Blowout Preventer Control System Reliability
Aug 3 2016 American Petroleum Institute (API) Standard 53 requires that manufacturers offer specific maintenance recommendations; however
Examination of Blowout Preventer Pressure Test Frequency
Mar 10 2020 United States Government or any agency thereof
1 4310-VH DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR Bureau of Safety and
Apr 29 2019 Subsequently
Lift Plate.indd
to hoist Type U BOP's and other assembled BOP stacks. Catalog for WOODCO USA BOP Lifting Equipment Sup. 2 ... We select suppliers on.
Texas Oil Tools Well Intervention Equipment
Nov 2 2021 Leading specialty manufacturers and suppliers of pressure control equipment. ... Specifications: ES Series Blowout Preventer.
INVESTIGATION REPORT VOLUME 2
Jun 5 2014 U.S. CHEMICAL SAFETY AND HAZARD INVESTIGATION BOARD ... b BOP manufacturers specify the shearing capabilities of their BSRs.
Lift Plate.indd
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Estimation of shear force for blind shear ram blowout preventers
Feb 17 2015 According to a recent report prepared for the U.S. Minerals Management Services (MMS)
National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and
we do not know—for instance the blowout preventer
BOP Manual
Material specifications including heat treatment
Deepwater Horizon
Jason Anderson
Aaron Dale Burkeen
Donald Clark
Stephen Curtis
Gordon Jones
Roy Wyatt Kemp
Karl Dale Kleppinger, Jr.
Blair Manuel
Dewey Revette
Shane Roshto
Adam Weise
Dedication
ii We wish to acknowledge the many individuals and organizations, government officials and agencies alike that offered their views and insights to the Commission. We would especially like to express our gratitude to the Coast Guard's Incident Specific Preparedness Review (ISPR) for allowing Commission staff to participate in its inter views and discussions, which was invaluable to the preparation of this report. (A copy of the Coast Guard's ISPR report can be found at the Commission's website at www.oilspillcommission. gov). We would also like to thank Chevron for performing the cement tests that proved so critical to our investigation into the Macondo well blowout. We also thank the Department of Energy, which served as our supporting agency, and all of the Department employees whose assistance was so essential to the success and functioning of the Commission. In particular, we would like to thank Christopher Smith, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Oil and Natural Gas, who acted as the Commission's Designated Federal Officer, as well as Elena Melchert, Petroleum Engineer in the Office of Oil and Gas Resource Conservation, who served as the Committee Manager. But most importantly, we are deeply grateful to the citizens of the Gulf who shared their personal experiences as Commissioners traveled in the region, providing a critical human dimension to the disaster and to our undertaking, as well as the many pe ople who testified at the Commission's hearings, provided public comments, and submitted statements to our website. Together, these contributions greatly informed our work and led to a better report. Thank you one and all.Copyright, Restrictions, and Permissions Notice
Except as noted herein, materials contained in this report are in the public domain. Public domain information may be freely distributed and copied. However, this report contains illustrations, photographs, and other information contributed by or licensed from private individuals, companies, or organizations that may be protected by U.S. and/or foreign copyright laws. Transmission orreproduction of items protected by copyright may require the written permission of the copyright owner.
When using material or images from this report we ask that you credit this report, as well as the source
of the material as indicated in this report.] Permission to use materials copyrighted by other individuals,
companies or organizations must be obtained directly from those sources. This report contains links to many Web sites. Once you access another site through a link that we provide, you are subject to the use, copyright and licensing restrictions of that site. Neither the Government nor the National Commission on the BP/Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling(Commission) endorses any of the organizations or views represented by the linked sites unless expressly
stated in the report. The Government and the Commission take no responsibility for, and exercise no control over, the content, accuracy or accessibility of the material contained on th e linked sites. iiiiiiDeep Water
National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon
Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling
January 2011
ivBob Graham, Co-Chair
Cherry A. Murray
Donald F. Boesch
Fran Ulmer
Frances Beinecke
William K. Reilly, Co-Chair
Terry D. Garcia
vvForeword
PART I: The Path to Tragedy
Chapter 1
Everyone involved with the job...was completely satisfied...." The Deepwater Horizon, the Macondo Well, and Sudden Death on the Gulf of MexicoChapter 2
Each oil well has its own personality"
The History of Offshore Oil and Gas in the United StatesChapter 3
It was like pulling teeth."
Oversightand Oversightsin Regulating
Deepwater Energy Exploration and Production in the Gulf of Me xicoPART II: Explosion and Aftermath:
The Causes and Consequences of the Disaster
Chapter 4
But, who cares, it's done, end of story, [we] will probably be fine and we'll get a good cement job."The Macondo Well and the Blowout
Chapter 5
You're in it now, up to your neck!"
Response and Containment
Chapter 6
The worst environmental disaster America has ever faced."Oiling a Rich Environment: Impacts and Assessment
Chapter 7
People have plan fatigue . . . they've been planned to death"Recovery and Restoration
PART III: Lessons Learned:
Industry, Gover
nment, Energy PolicyChapter 8
Safety is not proprietary."
Changing Business as Usual
Chapter 9
Develop options for guarding against, and mitigating the impact of, oil spills associated with offshore drilling." Investing in Safety, Investing in R esponse, Investing in the GulfChapter 10
American Energy Policy and the Future of Offshore DrillingEndnotes
Appendices
Appendix A: Commission Members
Appendix B: List of Acronyms
Appendix C: Executive Order
Appendix D: Commission Staff and Consultants
Appendix E: List of Commission Meetings
Appendix F: List of Staff Working Papers
Index vi xiii 1 2155
87
89
129
173
197
215
217
249
293
307
356
358
359
362
365
366
368
vi
The explosion that tore through the
Deepwater Horizon
drilling rig last April 20, as the rig's crew completed drilling the exploratory Macondo well deep under the waters of the Gulf of Mexico, began a human, economic, and environmental disaster. Eleven crew members died, and others were seriously injured, as fire engulfed and ultimately destroyed the rig. And, although the nation would not know the full scope of the disaster for weeks, the first of more than four million barrels of oil began gushing uncontrolled into the Gulfthreatening livelihoods, precious habitats, and even a unique way of life. A treasured American landscape, already battered and degraded from years of mismanagement, faced yet another blow as the oil spread and washed ashore. Five years after Hurricane Katrina, the nation was again transfixed, seemingly helpless, as this new tragedy unfolded in the Gulf.The costs from this one industrial accident ar
e not yet fully counted, but it is already clear that the impacts on the region's natural systems and people were enormous, and that economic losses total tens of billions of dollars. On May 22, 2010, President Barack Obama announced the creation of the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling: an independent, nonpartisan entity, directed to provide a thorough analysis and impartial judgment. The President charged the Commission to determine the causes of the disaster, and to improve the country's ability to respond to spills, and to recommend reforms to make offshore energy production safer. And the President said we were to follow the facts wherever they led. This report is the result of an intense six-month effort to fulfill the President's charge. viiviiDeepwater Horizon
Deepwater Horizon
viii Complex Systems Almost Always Fail in Complex Ways"Deepwater Horizon
Deepwater Horizon
ixixDeepwater Horizon
Deepwater Horizon
Deepwater
Horizon
Exxon Valdez
*The chief counsel's investigation was no doubt complicated by the la ck of subpoena power. Nonetheless, Chief Counsel Bartlit did an extraordinary job building t he record and interpreting what he learned. He used his considerable powers of persuasion along with other tools at his disposal to engage the invo lved companies in constructive and informative exchanges. xThe Deepwater Drilling Prospect
Deepwater Horizon
xixiThe Commission and Its Work
Deepwater Horizon
Deepwater Horizon
xiiOur Thanks and Dedication
Deepwater Horizon
xiiixiiiPart I
The Path to Tragedy
On April 20, 2010, the 126 workers on the BP
Deepwater Horizon
were going about the routines of completing an exploratory oil wellunaware of impending disaster. What unfolded would have unknown impacts shaped by the Gulf region's distinctive cultures, institutions, and geographyand by economic forces resulting from the unique coexistence of energy resources, bountiful fisheries and wildlife, and coastal tourism. The oil and gas industry, long lured by Gulf reserves and public incentives, progressively developed and deployed new technologies, at ever-larger scales, in pursuit of valuable energy supplies in increasingly deeper waters farther from the coastline. Regulators, however, failed to keep pace with the industrial expansion and new technologyoften because of industry's resistance to more effective oversight. The result was a serious, and ultimately inexcusable, shortfall in supervision of offshore drilling that played out in the Macondo well blowout and the catastrophic oil spill that followed. Chapters 1 through 3 describe the interplay of private industry and public oversight in the distinctive Gulf deepwater context: the conditions that governed the deployment of theDeepwater Horizon
and the drilling of the Macondo well. xiiiChapter One
The Deepwater Horizon, the
Macondo Well, and Sudden Death
on the Gulf of MexicoAt 5:45 a.m. on Tuesday, April 20, 2010, a
Halliburton Company cementing engineer sent
an e-mail from the rigDeepwater Horizon, in
the Gulf of Mexico off the Louisiana coast, to his colleague in Houston. He had good news: We have completed the job and it went well." 1 Outside in the Gulf, it was still darkbeyond the glare of the floodlights on the gargantuan rig, the four decks of which towered above the blue-green water on four huge white columns, all floating on massive pontoons. The oil derrick rose over 20 stories above the top deck. Up on the bridge on the main deck, two officers monitored the satellite- guided dynamic positioning system, controlling thrusters so powerful that they could keep the33,000-ton
Deepwater Horizon centered over a well
even in high seas. The rig's industrial hum and loud mechanical noises punctuated the sea air as a slight breeze blew in off the water. The crew worked onChapter One
Pride of the Transocean fleet of offshore drilling rigs, Deepwater Horizon rides calmly on station 40 miles off the Louisiana coast. The $560-million-dol lar rig, under lease to BP, was putting the finishing touches on the oil company"s18,000-foot-deep Macondo well when it blew out and escaping methane gas
exploded. Eleven workers died in the inferno. According to the governmen t"s estimates, by the time the well was sealed months later, over 4 million barrels of oil had spilled into the Gulf.Photo courtesy of Transocean
National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore D rilling the well bore, aiming always to keep the pressure inside the well balancing the force exerted by the surrounding seabed. 2 By the time the Halliburton engineer had arrived at the rig four days earlier to help cement in the two-and-a-half-mile-deep Macondo well, some crew members had dubbed it the well from hell." 3 Macondo was not the first well to earn that nickname; 4 like many deepwater wells, it had proved complicated and challenging. As they drilled, the engineers had to modify plans in response to their increasing knowledge of the precise features of the geologic formations thousands of feet below. Deepwater drilling is an unavoidably tough, demanding job, requiring tremendous engineering expertise. BP drilling engineer Brian Morel, who had designed the Macondo well with other BP engineers including Mark Hafle, was also on board to observe the final stages of work at the well. 5 In an April 14 e-mail, Morel had lamented to his colleagues, this has been [a] nightmare well which has everyone all over the place." 6BP and its corporate partners on
the well, Anadarko Petroleum and MOEX USA, had, according to government reports, budgeted $96.2 million and 51 days of work to drill the Macondo well inMississippi
Canyon Block 252.
7 They discovered a large reservoir of oil and gas, but drilling had been challenging. As of April 20, BP and the Macondo well were almost six weeks behind schedule and more than $58 million over budget.quotesdbs_dbs27.pdfusesText_33[PDF] BLP-500-VS - Jammer Telecom - France
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