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Bergsoniana

1 | 2021

Reassessing Bergson

Matyáš

Moravec,

Frédéric

Worms and

Caterina

Zanfi (dir.)

Electronic

version URL: https://journals.openedition.org/bergsoniana/280

DOI: 10.4000/bergsoniana.280

ISSN:

2800-874X

Publisher

Société des amis de Bergson

Electronic

reference Matyáš Moravec, Frédéric Worms and Caterina Zan (dir.),

Bergsoniana

, 1

2021, "Reassessing

Bergson" [Online], Online since 01 July 2021, connection on 08 November 2021. URL: https:// journals.openedition.org/bergsoniana/280; DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/bergsoniana.280 Les contenus de la revue sont mis à disposition selon les termes de la Licence Creative Commons

Attribution 4.0 International.

BERGSONIANA

N°1 | 2021Reassessing Bergson

© Bergsoniana - 2021.

ISSN: 2800-874XCréation et mise en page

Atelier Congard

www.atelier-congard.frPublié avec le soutien de l"École universitaire de recherche Translitterae

(Programme "Investissements d"avenir» ANR-10-IDEX-0001-02 PSL et ANR-17-EURE-0025)DIRECTION Frédéric WORMS (École normale supérieure de Paris), Caterina ZANFI (CNRS/École normale supérieure de Paris)

SECRÉTAIRE DE RÉDACTION

Emily HERRING

COMITÉ SCIENTIFIQUE

Alia AL-SAJI (McGill University), Arnaud BOUANICHE (Lycée Gambetta d"Arras), Élie DURING

(Université Paris Nanterre), Florence CAEYMAEX (FNRS/Université de Liège), Arnaud FRANÇOIS

(Université de Poitiers), Hisashi FUJITA (Université Kyushu Sangyo), Nadia Yala KISUKIDI (Université

de Paris 8), Paul-Antoine MIQUEL (Université de Toulouse II), Débora MORATO PINTO (Universidad

Federal de São Carlos), M. Sait OZERVARLI (Université Yıldız d"Istanbul), Camille RIQUIER (Institut

catholique de Paris)

COMITÉ DE RÉDACTION

Alessandra CAMPO (Université dell"Aquila), Deng GANG (Université Jiao Tong de Shanghai), Clément

MORAVEC, University of Durham), Ryusuke OKAJIMA (Université Keio), Miguel José PALEY DE GREIFF (The New School, NY), Bruno Batista RATES (Universidad de São Paulo), Mathilde TAHAR (Université de Toulouse II)

SOMMAIRE

Editorial

Frédéric WORMS, Caterina ZANFI ......................................................................................................................... 5

RECHERCHES

Reassessing Bergson

Introduction

Matyáš MORAVEC ........................................................................................................................................................................ 11

"A Memory within Change Itself". Bergson and the Memory Theory of Temporal Experience

Yaron WOLF ............................................................................................................................................................... 13

Combining Tense and Temporal Extension: The Potential of Bergson's 'Qualitative Multiplicity' for Conquering Problems of (Analytic) Time Metaphysics

Sonja DEPPE ............................................................................................................................................. 33

Bergsonian Answers to Contemporary Persistence Questions

Florian FISCHER ....................................................................................................................................................... 51

Bergson and the Heptapods

Barry DAINTON ....................................................................................................................................................... 69

What Bergson Should Have Said to Einstein

Steven SAVITT .......................................................................................................................................................... 89

Mis/Reading Bergson - on Time and Life and Matter

Suzanne GUERLAC ................................................................................................................................................ 101

Bergson and Our Understanding of Interaction,

Constraints and Collective Aspirations

Emmanuel PICAVET ............................................................................................................................................... 119

Note sur la liberté comme expression dans l'Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience

Mark SINCLAIR ...................................................................................................................................................... 139

The Duration of History in Bergson

Caterina ZANFI ........................................................................................................................................................ 155

Bergson et son temps

Frédéric WORMS ................................................................................................................................................... 173

TEXTES

Correspondance Henri Bergson - Adolf Keller (1914-1939). Un dialogue franco-suisse entre philosophie, théologie, psychanalyse et relations internationales

Florent SERINA ...................................................................................................................................................... 185

Correspondance Henri Bergson - Adolf Keller (1914-1939) ........................................................... 201

VARIA L'intuition chez Bergson et chez les néo-confucianistes

Gang DENG ............................................................................................................................................................. 217

Bergson et la télépathie : à propos d'une correspondance inédite

Renaud EVRARD .................................................................................................................................................... 237

ÉDITORIAL

Frédéric WORMS, Caterina ZANFI

Nous sommes très heureux de présenter à nos lectrices et à nos lecteurs le premier numéro de Bergsoniana, la nouvelle revue philosophique consacrée à la pensée d'Henri Bergson tout à la fois en elle-même, dans son rayonnement global, dans ses reprises historiques et comme perspective sur les problèmes contemporains. En elle-même, car il reste tant à dire sur cette oeuvre malgré le renouveau qui a caractérisé les vingt dernières années. Ce qui caractérise d'ailleurs ces lectures, c'est toujours la découverte de nouveaux points de vue, mais aussi la recherche de l'unité d'une pensée. Bergson ne faisait-il pas de l'unité de l'intuition, mais aussi de ses e?ets inépuisables, le double critère de la pensée vraie ? En tant que publication de référence de la Société des amis de Bergson, la revue marque une nouvelle étape, après la série des Annales bergsoniennes (neuf volumes de 2002 à 2020) qui succédait elle- même lointainement à celle des Études bergsoniennes (onze volumes de

1948 à 1976), éditées par l'ancienne Association des amis de Bergson.

Sur les épaules des collections qui l'ont précédée et qui ont tant contribué au développement des études sur Bergson et à la préparation des éditions critiques de ses écrits, Bergsoniana se propose de faire connaître les nouvelles lectures de Bergson provenant du monde entier et de répondre aux nouveaux dé?s philosophiques dans lesquels la pensée de Bergson continue d'o?rir des éléments féconds de ré?exion. Mais dans son rayonnement, ses reprises et ses enjeux contemporains aussi : l'ampleur des débats suscités par la circulation de la philosophie de Bergson tout au long du siècle dernier est étonnante, ainsi que la fertilité que sa pensée montre encore en ce début de 21

ème siècle sur tant de questions

d'ordre épistémologique, esthétique, moral, politique.

6 Bergsoniana N°1 | 2021

C'est pourquoi Bergsoniana ne s'adresse pas qu'à un public d'exégètes des textes de Bergson, ou de spécialistes de philosophie française des décennies au tournant des 19ème et 20ème siècles. Au-delà des études sur le bergsonisme en tant que courant majeur de l'histoire de la philosophie contemporaine, la revue cherchera aussi et surtout à mettre en lumière les dialogues que cette philosophie a entretenu et entretient avec d'autres courants français et internationaux, et sa fertilité dans les débats d'aujourd'hui, où la question de la vie est désormais au coeur des débats les plus brûlants dans les sciences, l'éthique, ainsi que la politique. L'équipe scienti?que internationale renouvelée et la conversion de cette publication en revue en accès ouvert vise à mieux répondre aux exigences de di?usion de cette publication et des activités des membres de la SAB, actifs dans vingt pays. On encouragera donc la publication en anglais, sans exclure évidemment la langue de référence des études bergsoniennes, qui restera le français. La revue privilégiera des numéros thématiques, avec di?érentes rubriques : les " Recherches » réuniront les contributions originales les plus récentes sur la philosophie de Bergson, alors que les " Textes » présenteront des sources encore inédites de Bergson, ainsi que de nouvelles traductions en français ou en anglais, et des essais di?cilement accessibles. Exceptionnellement, et néanmoins inévitablement, des essais qui ne rentrent pas dans le dossier thématique seront publiés dans une rubrique de " Varia. » Tous feront l'objet des procédures de lecture et d'acceptation qui permettent de faire de ces Bergsoniana ce qu'elles sont dans leur titre même : non pas la revue d'auteurs supposés " bergsoniens, » mais celle des problèmes qui le sont et qui sont ceux de toutes et de tous, dans le moment vital que nous vivons et qui nous requiert. Dans ses premières années, la revue trouvera un de ses axes thématiques dans le projet de recherche Un chapitre dans l'histoire globale de la philosophie : Nouvelles perspectives sur le bergsonisme, soutenu par le CNRS (IRN GlobPhilBergson) et réalisé par l'UMR 8547 Pays germaniques - Transferts culturels en partenariat avec l'Université Yıldız d'Istanbul (Turquie), Penn State (USA), Fukuoka (Japon), São Carlos (Brésil), Yaoundé 1 (Cameroun) et Vilnius (Lituanie). La pensée de Bergson y sera considérée en tant que mouvement intellectuel global, et les interprétations locales et les nouvelles sémantisations qu'elle a rencontré depuis le 20

ème siècle seront observées.

Éditorial 7

À l'occasion de la parution de ce premier numéro de la revue, nous tenons à remercier chaleureusement les institutions sans lesquelles le projet n'aurait pu être réalisé : l'EUR Translitterae pour son généreux soutien, ainsi que le CNRS, Aix-Marseille Université, l'EHESS et Avignon Université qui soutiennent Bergsoniana à travers l'USR 2004 OpenEdition Center. https://doi.org/10.4000/bergsoniana.497

RECHERCHES

Reassessing Bergson

Sommaire

Introduction Matyáš MORAVEC

"A Memory within Change Itself". Bergson and the Memory ? eory of Temporal ExperienceYaron WOLF

Combining Tense and Temporal Extension: ? e Potential of Bergson's 'Qualitative Multiplicity' for Conquering Problems of (Analytic) Time MetaphysicsSonja DEPPE

Bergsonian Answers to Contemporary Persistence QuestionsFlorian FISCHER

Bergson and the HeptapodsBarry DAINTON

What Bergson Should Have Said to EinsteinSteven SAVITT Mis/Reading Bergson - on Time and Life and MatterSuzanne GUERLAC

Bergson and Our Understanding of Interaction, Constraints and Collective Aspirations Emmanuel PICAVET

Note sur la liberté comme expression dans l'Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscienceMark SINCLAIR

? e Duration of History in Bergson Caterina ZANFI

Bergson et son tempsFrédéric WORMS

INTRODUCTION.

REASSESSING BERGSON

Matyáš MORAVEC

In 1912, Bertrand Russell published his "Philosophy of Bergson," based on a presentation he gave earlier to "?e Heretics" society in Cambridge. ?ough not the ?rst - and certainly not the last - attack against Bergsonian thought from an analytic philosopher, Russell's criticism played a crucial part in the disappearance of Bergson from analytic thought. One still ?nds Bergson mentioned (usually in a highly critical manner) by analytic- minded philosophers in the 1940s and 1950s, but by the 1960s, he almost entirely disappears from analytic discussions, especially those revolving around the philosophy of time. Although Russell's critique has, itself, been criticised and dismantled at various points, the historical constellations around the birth of analytic philosophy in Cambridge ensured a devastating and lasting in?uence of Russell's criticism and Bergson's gradual exclusion from the mainstream of English-speaking philosophy. In the past few years, this has, for the ?rst time, started to change. Recent scholarship has seen increasing interest by English-speaking philosophers in Bergson's thought on - amongst other topics - time, history, action, and memory. ?is has enabled Bergson to step out of those philosophical traditions with which he is almost canonically bound and enter into new dialogues. Over a hundred years after facing Russell's critique and just under a hundred years since his reception of an honorary doctorate there, Bergson returned to Cambridge. ?e essays published in this collection are the fruits of the "Reassessing Bergson" conference, which took place on 11-

12 September 2019 at Pembroke College, Cambridge. ?e aim of this

12 Bergsoniana N°1 | 2021

event was not merely to undo the damage done by Russell, but also to bring together scholars from di?erent philosophical traditions, working on di?erent topics with di?erent methods, but who are all joined by a common interest in Bergson. ?e essays in this issue of Bergsoniana are based on the talks given there. We would like to thank all the institutions which allowed this meeting to take place: ?e Arts and Humanities Research Council, the Aristotelian Society, the British Society for the History of Philosophy, Faculty of Divinity, University of Cambridge, the Mind Association, Pembroke College, Cambridge, the Société des Amis de Bergson, and the Society for Philosophy of Time. Most importantly, our thanks go to all the participants who nourished the extremely fruitful dialogues that started in Cambridge. Matyáš Moravec is a postdoctoral research associate at Durham University. His research focuses on building links between Bergson's philosophy, analytic metaphysics and the philosophy of religion. He is also interested in Bergson's reception by early 20th-century British philosophers. https://doi.org/10.4000/bergsoniana.422 "A MEMORY WITHIN CHANGE

ITSELF." BERGSON AND

THE MEMORY THEORY OF

TEMPORAL EXPERIENCE

Yaron WOLF

Introduction

When we consider our experience from a broad perspective - taking into account our cognitive, emotional, and evaluative attitudes - it is evident that in many cases memory does not possess a merely causal role in relation to experiences that have temporal contents. At least some of these aspects of experience are constitutively related to memory. ?at is, they would not be the kind of experiences they in fact are if memory did not ?gure in them.

1 Our experiences of nostalgia, of grief, our re?ections

on the way time has been passing faster as we have been growing older, our appreciation of the progress we've been making - all of these cases arguably include the experienced recollection of past events and are thus not only causally related to past experiences. A constitutive relation to memory also seems to obtain in the case of our more banal re?ections on temporal order, for example when I try to remember whether I watered my plants yesterday, or the day before.

1. ?ere are, broadly, two ways in which memory can constitutively ?gure in experience:

(i) remembered things or events can be taken to be included in the contents of current experiences; (ii) the remembered things or events can be (further) taken to be experienced as memories. Marking a di?erence between the two is crucial in the context of the "modi?ed" memory theory of change perception (James 1890; Stout 1930; Husserl

1991; O'Shaughnessy 2000; Phillips 2010; 2018), which I explore below.

14 Bergsoniana N°1 | 2021

My focus here, however, is on a much more tightly circumscribed topic - the relation between memory and our non-inferential experience of change and motion.2 And my central claim will be that Bergson's views on this relation, which have not been discussed in signi?cant detail in the literature, can shed new light upon recent debate on the topic.

3 I approach

this in three steps. First, I examine the "memory theory" of non-inferential temporal experience in its two main forms - a "traditional" version and a "modi?ed account" - situating Bergson's views vis-à-vis this distinction. Second, I explore a contemporary defence of the memory theory (Phillips

2010; 2018) and underline a limitation in this account. Finally, I focus on

a feature of Bergson's re?ections on memory and temporal experience that can potentially address this limitation.

I. ?e Memory ?eory: Tradition and Modification

Various thinkers have defended a memory theory of immediate temporal experience, on which memory is taken to be not only causally related to but also partially constitutive of our experience of change. An in?uential

2. ?e term "non-inferential experience," frequently quali?ed as "immediate experience,"

is meant to mark out the character of perceptual experience as distinct from reasoning expressed in personal-level judgments or inferences. See Chisholm (1957, 158-159) for highly in?uential discussion of non-inferential experience in this sense. Le Poidevin has described non-inferential temporal experience as follows: "We are indirectly aware of the passage of time when we re?ect on our memories, which present the world as it was, and so a contrast with how things are now. But much more immediately than this is seeing the second hand move around the clock or hearing a succession of notes in a piece of music, or feeling a raindrop run down your neck. ?ere is nothing inferential, it seems, about the perception of change and motion: it is simply given in experience" (Le Poidevin 2007, 87).

3. Bergson's views on the faculty of memory and its role in experience broadly construed

have been, by contrast, the object of sustained study which has also extended beyond Bergson scholarship. For all the fact that Bergson's thought as a whole was not widely discussed after the ?rst decades of the previous century, in the Anglophone context in particular, Bergson's re?ections on the faculty of memory have exerted a signi?cant in?uence upon the understanding of memory and its structure in 20th-century philosophy and psychology. ?is holds true, in particular, for the distinction between two types of memory - "habit memory" and "image memory" - advanced in Matter and Memory (Bergson 1988, 79-90). Key instances of this in?uence include Russell's chapter on memory in Analysis of Mind (Russell 1921, 166), and the distinction between "memory systems" in the works of two of the most prominent memory researchers in recent decades (Tulving 1986, 307; Shachter 1996, 165, 169-170; see also Tulving and Shachter 1994,

6, 8). For recent accounts of Bergson's views on memory, see Ricoeur (2000, 21-30;

50-53; 427-440); François (2008, 31-36); Ansell-Pearson (2018, Ch 4); Perri (2017);

Sinclair (2019, Ch 4).

"A Memory within Change Itself."... 15 source for the position is Reid's view. According to Reid, sense perception is limited to the present moment in a "strict" sense: [I]f we speak strictly and philosophically, no kind of succession can be an object either of the senses, or of consciousness; because the operations of both are con?ned to the present point of time, and there can be no succession in a point of time (Reid 1785, 325-326). Reid is working with an Augustinian idea of the present as having no temporal extension whatsoever, an "interval with no duration" (Augustine

2008, 232) or an "indivisible point of time, which divides the future

from the past" (Reid 1785, 326). And since sense perception is limited to the present, we cannot be said to perceive succession by sense. Now, and here Reid also follows Augustine, we do often speak as if the present has temporal extension. We say that we see motion (Reid 1785, 326), and we consider the present as varying according to the particular context of discussion - we speak of the present hour, year, or century (Reid 1785,

326; Augustine 2008, 231-232).

4 ?is kind of inaccuracy, Reid notes, is

perfectly legitimate in "common life" (Reid 1785, 326). Philosophers, however, should insist on a "strict" meaning of the expression "the present moment." ?is ?rst point leads to the positive aspect of Reid's argument concerning the origin of our idea of succession: [I]t is only by the aid of memory that we discern motion, or any succession whatsoever: we see the present place of the body; we remember the successive advance it made to that place: the ?rst can then only give us a conception of motion, when joined to the last (Reid 1785, 327). We do in fact experience temporal features, despite the fact that this awareness is not strictly perceptual. Reid is here o?ering a bare-bones version of the traditional memory theory. On the view, our awareness of change essentially depends on memory, it is memorial awareness. 5

4. Augustine, unlike Reid, does not consider sense perception to be con?ned to the

present, and does not make the Reidian distinction between memory and perception presented below (e.g., Augustine 2008, 242-243).

5. It might be suggested that Reid's account is of the way we acquire a "conception"

(Reid 1785, 327), rather than an experience, of motion. Reid, however, is also arguably aiming for an account of the way we are made aware, "discern" (1785, 327) or "observe" (1785, 326) change. For relevant discussion, see Falkenstein (2017, 48-49). Additional important instances of the traditional memory theory can be found in Brentano's lectures on the consciousness of time, as described by Husserl (1991, 13-14), and Mellor's (1998,

122-123) explanation of our short-term awareness of time. Mellor's focus in the relevant

passage, however, is solely on the directionality of temporal experience.

16 Bergsoniana N°1 | 2021

?e Reidian account faces numerous challenges. Here's a ?rst. Take the opening notes of Bach's Cello Suite #1 in G Major: G-D-B

FIGURE 1. Opening notes of Bach's Cello Suite #1

?e form of the view as presented by Reid above needs to be re?ned in order to seem at least initially plausible. We would need, for example, to be able to account for a structure in our awareness of change (in memory) that maps onto the progression of the notes. When we experience the ?rst B, it wouldn't be enough to say that we remember G and D together with the sense perception of B, which would be compatible with D having been heard before the G, and with the G having been heard two months ago (see Dainton 2006/2000, 124). We would want to say that we remember having just heard D with a short-term memory of G and having previously heard G when the D was played. Without temporal distance and order as part of the traditional memory theory, it is wildly implausible. It could perhaps be claimed that Reid's view already includes something like the idea of temporal distance and order, when he writes (in relation to the spatial case) of remembering the "successive advance [the object] made to [its present] place." Even with the idea of distance and order in place, however, the view seems to face an insurmountable challenge. On the traditional memory theory, remembering what occurred a year ago and what happened two seconds ago involves experiences of the same kind. Likewise, noticing that something changed in relation to the way it was a minute ago, and being aware of a note played half a second ago on the cello involves the same type of awareness. ?is kind of identity lies in con?ict with what is widely taken to be a striking experiential di?erence between perceiving change and noticing that something has changed, a di?erence in?uentially noted by Broad (1923, 351) and Russell (Russell 1927, 280-

281).6 Watching a shooting star, for example, is di?erent than noticing

that the moon has changed its position. ?is kind of di?erence does not

6. Broad frames this as a "notorious fact" (Broad 1923, 351) rather than a particularly

original insight. As we shall see below, the di?erence Broad and Russell are bringing out here can be accommodated by accounts which predate their work, e.g., James' (1890) and "A Memory within Change Itself."... 17quotesdbs_dbs25.pdfusesText_31

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