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MONITORING MEDIAPLURALISM IN THE DIGITAL ERA

APPLICATION OF THE MEDIA PLURALISMMONITOR IN THE EUROPEAN UNION,ALBANIA, MONTENEGRO, THE REPUBLIC OFNORTH MACEDONIA, SERBIA & TURKEY INTHE YEAR 2020

Country report: France

Franck Rebillard, IRMÉCCEN - Université Sorbonne Nouvelle Jedediah Sklower, IRMÉCCEN - Université Sorbonne Nouvelle

Research Project Report

Issue 2021.2809

July 2021

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1.About the project4

1.1.Overview of the project4

1.2.Methodological note4

2.Introduction6

3.Results from the data collection: assessment of the risks to media

pluralism8

3.1.Fundamental protection (41% - medium risk)9

3.2.Market plurality (58% - medium risk)11

3.3.Political independence (27% - low risk)14

3.4.Social inclusiveness (37% - medium risk)16

4.Pluralism in the online environment: assessment of the risks19

5.Conclusions22

6.References24

Annexe I. Country Team

Annexe II. Group of Experts

© European University Institute 2021

Content and individual chapters © Franck Rebillard, Jedediah Sklower, 2021 This work has been published by the European University Institute,

Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies.

This text may be downloaded only for personal research purposes. Additional reproduction for other purposes, whether in hard copies or electronically, requires the consent of the authors. If cited or quoted, reference should be made to the full name of the author(s), editor(s), the title, the year and the publisher.

Requests should be addressed to cmpf@eui.eu

Views expressed in this publication reflect the opinion of individual authors and not those of the European University Institute.

Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom

Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies

Research Project Report

RSC / Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom

2021.2809

Published in July 2021

European University Institute

Badia Fiesolana

I 50014 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI)

https://cadmus.eui.eu/ The Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom is co-financed by the European Union. This publication reflects the views only of the author(s), and the Commission cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein.

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1. About the project

1.1. Overview of the Project

TheMedia PluralismMonitor(MPM) isaresearch tooldesignedto identifypotentialrisks tomediapluralism inthe MemberStatesof theEuropeanUnion andincandidate countries.Thisnarrative reporthasbeen producedon thebasisof theimplementationof theMPMcarried outin2020. Theimplementationwas conductedin 27EUMember States,aswell asinAlbania, Montenegro,theRepublic ofNorthMacedonia, Serbiaand Turkey.Thisproject, underapreparatory actionofthe EuropeanParliament,was supported bya grantawardedby theEuropeanCommission totheCentre forMediaPluralism andMediaFreedom (CMPF) at the European University Institute.

1.2. Methodological note

Authorship and review

TheCMPF partnerswithexperienced, independentnationalresearchers tocarryout thedatacollection and authorthe narrativereports,except inthecase ofItalywhere datacollectionis carriedoutcentrally bythe CMPF team. The research is based on a standardised questionnaire developed by the CMPF. In Francethe CMPFpartneredwith Prof.Franck RebillardandDr. JedediahSklower(IRMÉCCEN - UniversitéSorbonne Nouvelle), whoconducted thedatacollection, scoredandcommented onthevariables inthe questionnaireandinterviewed experts.Thereport wasreviewedby theCMPFstaff. Moreover,to ensureaccurate andreliablefindings, agroupof nationalexpertsin eachcountryreviewed theanswersto

particularlyevaluative questions(seeAnnexe IIforthe listofexperts). Foralist ofselectedcountries, the

final country report was peer-reviewed by an independent country expert. Risksto mediapluralismare examinedinfour mainthematicareas: FundamentalProtection,Market Plurality,Political IndependenceandSocial Inclusiveness.Theresults arebasedon theassessmentof a number of indicators for each thematic area (see Table 1). Fundamental ProtectionMarket PluralityPolitical IndependenceSocial Inclusiveness

Protection of freedom of

expressionTransparency of media ownershipPolitical independence of mediaAccess to media for minorities

Protection of right to

informationNews media concentrationEditorial autonomyAccess to media for local/regional communities and for community media

Journalistic profession,

standards and protectionOnline platforms concentration and competition enforcementAudiovisual media, online platforms and electionsAccess to media for women

Independence and

effectiveness of the media authorityMedia viabilityState regulation of resources and support to media sectorMedia Literacy

Universal reach of

traditional media and access to the InternetCommercial & owner influence over editorial contentIndependence of PSM governance and fundingProtection against illegal and harmful speech Table 1: Areas and Indicators of the Media Pluralism Monitor

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The digital dimension

TheMonitor doesnotconsider thedigitaldimension tobean isolatedareabut ratherasintertwined with traditionalmedia andexistingprinciples ofmediapluralism andfreedomof expression.Nevertheless,the

Monitoralso extractsdigital-specificrisk scoresandthe reportcontainsa specificanalysisof risksrelatedto

the digital news environment.

The calculation of risk

The results for each thematic area and indicator are presented on a scale from 0 to 100%.

Scores between 0 and 33%: low risk

Scores between 34 to 66%: medium risk

Scores between 67 and 100%: high risk

Withregard toindicators,scores of0are rated3%while scoresof100 arerated97% bydefault,to avoidan assessment of total absence or certainty of risk. Disclaimer:The contentofthe reportdoesnot necessarilyreflectthe viewsofthe CMPF,northe positionof themembers composingtheGroup ofExperts.It representstheviews ofthenational countryteamthat carriedout thedatacollection andauthoredthe report.Dueto updatesandrefinements inthe questionnaire,MPM2021 scoresmaynot befullycomparable withpreviouseditions oftheMPM. Formore detailsregarding theproject,see theCMPFreport onMPM2021,soon availableon:

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2. Introduction

Population: Asof January2021,there are67.4million inhabitantsinFrance, morethan2 millionof which live in overseas territories (INSEE, 2021a). Languages: Francehas adiverselinguistic landscape:besideFrench, numerousregionallanguages (Alsatian,Basque, Breton,Catalan,Corsican, Occitan,andso forth),avariety ofCreoleand overseas languages, as well as languages spoken by immigrant communities, and sign language. Minorities: Ethnicminorities havenolegal existenceinFrance, andthereare importantrestrictionson theproduction ofethnicstatistics. In2019,there were6.7million immigrants(amongwhich 2.5million acquiredFrench citizenship)and0.7 millionforeignersborn onFrenchsoil. 46.5%ofimmigrants living inFrance werebornin Africa,33.3%in Europe,14.7%in Asia(INSEE,2021b). Withtheresponse to the pandemic, the number of visas granted in 2020 fell drastically (-80%). Economicsituation: France sGDP wasabout ¬2,279 trillionin2020. Franceisthe third-largest economyin Europe(behindGermany andGreatBritain). Itsuffereda majorrecessionin 2020dueto lockdown (-8.3%), a record since World War II (INSEE, 2021c). Politicalsituation: Since the2017elections, Francehasbeen governedbyPresident Emmanuel Macron,whose politicalparty,the centristandpro-free marketLaRépublique EnMarche(LaREM), controlsthe NationalAssembly.LaREM wascreatedto conquerpoweroutside ofthetraditional political landscape, in a context in which the far right has gained ground. Mediamarket: Asis thecasein mostWesternEuropean countries,France smediascape hostsbotha publicand aprivateaudiovisual sector.Withthe adventofdigital terrestrialtelevisionin the2000s, therewas amultiplicationof privatechannels,now controlledbya fewmajorgroups; theprojectto createa newsinglepublic entityhasbeen postponed,dueto theCOVID-19crisis. Theprintpress is dividedbetween national,mostlypoliticized outletsaimedat urban,upper-middle-classreaders, and regionaloutlets whosereadershipis olderandless welloff.This mediaenvironmenthas beenevolving ata fastpacewith theprogressof onlinemediaand digitalplatforms,while legacymedia,and especially the print press, have been experiencing growing economic difficulties. Regulatoryenvironment: TheTV andradiosectors areregulatedby theConseilSupérieur de l Audiovisuel(CSA). Itisexpected tomergewith theauthorityin chargeofauthor rights(HADOPI)and takeon thesupervisionof onlinecontents,while telecommunicationnetworksand serviceswillremain theprerogative oftheirexisting regulator(ARCEP).Moreover, thenationalCompetition Authority (Autoritéde laconcurrence)can becalledupon forissuespertaining toeconomicconcentration (08/01/1986law no86-897;Code ofCommerce,art. L-233,L-420,L-430, L-464).Atthe European level,France hasbeen,to acertainextent, aleaderin theregulationof onlineissues:it wasthefirst to applythe April2019EU CopyrightDirective(no 2019/790)withinmonths (07/24/2019lawno 2019-775) andplanned ataxon theGAFA.However, theresultsof thesemeasuresand othershavenot met expectations, as was the case with recent laws dealing with disinformation and online hate speech. COVID-19:The effectsofthe COVID-19crisisblended withacertain numberofpreexisting trends, notablyenabling furtherconcentrationwithin allmediasectors andincreasingthe professionaland economicinsecurity ofmanymedia professionals.Theconjuncture isalsoaffected bydistrustin

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mainstreaminformation sources,avariety ofattackson journalists(terroristthreats, physicalviolence, harassment,strategic lawsuitsagainstpublic participation[SLAPP]),and controversiallegislative measures ontradesecrets, hatespeech,the protectionofthe imageofpolice officers which have added to existing concerns.

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3. Results from the data collection: assessment of the risks to media pluralism

Consideringthe indicatorsofthe MPM,theassessments forFrancereveal theexistenceof amajorityof situationsin whichtherisk formediapluralism is medium (11 indicators).Eventhough highriskassessed indicatorsremain rare(2indicators), itshouldbe notedthatlow riskones(7 indicators)donot dominate. Theinternational contextofthe pandemicin2020, ofcourse,affected Frenchsocietyas wellasits media. However,many problemsstemfrom morestructuralevolutions whosecausesand effectshavebeen ignoredat thenationallevel forarather longtime,and severalothersare actuallytiedto reformsrecently initiated by the executive branch. WhileFrance hasastrong legalinfrastructureensuring FundamentalProtections (medium risk 41%), theonlyindicator showingalow riskinthis setisthat oftheindependence and effectivenessof thepublicmedia authority.Indeed,several recentlegislativeand regulatoryendeavors representa threatonfreedom ofexpressionand therightto information.Despiteefforts tosupportthe professionduring thepandemic,the securityofjournalists hasdegradedon multiple fronts socioeconomic, physical and legal. Thearea ofMarketPlurality isthe mostworryingof all(mediumrisk 58%). Thoughthetransparency ofmedia ownershipisrelatively wellensured,anti-concentration normshaveproven incapableof preventingthe accelerationofmedia concentrationinthe handsofa smallsetof conglomeratesand billionaires,while advertisingrevenuesare shrinkingata fastpace(Rebillard, 2020),asthey havebeen preemptedby theonlineGoogle andFacebookduopoly (Perrot&al., 2020).Thisconfiguration seriouslyjeopardizes theeconomicviability ofmanymedia outlets.Itthus threatenspluralism,as well asthe credibilityofmany outlets,assome conglomeratesimposedeleterious professionaland

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managerial standards to reduced newsrooms, which undermine their independence and work. Francehas anefficientregulatory frameworkthatensures thePoliticalIndependence of public audiovisualmedia andsupportmechanisms (lowrisk 27%). Directpoliticalcontrol ofmediaoutlets is rare.Yet, indirectly,theties betweenprivateowners ofmediaempires andpowerfulpolitical figures orprivate economicinterestssometimes leadtoa favorablecoverageof thelatter sagenda and ideological collusion. Recently,there hasbeena risingawarenessof theproblemsassociated withSocialInclusiveness (mediumrisk 37%). Recentlaws(08/04/2014 no2014-873;01/27/2017 no2017-86)have specifically addressedthese questionsandothers (harassmentinthe workplace,hatespeech), buthaveoften fallenshort ofprovidingefficient answers,aswas thecasewith theAvialaw (06/24/2020no2020-766). Despiteformal progresses(inmanagement positions,forinstance), minoritiesstillsuffer frommedia stereotyping.Media literacyprogramsare strong,butunequally implementedatthe nationallevel; conspiracy theories are on the rise, as trust in the media remains low.

3.1. Fundamental Protection (41% - medium risk)

TheFundamental Protectionindicatorsrepresent theregulatorybackbone ofthemedia sectorinevery contemporarydemocracy. Theymeasurea numberofpotential areasofrisk, includingtheexistence and effectivenessof theimplementationof regulatorysafeguardsfor freedomofexpression andtheright to information;the statusofjournalists ineachcountry, includingtheirprotection andabilityto work;the independenceand effectivenessofthe nationalregulatorybodies thathavecompetence toregulatethe media sector, and the reach of traditional media and access to the Internet. The Protectionof freedomofexpression indicator showsamedium riskassessment(41%). France s constitutionand legalapparatus(especially thefamous29 July1881law) aswell astheEuropean textsit abidesby ensurefreedom ofthepress, ofopinion,and ofexpression(Bigot, 2017;Derieux,2018). There arelegally definedrestrictions,which dealwithdefamation andpublicinsults, privacy,rightto image(1881 law),apology ofterrorism(04/03/1995 lawno55-385; 11/14/2014no2014-1353), informationmanipulation

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(12/22/2018no 2018-1202)andhate speech(07/14/1990 Gayssot lawno90-615; 01/27/2017no2017-86;

06/25/2020no 2020-766),aswell asconfidentialitysafeguards (professionaldiscretion,civil servant

discretion,doctor-patient confidentiality,secretdefense, etc.),especiallyfor whistle-blowers(11/12/2007law

no 2007-1598; 01/03/2012 decree no 2012-484; 12/09/2016 Sapin law no 2016-1691). Thisis whereproblemsarise, especiallywiththe growinguseof strategiclawsuitsagainst public

participationprocedures (SLAPP, procès-bâillons gaglawsuits,in French)againstindividual journalists

ormedia outlets(Fontaine& al.,2017;Voisard, 2016).Thisphenomenon isepitomizedby billionaire(and mediamogul) VincentBolloré,who hasregularlyattacked andresortedto flakagainstinvestigative journalists,NGOs andwhistle-blowerswho havedenouncedthe numerouscorruptionscandals thatvarious branchesof hisconglomeratehave beeninvolvedin, especiallyinAfrica (ReportersWithoutBorders, 2018). Hereare acoupleof recentexamples:in July2020,Bolloré wascondemnedfor abusivelyusingdefamation proceduresagainst BenoîtCollombat,a journalistatFrance Interwhohad investigatedonthe working conditionsof aCamerooniancompany (Socapalm)ownedat 40%byBolloré. InFebruary2021, the VersaillesCourt ofAppealsoverturned a2019ruling whichhadcondemned Mediapart andits journalist Fanny Pigeaud for an article dealing with Bolloré s economic and political influence in Cameroon. Anti-terrorismmeasures, andtheState s frequentuseof thestateof emergency(Councilof Europe Commissionerfor HumanRights,2019; Houry,2018;Office oftheUnited NationsHighCommissioner for HumanRights, 2019)alsorepresent athreat,as dorecentlaws, suchasthe aforementioned December2018 oneandits verybroaddefinition ofdisinformation(Badouard, 2017,2020;Doutreix & Barbe,2019), orthe2021 lawon global security (05/25/2021no 2021-646)whichhad initiallyaimedat restrictingthe disseminationofthe imageofpolice forces a provisionwhichwas eventuallytakenout, followingcriticisms andprotests(Amnesty International,2020b;Office oftheUnited NationsHigh Commissionerfor HumanRights,2020; SyndicatNationaldes Journalistes,2020).These facts,andothers,

shed light on why France is ranked 34 in Reporters Without Borders (2020b) press freedom assessment.

The Protectionof righttoinformation (RTI) indicatoralsoshows amediumrisk assessment(50%).In this casetoo, thisfundamentalright isguaranteedby France slegalapparatus (07/17/1978lawno 78-753;

07/11/1979no 79-587;04/12/2000no 2000-321).However,it suffersimportantrestrictions France sRTI

law applies onlytothe executive,excludingStated ownedenterprisesand privatebodieswhich undertake publicfunctions , accordingtothe CenterforLaw andDemocracy s2017 report in acontextof growing publicdemand fortransparency(Commission d AccèsauxDocuments Administratifs,2019),which leadthe aforementionedCenter torankFrance s veryweakRTI law 107out ofthe128 countriesanalyzedin its GlobalRTI rating.Moreover,a 30July2018 lawontrade secrets(no2018-670, whichtransposedan EU directive),whose perimeterwasrecently extended(12/07/2020law no2020-1525),further restrictsaccess

tothis rightandsource confidentiality(Anticor,2020; Anticor&Transparency International,2020;Corporate

EuropeObservatory, 2015;Leroux& al.,2019;Reporters WithoutBorders,2020a; SHERPA,2020; Syndicatde laPresseIndépendante d InformationenLigne, 2018).SLAPPprocedures areonthe rise,and therehave alsobeenrecent casesofState pressureonjournalists dealingwithvarious affairs( Benalla affair , arms sales to Saudi Arabia to support its war in Yemen Reporters Without Borders, 2019a). Thesituation ofthe Journalisticprofession ,its standardsand protectionis worrying,despitea long- lastingtradition ofunionization.Risk, here,isalso medium(48%),as thereisa generaldegradation,on manylevels. Followingyearsof mobilization,therehas beenarecent improvementofthe statusof pigistes (non-permanentwage-earning journalists),andyet, moreandmore journalistsaresubmitted topressures bytheir employerstoaccept thestatusof auto-entrepreneurs ,i.e. self-employment gigs whichis contraryto thelaw(03/29/1936 Brachardlaw ;07/04/1974 Cressardlaw no 74-630),theLabor Code (art.L-7112-1), andcollectiveagreements (Charon,2020;Chupin, 2014;Dupuy,2016; Frisque,2013;

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Profession: Pigiste,2016;Société CiviledesAuteurs Multimedia,2019).Many abandontheprofession (Charon& Pigeolat,2020;Leteinturier, 2016).Theonline environmenthascreated itsspecificbrand of

precarious desk journalist positions,with themultiplicationof webcontentproducer [rédacteurweb ]

contractsor bloggerpositions(Neihouser, 2018),whichdo notofferthe protectionsassociatedto the traditionalstatus, extendingahistorical trendofderegulation tothemedia sector(Boltanski& Chiapello,

2018).

Thehigh levelsofmedia concentration,thedeterioration ofprofessionalstandards, terroristthreats (InternationalFederation ofJournalists,2020) andviolenceagainst reporters from protestors,private interestsand policeforcesalike (AmnestyInternational,2019, 2020a,2020c;Bauer, 2020;Councilof EuropePlatform toPromotethe ProtectionofJournalism andtheSafety ofJournalists,2020a, 2020b; Défenseurdes Droits,2020;European CentreforPress andMediaFreedom, 2020;ReportersWithout Borders,2019b, 2021) ,cases ofonlineharassment offemalejournalists, massivelay-offsin manymedia outlets,the COVID-19crisis:all thesefactors,among others,painta worryingtableauof thesituationof journalists in France. TheIndependence andeffectivenessof themediaauthority indicatorshows alowrisk assessment (8%).The mediaregulatorfor TVandradio (CSA)isan independentpublicauthority, withanautonomous budget.Its decisionsaretransparent, asisthe appointmentofits members(07/26/1983no 83-675;

09/20/1986no 86-1067;11/15/2013no 2013-1028).Withthe expansionofits missionstothe online

environment(following itsfusionwith theHADOPI),there isconcernit couldbecomemore vulnerableto pressures if its budget is not increased accordingly. For the Universal reach of traditional media and access to the Internet assessment, see section 4.

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3.2. Market Plurality (58% - medium risk)

TheMarket Pluralityareafocuses ontheeconomic riskstomedia pluralism,derivingfrom lackof transparencyand concentrationofownership, sustainabilityofthe mediaindustry,exposure ofjournalismto commercialinterests. Thefirstindicator examinestheexistence andeffectivenessof provisionson transparencyof mediaownership.Lack ofcompetitionand externalpluralismis assessedseparatelyfor the newsmedia (productionofthe news)andfor theonlineplatforms (gatewaystothe news),considering separatelyhorizontal andcross-mediaconcentration; theconcentrationof onlineadvertisingmarket; andthe roleof competitionenforcement.The indicatoronmedia viabilitymeasuresthe trendofrevenues and employment,in relationwithGDP trends.Thelast indicatoraimsto assessrisksto marketpluralityposed by business interests on production of editorial content, both from commercial and owners influence The Transparencyof mediaownership indicatoris theonlyone oftheMarket pluralityareato showalow riskassessment (31%).Indeed,France imposesthepublication ofalldirect andindirect/finalowners of mediaoutlets (08/01/1986lawno 86-897;09/20/1986no 86-1067;06/12/2009no 2009-669;11/14/2016 no2016-1524; 12/09/2016no2016-1691); theimplementationin Franceofrecent EUDirectiveson transparencyfurther securesit.However, researchhas,for instance,stressedthat thecomplexityand multilayerednature ofnumerousmedia conglomerate sownershipstructures createacertain degreeof opacity(Cagé &al.,2017), withmothercompanies oftenbasedin foreignnations(some ofthemin tax havens). Amongall MPMindicators, Newsmedia concentrationis theoneassessed atthehighest risk(75%). Franceestablished acertainnumber ofanti-concentrationthresholds inthevarious mediasectorsas well asspecific oroverarchingregulation andsurveillanceauthorities (07/29/1982lawno 82-652;10/23/1984 no84-947; 02/01/1994no94-88; 08/01/2000no2000-719; 07/17/2001no2001-624). Yetthisapparatus hasproven itspowerlessnessin thefaceof trendsthat,since the1980s,and moresoin thepast15 years, havefavored highlevelsof horizontalandcrossmedia concentration(Acrimed& LeMonde diplomatique,

2020;Cagé &al.,2017; Carasco,2018;Chupin &al.,2012; Diard,2016;Kamina, 2016;Lagues& al.,

2016).

Inrecent years,majormagazine pressgroupshave beensoldby theirhistoricalowners. Forinstance,

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ReworldMedia tookoverMondadori France(AutoPlus , Biba, Nousdeux , Grazia, Closer, Science& vie,

Téléstar & )in January2020,and Bertelsmannsoldits PrismaMediagroup (Capital, Géo, Gala, Voici, Télé

loisirs, Femmeactuelle ) toVivendi inDecember2020. TheBolloréempire isfurtherbloated byitsApril 2020

investmentin theLagardèregroup; themogulhas clearlyexpressedhis desiretocreate newsynergies betweenthe Europe1radio channel(whichis partofthe Lagardèregroup)and hisfarright 24-hournews televisionchannel CNews.Theproject isforthe momentblockedby BernardArnault,who alsomassively investedin theLagardèregroup, asitwas beingdismantled.The latestcaseof thistrendis theacquisition bythe TF1group(owned byBouygues)of theM6-RTLgroup (ownedbyBertelsmann). Theoperationwill notconcern the24-hournews channels.Ifit isapprovedby theCompetitionAuthority, thenewentity will controlmost oftheprivate televisionmarketin France(TF1+M6= 42%ofthe free-to-airTVaudience and

70% of TV advertising, as of June 2021).

Construction,arms, transportation&logistics, telecommunications:thegroups thathaveinvested inthe sectorsince the1980soperate ineconomicfields inwhichthe Statehasimportant stakes,whichare highly dependenton publicprocurement,and traditionallyhighlyregulated. Mediacontrol,in thiscontext,can lead toinfluence, andtheties theseownersoften havewithleading politicalfigures amongwhichPresidents Macronor Sarkozy(Cassini& Faye,2021;Lévrier, 2019) are wellknownand documented.Thissituation hasalready haddireconsequences onpluralism,freedom ofexpression,and thepublicsphere. However, nationalmedia arescrutinizedby theircompetitorsand ownstaff(as wasthecase whenDanielKYetínský entered LeMonde scapital), theinterventionsof mediaownersare publiclydenouncedand thusoften counterproductive. The Onlineplatforms concentrationindicatoris onlyslightlyless alarmingthanthe previoussubindicator, with a medium-to-high-risk assessment (65%) see section 4 for details. The Mediaviability indicatoris thesecondone tohavea highrisk assessment (70%).Mostfields within themedia sectorhavebeen experiencingstructuralchallenges foryears,and despiteemergencymeasures andan importantimprovementin socialbenefitsfor pigistes,the COVID-19crisishas worsenedtheir situation,with revenuesplummetingin 2020.Allsectors havebeenimpacted; accordingtodata collected afterthe firstlockdownin France(May2020) bythe Départementdes Études,dela Prospectiveetdes Statistiques (2020a, 2020b; see also CSA, 2020a) the Ministry of Culture s research department, televisionbroadcasting wasexpectedto lose ¬1,354million in2020,down from ¬10,062million in2019 (-13%), radio broadcasting: ¬170 million (-13%), newspaper publishing: ¬559 million (-15%), magazines and periodicals: ¬728 million (-16%), press agencies: ¬64 million (-11%), printing: ¬109 million (-16%), retail: ¬448 million (-19%). Inthe lasttwoyears, severalnewspapersand magazineshavefaced liquidation(LaMarseillaise , Paris-

Normandie, ParisTurf , Bilto, TiercéMagazine &).Numerous localnewspapershave reducedtheiractivity,

andhave resortedtopartial unemployment.Circulationhas alsobecomeproblematic, forbothnational and localnewspapers. Presstalis,themain paperpressdelivery service(itdistributed 75%ofall newspapersin

2012),which hasbeenconfronting astructuralcrisis foryears,filed forbankruptcyin May2020,and its

regionalantennas wereliquidated.In July,arecovery planwasaccepted bytheParis TradeTribunal, leadingto thecreationof FranceMessagerie,a new,reduced,entity. Thisfactor,articulated toCOVID-19,

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hasonly addedtothe difficultiesofthe regionalprintpress. Precariousjournalists,and, firstofall, pigistes

andthose whoareobliged toacceptillegal self-employmentgigs,suffer greatlyfromthis reconfiguration. Manyother outletshavehad toresortto drasticlay-offs,severance andredundancyplans inorderto survive orhaveexploited theCOVID-19crisis toadvanceor acceleratepreviousplans. TheAFP negotiateda voluntaryredundancyplan with125employees (48journalists)and laidoff95 people.Reuters laidoff 25peoplein France(30%of itsheadcount). LeFigaro plans tocut60 membersofits staff. L Humanitéhad todepartfrom 35ofits 137staffmembers (amongwhich28 journalists).Thereare also ongoingredundancy planswithinthe publicsector;by 2022,therewill be340jobs cut(157lay-offs) at RadioFrance afteramutually agreedcollectiveseverance plan.Thesame trendcanbe seeninother media:within theaudiovisualsector, forexample,the AlticeGroup(BFM, RMC &),245permanent

contracts, and 40% of all piges have been suppressed, and half of the occasional workforce will be laid off.

Forlack ofanyfundamental changeinits conceptionofthe roleandinfrastructure ofthemedia and journalism,France iscondemnedto anunprecedentedexhaustion ofitsmediascape. Concerningonline mediaoutlets (Smyrnaios,2013),some digitalversionsof newspapersanda fewonlinejournals have managedto consolidatetheirposition. Mediapart,forinstance, isbenefittingfrom agrowingaudience, with asound hardpaywall model, anditfurther ensureditsindependence, byputtingits capitalina Fundfora free press , akin to The Guardian s Scott Trust . The Commercialand ownerinfluenceover editorialcontent indicatorhas amediumrisk assessment (50%).As wehaveseen, Frenchjournalistsare guaranteedalarge numberofrights, whetherbylaw (03/29/1935 Brachard law),theLabor Code(art.L-7112-2 to5),status orparticularagreements/ethical

charterssigned betweenthenewsrooms viatheir sociétés dejournalistes (SDJ) andowners especially

thefundamental assignment and conscience clauses.Theincreasing dependencyuponprivate investors hastransformed thebalanceof powerwithinmedia outlets(Comby& Ferron,2018):in thefaceof unemployment,journalists oftenhaveno otherchoicebut toacceptthe conditionsimposedby theirnew employers thesafeguardsthen nolongerhave anyweight.There areindeedmore andmorecases of newowners whoimposedradical changesuponthe journalisticanddeontological identityofthe outletsthey tookcontrol of,anddid sotoget ridofpermanently employed,professionaljournalists (unlesstheyaccept thenew conditionsandresign themselvestoself-censorship), replacingthemwith amuchmore malleable andinexperienced workforce,whateverthe materialorsymbolic cost.Forinstance, ReworldMediasaw all conscious journalists resignfromthe magazines(mostof all)ittook overwhenit acquiredMondadori;it thencould freelyoutsourceas manyfunctionsas possible,streamlinecosts byresortingto alow-wage companyin Madagascar,rationalizingand discipliningtheproduction ofcommercialcontent thankstoself- employed brand managers andinterns. Thelogichere istouse strongmediabrands andrecyclethem in othermarkets (events,e-commerce,convergence strategies),atthe expenseofthe productionofnews by journalists.

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3.3. Political Independence (27% - low risk)

ThePolitical Independenceindicatorsassess theexistenceand effectivenessofregulatory andself- regulatorysafeguards againstpoliticalbias andpoliticalinfluences overnewsproduction, distributionand access.More specifically,thearea seekstoevaluate theinfluenceof theStateand, moregenerally,of politicalpower overthefunctioning ofthemedia marketandthe independenceofpublic servicemedia. Furthermore,the areaisconcerned withtheexistence andeffectivenessof (self)regulationinensuring editorialindependence andavailabilityof pluralpoliticalinformation andviewpoints,in particularduring electoral periods. The Politicalindependence ofmediaindicator showsamedium riskassessment(38%). Withinthe audiovisualsector, mediaindependenceis monitoredbythe CSA(09/30/1986law no86-1067).Most ethicalcharters inpressoutlets emphasizehonesty,impartiality, freedomofthought andofits expression, denouncecensorship, anddefendindependence frompoliticalparties. However,nowadays,the problemin Franceis notthatof directpoliticalcontrol, butofthe closetiesthat existbetweenthe ownersofmedia

conglomeratesand politicalfigures,the formeroftenhaving theirsayin theappointmentof editors-in-chief.

Forinstance, PresidentEmmanuelMacron hastightlinks tomediaempire owners,andespecially Bernard Arnaultand XavierNiel(Cassini &Faye,2021); beforebeingelected, heintervenedin important transactions(for instancewhenthe Niel-Pigasse-Bergétriotook overLeMonde ).At theregionallevel, whereconcentration isveryhigh (theCréditmutuel inEasternFrance, theRosselgroup intheNorth, Xavier Nielin theSouth &),ties betweenthedaily regionalpress,local media,whichmost oftenbenefitfrom a

monopoly on local news, and local political elites are very tight, which represents yet another important risk.

The Editorialautonomy indicator alsoshowsa mediumriskassessment (54%).Thisis duetothe factthat thereis nocommonregulation specifictothe appointmentofeditors-in-chief, andtherearen t anylegal

safeguardsconcerning privatemedia.Sociétés dejournalistes(SDJ) haveprogressivelyclaimed arolein

theseprocedures, overthepast decades(Laugée,2010). Forinstance, LeMonde sSDJ managedto

imposea righttoveto thenominationof aneweditor-in-chief, afterinvestorDaniel KYetínskýenteredits

capital.The growingoligopolisticconcentration representsaserious threattoeditorial autonomy.A paradigmaticcase hereisthat oftheradical editorialandideological changesVincentBolloré hasimposed

15The Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom is co-financed by the European Union

on the newsrooms of many of the media outlets he possesses (Canal+, CNews). The audiovisualmedia, onlineplatformsand electionsindicator showsalow riskassessment(14%). France sregulatory apparatus(ElectoralCode, laws:09/30/1986no 86-1067;04/14/2011no 2011-412;

04/25/2016no 2016-506)guaranteesequal treatmentofall politicalforcesduring electoralcampaignson all

audiovisualmedia (publicorprivate): theCSAmonitors anddocumentsthese questions.Nonetheless, regulationcannot keepprivatechannels fromdevelopingideologized talkshows(a growingnorm,in recent years),whose participants voicewill notbecounted aspartof oneparty sspeaking timeduringa campaign within asituationof decreasingpluralism,this isaworrying trend.Lastly,these rulesdonot applytonon- terrestrialmedia oronlineoutlets, afactthat stressesthesystem s obsolescence,especiallyconsideringquotesdbs_dbs30.pdfusesText_36

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