[PDF] Liberal Leviathan Defined in terms of the

View - Download Liberal Leviathan

Previous PDF

Next PDF

Liberal Leviathan

PRINCETON STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL HISTORY AND POLITICS Series Editors G. John Ikenberry, ?omas J. Christensen, and Marc Trachtenberg

Recent Titles

?e Cold War and A?er: History, ?eory, and the Logic of International Politics by Marc Trachtenberg America"s Mission: ?e United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy,

Expanded Editionby Tony Smith

Liberal Leviathan: ?e Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order by G. John Ikenberry Worse ?an a Monolith: Alliance Politics and Problems of Coercive Diplomacy in Asia by ?omas J. Christensen Politics and Strategy: Partisan Ambition and American Statecra? by Peter Trubowitz ?e Clash of Ideas in World Politics: Transnational Networks, States, and Regime Change,

1510-2010 by John M. Owen IV

How Enemies Become Friends: ?e Sources of Stable Peace by Charles A. Kupchan

1989: ?e Struggle to Create Post-Cold War Europe by Mary Elise Sarotte

?e Struggle for Power in Early Modern Europe: Religious Con?ict, Dynastic Empires, and International Change by Daniel H. Nexon Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and Con?ict in China"s Territorial Disputes by M. Taylor Fravel ?e Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World by Lorenz M. Lüthi Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East by Etel Solingen Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980-2000 by Alastair Iain Johnston Appeasing Bankers: Financial Caution on the Road to War by Jonathan Kirshner ?e Politics of Secularism in International Relations by Elizabeth Shakman Hurd Unanswered ?reats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power by Randall L. Schweller Producing Security: Multinational Corporations, Globalization, and the Changing Calculus of Con?ict by Stephen G. Brooks Driving the Soviets up the Wall: Soviet-East German Relations, 1953-1961 by Hope M. Harrison Legitimacy and Power Politics: ?e American and French Revolutions in International

Political Culture by Mlada Bukovansky

Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare: ?e Evolution of British and American Ideas about

Strategic Bombing, 1914-1945 by Tami Davis Biddle

Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations by Daniel Philpott A?er Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order a?er Major Wars by G. John Ikenberry

G. JOHN IKENBERRY

Liberal Leviathan

?e Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS

Princeton and Oxford

Copyright © 2011 by Princeton University PressPublished by Princeton University Press, 41 William Street, Princeton, New Jersey 08540In the United Kingdom: Princeton University Press, 6 Oxford Street, Woodstock, Oxfordshire ox20 1twpress.princeton.eduAll Rights Reserved?ird printing, and ?rst paperback printing, 2012Paperback ISBN 978-0-691-15617-0?e Library of Congress has cataloged the cloth edition of this book as followsIkenberry, G. John.

Liberal leviathan : the origins, crisis, and transformation of the American world order / G. John

Ikenberry.

p. cm. - (Princeton studies in international history and politics)

Includes index.

ISBN 978-0-691-12558-9 (hardcover : alk. paper) 1. United States-Foreign relations-

21st century. 2. Hegemony, 3. Unipolarity (International relations) I. Title.

E895.I44 2011

327.73009"05-dc22

2011001740

British Library Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available ?is book has been composed in Garamond Premier Pro

Printed on acid-free paper.∞

Printed in the United States of America

109876543

"Sed quis custodiet ipsos custodes?" ["But who watches the watchers?"] -Juvenal, Satires, VI, 347 "What I fear more than the strategies of my enemies is our own mistakes." -Pericles in his funeral oration as recorded by ?ucydides "He that is taken and put into prison or chains is not conquered, though overcome; for he is still an enemy." -Hobbes, Leviathan, conclusion

This page intentionally left blank

For my wife Lidia Reiko and our son Jackson Kan

This page intentionally left blank

Contents

Preface xi

Acknowledgments xvii

One Crisis of the Old Order 1

Part One: ?eoretical Foundations33

Two Power and the Varieties of Order 35

?ree Power and Strategies of Rule 79

Four Unipolarity and Its Consequences 119

Part Two: Historical Origins and Trajectories of Change157

Five ?e Rise of the American System 159

Six ?e Great Transformation and the Failure of Illiberal

Hegemony 221

Seven Dilemmas and Pathways of Liberal International Order 279

Eight Conclusion: ?e Durability of Liberal

International Order 333

Index 361

This page intentionally left blank

xi

Preface

?is book is an inquiry into the logic and changing character of liberal international order. Over the last two hundred years, Western democratic states have made repeated e?orts to build international order around open and rule-based relations among states-that is, they have engaged in liberal order building. ?is "liberal project" has unfolded amidst other great forces and events that have shaped the modern world-imperial- ism, revolution, world war, economic boom and bust, nation-building, and globalization. In the second half of the twentieth century, the United States engaged in the most ambitious and far-reaching liberal order building the world had yet seen. ?e result was a particular type of liberal international order-a liberal hegemonic order. ?e United States took on the duties of building and running an international order, organizing it around multilateral institutions, alliances, special relationships, and cli- ent states. It was a hierarchical political order with liberal characteristics. De?ned in terms of the provision of security, wealth creation, and social advancement, this liberal hegemonic order has been, arguably at least, the most successful order in world history. ?is book o?ers an account of the origins and inner workings of this far-?ung political order. xii Preface But in the last decade, this American-led hegemonic order has been troubled. ?e most obvious crisis in this order occurred during the recent George W. Bush administration as it generated worldwide opposition to its unilateralist tendencies, "war on terror" grand strategy, and inva- sion of Iraq. Some observers argue that under Bush"s watch, the United States turned itself into an empire. ?e United States coerced more than it led. For those who trace this imperial turn to the Bush administration, the crisis may now be over. But for those who see imperial tendencies in the unipolar distribution of power that stands behind American foreign policy, the crisis continues. Other observers argue that the problems with the American-led order run deeper. We are witnessing a passing of the American era, a return to multipolarity, and the rise of rival non- liberal order-building projects. In the view of some commentators, it is liberal internationalism itself that is passing away. ?is book engages this debate. I argue that the crisis that besets America-led liberal world order is a crisis of authority. A political strug- gle or contest has been ignited over the distribution of roles, rights, and authority within liberal international order. ?e hegemonic aspect of liberal order-that is, America"s role and the old hegemonic bargains that surround it-is under pressure. But the deeper logic of open and loosely rule-based international order remains widely embraced. Prob- lems and dilemmas about the organization and operation of liberal international order have mounted in recent years. But the solutions to these problems and dilemmas lead toward the renewal and reorganiza- tion of liberal order-not its overturning. To get to this argument, I make some distinctions between levels-or layers-of international order. It is useful to think of these levels as geo- logical strata. At the deepest level, you have the bedrock of the modern international order: the Westphalian system of sovereign states organized around a group of leading states arrayed in a rough power equilibrium. On this foundation, various sorts of international orders have been-and can be-organized. As I have noted, liberal international order is order that is open and at least loosely rule-based, and as such, it can be contrasted with order that is organized into rival blocs or exclusive regional spheres. But

Preface xiii

liberal international order itself can be organized in di?erent ways. And in the past decade, its organization through the leadership of a dominant state-the American-led hegemonic order-has reached a crisis. ?e crisis runs deeper than the controversies generated by recent American foreign policy. Transformations in the Westphalian sys- tem-the rise of unipolarity, eroded norms of state sovereignty, the shi?ing sources of violence, and the intensi?cation of security interde- pendence-all make the management of liberal hegemony more di?cult and problematic. But these dilemmas and problems that have made the U.S.-led liberal hegemonic order contested and unstable are not destroy- ing liberal international order, but pushing and pulling states toward a new kind of liberal international order-more inclusive, less hierarchi- cal, and infused with more complex forms of cooperation. ?is book can be read as a sequel to my earlier book, A?er Victory: Insti- tutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order a?er Major Wars. ?at book was published on the eve of the Bush administration and Sep- tember 11. In the light of my argument in A?er Victory, the Bush adminis- tration presented an extraordinary puzzle. ?e strong version of my claim was that the United States had so bound itself to the larger Western and global system through layers of multilateral institutions and alliances that it would not be possible for the United States to unbind itself. But this is what the Bush administration attempted to do. ?e weaker version of my argument was that a president could attempt to uproot America from the liberal multilateral system it built over a half century, but it wouldn"t want to-and if it did, it would be punished for doing so. ?e Bush administration may well have paid a price for its policies. It certainly retreated from them in its last years. But the puzzle of the Bush administration led me to look more deeply at the underlying shi?s in the global system that created pressures and opportunities for the Bush revolution. It is this puzzle that has led to my focus on the shi?s in the Westphalian underpinnings of liberal order-the rise of unipo- larity, the erosion of sovereignty, and the transformation of security interdependence. But the story is even more complicated than this. Yes, the Westphalian foundations of liberal order have shi?ed, and this has xiv Preface triggered problems and dilemmas that make American-led hegemonic order unstable. But these underlying shi?s themselves have, for the most part, emerged out of the great postwar success story of liberal interna- tionalism. ?e global liberal system has outgrown its American-led, hegemonic foundation. ?is is a problem-but it is a problem of success rather than failure of the liberal project. At the end of the book, I o?er arguments about how the United States might seek to pursue liberal order building in the coming era. I argue that the United States should "lead through rules" and look for ways to renegotiate hegemonic bargains with other states. I also argue that the United States needs to recapture the public philosophy of lib- eral internationalism-a blend of liberal and realist thinking-that served it so well in the postwar decades. It combined the liberal spirit of the United Nations and the realist spirit of NATO and the American- alliance system in East Asia. I have always thought that Harry Truman and Dean Acheson together re?ected this dual vision. Truman embod- ied the liberal spirit. As a disciple of Woodrow Wilson, he carried in his billfold the poem "Locksley Hall," Tennyson"s famous ode to the world"s common humanity and the dream of universal peace. Truman really did believe that a global peace organization could be built that could tame the violence of nations. Acheson, Truman"s secretary of state, was a real- ist. He was famously skeptical of the United Nations. In one speech, he noted: "In the Arab proverb, the ass that went to Mecca remained an ass, and a policy has little added to it by its place of utterance." Yet while these visions seemingly clashed, they ended up working in tandem. One vision inspired the building of institutions and the search for univer- sal principles of order. ?e other vision built alliances and aggregated power in pursuit of safety and freedom. As I argued in A?er Victory, and as I argue again in this book, power and rules are not enemies; they can be friends, and they are both necessary in the production of liberal order. It is perhaps no coincidence that one of my favorite Western movies is John Ford"s ?e Man Who Shot Liberty Valance, which stars Jimmy Stew- art and John Wayne. It is a classic morality tale. ?e movie takes place in a small Western town being terrorized by a gang of outlaws. Into this town

Preface xv

rides Ransom Stoddard, played by Jimmy Stewart, a newly minted lawyer from the east. He sets up his o!ce in town and immediately encounters the fearsome outlaw, Liberty Valance, played by Lee Marvin. Stoddard is appalled that the townspeople are not resisting the outlaw and his gang. But when he confronts Valance he is slapped down, and the gang prepares to make quick work of him. In the background stands Tom Doniphon, played by John Wayne, a tough rancher able to stand up to Valance. He tells Stoddard to get out of town before he is killed. 0e young lawyer"s appeal to laws and what is right is useless without the ability to back it up with force"one needs a gun in these parts.Ž Stoddard refuses to leave (Nobody ghts my battles") and instead organizes a school to teach townspeople about the virtues of democracy and the rule of law enshrined in the American Constitution. In the inevitable gunght with Liberty Valance, Stoddard is hopelessly outmatched. But standing secretly in the shadows, Doniphon takes his rie and dispatches the outlaw, and the gang is run out of town. Both of these gures"the lawyer and the man with the rie"were necessary for the story to end as it did.

0e point is made over and over again across the historical eras:

power is most durable and legitimate when exercised in a system of rules. Rules are most durable and legitimate when they emerge through a consensual process of rule making and are backed up by the right con- guration of power. 0e United States has been one of the most suc- cessful order-building states in world history because it has combined the exercise of its power with the championing of rule-based order. 0e challenge for the United States in the coming decades is to hold on to this logic of order building even as the deeper foundations of liberal international order shi. To reach these conclusions, the chapters that follow explore and oer arguments about: the logic and ideal-type relations between leading states and the international system the nature of hierarchical international orders the incentives and constraints that powerful states face support- ing and operating within rule-based international relations xvi Preface the character and logic of the postwar American-led liberal inter- national order the nature of the crisis confronting the American-led liberal inter- national order the sources and dimensions of the transformation of the West- phalian system the impact of unipolarity on patterns of international dominance and cooperation the Bush post-Westphalian grand strategy and why it failed the intellectual dilemmas, contradictions, and ambiguities con- fronting liberal internationalism a liberal grand strategy for unipolar America December ?66

Princeton, N.J.

xvii

Acknowledgments

?e ideas in this book have taken shape over many years, and along the way I have accumulated many personal and professional debts to friends and colleagues. I am grateful to Atul Kohli, my friend and colleague at Princeton, with whom I have periodically teamed up to co-teach a grad- uate seminar on Empire and Imperialism. I have bene?ted immensely from these intellectual encounters and his incisive critiques of my work. I am also grateful to Daniel Deudney, my old friend and coauthor, who has been a continuous source of stimulation and learning. Our two decades of collaborations are woven into this manuscript in many ways. I am also grateful to Anne-Marie Slaughter, who has supported my work in untold ways and remained a great source of intellectual inspiration. Our work together on the Princeton Project on National Security, cul- minating in the report Forging a World of Liberty under Law, crystal- ized my thinking about liberal grand strategy. Later, we worked together again on the ideas and legacy of Woodrow Wilson, which culminated in a book with our friends Tony Smith and ?omas Knock. I have also bene?ted from the kindness and generosity of many friends and colleagues who have o?ered comments on parts or the whole xviii Acknowledgments of the book manuscript, including Jeremy Adelman, Barry Buzan, Mick Cox, Christina Davis, Mary Finnemore, Andy Hurrell, Melvyn Le?er, Je? Legro, Andy Moravcsik, Daniel Nexon, and Tom Wright. I appre- ciate detailed comments on the manuscript from Peter Katzenstein, Charles Kupchan, Mike Mastanduno, Bill Wohlforth, John Owen, and the reviewers for Princeton University Press. Mike Mastanduno and Bill Wohlforth generously hosted a manuscript workshop at Dartmouth, funded by the Dickey Center for International Understanding. I appre- ciate the comments and advice given to me by my hosts and other par- ticipants, including Steve Brooks, Ben Valentino, Barry Posen, Jennifer Erickson, Bridgett Coggins, Jennifer Lind, Tom Walker, Albert Lee, and

Brent Strathman.

I am grateful to Joe Barnes and Daniel Kurtz-Phelan, who provided expert editorial comments on the manuscript. I have also bene?ted from excellent research assistance from several Princeton graduate students, including Michael McKoy, Alex Lanoszka, and Darren Lim. I also owe a special thanks to Chuck Myers, my friend and editor at Princeton Uni- versity Press, who has patiently guided the manuscript to completion. I thank Inwon Choue, President of Kyung Hee University, for his support and inspiration and to friends and colleagues at Kyung Hee for stimulating encounters over the years. I ?rst began work on the manuscript during a sabbatical leave at the Institute for Advanced Study in 2007-2008 as an NEH Fellow. I am grateful to the institute for support and to my colleagues who made the year so stimulating. Finally, and most importantly, I express my love and gratitude to my wife, Lidia Reiko Usami, and our son, Jackson Kan Ikenberry, to whom

I dedicate this book.

Liberal Leviathan

This page intentionally left blank

1 One

Crisis of the OldOrder

One of the great dramas of world politics over the last two hundred years has been the rise of liberal democratic states to global dominance. ?is liberal ascendancy has involved the extraordinary growth of the Western democracies-from weakness and minority status in the late eighteenth century to wealth and predominance in the late twentieth century. ?is rise occurred in ?ts and starts over the course of the mod- ern era. In the nineteenth century, Great Britain was the vanguard of the liberal ascendancy, becoming the leading industrial and naval power of its day. In the twentieth century, the United States was transformed from inwardness and isolation into the dominant world power. During these decades, world wars and geopolitical struggles pitted the liberal democracies against rival autocratic, fascist, and totalitarian great pow- ers. ?e Cold War was a grand struggle between alternative ideologies of rule and pathways to modern development. With the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the liberal ascen- dancy reached a worldwide crescendo. ?e United States and a far-?ung

2 chapter one

alliance of liberal democracies stood at the center of world politics- rich, powerful, and dominant. ?e Western democracies did not just grow powerful and rich. ?ey also made repeated e?orts to build liberal international order-that is, order that is relatively open, rule-based, and progressive. Led by Great Britain and the United States, they championed free trade and took steps to create multilateral rules and institutions of various sorts. Open markets, international institutions, cooperative security, democratic community, progressive change, collective problem solving, shared sov- ereignty, the rule of law-all are aspects of the liberal vision that have made appearances in various combinations and changing ways over the decades and centuries. In the decades a?er World War II, the United States engaged in the most ambitious and far-reaching liberal order building the world had yet seen. It was a distinctive type of liberal international order-a liberal hegemonic order. ?e United States did not just encourage open and rule- based order. It became the hegemonic organizer and manager of that order. ?e American political system-and its alliances, technology, currency, and markets-became fused to the wider liberal order. In the shadow of the Cold War, the United States became the "owner and operator" of the liberal capitalist political system-supporting the rules and institutions of liberal internationalism but also enjoying special rights and privileges. It organized and led an extended political system built around multilat- eral institutions, alliances, strategic partners, and client states. ?is order is built on strategic understandings and hegemonic bargains. ?e United States provided "services" to other states through the provision of security and its commitment to stability and open markets. In the ??y years following World War II, this American-led liberal hegemonic order has been remarkably successful. It provided a stable foundation for decades of Western and global growth and advancement. ?e United States and its partners negotiated agreements and built mechanisms that reopened the world economy, ushering in a golden era of economic growth. West Germany and Japan were transformed from enemies into strategic partners, ultimately becoming the second- and

Crisis of the Old Order 3

third-largest economies in the world. ?e Western powers also bound themselves together in pacts of mutual restraint and commitment, ?nd- ing a solution to the centuries-old problem of how Germany, France, and the rest of Europe could exist in peace-the great "quiet revolu- tion" of the twentieth century. In later decades, non-Western countries made transitions to democracy and market economy and integrated into this expanding liberal hegemonic system. ?e Cold War ended peace- fully and on terms favorable to the West. ?e Western allies were able to both outperform the Soviet system and ?nd ways to signal restraint and accommodation as Soviet leaders made di?cult choices to end hos- tilities with old rivals. By the 1990s, this American-led order was at a zenith. Ideological and geopolitical rivals to American leadership had disappeared. ?e United States stood at the center of it all as the uni- polar power. Its dynamic bundle of oversized capacities, interests, and ideals constituted a remarkable achievement in the unfolding drama of the liberal international project. In this book, I explore the logic and character of this American liberal hegemonic order. What are its inner workings and moving parts? How can we identify and understand the speci?c organizational logic of this liberal hegemonic order in the context of earlier e?orts to build liberal international order and the wider varieties of global and regional orders? How is it di?erent-if it is-from imperial forms of order? If it is a hier- archical order with liberal characteristics, how do we make sense of its distinctive blend of command and reciprocity, coercion and consent? Today, the American-led liberal hegemonic order is troubled. Con- ?icts and controversies have unsettled it. ?e most obvious crisis of this order unfolded during the George W. Bush administration. Its contro- versial "war on terror," invasion of Iraq, and skepticism about multilat- eral rules and agreements triggered a global outpouring of criticism. Anti-Americanism spread and gained strength. Even old and close allies started to question the merits of living in a world dominated by a uni- polar America. ?is sentiment was expressed in a particularly pointed fashion by the then French president Jacques Chirac, who argued that the world must be turned back into a multipolar one because "any

4 chapter one

quotesdbs_dbs46.pdfusesText_46

[PDF] le levier définition

[PDF] Le lexique de l'éloge : QCM

[PDF] Le lexique de la parole et du discours

[PDF] le lexique définition

[PDF] Le lexique du blâme : QCM

[PDF] le lexique mélioratif et péjoratif cours

[PDF] le libertinage au coeur de l'intrigue

[PDF] le lien ci dessous est l'exercice en question! pouvais vous m'aider ? le réussir s'il vous plaît Merci d'avance pour aide :)

[PDF] Le lien entre Guernica et le collage

[PDF] Le lien entre le developpement et l'education bonjour vous pouvait me fair un petit résume entre le lien du Développement et L'education la

[PDF] le lièvre et la tortue

[PDF] Le ligron des parents séparés

[PDF] Le lingot d'or

[PDF] LE LINGOT DOR

[PDF] le lion de joseph kesel(pour lundi je ne comprend rien