingly,accordingtothisauthorCroissywasresponsiblefortheplan,whilePomponneandLouvoisweretheexecutors.André Corvisier, Louvois, (Paris: Fayard, 1983), pp. 437-44, also acknowledged the indirect participation of Vauban. 7 Nowadays it is generally accepted the shared responsibility of Louis XIV, Louvois and Croissy, with the indirect participation of other senior officials, like Vauban and Chamlay. A recent reappraisal of this question in Jean-Philippe Cénat, Le roi stratège: Louis XIV et la direction de la guerre, 1661-1715, (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2010), p. 127-128, see also his appreciation on the responsibility for the ravaging of the Palatinate, p. 146-148. About Louis XIV's personal involvement in all decisions concerning war and foreign affairs see: Lossky, "The Intellectual Development of Louis XIV", p. 106, and also: John C. Rule, "Louis XIV, Roi-Bureaucrate", in Rule (ed.), Louis XIV and the craft of Kingship, 3-101 (p. 28-30). 8Cénat,Leroistratège,p.127andfollowing,andontheoriginofthe"stratégiedecabinet"p.99and110-11.AcriticaldiscussionoftheconceptinGuyRowlands,TheDynasticStateandtheArmyunderLouisXIV.RoyalServiceandPrivateInterest,1661-1701,(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2002),p.286-295.9BuildingonaremarkbyRousset,Corvisierdefinedthepolitiquedesréunionsas"défenseagressive",Corvisier,Louvois,p.435yff.AlthoughCorvisier'sinterpretationisgenerallyaccepted,somehistorianspreferredtheexpression"paixarmée"torefertothesamephenomenon,Bluche,LouisXIV,p.412,followedbyLucienBély,LesrelationsinternationalesenEurope,XVIIe-XVIIIesiècles,(Paris:PUF,1992),p.276.

3chiefmilitaryengineertosecuretheterritoryofFranceconsistingofasimplificationofitsbordersandanoverhaulofitsdefences(thefamousceinturedefer).10However,assomeauthorshavepointedout,weshouldnottakethispretensionofrationalitytoofar.11Theannexationswerenotcarriedoutconsistently,andinsomecasestheyprovedcounterproductive.Inanycase,sincetheywereimplementedinpeacetimeanddidnotinvolvetheclashoflargearmiestheyhavebarelyreceivedanyattentionbydiplomaticandmilitaryhistorians.Asexpected,theirapproachhasprivilegedthestudyofmilitaryadministrationandwarfareoverthelessformalised,low-scaleformsofaggressionthatprevailedduringthe1680s.Oneofthereasonsforthislackofattentionmayhavebeenthealleged"pettiness"oftheseaffairs.Historiansareoftenperplexedbythedisproportionatedisplayofviolenceoftheréunionsinrelationwiththeirminusculestrategicaims.12Theseactsofaggressionandintimidationwerealwaysimplementedinveryspecificgeographicalspaces.Thisisprobablywhythereisnomoderncomprehensivestudyonthepolitiquedesréunions.Besides,sincemostoftheréunionsendedupbeingephemeral,researchershavefocusedmainlyonthosecasesofspecialsignificanceforthenarrativeoftheformationofthenationalterritoryofmodernFrance(i.e.Alsace).13Asaresulttheréunionshavebeenstudiedmainlyasregionalphenomenainwhichbordersaretreatedasmerelandmarksintheprocessofnation-statebuildinginsteadofscenariosofcomplexinteractionsatdifferentlevels.14Afterall,itwasatborderswhererivalpolitiesclashed,loyaltiesweretested,andsovereigntyturnedproblematic.Noneofthese"local"questionscanbedismissedas"petty".Onthecontrary,theywereatthecoreofthepoliticalconcernsofthetime.ThatiswhytherealandmostrelevantimplicationsofLouisXIV'saggressivepoliciesduringthe1680sarebetterunderstoodfromtheborderthanfromtheking'scabinet.ThisregionalfocushasdivertedattentionfromotherformsofaggressionimplementedallalongtheFrenchbordersthatdidnotnecessarilyleadtoformalterritorialannexationsandcannotbeeasilyexplainedbythedefensiverationale.In 10MichèleVirol,Vauban.Delagloireduroiauservicedel'état,(Paris:ChampVallon,2003),p.93-105.11AndrewLossky,"MaximsofStateinLouisXIV'sForeignPolicyinthe1680s",inWilliamIIIandLouisXIV.Essays,1680-1720,byandforMarkA.Thomson,ed.byRagnhildHattonandJohnS.Bromley(Liverpool:LiverpoolUniversityPress,1968),7-23.12AndrewLossky,LouisXIVandtheFrenchMonarchy,(NewBrunswickNJ:RutgersUniversityPress,1994),p.172.13Seeforexample:GeorgeLivet,L'intendanced'AlsacesousLouisXIV1648-1715,(Paris:PublicationsdelaFacultédesLettresdel'UniversitédeStrasbourg,1956).TheoriginofthistraditionalfocusonAlsace,andparticularlyonStrasbourg,isdirectlyrelatedwiththe"Alsace-Lorrainequestion"betweenthefinaldecadesoftheXIXandthebeginningoftheXXcenturies,ArsèneLegrelle,LouisXIVetStrasbourg.EssaisurlapolitiquedelaFranceenAlsace,d'aprèsdesdocumentsofficielsetinédits,(Paris:Hachette,3rded.1883),"Avant-propos",p.VII.14Seeforexample:NellyGirardd'Albissin,Genèsedelafrontièrefranco-belge.LesvariationsdeslimitesseptentrionalesdelaFrancede1659à1789,(Paris:A.&J.Picard,1970).Ultimately,thisapproachisrootedintheoldandcurrentlymuchdiscreditedideaofthe"naturalfrontiers"ofFrance,aboutthissee:GastonZeller,"Lamonarchied'AncienRégimeetlesfrontièresnaturelles",Revued'histoiremoderne,t.8,nº9,(1933),305-333,PeterSahlins,"NaturalFrontiersRevisited:France'sBoundariessincetheSeventeenthCentury",AmericanHistoricalReview,v.95,nº5,(1990),1423-1451,andDanielNordman,FrontièresdeFrance.Del'espaceauterritoireXVIe-XIXesiècle,(Paris:Gallimard,1998).

4fact,thepolitiquedesréunionsembracedbutwasnotlimitedtotheréunionsthemselves.Inthissenseitisbetterunderstoodasaformofpowerpoliticsthanasaformofmilitarystrategy.ThepolitiquedesréunionswasawaytoimposeLouisXIV'sviewsbyforceinparticularcontexts,insteadofbyestablishedpeacefulmeans.Itimpliedtheuseofdirectviolenceinvariousdegreesbutalwayslimitedinscaleandscopeinordertoavoidtheoutbreakofwar.ItisimportanttonotethatthisstrategywaseffectivepreciselybecauseitwasappliedatalocalscaleandinvariousplacessimultaneouslyonweakertargetsthatcouldnotaffordanopenconfrontationwiththekingofFrance.ItiswhatSchwarzenbergercalledaStatusMixtum,anundefinedstatein-betweenpeaceandwarthatcouldbeprolongedaslongasthevictimcontinuedtomaintainpeacefulrelationswiththeaggressor.15Theaimofthisformofpowerpoliticswasnotlimitedtoobtaininganadvantagedefacto(i.e.occupyaterritory)butwasaimedatimposingbycoerciveforcetheacceptanceofnewtermsandconditionsdejure(i.e.compellingyouropponentto"voluntarily"renouncehisterritorialrights),withouttheuncertaintiesandcostsofafull-fledgedwarandtheconstraintsinherenttopeacetalks.InthispaperIwilltrytogivesomeinsightintothedisturbingimplicationsthatthisformofpowerpoliticshadnotonlyforborderaffairsbutalsomoregenerallyfortheruleofiusgentium.Mypaperhoweverwillnotfocusonthenorthernoreasternborderswherethechambresderéunionwereformallyestablished.Instead,myattentionturnstothesouthwest,particularlytotheFrench-SpanishborderintheBasque-speakingBidasoaRiverregionsituatedbetweentheGulfofBiscayandthewesternPyrenees.UnlikeFlanders,AlsaceortheFranche-Comté,theBidasoawasfarfrombeingastrategicpriorityforLouisXIV.Infact,militaryactivityintheregionwasconsistentlylowduringthewholeperiod.TheSunKingneverattemptedtoinvadeCastile-theheartlandoftheSpanishMonarchy,likethelatterusedtomenaceParisfromtheLowCountries.ThisismorestrikingifwetakeintoaccountthatthePyreneanborderwasfrequentlyilldefended.Onthecontrary,thekingevengavepermissiontohisvassalstoestablishtreatiesofamityorbonnecorrespondanceduringwartime.Asaconsequence,FrenchandSpanishneighbouringcommunitiescouldcontinuetoenjoypeacefulrelationsandtradeevenwhentheirrespectivesovereignswereatwar.Thereasonallegedforthispermissionwastheextremepovertyofthoseprovinces,whosepopulationcouldonlysurvivebytheimportoffoodstuffs.Forthesamereasonmaintenanceofalargearmyontheseterritoriesresultedtoocomplicatedfromalogisticalpointofview.Forallthesereasons,thekingsofFranceandSpainweremorethanhappytoacceptthe"neutralisation"oftheBasqueborderinordertoconcentratetheirwareffortsonotherfronts-liketheLowCountries.16Inspiteofallthis,duringthe1680stheBidasoasufferedthebrutalconsequencesofFrenchpowerpoliticsjustlikeotherstrategicborderregions.Farfrombeing 15GeorgShwarzenberger,"JusPacisacBelli?ProlegomenatoaSociologyofInternationalLaw",AmericanJournalofInternationalLaw,v.37,nº3(1943),460-479.16FernandoChavarríaMúgica,"Porcodiciaonecesidad:laexenciónaduaneravascongadayelsistemafronterizodeconversasafinalesdelsigloXVII"inLosámbitosdelafiscalidad:fronteras,territorioypercepcióndetributosenlosimperiosibéricos(siglosXV-XVIII),ed.byLuisSalasAlmela(Madrid:InstitutodeEstudiosFiscales,2011),77-105.

5consideredaminorquestion,itwastheobjectofintenseandpersistentattentionbyLouisXIV'sforeignservice.17Myresearchmakesevidentthatthepolitiquedesréunionswasnotdirecteduniquelytohighlystrategicpositions,andconsequentlyitwasnotmotivatedbydefensiveconcernsonly.Furthermore,itshowsthatthebrutalmethodsappliedinthenorthandtheeastwereactuallycommonpracticeallalongtheFrenchborders,implyingacoordinatedeffortfromthecourt.Finally,Ihopetodemonstratethatevenifeveryaggressionwasjustifiedbyopportunisticadhocarguments,Frenchpowerpoliticswereinformedbyamoregeneralpoliticaldoctrinethatintendedtolegitimatethesovereign'sarbitraryuseofforce.Theresultwasthedebasingofboththeruleofbordercustomarylawandiusgentiumingeneral,includingtraditionalwaysofsettlingdisputesbetweenbordercommunities.IwillbeginexplainingbrieflythelegalandculturalbackgroundofborderrelationsintheBidasoa.Secondly,IwillexposethedevastatingeffectsofFrenchpowerpoliticsduringthe1680s.Finally,IwillanalyseFrenchjustificationsandtheirconsequencesinthebackgroundofthecrisisofauthorityoftheLawofNationsattheendoftheseventeenthcentury.II.DespitebonnecorrespondancetheBidasoaregionwasfarfrombeingapeacefuloasis.Asinmanyotherlocalcontextsthereweresomedeep-rootedtensionsamongneighbouringcommunities.InourcasethemainissuewasthedominantpositionoftheSpanish"city"ofFonterabieovertheriverBidasoaitself.18Traditionally,itsjurisdictionembracedtheentirecourseoftheriverfromthelimitsoftheKingdomofNavarretoitsmouthintheGulfofBiscay.Thatincludednotonlyitsownshore,butalsotheoppositesideoftheriver(thatis,the"French"shore)andanyisletinbetween.Inpractice,thismeantthatFonterabiecouldimposeveryrestrictiveconditionsonnavigation,trade,building,andaccesstonaturalresourcesontheBidasoatotheinhabitantsofneighbouringvillages,includingthepeoplefromtheFrenchvillageofHendayeontheothersideoftheriver.Itsrightswerefoundedonthe"rightoffirstoccupant"becauseFonterabieclaimedhisfoundationwentbacktoRomantimeswhilethesmallvillageofHendayeexistedonlysincethelateMiddle 17TheBidasoaaffairwasarecurrentthemeonthecorrespondancebetweenLouisXIVandhisambassadorsinMadrid,AnaÁlvarezLópez,Lafabricacióndeunimaginario:losembajadoresdeLuisXIVyEspaña,(Madrid:Cátedra,2008),p.121;AlfredMorel-Fatio(ed.),MarquisofVillars,Mémoiresdelacourd'Espagne,de1679à1681,(Paris:Plon,1893),p.137and217-18.18PhilipIVofSpaingrantedthetitleof"city"toFonterabieasarewardforitsheroicresistanceduringtheFrenchsiegeof1638.InspiteofthishighlyregardedtitleFonterabiecontinuedtobeacommunityofmodestsize,wealthandinfluencecomparedwithothertownsintheprovinceofGuipúzcoa,SusanaTruchuelo,Larepresentacióndelascorporacioneslocalesguipuzcoanasenelentramadopolíticoprovincial(siglosXVI-XVII),(SanSebastián:DiputacióndeGuipúzcoa,1997).NeverthelessFonterabie'sjurisdictionembracedarelativelyextenseterritoryfromtheriverBidasoatotheeasternbankoftheestuaryofPasajes,comprisingvillageslikeIrún-Iranzu(justfewkilometersuptotheriverBidasoa),aswellastheportofSanJuanandthesmallvillageofLezo(bothintheestuaryofPasajes).FonterabiemaintainedseriouscontroversiesnotonlywiththeFrenchvillageofHendayebutalsowiththecommunitiesunderitsdirectjurisdiction,particularlywithIrún-Iranzu.SeeMartaTruchueloGarcía,IrúnyHondarribia:dosentidadeslocalesdurantelaEdadModerna,(Irún:AyuntamientodeIrún,2004).

6Ages.19Theseclaimswerepartiallysanctionedatthebeginningofthesixteenthcenturybyacross-bordercommissionentitledtoclarifythesituationafteraseriesofclashesbetweenthetwobordercommunities.20Fonterabiewasalsopowerfulenoughtoenforceitsclaimsduetotheintimidatingpresenceofitsfortressandpermanentgarrison,evenifsmall.AlthoughFonterabie'shegemonyovertheBidasoawasnotseriouslychallengedformorethanacentury,rightsovertheuseoftheriverwereofcoursearecurrentsourceoftensionsbetweenthetwobordercommunities.Settingmorefishingtrapsinprohibitedplacesorcultivatingalongtheriverbanksorontheisletswerecommoninfringements.Navigatingtheriverinforbiddenvessels(thatis,anyshipwithakeel),buildinganykindofstructureontheshore,orskippingthecompulsorydisembarkingofmerchandiseonFonterabie'sdock(andpaymentofthecorrespondingfees)weremoreseriousfaults.Inanycase,thetransgressionsthatcausedmostconcernwerethosethatcouldhavelastingandperniciousconsequencesforFonterabie'sclaimsintheBidasoa.21Inmoreexceptionaloccasions,thethreatcamenotfromformaltransgressionsbutfromhighlysymbolicperformancesintendedtoquestionand,whenpossible,erodethestatusquo.22Defiancecouldeasilyleadtoviolentclashes.Infact,violenceplayedaveryimportantroleintheassertionorcontestationofrights.Thatiswhythesekindsofconfrontationswerefarfrombeingspontaneousoruncontrolled.Theywerestrictlyregulatedbycustomandfollowedaprecisescript.Violencehencewasnotonlylimitedbutalsohighlyritualised.Inmostcasesitwasmainlysymbolicratherthanpurelyphysical.Itwasalsocommunal.Nomatterhowmanypeoplewereinvolved(afewfishermenorahundredtownsmen),inthiskindofconflictswhatwasatstakewastherightandhonourofthecommunityasawhole.Theaimoftheseviolentactswastheenforcement,assertion,orcontestationofrightsandnotplunder,conquest,orannihilation.Fatalencounterswererareandseriouswoundsinfrequent.Theseizureandritualdestructionoftoolsandvesselsweremuchmorecommon.Escalationwasofcoursestillpossible.Thisisaninherentrisktoanyviolentexchange.Butbordercommunitieshadincentivestopreventspiralsofaggression.Afteralltheywereneighbours.Theywerecompelledtolivesidebysideandtoshare 19AboutthisseeHugoGrotius,Dejurebelliacpacislibritres,(TheClassicsofInternationalLaw,ed.byJamesBrownScott,CarnegieEndowmentofInternationalPeace,2vols.,Oxford:ClarendonPress,1913),v.I,lib.II,cap.III:"Deacquisitioneoriginariarerum,ubidemarietfluminibus",particularlynºXVIII.FonterabieclaimedthattheOiasso,OiasonaorOiarsoquotedbyPtolomy,Strabo,andPliny,wasactuallyhisdirectRomanpredecessor.HowevertheneighbouringcommunitiesofIrún-Iranzu,SanSebastián,andthevalleyofOiarzunclaimedtheverysamething.Nowadays,thescientificconsensusisthatOiassowasactuallyIrún.20AcopyoftheprovisorysentenceissuedbytheFrenchandtheSpanishcommissionersinSt.-Jean-de-Luz,10April1510inAHN[ArchivoHistóricoNacional,Madrid],Estado,libro659,f.4-7.Abouttheseearly,provisorynegotiations:ThéodoricLegrand,EssaisurlesdifférendsdeFontarabieavecleLabourdduXVmeauXVIIImesiècle,(Pau:J.Empérauger,1905),p.3-23.21Forexample,ifforsomefamiliescultivatingalongtheriverbankswasawaytoassuretheirsurvival,fromthepointofviewofthecommunitythemereactofharvestingcouldbeusedasavalidlegalargumenttoclaimpossessionoverlandconsideredabandoned.Itwasmainlyforthislegalreason,andnotforeconomicinterests,thatdestroyingHendaye'scropsalongtheBidasoawasimportantforFonterabie.22Seeforexample:AMF[ArchivoMunicipaldeFuenterrabía],E-6-VI-6-16:FonterabietotheKingofSpain,1July1598.

7(evenifunequally)spacesandresources.Despitethefrequentconflicts,thiscontributedtomaintainthestatusquo.23Therewasaspecificwaytodealwitheachoftheseissues,butthegeneralprinciplewasthattheywerelocalaffairsthathadtobemanagedbylocalauthoritiesfollowinglocalcustom.Consequently,itwasexpectedthatallagentsinvolvedinthiskindofborderaffairhadtobelocals.Thisisnottosaythatbordercommunitiesactedwithoutatleasttheimplicitconsentofroyalofficials.TheKingofSpainhadaparticularinterestinfavouringthestatusquo.Fonterabieheldasmallgarrisonpaidforbytheroyaltreasuryandafortressthatconstitutedthefirstlineofdefenceagainsttheenemyincaseofinvasion.Fonterabie'sdominantpositionintheBidasoahinderedthepossibilityofasurpriseattackoranyotherunexpectedthreatfromacrosstheborder.ThiswasimportantbecausetheBasqueborderwasmuchmoreclosetotheSpanishheartlandthanitwastotheFrenchpoliticalcore.Royalinterferenceinborderaffairswasnotentirelyprecluded,butitremainedquiteexceptional.Eveninthesecasesroyalauthoritiespreferredtokeepalowprofiletopreventescalationandavoidanyundesiredengagement.Ordinarily,themanagement,enforcement,contestation,andeventualnegotiationofrightsinborderspacesremainedinthehandsoflocalauthorities.24Incertainoccasionssovereignsinterferedinborderaffairsunintentionally.SincetheendofthefifteenthcenturytheBidasoahadbecomeaplaceofencounterfortheSpanishandFrenchmonarchs.Duringthisperiodtheriverwasthescenarioofvariousmeetingsandexchangesbetweenkings,queens,andothermembersoftherulingfamiliesofSpainandFrance.Insuchoccasionstheordinaryjurisdictionalborderbetweenterritorieswastransformedintoaceremonialborderbetweenroyalcourts.Inprinciple,theselectionoftheBidasoaasthemostappropriateplacetostagetheseextraordinaryeventswasmotivatedbypracticalreasonsthathadnothingtodowiththelocalcontext.However,sincethepresenceofthesovereignwasanactofsovereigntyinitself,25thewayinwhichcourtceremonieswerestagedandperformedwasextraordinarilyimportantfortheassertionorrefusalofanyjurisdictionalclaim.26Thatcouldbethecaseevenifthepurposeoftheking'spresenceattheborderwascompletelydifferentfromtheoneenvisagedbylocal 23AsoneinhabitantofHendayesaidin1663:"másqueríanmuchomenosdevoluntaddeFonterabiequemuchomásqueselespudiesedarporotravía,puesasíseobligaríaycumpliríamejoryentiempodepazyguerratendríantodacomunicación,sinlaqualconfesóyrepitiónopodíanvivir",AGS[ArchivoGeneraldeSimancas],Estado,leg.K-1670,nº53.24Thiswasacommonfeatureofbordercommunities,seeFernandoChavarríaMúgica,"Enlosconfinesdelasoberanía.Facerías,escalasdepoderyrelacionesdefuerzatransfronterizasenelPirineoNavarro(1400-1615)"inLessociétésdefrontièredelaMediterranéeàl'Atlantique(XVIe-XVIIIesiècle),ed.byMichelBertrandandNatividadPlanas(Madrid:CasadeVelázquez,2011),193-217,andFernandoChavarríaMúgica,"El'ruido'delosconfinesdeNavarra:servicio,reputaciónydisimulacióndurantelanegociacióndelintercambiodeprincesas(1609-1615)",inServiralreyenlaMonarquíadelosAustrias:Medios,finesylogrosdelservicioalsoberanoenlossiglosXVIyXVII,ed.byAliciaEstebanEstríngana(Madrid:Sílex,2012),227-259.25PeterSahlins,Boundaries:TheMakingofFranceandSpaininthePyrenees,(Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1989),p.27-28.26SeeMaríaJosédelRíoBarredo,"Imágenesparaunaceremoniadefrontera.ElintercambiodelasprincesasentrelascortesdeFranciayEspañaen1615",inLahistoriaimaginada:ConstruccionesvisualesdelpasadoenlaEdadModerna,ed.byJoanLluísPalosandDianaCarrió-Invernizzi(Madrid:CEEH,2008),p.153-182.

8communities.ThatwasexactlywhathappenedduringthefamousnegotiationofthePeaceofthePyreneesin1659.TheplenipotentiariesofthekingsofSpainandFrancemetduringseveralweeksonanisletinthemiddleoftheBidasoa.Theisletwasappropriatelypreparednotonlytomakethemeetingsascomfortableaspossiblebutalsotorepresentanexactsymmetrybetweenthetwomonarchies.TheseprotocolaryarrangementswereintendedtosignifytheequalstatusofthekingsofSpainandFrance.Inordertoreinforcethisideatheisletitselfwasdeclared"neutral".Thusnobodycouldallegeapositionofsuperiorityovertheotherpartyduringthenegotiations.Bythismeanstheisletbecameapureceremonialspacewhereordinaryterritorialjurisdictionwastemporarilysuspended.27Oratleastthatwastheinitialintentionofthetwomonarchs.Ofcourse,localshadadifferentopinion.Fromaceremonialpointofview,theencounterofthetwoplenipotentiaries(orthesovereignsthemselves,aswouldhappenin1660)onanisletinthemiddleoftheriverseemedveryconvenient.Butthisinsistenceonsymmetrybetweenmonarchieshadadisturbingeffectonbordercommunities.ItconstitutedapotentiallydangerousprecedentforFonterabie'sclaimsoverthewholeriver.Ontheotherhand,forHendayeitwasanexcellentopportunitytopushforrenegotiationoftheconditionsofuseoftheriver.Followinganestablishedprinciple,theplenipotentiariesnegotiatingapeacetreatyonbehalfoftheirrespectivesovereignsdidnotgetinvolvedinalocalquarrelcompletelyunrelatedwiththewarthattheyweretryingtofinish.Theylimitedthemselvestoactingasmediatorsbetweenthetwoparties.TheBidasoaaffairwasneverpartoftheofficialagenda.HoweveritseemsthatHendayewaspersuasiveenoughtoengageCardinalMazarininthedefenceofitsrights.28AttheveryendofthenegotiationtheFrenchplenipotentiarypushedfortheintroductionofasecretclauseexpressingthewillingnessofbothsidestoreachanamicablesettlementofanydisputebetweenbordercommunitiesontheBidasoa.BythismeanstheplenipotentiariesenabledtheLieutenantGeneralofGuyenne,inFrance,andtheCaptainGeneralofGuipúzcoa,inSpain(thehighestroyalofficialsatprovinciallevel)toencourageapeacefulsolutionbetweenHendayeandFonterabie.OnlyinthecaseofnoagreementbetweenthetwobordercommunitieswouldtheFrenchandSpanishroyalofficialshavetoagreetoanappropriatesettlement"afterhearingtheclaimsofbothparties".Thecontentofthesecretclausewasinlinewithcustomarydoctrine.Inprinciple,itrespectedthedistinctionbetweenlocalaffairsandthesuperiorsphereofsovereignty.Itwasexpectedthatbordercommunitieswouldarriveatsomekindofagreementfollowingcustomaryarrangements.Theroleofroyalofficialswaslimitedtomediationand,inthelastinstance,co-arbitration.29 27BNF[BibliothèqueNationaledeFrance],Occid.,Ms.Français7156,ff.26-27vand34:MazarinotoLeTellier,Saint-Jean-de-Luz,30July1659,and4August1659,respectively.SeealsoDanielSéré,LaPaixdesPyrénées:Vingt-quatreansdenégociationsentrelaFranceetl'Espagne(1635-1659),(Paris:HonoréChampion,2007),p.450-455.28AdetaileddiscussionofthisepisodeinFernandoChavarríaMúgica,"Lafronteraceremonialylafronterareal:EltratadodelosPirineosylareavivacióndelconflictoporeldominiodelríoBidasoa(1659-1668)",inDeltractatdelsPirineusal'EuropadelsegleXXI:unmodelenconstrucció?,ed.byOscarJanè,(Barcelona:Museud'HistòriadeCatalunya,2010),75-86.29ThetextofthesecretclausebothinSpanishandFrenchinJoséAntonioAbreu,Coleccióndelostratadosdepaz,alianza,neutralidad,garantía,protección,tregua,mediación,accessión,

9Still,theintroductionofaclauseofthiskindinatreatyoftheimportanceofthePeaceofthePyreneeswasanunexpectedentanglementofsovereignsinanapparentlypettyjurisdictionalaffair.ThusthequarrelsbetweenFonterabieandHendayeintheBidasoaslidintothesphereofdiplomacyandhighpolitics.Infact,afterafewunfruitfulattemptsatmediation,royalofficialsdecidedtoresorttotheirrespectivemasters.Atthisstagelocalauthoritiesofbothbordercommunitieslosttheleadroleinfavourofhigh-rankingministers.ThequestionwasreviewedattheSpanishcourtbypetitionoftheFrenchambassador.Fromthebeginningitbecameclearthatthepositionsofthetwosidesdifferedsharply.Ontheonehand,theSpanishwerewillingtohearHendaye'saccusationsagainstFonterabieforallegedabusesintheBidasoaand,ifnecessary,tocorrectanywrongdoing.Ontheotherhand,therepresentativeoftheKingofFrancewantedtoinitiateanopen-endeddiscussionaboutjurisdictionontheBidasoaitself.ThatwasofcoursearedlinefortheSpanish.TheFrenchbegantotreattheaffairnotasaconventionalcontroversybetweentownsfolkbutasamatterofState.ThisshiftwasparticularlydangerousbecauseLouisXIVcouldthenfeeljustifiedtointervenedirectlyintheBidasoaindefenceofhissovereignty.TheSpanishallegedthatthisapproachviolatedthecontentofthesecretclause,andtheBidasoaaffairwasredirectedagaintothelocallevel.Twocommissionerswerethenappointedtodealwiththematterontheground.DuringthefollowingmonthsFrenchandSpanishrepresentativesmetatthesameisletinthemiddleoftheBidasoaastheroyalplenipotentiariesduringthepeacenegotiations,butinamuchlessglamorousfashion.However,thepositionofthetwocommissionswassodistantthatnotonlywasagreementimpossible,butfurtherbordertensionswereactuallyencouraged.Infact,infractionsbecamesoobviousandtheFrenchcommissionerssolenienttowardsthemthattheSpanishsuspectedtheywereactuallyencouragedfromabove.ThissuspicionseemedtobeconfirmedbythereluctanceoftheFrenchcommissionerstoleavethenegotiationsentirelyinthehandsofthelocals,aswasfirstproposedbytheSpanish.ThebuildingofafortifiedtowerinHendayetosurveythetractoftheriverclosesttothevillagewasanotherclearsignalthatthenegotiationswerecondemnedtofailurefromtheverybeginning.Insteadofacommonarbitrationeachpartyendedupproclaimingseparatelythelegitimacyoftheirrespectiveclaims.SometimeafterwardsanewwarbrokeoutbetweentheFrenchandSpanishmonarchies.InthefollowingyearsthestatusquoremainedthesameandFonterabiecontinuedtoenjoyadominantpositionontheborder.Nonetheless,developmentsaroundthesecretclausehadotherseriousevenifsubtleconsequences.BydeclarationoftheFrenchcommissioner,confirmedbyLouisXIVinJanuary1668(thatis,whentheWarofDevolutionwasalreadydeclared),thekingreservedtherighttoretaliateagainstFonterabieifitobstructedHendaye'sallegedjurisdictionon reglamentodelímites,comercio,navegación,etc.,hechosporlospueblos,reyesypríncipesdeEspaña[...]ReinadodelseñorD.FelipeIV.ParteVII,(Madrid:AntonioMarín,JuandeZúñigayviudadePeralta,1751),p.258-259.

10theBidasoa.30Althoughthethreatdidnotmaterialiseatthattime,itunderminedafundamentalvalueofcustomaryorderontheborder:trustbetweenneighbouringcommunities.Forthisreason,thistimeFonterabiewasveryreluctanttoparticipateinthecustomarytreatyofbonnecorrespondancenegotiatedbyprovincialrepresentativesfrombothsidesoftheborder.EvenifLouisXIVneverquestionedthevalidityofthesetraditionalagreements,implementationofpowerpoliticsontheBasqueborderdisruptedthistraditionalmechanismofmutualobligationthatpreventedviolencebetweenneighbouringcommunitiesandmadepossiblecross-bordercooperationduringwartime.Eventually,pressuresbyprovincialrepresentativesandroyalauthoritiesconvincedthemtojoinin.LouisXIV'sproclamationofhisretaliatoryrightswasmadeduringwartimeand,inprinciple,itceasedbeinginforceafterthesigningofthePeaceofAix-la-ChapelleinMay1668.However,theKing'sdeclarationmadeclearthathedidnotrenouncedirectinterventioninborderaffairs.Infact,heorderedhisnewambassadoratthecourtofSpaintoreinitiatenegotiationsatthehighestlevelaboutjurisdictionontheBidasoa.HisproposalwasbasedontheassumptionthatsincethepeaceagreementexplicitlyconfirmedthecontentoftheTreatyofthePyrenees(includingthesecretclauseontheBidasoa)itwaslegitimatetotreatitthroughdiplomaticchannelsinsteadofthroughlocalcustomaryarrangements.ButthistimetheSpanishrefusedtodealwiththequestionatall.TheycontinuedtoencourageFonterabietoenforceitsrightsasusual,alwaystakingcaretonotcompromisethehonouroftheKingofSpain.31Inanycase,afewyearslaterthepeacebrokedownagainandanewtreatyofbonnecorrespondancewasestablishedontheBidasoaborder.Buttheseagreementswereonlyvalidaslongasthewarlasted.Oncethewarwasoverayearlaterbordertensionsre-flourished.KnowingabouttheunprecedentedviolencedeployedbytheFrenchintheBidasoaduringthe1680s,itmaybeeasytoacknowledgethatFonterabie'smistrustwaswellfounded.ItcouldbearguedthatinLouisXIV'sattitudeduringtheseyearsitwaspossibletogetaglimpseofwhatwasabouttocome.ThereisnodoubtthattheunprecedentedinclusionoftheBidasoaaffairintheTreatyofthePyrenees,eveninthediscretetermsinwhichitwasdone,gavetheKingofFrancetheexcusetotransformalocalborderaffairintoadiplomaticincident.However,thetruthisthat,ingeneralterms,untilthatmomentLouisXIVhadfollowedestablishedformalities,conventions,andprocedures.HispolicytowardstheBidasoamayhavebeensurprisinglyboldbutitwasnotnecessarilyillegitimate.AfterthePeaceofNijmegeneverythingchanged.III.ThePeaceofNijmegen(1679)betweenSpainandFrancewastobesealedbyaroyalwedding.AgainacourtlyrepresentationattheBidasoaRiverpreparedanewmeetingbetweenthetwomonarchsandthedeliveryofPrincessMarie-Louiseof 30AHN,Estado,libro655,f.187-88:[Print]SentenceontheBidasoaaffairbytheFrenchcommissionersd'ArtagnanandSt.Martin-Barrez(issuedin26February1667,andconfirmedbyLouisXIVin25January1668)31AGS,Estado,leg.K-1411,nº90,MarianaofHabsburg,RegentQueenofSpain,toFonterabie(Madrid,16February1669)[draftletter]

11OrleanstothekingofSpain.32Aswehavealreadyseen,theseextraordinaryeventspresentednumerousopportunitiestochallengethestatusquointheborder.Wecannotforgetthat,thoughtheeventwasplannedtoitsminimaldetailattheroyalcourts,thepeopleinchargeofthepreparationswerelocals.ThatiswhyFonterabiewasparticularlyattentivethateventsprecedingtheceremonynotbeusedasanexcuseforunderminingitsjurisdiction.Therewereofcoursevariousincidentsbetweenthetwobordercommunitiesduringthepreparations,butcarewastakentonottodisturbthedevelopmentoftheofficialceremony.33Intheweeksfollowingtheroyalmeeting,bordertensionsmountedrapidly.Hendaye'sactsofdefiancebecamenotonlyfrequentbutalsomuchmoreserious.TheSpanishweresurprisedtoseehowtheirfishmongerswerebeaten,theirvesselsshot,andtheirfishtrapsdestroyed.HendayeevendaredtocaptureoneoftheirboatsandsenttheiroccupantstothecityofBayonneasprisoners,"mistreatedlikeinwartime".34Theseactswentwellbeyondcustomaryusageattheborder.ThesuddenescalationofviolenceintheBidasoaandrenewedpressuresbytheFrenchambassadorconvincedSpanishauthoritiesthatthesetensionswereencouragedonpurpose"bysuperiororder".35AccordingtotheCouncilofStateinMadrid,LouisXIV'saimwastoprovokeaviolentresponsefromFonterabieinordertohaveapretexttoresumehostilities.ThissuspicionwasnotfoundeduniquelyintheBidasoacasebutmoreingeneralin"Frenchrestlessnessandinwhattheyattempteverywhere"("inquietuddefrancesesydelostentativosquehacenportodaspartes").36Infact,theexacerbationoflocaltensionsallalongtheFrenchborderswassocharacteristicofthepolitiquedesréunions. 32ThedeliveryoftheprincesstookplaceintheBehobiapasson3November1679,AGS,Estado,leg.K-1636/37,nº88.33Forinstance,onedayaFrenchboatenteredintotheriverfromthesea.ApparentlytheboatcamefromthenearbyportofSaint-Jean-de-Luztosurveytheworks.Ithappenedthattheboathadakeel-aforbiddenvesselfortheFrenchintheBidasoa.Consequently,Fonterabieseizedit.Inaccordancewithcustomarypracticetheboathadtobesetpubliclyonfireontheshore-otherwisetheseizurecouldbeinterpretedasanactofpiracy.Theaimwastheenforcementofjurisdictionalrights,notplundering.However,inordertoavoidanydisruptionoftheroyalceremonyauthoritiesdelayedtheperformanceofthispunishmentuntilcourtiersofbothsideshadlefttheborder.OncetheceremonyfinishedFonterabiecouldfinallyshowthat,nomatterwhat,itsjurisdictionovertheBidasoacontinuedtobeinforce,AHN,Estado,libro628,f.21:FonterabietotheKingofSpain,13January1680;FrenchministersaccusedlaterFonterabieofhavingburnedtheFrenchroyalbannertogetherwiththeboat,AHN,Estado,libro628,f.139-41.Otherincidentsduringthepreparations:AGS,Estado,leg.K-1636/37,nº82.34AAE[ArchivedesAffairesÉtrangères],CP[CorrespondancePolitique],Espagne,nº63,f.84r-113r,117r-118v,133r-v,134r-138r,and151r.AHN,Estado,libro628,f.13-14.TheSpanishprotestedthroughordinarydiplomaticchannels,AAE,CP,Espagne,nº65,f.59r-60v:MarquisoftheBalbasestotheMarquisofVillars,Madrid,6April1680.35AHN,Estado,libro628,f.22:D.DiegodePortugal(CaptainGeneraloftheProvinceofGuipúzcoa)tothesecretaryGerónimodeEguía,SanSebastián,26February1680.TheSpanishpresentedanofficialcomplaintbeforetheMarquisofVillars,FrenchambassadorinMadrid,andtheCouncilofStateorderedtodothesamethroughtheSpanishambassadorinFrance,theDukeofJubenazo,AGS,Estado,leg.K-1646,nº142(5December1679),andnº147b(Madrid,11December1680)36AHN,Estado,libro628,ff.13-20:ConsultaoftheCouncilofState,Madrid,23March1680.

12Initially,themainconcernoftheSpanishministersinMadridwastoavoidanapparentlyminorincidentbeingusedasacasusbelli.37ConsequentlytheyconcentratedtheireffortsonpreventinganyviolentresponseagainstHendaye'sprovocations.38TheyaskedFonterabietoenforceitsjurisdictionina"moderate"manner.39Moreover,anyinvolvementofthegarrisonandthelocalauthoritiesintheconflictwasexplicitlyprohibited.Nonetheless,theincreasinghostilityofHendayeandsoldiers'willingnesstohelptheirfriendsandrelativesintownmadetheseinstructionsdifficulttoimplement.40Eventuallythesoldieryandtheroyalofficials,whocouldbedirectlyaccountable,werecompelledtoobeybut,astheCaptainGeneralofGuipúzcoawarned,thesamecouldnotbeimposedonthecommonpeople.41TheministerswerealarmedtolearnthattownsfolkdeployedpiecesofartilleryonthedocktostopanyattemptbyHendayetorecoverseizedvessels.42ThesedisturbanceswereenoughforLouisXIVtoaccuseFonterabieofveryseriouscrimes,includingthedestructionofhousesandevenachurch,committedallegedlytopreventpartitionoftheriverdecreedbyhim.TheKingofFrance,throughhisambassadorinMadrid,theMarquisofVillars,andhisministerofforeignaffairsinParis,ColbertdeCroissy,demandedexemplarypunishmentforthedamagessufferedbyHendaye.43Thedemandwasbackedbymilitarythreats.Vauban'splantorenewthefortificationsofthecityofBayonne,theprovincialcapital,includedtheconstructionofnewdefencesforHendayewiththeexplicitpurposeofcounterbalancingFonterabie'spowerintheBidasoa.44Atthesametime,anunusualamountoftroopsconcentratedinthesouthwestofFrance.45Infact,thecommanderofthiscontingentthreatenedretaliationiftheKing'sdemandswerenotmet.46 37Thisfearwasnotlimitedtoborderaffairsonly,seeforexamplethedeclarationoftheMarquisofLosBalbases,SpanishambassadorinFrance,onthecustomarysaluteamongroyalnavies,AGS,Estado,K-1646,nº57(Paris,25June1679).38"Quenoserecelavatantodelashostilidadesdefranceses,comodelardordelosdeFuenterrabía,quepretendíanelauxiliodelosmilitaresyqueestuviesenasuarbitriolaspuertasyusanlaartillería",ConsultaoftheWarCouncil,Madrid,26January1680,AHN,Estado,libro628,f.16.39"Quenosedisputeconlasarmasestenegocio,aunquemotivenaellofranceses,sinoquelosdeFuenterraviasevalgandelosactosyprotestasjurídicoshaciendosiempreestacausapropiadeentrelosvezinosdeunayotrafrontera,sinmezclarmiauthoridad,nombre,niarmas",AHN,Consejos,Castilla,leg.7119,nº103:TheKingofSpaintotheGovernoroftheCouncilofCastile,Madrid,18April1680.AHN,Estado,libro628,f.21:FonterabietotheKingofSpain,13January1680.40AHN,Estado,libro628,f.3-4:D.DiegodePortugaltotheKingofSpain,SanSebastián,5January1680.41AccordingtotheCaptainGeneralofGuipúzcoa:"estoconlagentedelpueblonosepuedereducirarazón",refusinganyliabilityfortheriotousbehaviorofthecommonpeople("algunasresolucionesquetumultuariamentetomaronlosvecinosdemenosobligaciones"),AHN,Estado,libro628,f.137-8:D.DiegodePortugaltotheCouncilofState,SanSebastián,5May1680.42AHN,Estado,libro628,f.139-141:MemorandumpresentedbytheMarquisofVillars.43AHN,Estado,libro628,f.25-28:MemorandumpresentedbytheMarquisofVillars.44AHN,Estado,libro628,f.127v.VaubanhimselfvisitedHendaye,AHN,Estado,libro628,f.125(newsfromBayonne,4May1680).AboutVauban'splansforthedefenceoftheprovinceofLabourdseePierreHourmat,HistoiredeBayonne.DesoriginsàlaRévolutionfrançaisede1789,(Bayonne:Sociétédessciences,lettresetartsdeBayonne,1987),p.357-8.45AHN,Estado,libro628,f.48-56:CouncilofState,Madrid,27April1680.46AHN,Estado,libro628,f.88:MaréchalLamberttoD.AlonsoJordán,GovernorofthefortressofFonterabie,Hendaye,28April1680.

13RumourswereheardthatLouisXIVwouldsendwarshipstoFonterabiewiththesamepurpose.47RumoursbecamerealityatthebeginningofMay1680withthearrivalofthreewarbrigantinesinfrontofFonterabie.FromthebeginningthecommanderoftheFrenchflotillamadeclearhismission:hiskingorderedhimtoseizeanyvesselsailinginoroutoftheBidasoauntilreceivingreparationsfordamagescausedbyFonterabie.48Theymetthethreatssomedayslater,capturingaboatandsendingtheiroccupantstoBayonneasprisoners.Amaritimeblockadewasformallyestablished.Fromthispointon,Fonterabiecouldonlybesuppliedbyland.Thiswasnotaminorissueforatownthatdependedonseatradeforaffordablefoodstuffs.AtfirstsighttheFrenchflotillawasnotparticularlyimpressive:fewbrigantines(or"smallfrigates")supportedbysomepinnacesandarmedboats.Infact,thepeopleofFonterabieaskedforpermissiontooustthemattheirexpense.49WecannotforgetthattheSpanishtownwaswellknownforitscorsairactivity.50Theyhadthepowerandtheexperiencetodoit.Nevertheless,theproposalwaskindlyrejectedbecauseitwouldcertainlyhaveputanabruptendtothepeacesorecentlysigned-andsealedwitharoyalwedding!InsteadtheydecidedtosatisfyFrenchdemandsbyappointingajudge-commissionertoinvestigateand,ifnecessary,punishtheallegedcrimesagainst(inthesayingoftheFrench)thedefencelesspeopleofHendaye,intheconfidencethatLouisXIVwoulddothesamewithhissubjects.51AftersomeweeksofinvestigationtheSpanishjudge-commissionerconcludedthatalltheallegedaccusationsagainstFonterabieweresimplyfalse.Ofcourseheacknowledgedthattherehadbeensomequiteviolentquarrelsandmaybesomeabuses,buttherewerenobombedhousesorburnedchurchesastheFrenchsaid.Onthecontrary,ifsomebodyhadtobeaccuseditshouldbeHendayeforitsnumerousinfringementsintheBidasoa.52LouisXIVdidnotthinkthesame.Heactuallysentacommissionertotheborderbuthismissionwasnottoinvestigate 47AHN,Estado,libro638,f.24(newsfromBayonne,24February1680),andf.89-90(newsfromFonterabie,28April1680).48"Memoireinstructifausr.duRivaucapitainedefrigatelegerecommandantlesquatrepinassesqueleRoyfaitarmerauportdeBayonne",AAE,CP,Espagne,nº65,f.65-66.AHN,Estado,libro628,f.126.However,RivauwassubstitutedbyRouxjustdaysafterbeingappointedbecausethekingwasinformedthathewasaHuguenot,ANF[ArchivesNationalesdeFrance],Marine,B242,f.198r("Billetalamain"6May1680)49AHN,Estado,libro628,f.260r-v:ConsultaoftheCouncilofState,Madrid,22August1680.50EnriqueOteroLana,LoscorsariosespañolesduranteladecadenciadelosAustrias.ElcorsoespañoldelAtlánticopeninsularenelsigloXVII(1621-1697),(Madrid:MinisteriodeDefensa,1992).JoséRamónGuevara,"ElcorsoHondarribiarra(1690-1714)",BoletíndeEstudiosdelBidasoa,15,(1997),35-116.TheFrenchdescribedthepeopleofFonterabieas"piratessansquartier",AAE,CP,Espagne,nº67,f.69r:LespesdeHureauxtoCroissy,fromtheriverpass,7May1681.51Theappointedjudge-commissionerwasFernandoRamírezdeAlcántara,oidoroftheChancilleríaofGrenade,AHN,Estado,libro628,f.111-17:CouncilofState,Madrid,12May1680.ThedecisionwasimmediatelycommunicatedtotheFrenchcourt,AHN,Estado,libro628,f.176-77:TheKingofSpaintotheDukeofJubenazo,ambassadorinFrance,Madrid,31May1680.52"Yúltimamente[...]nohabersearruinadotemplos,nicasasdelosdeAndayanimuertoningúnhombre,antesbiensehahalladoquelospromotoresdeestosenquentroshansidosiemprelosdeAndayayquelosdeFuenterrabíanohanmovidosinoesprecisadosdelanaturaldefensadesusvidasyhaciendas",AHN,Estado,libro628,f.180-3:ConsultaoftheCouncilofState,Madrid,4June1680.

14anywrongdoing,butrathertoclaimreparationsfortheallegeddamagessufferedbythepeopleofHendaye.53Thedisparityoftheirrespectivemissionsmadeanyagreementimpossible,buttheSpanishhopedthatestablishmentofsomesortofformalcontactsbetweencommissionerswouldatleastrelaxFrenchpressureontheborder.54Needlesstosay,theSpanishmisreadLouisXIV'sintentions.TheviolenceintheBidasoadidnotdiminish.Themaritimeblockadewasinplaceformorethanthreeyears.Thewarshipsonlylefttheirpositionstogetsuppliesorwhenbadweathermadesailingextremelydangerous-asinthewintermonths.InthemeantimefewboatsfromFonterabieventuredtofishinthesurroundingwaters.55HendayehadgainedfullcontroloftheBidasoa.ThingsgotevenworsewhenonemorningthecorpsesofeleveninhabitantsofHendayeappearedclosetoFonterabie.56TheyweretheoccupantsofaboatthathadvisitedtheFrenchbrigantinesthedaybefore.Apparentlyitseemedashipwreck-notaninfrequentaccidentintheturbulentwatersoftheGulfofBiscay,butFrenchauthoritiesaccusedthepeopleofFonterabieofmurder.57Aswasexpectedtheydemandedextraordinarypunishments.Theyevenusedthisepisodeasadiplomatictool,presentingthecaseinforeigncourtsasanexampleoftheunjusttreatmentthatFrancewasreceivingfromSpain.58UnsatisfiedwiththeexplanationsfromMadrid,LouisXIVorderedretaliation.ImmediatelytheflotillaextendeditsrangeofactiontothenearbyportofPasajes,whichwasalsounderthejurisdictionofFonterabiethoughnotinthemouthoftheBidasoa.Theycapturedmorefishermenandsailors.59ThesituationforFonterabiewasunbearable.Thebordercitywasunderextraordinarypressure.Itsufferedawar-likemaritimeblockadeandhadlostcontrolofitsownjurisdictionintheBidasoa.However,whatwasmosthumiliatingwasthepassivityforcedonthembytheirownauthorities.Notonlydidthekingnotprotectthem,heevenprohibitedrespondingtoanyaggression.60Theywerealsoaccusedofhorrendouscrimes.Whatwasworse,theyweretreatedwithsuspicionbytheirown 53ThecommissionerappointedbytheFrenchtodealwiththeBidasoaaffairwasJosephdeLespesdeHureaux,lieutenantgénéraldusénéschalofBayonne,AAE,CP,Espagne,nº65,f.76-77.54AHN,Estado,libro628,f.233-4:FernandoRamírezdeAlcántaratotheKingofSpain,Fonterabie,20July1680,andf.250-2:thesametotheMarquisofCanales,Fonterabie,30July1680.55Thesardinefisherywasveryimportantforthelocaleconomy,particularlyforthepoorestpeople,AAE,CP,Espagne,nº67,f.35v-36v:LespesdeHureauxtoCroissy,fromthepassofBehobia,12Mach1681.AHN,Estado,libro628,f.309:D.DiegodePortugaltoJuanAntoniodeZárate,SanSebastián,20August1680.AgeneraloverviewoninshorefishingintheBasquecoastinXabierAlberdi,"LapescaenellitoraldeGipuzkoadurantelaEdadModerna",ItsasMemoria:RevistadeEstudiosMarítimosdelPaísVasco,3,(2000),99-129.56Initially,FranciscoRamírezdeAlcántaraleftthecaseinthehandsoftheordinaryjusticesystem,buttheViceroyofNavarreinformedtheSpanishcourtthatFrenchauthoritiesdeniedthepossibilityofanaccident"andtheyhavesentfalsereportstotheMostChristianKing",AHN,Estado,libro629,f.70,and72v-73v:ConsultaoftheCouncilofState,Madrid,17May1681.57AAE,CP,Espagne,nº66,f.98v-99r:LouisXIVtotheMarquisofVillars,Versailles8June1681.58Seeforexample:BNF,Ms.Occ.,Clairambault589,f.317:Croissytod'Estrades,Versailles,FrenchambassadorinSavoy,6June1681.Bythattime,theSpanishgovernmenthadalreadyinstructedhisambassadorsinRome,Germany,England,andHolland,AHN,Estado,libro628,f.371v-372r:ConsultaoftheCouncilofState,Madrid,11October1680.59AHN,Estado,libro629,f.251-2:FonterabietotheKingofSpain,18June1681.60AHN,Estado,libro628,f.260r-v,and389.

15people.61RepresentativesofGuipúzcoa,theprovinceinwhichFonterabiewaslocated,wantedthebordercitytoattendtoallFrenchdemandstoavoidfurtherretaliation.62TheKingofSpainsentasecondjudge-commissionerendowedwithspecialpowerstoinvestigateandpunishtheallegedmurdersintheBidasoa.63Thiswasanextraordinarymeasurethatwasonlyappliedagainstpublicmalefactors,andthatcouldbeinterpretedasapresumptionofculpability.64Butagain,hewasnotabletofindanyevidenceofthecrimes.Afterthat,thecourtsentamemberoftheCouncilofCastile(themostprestigiousjudicialinstitutionoftheSpanishmonarchy)asnewjudge-commissionerwithidenticalresults.65TheSpanishministerswereafraidoflosingcompletecontrolofthesituation.InseekingtoappeaseLouisXIVtheypushedFonterabietothebrinkofopenrebellion.66TheonlywaytoappeaseLouisXIVwasofcoursebowingtohisdemands.Inspiteofhiscomplaintsforthelackofextraordinarypunishmentshismaininterestwasnottofindtheculpritsoftheallegedmurders.Infact,hisdemandsremainedthesamebeforeandafterthisincident:recognitionofHendaye'srighttofish,navigate,andtradefreelyintheBidasoa,andcompletejurisdictionoverhisownshore.Hisargumentationdidnotchangeeither.TheFrenchKingaccusedFonterabieofvariousviolentcrimesandabuseseversince1679.Everysingleborderincident,pastandpresent,wasinterpretedasanarbitraryaggressionagainstthe"defenceless"peopleofHendaye."Theaffairofthedrownedmen"(astheSpanishauthoritiesputit)reinforcedtherhetoricofvictimisationatthecoreoftheFrenchstrategyintheBidasoa.Itwasalsousedtojustifystrengtheningtheretaliatorymeasuresalreadyinplace,namelythemaritimeblockadeandthecaptureofprisoners.ThecriminalisationofFonterabiewasinstrumentalforthelegitimationoftheFrenchclaimsontheBidasoa.SincearmedinterventioninacommoncontroversybetweenlocalcommunitieswashardlyjustifiableinordinarylegaltermsLouisXIVresortedtoargumentstakenfromotherspheresoflaw.Partofhisjustificationwasbasedontherightofreprisal.67Inprinciple,areprisalwasalegalmeasurebywhichauthoritiesgavepermissiontoaprivatepersontoseizepropertyandhostagesfromthecountryfromwhichhefailedtoobtainjustice,ascompensationforhislosses.FrenchauthoritiespresentedthemselvesasenforcersofHendaye'scompensation 61AAE,CP,Espagne,nº67,f.161:LespesdeHureauxToCroissy,Bayonne25June1681.62AHN,Estado,libro628,ff.91-92:D.DiegodePortugaltotheKingofSpain,1May1680.63Thenewjudge-commissionerwasJoséRodríguezPortocarreroySilva,MarquisofCastrillo,alcaldedecasaycorte(thatis,memberoftheRoyalHighCourtofMadrid),AHN,Estado,libro629,f.294-98:ConsultaoftheCouncilofState,Madrid,24August1681.Meanwhile,theFrenchKingsenttheintendantFaucondeRistoHendayeinordertofindtheculpritsoftheallegedmurders,AAE,CP,Espagne,nº66,f.137yss.64JuandeHeviaBolaños,Curiafilipica,primeraysegundaparte,(Madrid:ImprentaRealporMateoLlanos,Madrid,1684;firstpublishedinLima,1603),partetercera,p.134.65Thethirdjudge-commissionerwasaveryrespectedjurist,D.JuandelCorral,memberoftheCouncilofCastile,AAE,CP,Espagne,nº66,f.142andfollowing:MarquisofVillarstoLouisXIV,Madrid,11July1681;theFrenchambassadordescribedhimas"ministrefortintegre"(f.148r-v)66Seeforexample,AHN,Estado,libro629,f.375-9:ConsultaoftheCouncilofState,Madrid10November1681.67AAE,CP,Espagne,nº65,f.20r-v:LouisXIVtotheMarquisofVillars,St.Germain,30Janvier1680[draftletter].AgeneraloverviewonthisaspectfromthepointofviewofthetheoristsofthetimeinStephenC.Neff,WarandtheLawofNations:AGeneralHistory,(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity,2008),p.76-82,and122-126.

16claims.Astheysaid,theywerecompelledtointervenedirectlybecauseFrenchvillagerswerenotpowerfulenoughtodefendthemselvesagainsttheabusesofFonterabie.Thisargumentationwasseriouslyflawedforseveralreasons.Resorttotherightofreprisalwasonlylegitimatewhenitwasnotpossibletoobtainjusticebyothermeans,andthatwasnotthecase.Afterall,thekingsofFranceandSpainwereatpeace.Theyevensealedtheiralliancewitharoyalmarriage.AccordingtothetermsofthePeaceofNijmegen,anydisputeamongthevassalsofthetwomonarchieshadtobesettledbyamicablemeans,aswasexplicitlystatedinthesecretarticleontheBidasoaoftheTreatyofthePyrenees(1659)andconfirmedagaininthelatestnegotiations.68Besides,LouisXIVhadnoreasontodoubtthegoodwilloftheSpanishking-atleastfromaformalpointofview.Infact,thekingofSpainsentnotonenortwobutthreejudge-commissionersentitledtopunishandrepairanywrongdoing.Furthermore,Frenchclaimsremainedextremelyvague.Reprisalswereonlylegitimateifthevalueoftheseizedgoodsdidnotsurpasstheclaimant'seconomiclosses,andnoattemptwasmadetoquantifythevalueofthedamages.Finally,certainaggressivemeasureslikethemaritimeblockade,treatinghostageslikeprisonersofwar,ortheviolentexclusionofFonterabiefromtheBidasoacouldhardlybejustifiedasactsofreprisalintendedtoobtaincompensation.Infact,thedirectinterventionofthekingofFranceinanordinaryquarrelbetweenbordercommunitiesweremorelikelytobeperceivedasanactofwar.69SincetherightofreprisalwasinsufficienttojustifytheFrenchactsofhostilityintheBidasoa,LouisXIVresortedtootherlegalarguments,namelytherightofretaliation.Unlikereprisal,therewasnoambiguityinretaliation:itwasanunequivocalactofaggressionandassuchitwassubjecttothelawsofwar.Whilereprisalsweremainlycompensatory,retaliationwasaboutpunishmentofaseriouswrongdoing.Thefinalaimhoweverwastodetertheoppositepartyfromharmfulactionconsideredunacceptable.Inordertobeeffectivethetargetoftheretaliatoryacthadtobeclearlystatedandtheaggressionhadtobeproportionaltotheonepreviouslyenactedbytheenemy.Inthissenseretaliationwasalimitedactofwarwithalimitedpurpose:re-establishmentofacertainstatusquoante.Retaliatory 68ThePeaceofNijmegensignedbetweenSpainandFrancedidnotmakeanyexplicitmentiontotheBidasoaaffair,butthetreatyexplicitlystatedthatthePeaceofthePyreneescontinuedtobeinforce(Art.XXVI),Abreu,Coleccióndelostratadosdepaz[...]ReynadodelseñorreyD.CarlosII.ParteII,(Madrid:AntonioMarín,JuandeZúñigayviudadePeralta,Madrid,1752),p.347-8.TheSpanishnegotiatiorsatNijmegenwerespecificallyinstructedtonotpermitanychangewithrespecttothestatusquointheBidasoa,AGS,Estado,leg.K-1670,nº152:minuta"Relacióndelprincipioquetuvieronlasdiferencias[...]sobreelusodelríoVidasoa[...]hastaeltiempopresenteconloqueSuMajestadharesueltoseobreenellaporlosplenipotenciariosdelapazenconsultade11deenerodeesteañode1676".69Interestingly,accordingtotheFrenchministerofmaritimeaffairs,themissionoftheflotillawasprecisely"fairelaguerreauxhabitantsdeFontarabie",ANF,Marine,B243,f.200r-v:SeignelaytoMauclerc,St.Germain,14April1680.Thisapproachcausedsomeinitialconfusiontothecommanderinchargeofthemaritimeblockade,whowasseriouslyreprimandedforacceptingthevalidityoflicencesandpassportsissuedbytheSpanishroyalauthority:"LeRoyaestéfortsurprisd'apprendrequevousayezlaissépasserleschaloupesetbarqueschargéesdemunitionsetvivrespourFontarabiesouspretextequelespatronsestoientporteursdespasseportsdugouvernerdeGuipuscoa[...]nemanquezdoncpasd'executerponctuellementlesordersquevousavezreçueetnevousmeslezjamaisdelesinterpreter",ANF,MarineB243,f.281v:SeignelaytoRoux,Fontainebleau,4June1680.

17actswereintendedtoceaseassoonastheenemystoppedhisharmfulbehaviour.Needlesstosay,Frenchauthorities'resorttothiskindofjustificationwasproblematic.Ontheonehand,LouisXIVwasnotinterestedinthere-establishmentoftheoldorderintheBidasoa,butintheimpositionofanentirelynewonemorebeneficialfortheFrench.Fromalegalpointofview,therightofretaliationcouldnotbeusedtojustifysuchpretensions.Ontheotherhand,retaliationwasbydefinitionaresponsetoapreviousaggression-itpresupposesastateofwaroratleastofopenhostility.70ThatcontradictedLouisXIV'sofficialdeclarationsoffriendshiptotheSpanishmonarchy.Infact,itwasnotcleartowhichaggressionexactlyLouisXIVwasresponding.Hewasrathervagueinthisrespect.Eversince1679theFrenchaccusedFonterabieofcontinuouswrongdoings,abuses,andaggressionsbuttheywererarelyspecified.Itseemsthateveryincidentwasusedasapretextforretaliation,includingcustomaryenforcementoffishingandnavigationrights.Sinceordinaryquarrelsbetweenbordercommunitiescouldhardlyjustifysuchadisproportionateresponse,itwasnecessarytopresentFonterabie'sactionsasarbitrarilyviolentandinfactcriminal.AstensionsmountedthereweresomespecificcircumstancesthathelpedtheFrenchtojustifytheirharshtreatmentoftheSpanishbordercity.Themostseriousofthemwasthedeploymentofartillery.Theuseof"cannons"againstthepeopleofHendaye,astheFrenchputit,wasconsideredanillegitimateaggressionthatrequiredamilitaryresponse-thatis,retaliation.71Needlesstosaytheaffairofthe"drownedmen"wasusedasaconfirmationofthecriminalconditionofFonterabie,72butitisworthbearinginmindthatthemaritimeblockadeandthecaptureofprisoners,nottomentionaggressionsinotherfrontierterritories,beganwellbeforethisincident.73TheretaliatoryargumentwascredibleonlyinsofarasFonterabiewaspresentedasacruelandpowerfulaggressor.OtherwiseFrenchhostilitywouldbenothingmorethananarbitrarybreachofpeace.Theresorttoreprisalandretaliationwashardlyjustifiedbuttheyweremorethanopportunisticpretextsforbruteforce.ThecriminalisationofFonterabiewasinstrumentalnotonlyinprovidingtheexcuseforarmedinterventionbutalsofortheadvancementofFrenchclaimsintheBidasoa.FrenchlegalargumentationwasbasedontheideathatFonterabie'sjurisdictionwasunlawfulbecauseitwasfoundedonnakedforceonly.ThankstoitsmilitarysuperiorityFonterabiewouldhaveimposed 70Neff,WarandtheLawofNations,p.123-124.71AHN,Estado,libro628,f.16:ConsultaoftheWarCouncil,Madrid,26January1680,andf.139-141:MemorandumoftheMarquisofVillars.AAE,CP,Espagne,nº65,f.238:ReportofLespesdeHeureauxontheBidasoaconferencesof23and26November1680.72"Jevousdespeschececourierexprespourvousinstruiredelaplusnoireetdelaplushorriblecruatutéquiaytjamaisestéexercéepurlesnationslesplusbarbares",AAE,CP,Espagne,nº66,f.87r:LouisXIVtotheMarquisofVillars,Versailles17May1681.TheformalprotestoftheFrenchambassadorin:AHN,Estado,libro629,f.99-100.Hissuccessorattheembassy,LaVauguyon,wasspecificallyinstructedbyLouisXIVtodemandanexemplarypunishmentfortheculprits"d'unebarbariesiénorme",AlfredMorel-Fatio,RecueildesinstructionsdonnésauxambassadeursetministresdeFrancedepuislesTraitésdeWestphaliejusqu'alaRévolutionFrançaise.XI.Espagne,(Paris:FélixAlcan,1894),t.I,p.312-3.73AstheDukeofOsunasaid,"queenFlandesnoleshanmuertoningunosvasallosyestánobrandoloqueobran".Interestingly,OsunabelievedthatFonterabiewasactuallyguilty,AHN,E,libro629,f.216-238:ConsultaoftheCouncilofState,Madrid2July1681(f.224r-v).

18itstermsandconditionsontheBidasoa,whileHendayeandotherbordercommunitiesweretooweakandtooscaredtocontesttheirclaimseffectively.Thisreasoningwasnotentirelynewbutithadneverbeenusedbeforeasalegalargument.AFrenchmemorandumwrittenatthebeginningoftheseventeenthcenturyconsideredFonterabie'spossesionoftheBidasoaillegitimatebecauseitwassupportedonly"bymereforceandthelawofarms"sincethe"Spanish"had"usurped"thewholeprovinceofGuipúzcoafromthekingofNavarrein1200.74ItalsoreferstothethreatoftheFonterabieandBehobiafortresses(thelatterdemolishedacenturyearlier)fromwhichtheSpanishfiredtheircannonsagainstanyFrenchwhoapproachedinvesselswithakeel.Theauthorwasparticularlyironicalaboutthispoint.Accordingtohim,theSpanishbasedtheirrightsmoreoncanonthanoncivillaw,duetothecontinuinggunshots("continuellecanonades")firedagainsttheFrench-makingpunswiththeFrenchhomonymwords"cannon"(artillery)and"canon"(Churchlaw).75ThememorandumseemedtobewrittentoencourageHenryIVofFrancetotakeactionintheBidasoaatamomentwhenadeclarationofwaragainstSpainseemedimminent.76ApartialcopyofthismemorandumwasamongthepapersofthehistorianFrançoisEudesdeMézeray(d.1683).77Thesameargumentwastimidlyre-proposedbytheFrenchambassadorduringthefailednegotiationsthatfollowedthePeaceofthePyrenees.78SomeyearslaterLouisXIVwouldbasehisstrategyintheBidasoaonthesameprinciple.Fromthispointofview,retaliationagainstFonterabiewasjustifiednotonlybyrecenteventsbutalsobycenturiesofviolentoccupation.FromastrictlyjuridicalpointofviewtheFrenchauthorities'reasoningremainedweak.Inprinciple,rightsofreprisalandretaliationwerelimitedtoobtainingcompensationforincurredlossesandtherestorationofastatusquoante.LouisXIV'saimsdidnotfitwellintothisdefinition.Apparentlyhispurposewassimplytojustifyhisrighttotheuseofforcetoimposeaneworderinsteadofdefendinglegitimateclaimsinalawfulmanner.Infact,theFrenchexplicitlyavoidedenteringintoanylegalcontroversy.ThisapproachcausedsomeconfusiontoLespesdeHeureaux,theFrenchcommissionersenttotheBidasoa.79Asaloyalsubjecthesurelyhadnoreasontodoubthismaster'srightfulintention.ThisispreciselywhyhewaswillingtosupportLouisXIV'sclaimsonsolidlegalgrounds.MuchtohissurprisehereceivedaseriousreprimandforhavingagreedwiththeSpanishcommissionertoreviewtheproceedingsandotherlegalinstrumentsfrompastnegotiations.80Thatwas,ofcourse,ordinarypractice.InsteadLespesdeHeureauxwasspecifically 74Aboutthishistoricalepisode:AngelCanellasLópez,"DelaincorporacióndeGuipúzcoaalaCoronadeCastilla",EnlaEspañaMedieval.EstudiosenmemoriadelProfesorD.SalvadordeMoxó,(Madrid:UniversidadComplutense,1982),II,p.11-20.75BNF,Ms.Occ.,Ms.François15846,f.97-116:"MemoiretouchantlaRivieredeBidassoquiseparelaFrancedancel'Espagne".76AntonioEirasRoel,"PolíticafrancesadeFelipeIII:LastensionesconEnriqueIV",Hispania:RevistaEspañoladeHistoria,n°118(1971),245-336.77BNF,Ms.Occ.,MsFrançais20771,f.222r-224v:"RivièredeBidasso".78ChavarríaMúgica,"Lafronteraceremonial",p.82.79AAE,CP,Espagne,f.185r-186v.80AAE,CP,Espagne,nº65,f.201r-204r:LespesdeHeureauxtoCroissy,Urrugne,9and10October1680;f.226:D.FernandoRamírezdeAlcántaratoLespesdeHeureaux,Fonterabie,17November1680;and,f.233:LespesdeHeureauxtoCroissy,Urrugne,23November1680.

19instructedtosimplypresenttheFrenchdemandstotheSpanishauthoritiesandwaitfororders.81LouisXIVdidnotpresentanyvalidprooftobackuphisclaims.ThatcouldpartlybeexplainedbytheinconsistencyofFrenchlegalarguments.Thetruthisthatmostofthemwouldnotstanduptoscrutiny.Thatwasexactlywhathappenedin1661whenFranciscoRamírezdePrado,arespectedjuristoftheCouncilofCastile,demolishedtheallegationspresentedbytheformerFrenchambassadorinMadrid.82TheonlylegalinstrumentallegedbyLouisXIVtolegitimatehisactionsintheBidasoaduringthe1680swasthesentencedictatedbyhiscommissionersin1667andconfirmedbyhimselfatthebeginningofthefollowingyearoncetheWarofDevolutionhadalreadybrokenout.Thesentence,however,wasnotavalidlegaljustificationbecausethejurisdictionofFrenchjudgesdidnotextendtoforeignterritory.Infact,Spanishcommissionershaddictatedasimilarsentenceassertingtheirownrightsthat,inturn,couldonlybeeffectiveintheirownterritory.Thiswascommonpracticeinbordercontroversies.Itwasawayofdeclaringthatbothsideswererightandthatneitherwouldrenouncetheirrespectiveclaims-inotherwords,itmeantthattheborderconflictremainedunsettled.TheonlycaseinwhichtheFrenchsentencecouldhaveanylegaleffectovertheSpanishwouldbeif,foranyreason,Spainfailedtoissueitsownsentence.AnexplicitrenunciationoftheSpanishcouldthenbeinterpretedasimplicitrecognitionoftheFrench.AndthatwasexactlyLouisXIV'slineofargument.Accordingtohim,Spanishcommissionershadfailedtodictatetheirsentenceindueform.83Thatwas,ofcourse,false.ThefinalstageoftheBidasoanegotiationsofthe1660swascharacterisedbyalackofcommunicationbetweentherespectivecommissioners,butthatdidnotpreventtheSpanishfromactuallydictatingtheirownsentence.Obviously,theFrenchministersknewthat.84ThatiswhytheyprohibitedLespesdeHeureauxfromreviewingtheproceedingsoftheformercommissioners.85OtherwisetheonlylegalinstrumentpresentedbytheFrenchinsupportoftheirclaimswouldbeimmediatelyinvalidated.86ThesamecouldbesaidwithrespecttotheallegedviolentpossessionoftheBidasoa-whattheFrenchironicallycalled"cannonlaw".ItistruethatenforcementofFonterabie'srightsrequiredacertaindegreeofviolence.AlongtheyearstherewerenumerousactsofdefiancebythepeopleofHendaye.Sometimestensionscouldleadtoviolentclashes.However,aswehaveseen,alltheselimitedconflictsweremanagedaccordingtocustomarylaw.ThetruthisthatFonterabie'sjurisdiction 81"SaMajesténevoulanpasquevousentrezdansladiscutiondesdroitsdepossessiondeceuxd'Andayequisontsuffisamentconfirmezparleditjugementduquelsamajesténeveupassousbirquelsoitdonnélamoindreattente",AAE,CP,Espagne,f.170-171v:CroissyaLespesdeHeureaux,Versailles,29September1680,andf.180y181:FaucondeRistoLespesdeHeureaux,Paris,5October1680.82ChavarríaMúgica,"Lafronteraceremonial",p.80-82.83AAE,CP,Espagne,nº65,f.20r-21v:LouisXIVtoMarquisofVillars,St.Germain,30January1680,[draftletter]84"MemoiredesaffairesqueleroyarecommandéesasesambassadeursenEspagneetquilsonttraitéesencettecourdepuislapaixdeNimeguejusqu'àlarupturaarrivéeaumoisdemars1689al'exceptiondecellesquiregardentlecommerce",AAE,CP,Espagne,nº63,f.165r-188v:"PeschesetnavigationdanslarivieredeBidassoa",f.178v-181v.("cahier",p.26-30).85AAE,CP,Espagne,nº65,f.128:LouisXIVtoLespesdeHeureaux,Calais,21July1680.86AAE,CP,Espagne,nº65,f.209r-v:LespesdeHeureauxtoCroissy,Urrugne,19October1680.

20wasnotseriouslyquestionedforaverylongtime.ObviouslytherelativeSpanishmilitarysuperiorityattheborder(thankstoitsfortressandartillery)playedapartinthat.Buttheirpowerwasbackedbystronglegallegitimation:theyhadthewrittenconsentoftheFrench.TherightsofFonterabieintheBidasoawerefoundedonaseriesofbilateralsettlementsbetweentheFrenchandtheSpanishestablishedatthebeginningofthesixteenthcentury.Inotherwords,formorethanacenturyandahalftheFrenchhadvoluntarilyacceptedFonterabie'sjurisdiction.87Thatiswhypresentingallegationsbasedontheseagreementscouldbecounter-productive.InthiscontextFonterabie'sactsofviolenceintheBidasoacouldonlybeinterpretedintwoways:aslegitimateenforcementofitsrights,orasabusiveenforcementofthesamerights.TheformerweresupposedlyprovokedbyHendaye'strespassing's,andthelattermayhaveledtoarighttocompensation,butinneithercasecouldFonterabie'srighttoenforceitsjurisdictionbequestioned.OnlyasystematicallydisproportionateandarbitraryuseofforcecoulddelegitimizeitsstatusintheBidasoa.AndthatseemstohavebeentherationalebehindLouisXIV'scriminalisationofFonterabie.IV.TheescalationofLouisXIV'saggressionsandhisuseofthelanguageofreprisal,retaliation,andabsolutesovereignpowerseemedtobeapreludetoanofficialresumptionofhostilities.CertainlyitwasnotonlytheBidasoathatwasatstake.Aswehavealreadysaidatthebeginningofthiswork,Frenchstrategicprioritieslayelsewhere.Actually,thevastmajorityofLouisXIV'sactsofaggressionsduringthisperiod,includingsystematicpillage,violentoccupationsandunilateralannexations,werecommittedintheSpanishLowCountriesandtheRhineland.88TheargumentsusedtojustifyalltheseaggressionswerenotverydifferentfromtheonesusedintheBidasoa.89Reprisal,retaliation,andabsolutesovereignpowerwerethecommonlanguageofthepolitiquedesréunions.Thesentencesfromthechambresderéunion 87AfactacknowledgedevenbytheFrenchcommissionerhimself:"cettepernicieusesentenceprovisionelledel'an1510laquelleadiugeaauxespagnolsl'usagedelarquotesdbs_dbs25.pdfusesText_31