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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the 3HRSOH·V 5HSXNOLŃ RI FOLQM
iOFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the 3HRSOH·V 5HSXNOLŃ RI FOLQM
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the 3HRSOH·V 5HSXNOLŃ RI FOLQM
Military and Security Developments
HQYROYLQJ POH 3HRSOH·V 5HSXNOLŃ RI FOLQM
2020Annual Report to Congress
A Report to Congress Pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act forFiscal Year 2000, as Amended
6HŃPLRQ 1260 ´Modifications to Annual Report on Military and Security Developments Involving the
3HRSOH·V 5HSXNOLŃ RI FOLQMµ RI POH 1MPLRQMO GHIHQVH $XPORUL]MPLRQ $ŃP IRU )LVŃMO KHMU 2020, Public
Law 116-92, which amends the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Section1202, Public Law 106-6D SURYLGHV POMP POH 6HŃUHPMU\ RI GHIHQVH VOMOO VXNPLP M UHSRUP ´LQ NRPO
ŃOMVVLILHG MQG XQŃOMVVLILHG IRUP RQ PLOLPMU\ MQG VHŃXULP\ GHYHORSPHQPV LQYROYLQJ POH 3HRSOH·V 5HSXNOLŃ
of China. The report shall address the current and probable future course of military-technological GHYHORSPHQP RI POH 3HRSOH·V ILNHUMPLRQ $UP\ MQG POH PHQHPV MQG SURNMNOH GHYHORSPHQP RI FOLQHVH security strategy and military strategy, and of the military organizations and operational concepts supporting such development over the next 20 years. The report shall also address United States- China engagement and cooperation on security matters during the period covered by the report,including through United States-China military-to-military contacts, and the United States strategy for
VXŃO HQJMJHPHQP MQG ŃRRSHUMPLRQ LQ POH IXPXUHBµOFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the 3HRSOH·V 5HSXNOLŃ RI FOLQM
PREFACE:
$ 20 K($5 5(75263(F7H9( 21 F+H1$·6STRATEGY AND ARMED FORCES
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the 3HRSOH·V 5HSXNOLŃ RI FOLQM
i For 20 years, the Department of Defense (DoD) has provided Congress with an annual report onPLOLPMU\ MQG VHŃXULP\ GHYHORSPHQPV LQYROYLQJ POH 3HRSOH·V 5HSXNOLŃ RI Fhina (PRC). These reports
OMYH MVVHVVHG POH ŃRQPRXUV RI FOLQM·V QMPLRQMO VPUMPHJ\ LPV MSSURMŃO PR VHŃXULP\ MQG PLOLPMU\ MIIMLUV
MQG SRPHQPLMO ŃOMQJHV LQ POH 35F·V MUPHG IRUŃHV RYHU POH QH[P 20 \HMUV MPRQJ RPOHU PMPPHUVB 2020
marks an important year for POH 3HRSOH·V ILNHUMPLRQ $UP\ 3I$ MV LP RRUNV PR MŃOLHYH LPSRUPMQP PRGHUQL]MPLRQ PLOHVPRQHV MOHMG RI POH FOLQHVH FRPPXQLVP 3MUP\·V FF3 NURMGHU JRMO PR PUMQVIRUPFOLQM LQPR M ´PRGHUMPHO\ SURVSHURXV VRŃLHP\µ N\ POH FF3·V ŃHQPHQMU\ LQ 2021B $V POH 8QLPHG 6tates
continues to respond to the growing strategic challenges posed by the PRC, 2020 offers a uniqueRSSRUPXQLP\ PR MVVHVV NRPO POH ŃRQPLQXLP\ MQG ŃOMQJHV POMP OMYH PMNHQ SOMŃH LQ POH 35F·V VPUMPHJ\ MQG
armed forces over the past two decades.GRG·V ILUVP MQQXMO UHSRUP PR FRQJUHVV LQ 2000 MVVHVVHG POH 35F·V MUPHG IRUŃHV MP POMP PLPH PR NH M
VL]MNOH NXP PRVPO\ MUŃOMLŃ PLOLPMU\ POMP RMV SRRUO\ VXLPHG PR POH FF3·V ORQJ-term ambitions. The report
UHŃRJQL]HG POH FF3·V RNÓHŃPLYH RMV IRU POH 35F PR NHŃRPH M ´VPURng, modernized, unified, and
RHMOPO\ QMPLRQBµ Despite these great power aspirations, the PLA lacked the capabilities, organization,
and readiness for modern warfare. Yet the CCP understood these deficiencies and set long-term goals to strengthen and transform its armed forces in a manner commensurate with its aspirations to strengthen and transform China. GRG·V 2000 UHSRUP MVVHVVHG POMP POH 3I$ RMV VORRO\ MQG XQHYHQO\ MGMSPLQJ PR POH PUHQGV LQ PRGHUQRMUIMUHB 7OH 3I$·V IRUŃH VPUXŃPXUH MQG ŃMSMNLOLPLHV IRŃXVed largely on waging large-scale land warfare
MORQJ FOLQM·V NRUGHUVB 7OH 3I$·V JURXQG MLU MQG QMYMO IRUŃHV RHUH VL]MNOH NXP PRVPO\ RNVROHPHB HPV
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capabilities were rudimentary; its use of information technology was well behind the curve; and itsQRPLQMO VSMŃH ŃMSMNLOLPLHV RHUH NMVHG RQ RXPGMPHG PHŃOQRORJLHV IRU POH GM\B )XUPOHU FOLQM·V GHIHQVH
industry struggled to produce high-quality systems. Even if the PRC could produce or acquire modern weapons, the PLA lacked the joint organizations and training needed to field them effectively. TheUHSRUP MVVHVVHG POMP POH 3I$·V RUJMQL]MPLRQMO RNVPMŃOHV RHUH VHYHUH HQRXJO POMP LI OHIP XQMGGUHVVHG
POH\ RRXOG ´LQOLNLP POH 3I$·V PMPXUMPLRQ LQPR M RRUOG-ŃOMVV PLOLPMU\ IRUŃHBµ7RR GHŃMGHV OMPHU POH 3I$·V RNÓHŃPLYH LV PR NHŃRPH M ´RRUOG-ŃOMVVµ PLOLPMU\ N\ POH HQG RI 204E³a
goal first announced by General Secretary Xi Jinping in 2017. Although the CCP has not defined whatM ´Rorld-ŃOMVVµ PLOLPMU\ PHMQV RLPOLQ POH ŃRQPH[P RI POH 35F·V QMPLRQMO VPUMPHJ\ LP LV OLNHO\ POMP %HLÓLQJ
will seek to develop a military by mid-century that is equal to³or in some cases superior to³the U.S.
military, or that of any other great power that thH 35F YLHRV MV M POUHMPB $V POLV \HMU·V UHSRUP GHPMLOV
the PRC has marshalled the resources, technology, and political will over the past two decades to strengthen and modernize the PLA in nearly every respect. Indeed, as this report shows, China is already ahead of the United States in certain areas such as:OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the 3HRSOH·V 5HSXNOLŃ RI FOLQM
ii> Shipbuilding: The PRC has the largest navy in the world, with an overall battle force of
approximately 350 ships and submarines including over 130 major surface combatants. In comparison, the U.S. NaY\·V NMPPOH IRUŃH LV MSSUR[LPMPHO\ 2E3 VOLSV MV RI HMUO\ 2020B > Land-based conventional ballistic and cruise missiles: The PRC has more than 1,250 ground- launched ballistic missiles (GLBMs) and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. The United States currently fields one type of conventional GLBM with a range of 70 to 300 kilometers and no GLCMs.> HQPHJUMPHG MLU GHIHQVH V\VPHPV 7OH 35F OMV RQH RI POH RRUOG·V OMUJHVP IRUŃHV RI MGYMQŃHG ORQJ-
range surface-to-air systems³including Russian-built S-400s, S-300s, and domestically produced systems³that constitute part of its robust and redundant integrated air defense system architecture.0RUH VPULNLQJ POMQ POH 3I$·V VPMJJHULQJ MPRXQPV RI QHR PLOLPMU\ OMUGRMUH MUH POH Uecent sweeping
efforts taken by CCP leaders that include completely restructuring the PLA into a force better suited
IRU ÓRLQP RSHUMPLRQV LPSURYLQJ POH 3I$·V RYHUMOO ŃRPNMP UHMGLQHVV HQŃRXUMJLQJ POH 3I$ PR HPNUMŃH
new operational concepts, and expanding POH 35F·V RYHUVHMV PLOLPMU\ IRRPSULQPBGHVSLPH POH 3I$·V SURJUHVV RYHU POH SMVP 20 \HMUV PMÓRU JMSV MQG VORUPŃRPLQJV UHPMLQB 7OH 35F·V
leaders are aware of these problems, and their strategy envisions the PLA undergoing almost 30 more years of modernization and reform. Of course, the CCP does not intend for the PLA to be merely aVORRSLHŃH RI FOLQM·V PRGHUQLP\ RU PR NHHS LP IRŃXVHG VROHO\ RQ UHJLRQMO POUHMPVB $V POLV UHSRUP VORRV
the CCP desires the PLA to become a practical instrument of its statecraft with an active role inMGYMQŃLQJ POH 35F·V IRUHLJQ SROLŃ\ SMUPLŃXOMUO\ RLPO UHVSHŃP PR POH 35F·V LQŃUHMVLQJO\ JORNMO LQPHUHVPV
and its aims to revise aspects of the international order.*LYHQ POH ŃRQPLQXLP\ LQ POH 35F·V VPUMPHJLŃ RNÓHŃPLYHV POH SMVP 20 \Hars offer a harbinger for the future
ŃRXUVH RI POH 35F·V QMPLRQMO VPUMPHJ\ MQG PLOLPMU\ MVSLUMPLRQVB FHUPMLQO\ PMQ\ IMŃPRUV RLOO GHPHUPLQH
how this course unfolds. What is certain is that the CCP has a strategic end state that it is working
towards, which if achieved and its accompanying military modernization left unaddressed, will haveserious implications for U.S. national interests and the security of the international rules-based order.
Report scope: This report covers security and military developments involving the PRC until the end of 2019.
Developments in 2020, including the implications of the COVID-OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the 3HRSOH·V 5HSXNOLŃ RI FOLQM
iiiThis page left intentionally blank
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the 3HRSOH·V 5HSXNOLŃ RI FOLQM
ivEXECUTIVE SUMMARY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the 3HRSOH·V 5HSXNOLŃ RI FOLQM
v81G(567$1GH1* F+H1$·S STRATEGY
FOLQM·V 1MPLRQMO 6PUMPHJ\
> The PeoplH·V 5HSXNOLŃ RI FOLQM·V 35F·V VPUMPHJ\ MLPV PR MŃOLHYH ´POH JUHMP UHÓXYHQMPLRQ RI POH
FOLQHVH QMPLRQµ N\ 204EB FOLQM·V VPUMPHJ\ ŃMQ NH ŃOMUMŃPHUL]HG MV M GHPHUPLQHG SXUVXLP RI SROLPLŃMO
and social modernity that includes far-ranging efforts to expand ChiQM·V QMPLRQMO SRRHU SHUIHŃP
its governance systems, and revise the international order.> The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) frames this strategy as an effort to realize long-held
QMPLRQMOLVP MVSLUMPLRQV PR ´UHPXUQµ FOLQM PR M SRVLPLRQ RI VPUHQJPO SURVSHULPy, and leadership on
the world stage.> 7OH FF3·V OHMGHUVOLS OMV ORQJ YLHRHG FOLQM MV HPNURLOHG LQ M PMÓRU LQPHUQMPLRQMO VPUMPHJLŃ
competition with other states, including, and in particular, the United States. > In 2019, China intensified its efforts to advance its overall development including steadying its economic growth, strengthening its armed forces, and taking a more active role in global affairs.Foreign Policy
> 7OH 35F·V IRUHLJQ SROLŃ\ VHHNV PR UHYLVH MVSHŃPV RI POH LQPHUQMPLRQMO RUGHU RQ POH 3MUP\·V Perms
and in accordance with ideas and principles it views as essential to forging an external environment ŃRQGXŃLYH PR FOLQM·V QMPLRQMO UHÓXYHQMPLRQB > In 2019, the PRC recognized that its armed forces should take a more active role in advancing its foreign policy, highlighting the increasingly global character that Beijing ascribes to its military power.Economic Policy
> 7OH FF3 SULRULPL]HV HŃRQRPLŃ GHYHORSPHQP MV POH ´ŃHQPUMO PMVNµ MQG POH IRUŃH POMP GULYHV FOLQM·V
modernization across all areas, including its armed forces.> FOLQM·V HŃRQRPLŃ GHYHORSPHQP VXSSRUPV LPV PLOLPMU\ PRGHUQL]MPLRQ QRP RQO\ N\ SURYLGLQJ POH
means for larger defense budgets, but through deliberate Party-led initiatives such as OBOR and Made in China 2025, as well as the systemic benefits RI FOLQM·V JURRLQJ QMPLRQMO LQGXVPULMO MQG technological base.Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) Development Strategy
> 7OH 35F SXUVXHV LPV 0F) GHYHORSPHQP 6PUMPHJ\ PR ´IXVHµ LPV HŃRQRPLŃ MQG VRŃLMO GHYHORSPHQP
strategies with its security strategies to build an integrated national strategic system and capabilities
LQ VXSSRUP RI FOLQM·V QMPLRQMO UHÓXYHQMPLRQ JRMOVBOFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the 3HRSOH·V 5HSXNOLŃ RI FOLQM
vi> 0F) HQŃRPSMVVHV VL[ LQPHUUHOMPHG HIIRUPV 1 IXVLQJ POH FOLQM·V GHIHQVH LQGXVPULMO NMVH MQG LPV
civilian technology and industrial base; (2) integrating and leveraging science and technology innovations across military and civilian sectors; (3) cultivating talent and blending military andcivilian expertise and knowledge; (4) building military requirements into civilian infrastructure and
leveraging civilian construction for military purposes; (5) leveraging civilian service and logistics
ŃMSMNLOLPLHV IRU PLOLPMU\ SXUSRVHV MQG 6 H[SMQGLQJ MQG GHHSHQLQJ FOLQM·V QMPLRQMO GHIHQVHmobilization system to include all relevant aspects of its society and economy for use in
competition and war. > While MCF has broader purposes than acquiring foreign technology, in practice, MCF meansPOHUH LV QRP M ŃOHMU OLQH NHPRHHQ POH 35F·V ŃLYLOLMQ MQG PLOLPMU\ HŃRQRPLHV UMLVLQJ GXH GLOLJHQŃH
costs for U.S. and global entitLHV POMP GR QRP GHVLUH PR ŃRQPULNXPH PR POH 35F·V PLOLPMU\
modernization.Defense Policy & Military Strategy
> The PRC has stated its defense policy aims to safeguard its sovereignty, security, and developmentLQPHUHVPVB FOLQM·V PLOLPMU\ VPUMPHJ\ UHPMLQV NMVHG RQ POH ŃRQŃHSP RI ´MŃPLYH GHIHQVHBµ
> In 2019, the PLA remained primarily oriented towards longstanding regional threats while
HPSOMVL]LQJ M JUHMPHU JORNMO UROH IRU LPVHOI LQ MŃŃRUGMQŃH RLPO FOLQM·V GHIHQVH SROLŃ\ MQG PLOLPMU\
strategy.> FOLQM·V OHMGHUV VPress the imperative of meeting key military transformation markers set in 2020
MQG 203DB 7OHVH PLOHVPRQHV VHHN PR MOLJQ POH 3I$·V PUMQVIRUPMPLRQ RLPO FOLQM·V RYHUMOO QMPLRQMO
PRGHUQL]MPLRQ VR POMP N\ POH HQG RI 204E FOLQM RLOO ILHOG M ´RRUOG-ŃOMVVµ PLOLPMry.> 7OH FF3 OMV QRP GHILQHG ROMP LP PHMQV N\ LPV MPNLPLRQ PR OMYH M ´RRUOG-ŃOMVVµ PLOLPMU\B JLPOLQ
POH ŃRQPH[P RI FOLQM·V QMPLRQMO VPUMPHJ\ ORRHYHU LP LV OLNHO\ POMP FOLQM RLOO MLP PR GHYHORS Mmilitary by mid-century that is equal to³or in some cases superior to³the U.S. military, or that
of any other great power that China views as a threat to its sovereignty, security, and development interests. MISSIONS, TASKS, & MODERNIZATION OF CHIN$·6 $50(G )25F(6 H17+( ´1(J (5$µ
> 7OH 35F·V VPUMPHJ\ LQŃOXGHV MGYMQŃing a comprehensive military modernization program that aims
PR ´NMVLŃMOO\µ ŃRPSOHPH PLOLPMU\ PRGHUQL]MPLRQ N\ 203D MQG PUMQVIRUP POH 3I$ LQPR M ´RRUOG-
clasVµ PLOLPMU\ N\ POH HQG RI 204EB> 7OH 3I$·V HYROYLQJ ŃMSMNLOLPLHV MQG ŃRQŃHSPV ŃRQPLQXH PR VPUHQJPOHQ POH 35F·V MNLOLP\ PR ŃRXQPHU
an intervention by an adversary in the Indo-Pacific region and project power globally.OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the 3HRSOH·V 5HSXNOLŃ RI FOLQM
vii > In 2019, the PLA continued to make progress implementing major structural reforms, fielding modern indigenous systems, building readiness, and strengthening its competency to conduct joint operations.> China has already achieved parity with³or even exceeded³the United States in several military
modernization areas, including: ² Shipbuilding: The PRC has the largest navy in the world, with an overall battle force of approximately 350 ships and submarines including over 130 major surface combatants. In comparison, the UB6B 1MY\·V NMPPOH IRUŃH LV MSSUR[LPMPHO\ 2E3 VOLSV MV RI HMUO\ 2020B China is the top ship-producing nation in the world by tonnage and is increasing its shipbuilding capacity and capability for all naval classes. ² Land-based conventional ballistic and cruise missiles: The PRC has developed its conventional missile forces unrestrained by any international agreements. The PRC has more than 1,250 ground-launched ballistic missiles (GLBMs) and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. The United States currently fields one type of conventional GLBM with a range of 70 to 300 kilometers and no GLCMs.² Integrated air defense systems 7OH 35F OMV RQH RI POH RRUOG·V OMUJHVP IRUŃHV RI MGYMQŃHG
long-range surface-to-air systems³including Russian-built S-400s, S-300s, and domestically produced systems³that constitute part of its robust and redundant integrated air defense system (IADS) architecture. GHYHORSPHQPV LQ POH 3I$·V 0RGHUQL]MPLRQ MQG 5HIRUP > 7OH 3HRSOH·V ILNHUMPLRQ $UP\ $UP\ 3I$$ is the largest standing ground force in the world. In 2019, the PLAA continued to transition into a modern, mobile, and lethal ground force by fielding upgraded combat systems and communications equipment and enhancing its ability to conduct and manage complex combined-arms and joint operations. > 7OH 3HRSOH·V ILNHUMPLRQ $UP\ 1MY\ 3I$1³the largest navy in the world³is an increasingly modern and flexible force that has focused on replacing previous generations of platforms with limited capabilities in favor of larger, modern multi-role combatants. As of 2019, the PLAN is largely composed of modern multi-role platforms featuring advanced anti-ship, anti- air, and anti-submarine weapons and sensors. ² Naval Shipbuilding and Modernization: The PLAN remains engaged in a robust shipbuilding and modernization program that includes submarines, surface combatants, amphibious warfare ships, aircraft carriers, and auxiliary ships as well as developing and fielding advanced weapons, sensors, and command and control capabilities.OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the 3HRSOH·V 5HSXNOLŃ RI FOLQM
viii > 7OH 3HRSOH·V ILNHUMPLRQ $UP\ $LU )RUŃH 3I$$) and PLAN Aviation together constitute the largest aviation forces in the region and the third largest in the world, with over 2,500 total aircraft and approximately 2,000 combat aircraft. The PLAAF is rapidly catching up to Western air forces across a broad range of capabilities and competencies. > 7OH 3HRSOH·V ILNHUMPLRQ $rmy Rocket Force (PLARF) LV UHVSRQVLNOH IRU POH 35F·V VPUMPHJLŃ land-based nuclear and conventional missile forces. The PLARF develops and fields a wide variety of conventional mobile ground-launched ballistic missiles and cruise missiles. The PRC isdeveloping new intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that will significantly improve its
nuclear-ŃMSMNOH PLVVLOH IRUŃHVB 7OH QXPNHU RI RMUOHMGV RQ POH 35F·V OMQG-based ICBMs capable
of threatening the United States is expected to grow to roughly 200 in the next five years. ² The PRC is expanding its inventory of the multi-role DF-26, a mobile, ground-launched intermediate-range ballistic missile system capable of rapidly swapping conventional and nuclear warheads. ² 7OH 35F·V URNXVP JURXQG-based conventional missile forces compliment the growing size and capabilities of its air- and sea-based precision strike capabilities. > The PLA Strategic Support Force (SSF) is a theater command-level organization establishedPR ŃHQPUMOL]H POH 3I$·V VPUMPHJLŃ VSMŃH Ń\NHU HOectronic, and psychological warfare missions and
capabilities. The SSF Network Systems Department is responsible for cyberwarfare, technical reconnaissance, electronic warfare, and psychological warfare. Its current major target is theUnited States.
² The 35F·V 6SMŃH (QPHUSULVHB 7OH 35F·V VSMŃH HQPHUSUise continues to mature rapidly. Beijing has devoted significant resources to growing all aspects of its space program, from military space applications to civil applications such as profit-generating launches, scientific endeavors, and space exploration. ² The PLA has historically PMQMJHG POH 35F·V VSMŃH SURJUMPB 7he SSF Space Systems Department is responsible for nearly all PLA space operations.² HQ 201E POH 35F GHVŃULNHG VSMŃH MV M ´ŃULPLŃMO GRPMLQ LQ LQPHUQMPional strategic
ŃRPSHPLPLRQµ MQG VPMPHG POH VHŃXULP\ RI VSMŃH SURYLGHG VPUMPHJLŃ MVVXUMQŃH PR POH ŃRXQPU\·V
national and social development. > Military Readiness: In recent years, CCP leaders have directed the PLA to improve its combatreadiness. This guidanŃH LV LQŃUHMVLQJO\ HYLGHQP LQ POH LQPHQVLP\ RI POH 3I$·V PUMLQLQJ MQG POH
complexity and scale of its exercises.OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the 3HRSOH·V 5HSXNOLŃ RI FOLQM
ix Capabilities for Counter Intervention and Power Projection > The PLA is developing capabilities to provide options for the PRC to dissuade, deter, or, if ordered, defeat third-party intervention during a large-scale, theater campaign such as a Taiwan contingency. > 7OH 3I$·V MQPL-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities are currently the most robust within the First Island Chain, although the PRC aims to strengthen its capabilities to reach farther into thePacific Ocean.
> The PRC also continues to increase its military capabilities to achieve regional and global security
objectives beyond a Taiwan contingency. > The PLA is developing the capabilities and operational concepts to conduct offensive operations within the Second Island Chain, in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and in some cases, globally. In addition to strike, air and missile defense, anti-surface and anti-submarine capabilities improvements, China is focusing on information, cyber, and space and counterspace operations.Nuclear Deterrence
> FOLQM·V VPUMPHJLŃ MPNLPLRQV HYROYLQJ YLHR RI POH VHŃXULP\ OMQGVŃMSH MQG ŃRQŃHUQV RYHU
survivability are driving significant changes to the size, capabilities, and readiness of its nuclear
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