[PDF] 20-1459 United States v. Taylor (06/21/2022)

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1 (Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2021

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

UNITED STATES v. TAYLOR

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 20-1459. Arg ued December 7, 2021 - Decided June 21, 2022 For his participation in an unsuccessful robbery during which his accom plice shot a man, respondent Justin Taylor faced charges of violating the Hobbs Act, 18 U. S. C. §1951(a), and of committing a "crime of vio- lence" under §924(c). The Hobbs Act makes it a federal crime to com mit, attempt to commit, or conspire to commit a robbery with an inter- state component. §1951(a). Section 924(c) authorizes enhanced punishments for those who use a firearm in connection with a "crime of violence" as defined in either §924(c)(3)(A) - known as the elements clause - or §924(c)(3)(B) - known as the residual clause. Before the District Court, the government argued that Taylor's Hobbs Act offense qualified as a "crime of violence" under §924(c). Taylor ultimately pleaded guilty to one count each of violating the Hobbs Act and §924(c).

The District Court sentenced Taylor

to 30 years in federal prison - a decade more than the maximum sentence for his Hobbs Act conviction alone. Taylor later filed a federal habeas petition focused on his §924(c) conviction, which was predicated on his admission that he had committed both conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery and at tempted Hobbs Act robbery. Taylor argued neither Hobbes Act offense qualified as a "crime of violence" for purposes of §924(c) after United States v. Davis, 588 U. S. ___. In Davis, this Court held that §924(c)(3)(B)'s residual clause was unconstitutionally vague. Id., at ___-___. In his habeas proceeding, Taylor asked the court to apply Davis retroactively and vacate his §924(c) conviction and sentence. The government maintained that Taylor's §924(c) conviction and sen- tence remained sound because his crime of attempted Hobbs Act rob bery qualifies as a crime of violence under the elements clause. The Fourth Circuit held that attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a crime of violence under §924(c)(3)(A). The Fourth Circuit vacated

2 UNITED STATES v. TAYLOR

Syllabus

Taylor's §924(c) conviction and remanded the case for resentencing. In reaching its judgment, the Fourth Circuit noted that other courts have held that attempted Hobbs Act robbery does qualify as a crime of vio lence under the elements clause. Held: Attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a "crime of vio- lence" under §924(c)(3)(A) because no element of the offense requires proof that the defendant used, attempted to use, or threatened to use force. Pp. 3-13. (a) The Court applies a "categorical approach" to determine whether a federal felony may serve as a predicate for a conviction and sentence under the elements clause, which po ses the question whether the fed- eral felony in question "has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force." §924(c)(3)(A) (emphasis added). The relevant inquiry is not how any particular defendant may commit the crime but whether the federal felony at issue always requires the gov- ernment to prove - beyond a reasonable doubt, as an element of its case - the use, attempted use, or threatened use of force. This Court has long understood similarly worded statutes to demand similarly categorical inquiries. See, e.g., Borden v. United States, 593 U. S. ___, ___. An attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not satisfy the elements clause. To secure a conviction for attempted Hobbs Act robbery, the government must prove that the defendant intended to complete the offense and that the defendant completed a "substantial step" toward that end. See, e.g., United States v. Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U. S. 102, 107. An intention is just that, no more. And whatever a substantial step requires, it does not require the government to prove that the defend- ant used, attempted to use, or even threatened to use force against another person or his property - even if the facts would allow the gov- ernment to do so in many cases. As the Model Penal Code explains with respect to the Hobbs Act's common-law robbery analogue, "there will be cases, appropriately reached by a charge of attempted robbery, where the actor does not actually harm anyone or even threaten harm." ALI, Model Penal Code §222.1, p. 114. But no element of at- tempted Hobbs Act robbery requires proof that the defendant used, attempted to use, or threatened to use force. Pp. 3-6. (b) The government's countervailing arguments fail. Pp. 6-13. (1) The government first argues that the elements clause encom- passes not only any offense that qualifies as a "crime of violence" but also any attempt to commit such a crime. But the elements clause only asks whether the defendant did commit a crime of violence as defined by the statute. Pp. 6-7. (2) The government next argues that the "substantial step" ele- ment of attempted Hobbs Act robbery categorically requires it to prove

3 Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022)

Syllabus

that a defendant used, attempted to use, or threatened to use physical force. But while many who commit the crime of attempted Hobbs Act robbery do use, attempt to use, or threaten to use force, the govern- ment's problem is that no element of attempted Hobbs Act robbery re- quires the government to prove such facts beyond a reasonable doubt. The government maintains that anyone who takes a substantial step toward completing Hobbs Act robbery always or categorically poses a "threatened use" of force because the word "threat" can be used to speak of an abstract risk. The government submits that the elements clause uses the term to require only an objective, if uncommunicated, threat to community peace and order. But when Congress uses the word "threat" in such an abstract and predictive (rather than commu- nicative) sense, it usually makes its point plain. The textual clues in the statute point in the opposite dire ction of the government's reading. Moreover, the government's view of the elements clause would have it effectively replicate the work formerly performed by the residual clause. Under usual rules of statutory interpretation, the Court does not lightly assume Congress adopts two separate clauses in the same law to perform the same work. See, e.g., Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Service, Inc., 486 U. S. 825, 839, n. 14. Pp. 7-10. (3) The government's final theory accepts that a conviction under the elements clause requires a communicated threat of force and con- tends that most attempted Hobbs Act robbery prosecutions involve ex- actly that. But whatever this argument proves, the theory cannot be squared with the statute's terms. Congress in the elements clause did not mandate an empirical inquiry into how crimes are usually commit ted, let alone impose a burden on the defendant to present proof about the government's own prosecutorial habits. Attempted Hobbs Act rob bery does not categorically require proof of the elements § 924(c)(3)(A) demands. That ends the inquiry, and nothing in Gonzales v. Duenas- Alvarez, 549 U. S. 183, suggests otherwise. Pp. 10-13.

979 F. 3d 203, affirmed.

G ORSUCH, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,

C. J., and B

REYER, SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined. T HOMAS, J., and ALITO, J., filed dissenting opinions. _________________ _________________

1 Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022)

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash- ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 20-1459

UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. JUSTIN

EUGENE TAYLOR

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

[June 21, 2022] JUSTICE GORSUCH delivered the opinion of the Court. Does attempted Hobbs Act robbery qualify as a "crime of violence" under 18 U. S. C. § 924(c)(3)(A)? The answer mat ters because a person convicted of attempted Hobbs Act rob- bery alone normally faces up to 20 years in prison. But if that offense qualifies as a "crime of violence" under § 924(c)(3)(A), the same individual may face a second felony conviction and years or decades of further imprisonment. I After a robbery went awry and his accomplice shot a man, the federal government charged Justin Taylor with violat- ing the Hobbs Act and § 924(c). The Hobbs Act makes it a federal crime to commit, attempt to commit, or conspire to commit a robbery with an interstate component. 18 U. S. C. § 1951(a). Meanwhile, § 924(c) authorizes further punish- ments for those who use a firearm in connection with a "crime of violence." For purposes of § 924(c), a federal felony qualifies as a "crime of violence" if it meets either of two definitions. The first definition is found in § 924(c)(3)(A), a provision some 2

UNITED STATES v. TAYLOR

Opinion of the Court

times called the elements clause. That clause covers of- fenses that "ha[ve] as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or prop erty of another." The second definition, located next door in § 924(c)(3)(B) and often referred to as the residual clause, encompasses offenses that "by [their] nature, involv[e] a substantial risk that physical force . . . may be used." Before the District Court, the government argued that Mr. Taylor's Hobbs Act offense qualified as a "crime of vio- lence" under these definitions. And at that point, Mr. Tay lor did not disagree, choosing instead to plead guilty to one count each of violating the Hobbs Act and § 924(c). For his crimes, the District Court sentenced Mr. Taylor to 30 years in federal prison - a decade more than he could have re ceived for his Hobbs Act conviction alone. Later, Mr. Taylor filed a federal habeas petition. In it, he did not challenge his Hobbs Act conviction. Instead, he fo- cused on § 924(c). Mr. Taylor submitted that his § 924(c) conviction was predicated on his admission that he had committed both conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery and attempted Hobbs Act robbery. And, Mr. Ta ylor argued, neither of those offenses continued to qualify as a "crime of violence" after United States v. Davis, 588 U. S. ___ (2019). In Davis, this Court held § 924(c)(3)(B)'s residual clause un- constitutionally vague, and we refused to enforce a convic- tion and sentence premised on its terms. Id., at ___-___ (slip op., at 24-25). In his habeas proceeding, Mr. Taylor asked the court to apply Davis retroactively and vacate his own § 924(c) conviction and sentence. The government opposed Mr. Taylor's petition. In doing so, it did not seek to revisit

Davis or oppose its retroactive

application to Mr. Taylor's case. Instead, the government observed that

Davis declared only the residual clause un-

constitutional; even today the elements clause remains in force. And, the government argued, the crime of attempted Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a crime of violence under the

3 Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022)

Opinion of the Court

elements clause even if conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act rob- bery may not. By this chain of logic, the government rea soned, Mr. Taylor's § 924(c) conviction and sentence re mained sound. Ultimately, the Fourth Circuit agreed to hear the dispute and sided with Mr. Taylor. It held that attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A) because no element of the offense requires the government to prove that the defendant used, attempted to use, or threatened to use force. By way of remedy, the Courtquotesdbs_dbs22.pdfusesText_28

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