An Advisory Centre on International Investment Law: Key Features PDF

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An Advisory Centre on International Investment Law: Key Features

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Academic Forum on ISDS Website:

1Introduction:theimportanceofanadequatedispute-settlementprocessfortheinternationalinvestmentregimeTheinternat ionalinvestmentlawandpolicyregimeis oneofthestrongestinternationalregimesinexiste nce.Itderivesitsstrengthfro mthefac tsthatinternationalinvestorscandirectlybringclaimsagainstallegedlyoffendingStatesiftheyconsider thattheirrightshavebeenviolate dandthatthis investor-Statedispute-settlement(ISDS)regime - arbitrationbyadhoctribunals - settlesdisputesinamanne rthat canbe(andtypicallyare)enforced.Thisdispute-settlementmechanismisattheheartoftheinternationalinvestmentregimeandthereforeofgreatrelevanceforbothStatesandinvestors.Yet,thisdispute-settlementmechanismhascomeunderconsiderablecriticism,asrecognizedinUNCITRAL'sWorkingGroupIIIon"Investor-StateDisputeSettlementReform".1ManyofthesecriticismsarereflectedintheWorkingGroup'sreports2(and,hencedonotneedtoberepeatedhere).TheyareatthebasisoftheWorkingGroup'seffortstoimprovetheregime'sdispute-settlementmechanism.Improvementisallthemoreimportantasthenumberofinvestor-Statedisputesisrising,3andthereisconsiderablepotentialformoredisputes.Bytheendof2018,942knowntreaty-basedISDScaseshadbeenreported,involving117countriesasrespondents.4Sometwo-thirdsofthecaseshaddevelopingcountriesoreconomiesintransitionasrespondents,5andthegreatmajorityaroseonlysincetheyear2000.Moreover,ISDSproceedingscanalsobeinitiatedonthebasisofstatecontracts,aswellasinvestmentlawsadoptedbynationallegislatures,underdispute-settlementprovisionscontainedinthem.Contract-basedISDScasesnumbered127inICSIDalonebytheendof2018,6andthosebasedoninvestmentlawsofhostcountriesnumbered687 - virtuallyalloftheminvolvingdevelopingcountriesoreconomiesintransition.ThisbroughttheoveralltotalofISDScaseseasilytowellover1,100bytheendof2018.8Inaddition,theaveragenumberofdisputeshasbeengrowingovertheyears.Newlyinitiatedtreaty-basedinvestmenta rbitrationsaveraged8peryearduring1996-1998,rosemorethanfourfoldto36peryearduring2006-2008anddoubledfurtherto74peryearduring2016-2018.9Duringthesametimepe riods,the annualnumberofnewcontr act-basedcasesatICSID aloneaveraged3,6 and6 ,respectively.10Itis quitelikelythatthenumbe rofdisputeswil lgrowfu rther,asinternationalinvestorsdiscoverandhaverecoursetotheISDSmechanism,facilitatedperhaps(amongotherthings),bythird-partyfunders.11Infact,thepotentialfordisputesisconsiderable,considering(1)thegrowthofinwardFDI(withitsstockamounting,attheendof2018,to US$32trillion12);(2)thenumberof internationalin vestorscontrollingassetsabroad(whichissubstantiallyover100,000),thenumberoftheirforeignaffil iates(whichissubstantiallyoveronemillion )andthenumberof

2investors13insuchaffiliates(allofwhich,dependingontheapplicableinternationalinvestmentagreement(IIA),mayhavearighttoinitiatearbitrationproceedings);(3)thenumberof Statecontracts andnatio nalinvestmentlawsgrantinginternationaldispute-settlementrecourse;and(4)theembeddednessofFDIinhostcountries,involving,as itdoes,a widerange ofinteractions relatingto theproductionprocessovertheentirelife-cycleofaprojectand,morebroadly,therelationshipbetweenforeignaffiliatesandhostcountrygovernments.Addtothat(5)thenumberofIIAs;(6)theirproclivitytowardsbroaddefinitionsof"investors"and"investme nts";(7)theiropen-endedformulationofinvestorprotectio ns,especiallyinoldtreaties ;(8)theoftenimprecisedraftingof(especiallyolder)treaties,inflexibleStatecontracts,aswellasnationallawsthatmaybeinconflictwithinternationalobligations;and(9)thefactthatviolationsofinvestorrightscantakeplacebydifferentbranchesofgovernmentsandspecializedagencies,andatanyadministrativelevel(i.e.,notonlythenationallevel),includingoutofignoranceofexistingobligations,increasinginthismannerthepossibilitiesofactionsthatcangiverisetod isagreements.Finally,(10)changingnaturalresourcepr icescanbecomeasourceof confl ict,intheabsence ofcontractclausesthatal lowforadjustmentsinlightofchangedc ircumstan ces,inpar ticular(11 )when newgovernmentscometopower.Thepotent ialforconflictsofallkindsb etween hostStatesandinternati onalinvestorsisthereforeconsiderable,asarethepotentialliabilities.And,whateverthecause,itisvirtuallyunavoidablethat,asineveryrelationship,disputesarisefromtimetotimebetweenhostStatesandinternationalinvestors.Adispute-settlementregimeisneededtosettlethem,especiallyifinvestorsdonottrustlocalcourts,andgovernmentsofhostStatesdonot wantto use - orcannot use - thecourtso finvestors'homecountries.Moreover,internationalinvestmentdisputesarecostly.14Accordingtoonestudy,averagepartycostspercasebetween2013andend-May2017wereUS$7.4millionforclaimantsandUS$5.2millionforrespondents,withanupwardtrend;averagetribunalcostswereUS$1.1millionpercase.15Duringthesametimeperiod,theaverageamountofdamagesclaimed16amountedtoUS$1.1billionpercase(excludinglargercases,itcametoUS$196million),alsoonanupwardtrend;however, theaverageamountawarded17tosuccessfulclaimantswasconsiderablyless,US$171millionpercase,againonanupwardtrend.18Asthesenumbersimply,thoughtherearemanycasesinwhichthecostsaremuchlower,thereremainmanyinwhichthecostsaremuchhigher,reachingintothebillionsofdollarsandaccountingforsubstantialsharesofforeignexchange.Whiledifferentauthorsreportdifferentcostfigures(andusedifferentmethodologies,e.g.,reportmediancosts),19themainfeaturesareclear:costsarehighandrising.Tothesefinancialcosts,onehastoaddthepotentialreputationalcostssufferedbyhostcountriesandthepotentiallossofFDIinflows.20Giventhecentralityandpotencyoftheregime'sdispute-settlementmechanism,itneedstobebeyondreproach.ThisisoneofthereasonswhyStatesarereviewing

3theirsubstantiveobligationsinIIAs,whymanyStatesaredraftingrevisedmodeltreatiesandwhyUNCITRAL'sWorkingGroupIIIisdiscussinghowthedispute -settlementmechanismcanbeimproved.Indoingso,itf ocuseson proceduralimprovements,asreflectedintheWorkingGroup'sreports.21Oneimportantaspect,however,isonlybeginningtogetattentionintheWorkingGroup'sdiscussions,anditiscen tralto thelegitimacyoftheregime'sdispute-settlementmechanism:thefactthatmanydevelopingcountrieshaveneithertheexperiencedpersonnelnorthefinancialresourcestodefendthemselvesadequatelyininternationalarbitralproceedingsandpreparethemselvesproperlyinthecrucialphaseimmediatelyaheadofsuchproceedings.Thislimits,defacto,theirabilitytohaveaccesstojusticeonthebasisofequalityofarms.22Itisaregimeflawthatrequiresattentionnotonlybecauseofitsbearingonthecredibility - andhencelegitimacy - oftheinvestmentregime,butalsobecauseoftheoftencostlydispute-settlementprocess,itsoutcome intermsofawards,andits potentiallynegativereputationalimplicationsfortherespondentsasinvestmentlocations.Itis thereforelaudabl ethat UNCITRAL'sWor kingGroupIII - inresponset othe suggestionofseveralmemberState s23 - hasputthe issuesofdefact oaccesstojusticeandcreatinga levelplayin gfieldinregardtointer natio nalinvestment-disputesettlementonitsagenda,underthetitle"AdvisoryCentreonInternationalInvestmentLaw".24ThefollowingdiscussionaddressesanumberofissuesrelatedtotheestablishmentofsuchaCentre,beginningwithabriefdescriptionofasimilarinstitutioninthetradearea.A.Theprecedent:theAdvisoryCentreonWTOLawEffortstoestablishanAdvisoryCentreonInternationalInvestmentLaw(ACIIL)25canlearnfromthesuccess fulapproachpursuedinanotherfield,namelytheinternationaltradearea,wheninterested governmentscreatedtheindependentAdvisoryCentreonWTOLaw(ACWL)asanintergovernmentalorganization.TheACWLwasestablishedin2001.26AsofJuly2019,80countrieswereentitledtoitsservices.27Itsestablishmentreflectedthefactthat,afterthecreationoftheWTOin1995,thenumberandcomplexityofWTOdisputeshadrisenconsiderably.Eventoday,"[w]hilemostdevelopedcountrieshave'in-house'legalexpertisethatenablethemtounderstandWTOlawandtoparticipatefullyintheWTOlegalsystem,mostdevelopingcountriesandLDCs[leastdevelopedcountries]donot."28Togetherwithfinancialandinstitutionalconstraints,thissituationmadeitdifficultfordevelopingcountriestousetheWTO'sdispute-settlementmechanismeffectively.TheACWLwasthereforecreated"toprovidethesecountrieswiththislegalcapacityandtohelpthemtounderstandfullytheirrightsandobligationsunderWTOlaw."29Accordingly,theACWLprovidesarangeofimportantservicestoitsbeneficiaries:alldevelopingcountriesthat havebecomememb ersoftheCentre andhavecontributedtoitsEndowmentFund.Inaddition,LDCsareautomaticallyentitledto

4theCentre's services,withouthaving tobecomeACWLmembersorhaving tocontributetoitsEndowmentFund,aslongastheyareWTOmembersorareintheprocessofbecomingmember s.30(Developedcountriesare notentitl edtotheCentre'sservices.)TheservicesthattheACWLprovidesare(1)givingfreeadvice,intheformoflegalopinions,togovernmentsonallproceduralandsubstantiveissuesarisingunderWTOlaw;(2)assistingcountries(formodestfees,butfree-of-chargeforLDCs)inallstagesoftheWTO'sregularpanelandAppellateBodyproceedingsascomplainants,respondentsandthirdparties, beginningw iththeinit ialassessmentandpreparationofcasesandincludingadvocacyatpanelmeetings(includingansweringquestionsfrompanelsandpartiesatthemeetings),todraftingnoticesofappealandadvocacyduringAppellateBody hearings;(3)supporting alternativedi spute-settlementproceedings;and(4)holdingtrainingsonWTOlawandprocedures,aswellasarrangi ngsecon dmentsforgovernmentlawyersa ttheCentre.31In20 18alone,theACWLprepared237legalopinions,assisteddevelopingcountriesin17disputes(includingfivenewones),awardedtrainingcertificatesto39delegates,andundertookvariousadhoctrainings.32Astogovernance,theACWLisindependentfromtheWTO.ItsGeneralAssembly - consistingofrepresentativesofthe(in2019)47membersoftheACWL (36developingcountries;11developedcountries,plusoneassociatedevelopedcountrymember33)andthe44LDCsentitledtotheCentre'sservices - overseestheCentre'sfunctioning,monitorsitsfinancesandadoptstheannualbudget.34TheManagementBoard - consistingofsixpersonsfromdevelopedanddevelopingcountries,servingintheirpersonalcapacity - decidesonmattersrelatedtotheefficientandeffectiveoperationoftheACWLandoverseesthemanagementoftheACWL'sEndowmentFund;itreportstotheGeneralAssembly.Finally,anExecutiveDirectorandtwoDeputyDirectorsmanagetheACWL'sday-to-dayoperations;theExecutiveDirectorisalsoanexofficiomemberoftheManagementBoard.35TheACWLisf inancedfro mthereve nuesofanEndowmentFunde stablishedthroughcontributionsf romdevelopedanddevelopingcountrymembers ;feesgeneratedbysupportingdispute -settlementproceedings;andvo luntarycontributionsfrommembers.36Morespecifically,theone-timecontribu tionsofnewlyaccedingdevelopingcountriesaredeterminedonthebasisoftheirshareofworldtradeandp ercapitaincome,c lassifiedi nthreemember shipcategories:CategoryA:CHF486,000;CategoryB:CHF162,000;andCategoryC:CHF81,000.37Thereisnofixed membership amountfo rdevelopedcountries; afinancialcontributionisagreedwiththeACWL'sGeneralAssemblyuponratificationoftheACWLAgreement. Developedcountriesalso contributethebulkofvolunt arycontributions.Asalreadymentioned,LDCsthataremembersoftheWTO(orareintheprocessofaccedingtotheorganization)areentitledtotheCentre'sserviceswithouthavingtobecomemembersoftheACWL.TheACWT'sproposedregularbudgetfor2019isCHF4,665,000.38

5ThereisgeneralagreementthattheACWLhasdoneagoodjob39andinthismannerhascontributedtothelegitimacyoftheinternationaltradingsystem.Thereasonsincludethat ithashadexcellent leadershipanddedicatedstaff;thatitsstaffis respectedandtrustedbypartiesseekingtheCentre'sassistance,helpingstafftoestablishanopenanddeeprelationshipwithbeneficiaries;andthatitcanactasanhonestbroker,includingbyadvisinggovernmentswhentoseekacompromise.B.AnAdvisoryCentreonInternationalInvestmentLawAnyeffort toestablishanAdviso ryCentre onInternationalInves tmentLawcanlearnfromthearrangementsandexperienceoftheAdvisoryCentreonWTOLaw.40Thus,interested governmentscouldestablishanACI ILasanindependentintergovernmentalorganizationtodealwithinternationalinvestmentdisputes,withitsmembershipbeingopentoallcountries.Naturally,makingsuchaCentreoperationalrequiresaddressinganumberofissues.Someoftheseareoutlinednext.411.BeneficiariesTobeginwith - andusingastheprincipalcriterionthatrespondentgovernmentsshouldbeunder-resourced - thebeneficiariescouldonlybedevelopingcountriesandeconomiesintransitionthataremembersoftheACIIL,with,ontheonehand,takingintoaccountl evelofincome, and,ontheotherhand,grantingspecialconditionstoLDCs.42Manyofthesecountriesdonothavethetop-levelin-househumancapacityt odealeffectivelywithhi ghlycomp lexissuesofi nternationalinvestmentlaw,andmanyhavegreatdifficultiesallocatingthefinancialresourcesrequiredtohirei nternationall awfirmstohelpintheirdefense.(Anumb erofdevelopedcountries,too,donothavethein-househumancapacityrequiredtodealwiththeentire rangeofi ssuesrelatedtoinv estmentdisputes.Switzerland,forexample,seeksexternalsupporttodefenditselfinISDScases,butithasthefinancialmeanstohireoutsidelawyerstodealwithcasesifandwhentheyarise.)Moreover,ifStatesface(orarelikelytoface)disputesonlyfromtimetotime,theopportunitycostsofbuilding uphighlycompete nt43in-housecapacity(andthepossibilitythatcompetentstaffmayberotatedwithinthegovernment,orhiredawaybyinternationallawfirms)maynotbeattractive.Atthesametime,itwouldbedesirableforgovernmentlawyerstobepartofanydefenseteamsandtodevelopthecapacitytopreventandresolvedisputesatthenationallevel(seebelow).2.ServicesIdeally,anACIILwouldass istreque stinggovernmen tsintheentire rangeofchallengesrelatedtotheinternationalinvestmentlawandpolicyregimeingeneralandsourcesofconflictsinparticular.Mostnotably,suchassistancecouldbegearedtowards(1)seekingtoavoidthatconflictsariseinthefirstplace,includingthrough

6helpinthedra ftingofIIAs,S tatecontracts andnationalinve stmentlawsinamannerthathelps toavoidconfl ictsbetweeninter national investorsandhos tStates;(2)themanagementofconflictsbetweeninternationalinvestorsandhostcountrygovernmentsatt henationallevelsothat ,ifa ndwhenconflictsarise(includingatthesub-nationallevel),thesedonotreachtheinternationallevelbutratherareresolvedloca lly;an d(3)thehan dlingofdisputesreachingthe internationallevelsothattheyaremanagedproperlywhentheyreachthatlevel.Thereisnodoubt thatanu mberofc ountrieswouldbe nefitfromtechn icalassistanceinregardtothisentirerangeofchallenges.Ideally,therefore,anACIILcouldbecomeaone-stopshop,sotospeak,andprovidecomprehensiveassistancetounder-resourcedgovernments.However,atleasttwoconsiderationsneedtobekeptinmindwhendiscussingthepossiblescopeofactivitiesofanACIIL,namelythedesirabilitytoavoidduplicatingtheworkofotherorganizationsand,atthesametime,keepfundingneedsdown.Therefore,andbeforeturningtotheservicesanACIILcouldprovide,abriefreviewoftheassistancealreadyavailabletodevelopingcountriesisinorder.44a.ConflictavoidanceTheimprecise draftingofIIAs,Statecontra ctsandnationallaw sandtheir insufficientimplementationcanbeimportantreasonsforconflictsbetweeninternationalinvestorsandhostStatesthateventuallybecomeISDScasesandresultinhighcostsforrespondents.Addressingthisissueisthereforeimportant.Infact,anumberoforganizationsoffertechnicalassistanceinthisrespect(rangingfromthetrainingofgovern mentofficialstomaking adhocadvisorys ervicesa vailableto requestingcountries),oftenbasedonresearch.RegardingthedraftingofIIAsandissuessurroundingtheseagreements,UNCTADhasalong -standingprogrammetoprovid etrainingonthenegot iationof suchtreaties,basedonextensiveandin-depthresearchandthemonitoringoftrends;informedbyintergovernmentaldeliberationsinitsInvestmentCommissionandits"ReformPackagefor theInternationalInves tmentRegime";45and,uponre quest,supplementedbycountry-specificadvisoryservices.46UNCTAD's"InvestmentPolicyHub",inparticula r,provi descomprehensiveinformationabouttheprincipalIIAmatters,includinginfor mationoninvestmenttreaties, investmentdisputes,investmentlaws,andpolicymeasures.47TheOECD,too,hasanintergovernmentalbodydealingwithinvestmentissueswhosedeliberationsarepartlyrelatedtotheorganization'sPolicyFrameworkforInvestme nt,48andthelegalrese archundertakenoninvestmentmatters.TheInvestmentPolicyandPromotionUnitoftheWorldBankGroupalsoprovidestrainingintheinternationalinvestmentarea.49Additionally,thereare variousnon-governmentalorganizationsthatorga nizetrainingandadvisor yserv icesandundertakerelatedresearc h,includingtheInternationalInstituteforSustainableDevelopment50andtheColumbiaCentreonSustainableInvestment.51

7RegardingthedraftingofStatecontracts,negotiationssupportisavailablethroughtheInternationalSeniorLawyersProgram,whichhasalong-standingprogrammetoprovideprobonolegalservicestorequestinggovernmentsinrelationtoinvestmentandcommercialcontractsinvolvingforeigninvestors.52TheAfricanLegalSupportFacilityoffersthesamesupporttoAfricangovernments,freeofcharge.53AndtherecentlyestablishedCONNEX initiativeprovides,alsofreeof charge,multidisciplinaryteamstorequestinggovernmentsofd evelopingcountriesandtransitioneconomiesworld-widenegotiatingcontractswithinternationalinvestors,focusedonextractiveindustriesandalsoinfrastructure.54Finally,theInternationalDevelopmentLawOrganization(IDLO)offersnegotia tionsupportrelated totheLDCs,basedonprobonoandreduced-feeservices.55Regardingnationalinvestmentlaws,thesameorganizationsthatprovidesupportforthenegotiationofIIAsalsoassistinthedraftingofnationalinvestmentlaws.Inaddition,variouscountriesprovidefundingforthispurposeintheframeworkoftheirbilateralprogrammes.Finally,andasobservede arlier,even whenth eappropriateinstrumentsa reinplace,itisalsonecessarytoavoidill-advisedactionsbyStateauthorities,sometimesoutofignoranceofprovisionsinIIAs.Thischallengerequiresprimarilyactionatthenationallevel.Inparticu lar,itrequiresthat central governmentsinformtheirministriesandvarioussub-nationalentitiesabouttheobligationstheyhaveenteredintothroughinternationaltreaties.b.ConflictmanagementatthenationallevelIfandwhenconf lictsbetweeninternationalinves tors andhostStatesoccur - astheyinevitablydo,asdiscussedearlier - thechallengebecomestomanagethemproperlyandtoavoidthattheyreachtheinternationallevel.Forthispurpose,anumberofcountrieshaveestablishedmechanismstomonitorinvestorgrievancesbeforetheyescalateintooutrightconflicts,withaviewtowardsresolvingthem.Onesuchearly-warningmechanism consistsofthecreatio noftheinstitutionofinvestmentombudspersons.Themostwell-knownoftheseisprobablytheOfficeoftheForeignInvestmentOmbudsman,agrievance-resolutioncentreestablishedintheRepublicofKoreain1999.56Anotherapproachistocreatenationalcoordinationcommitteestowhichconflictsarebeingreported,withaviewtowardsresolvingthem.Chile,Colombia,CostaRica,Mexico,andPeruareexamplesforhowthiscanbedone.57Thesemechanismsareveryusefultoaddressgrievancesandmanageconflicts,andtheyarebecomin gmorevalua bleasthenumberofint ernationali nvestmentdisputesrisesanddisputesbecomemorecomplexandcostliertoresolve.58Forthisreason,theWorldBankissupportingcountriesintheestablishmentofinvestment-grievancemechanismstodealwi thinvestorgrievancesatanearly stageand,ifpossible,resolvethem.59

8c.ThehandlingofdisputesreachingtheinternationallevelWhendisputesreachtheinternationallevel,thechallengebecomesmanagingtheminamannerthatrespondentStatesareinthebestpossiblepositiontoprepareanddefendthemselvesadequately.Thisbeginswithundertakingproperpreparationswhenrespondentsarefacedwithformalnoticesofdisputesbyclaimants,thatis,beforearbitralproceedingsbegin.Thisisanimpor tantsta gethatma ywellbedecisiveforthe subsequentdeliberations.Inparticular,governmentsth athaven otyet(orseldom)beeninvolvedininternationalarbitralproceedingsoftenlacktheexperienceofhowtohandleanoticeofconsultationordispute.Forthisreason,ICSIDhasissueddetailedandpracticalstep-by-stepguidanceonhowtorespondtoinvestmentclaims;60italsoprovides capacity-buildingtechnicalass istanceonhow casesare processedunderICSIDrules.61However,whenitcomestoformalinternationalarbitralproceedings,virtuallynosupportisavailableto responde ntgovernments.ThePermane ntCourtofArbitration(PCA)hasaFinancial AssistanceFund thatisfinancedbyvol untary contributions;ithelpsdevelopingcountriesthatmeetcertainconditionsmeetpartofthe costsof(therelativel yfew)investmentarbitrationsadministeredbythePCA.62TheUnitedNationsSecretary-General'sTrustFundtoAssistStatesintheSettlementofDisputesthroughtheInternationalCourtofJustice(ICJ)canassistStatesthatdonothavethenecessaryfinancialresourcesinrelationtoexpensesincurredin(therelativel yfew)ICJinvestmentarbitrationcases;itisfundedbyvoluntarycontributionsand,hence, itssupportdependsontheavailabil ityof funds.63Onoccasion,individualgovernmentsreceivefinancialsupportfromprivatefoundations,suchasUruguayinitscaseofPhilipMorrisvs.Uruguay.64TheAfricanLegalSupportFacilitymayselectivelyhelpcountriesinAfricainarbitrationcasesinwhichithasassistedtheminnegotiatingtheunderlyingcontracts.65IDLOoffersdispute-settlementsupportforLDCs,basedonprobonoandreduced-feeservices.66Itishowevernotcleartowhatextentservicesofferedonaprobonobasiscanbereliedonandaresustainableasanapproach,giventhecostsinvolved;however,somefirmsmayprovidesuchservicesasastrategytoenterthemarketandbuilduptheirpractice.67Inotherwords,nopredictableservicescomparabletothoseavailableinotherareasrelatedtotheinternationalinvestmentlawandpolicyregimeingeneralandsourcesofconflict sinparticulara reava ilabletosupportunder-resourcedrespondentgovernmentsininternationalinvestmentdisputes.d.ThepossiblescopeofactivitiesofanACIILAwiderangeofissuesrelatedtotheinternationallawandpolicyregimerequiresattention,andunder-resourcedcountriescouldbenefitfromtechnicalassistanceinregardtomostofthem.Fortunately,therearevarioussupportservicesavailable

9regardingmostofthem,evenif thesecould bestre ngthened.Howev er,whenitcomestothehandlingofinvestmentdisputesattheinternationallevel,virtuallynopredictablesupportisavailabl etounder-resourcedgovernmentsthatarerespondentsininternationalinvestmentdisputes.Thisispa rticula rlyworrisomebecause - asdiscus sedearlier - thenumbero finvestmentdisputesislarge,thepotentialformanymoredisputesissubstantialandthecostsofinternationaldispute-settlementproceedings(both,intermsoffinancialcostsandpossible negativeeffect sforhostcountries)canb econsiderable;moreover,itisquitelikel ythathi gh-qualityrepresentation mayincreasethelikelihoodofsuccessininternationaldisputesettlement.68Atthesametime,mostdevelopingcountriesandeconomie sintransitiondonothavet hehumanand financialresourcestodefen dthemselvesadequatelyininterna tionaldispute-settlementproceedings;this ,int urn,bea rsontheveryleg itimacyoftheinternationalinvestmentlawandpolicyregime.Inlight ofthissituation ,aninde pendentAdvisor yCentreonInternationalInvestmentLawwouldfillan importantlac unaintheintern ationalinvest mentregime.Itcouldhave,asitscorepurposeandcompetency,toassistunder-resourcedbeneficiarygovernmentsinobtainingadequate legald efenseininternationalinvestmentdisputes.Suchassistancecouldfocusontheselectionandappointmentofarbitrators;thepreparationofstatementsandevidence;thedevelopmentoflegalarguments;andtherepresentationathearings.IncorporatinggovernmentlawyersfromrespondentStatesindefenseteams - includingintheformofmixedteams - wouldcontributetocapac itybuild ing.Assistancecouldalsoinclude providingalternativedispute-resolutionservicesandgivinglegaladviceonproceduralandsubstantiveissuesarisingunderinternationalinvestmentlaw.Moreover,sinceanumberofdisputes aresettleamicably afterarbitrationshave commencedandbeforefinalawardsarerendered,theCentrecouldplayausefulroleinpromotingsuchsettlements.69ThescopeoftheCentre'sworkcouldalsoencompasstheinitialassessmentandpreparationofcases,giventha tproperpreparationsarecrucial fort heactualhearingsofdisputes;thiscouldincludeanalysesofrisksassociatedwithcasesandadvicetogovernmentsastowhetherornottheyshouldseektosettleacase - orseekmediation - beforeformalproceedingsbegin.ClosecooperationwithICSIDtopreparegovernmentsforpossiblecaseswouldbeverydesirableinthisrespect,70consideringthatthatorganizationisalreadyprovidingservicesinthisarea.ThiswouldalsocontributetothebuildingoflocalcapacityregardingISDSissues.Inhavingthisclearfocus,anACIILwouldavoidduplicationoftheworkofotherorganizationsand - alsoanimportantconsideration - itwouldbecomefinanciallymorefeasible,asdispute-settlementproceedingsalonecanbeveryexpensive.Infact,particularcareneedstobetakennottooverloadthemandateofaCentre,asotherwisefinancialconsidera tionsmightultimatelyprevent theCentre'sestablishment.

10Beyonditscoremandate,theCentre'sworkcouldeventuallybeextendedtoprovidetechnicalassistanceandcapaci tybuildinginotherareasof theinter nationalinvestmentregime,inparticula rasregardsthecre ationof conflict-managementarrangementsatthenationallevela ndtheex changeofe xperienceandbestpractices.Suchaphasing-incouldtakeplaceinthelightofexperiencegained,bemadedependentonneedandtheavailabilityofresourcesandbesubjecttotheavoidanceofduplication.3.GovernanceMembershipinanACIILc ouldbeopent oallcountries:developingcountries,economiesintransitionanddevelopedcountries.AswiththeACWL,anACIILcouldhaveageneral assemb ly(consistingofrepre sentativesofitsmembers andbeneficiaries)tooverseeallaspectsoftheCentre'sfunctioning,andamanagementboard(consisting ofasmallnumberofrepresentatives chosent oref lecttheorganization'smembership)todecidemattersre latedtotheCentre'soperat ion.SuchastructurewouldallowtheACIILoperateinanindependentmanner.AnExecutiveD irectorcouldmanagetheCentre' sday-to-dayactivities. TheExecutiveDir ectorwouldhavetoprov idecompetentl eadership ,supportedbydedicatedstaffwhoisrespectedandtrustedbybeneficiaryrespondents.This,inturn,wouldallowthestafftoestablishastrongrelationshipwithrespondentsandtoactasanhonestbroker,includingbyadvisinggovernmentsonwhentoseektosettleadispute.Infact,suchaCentremightbeinabetterpositionthananyotherorganizationtoacquirethetrustanddeepcooperationofitsclients.Crucially - andthisiscentralto theCentre's credibility - thein-housesta ffoflawyerswouldhavetobeexpertsininternationalinvestmentlaw.Staffingwouldhavetorecognizethatinternationalinvestmentlawisnotaunifiedbodyoflaw,makingitacomplex71mattertoresolv einvestmentdisputes - althoughnotnecessarilyamorecomplexmatterthanresolvingWTOdisputes:WTOlawincludesmanydifferen tagreementscoveringvarious topics(antidumping,subsidie s,intellectualproperty,technicalbarriers,etc.),whileinvestmentdisputes(althoughinvolvingamuchhighernumber ofins truments)arelargelyabouta handfulofprovisions.72(TheACWLhad,asofJuly2019,aprofessionalstaffof12,withfouradditionalstaffonitssecondmentprogramme.73)4.FinancingAsdiscussedearlier,theconductofarbitrationproceedingsiscostly.Hence,theestablishmentofanACIILwouldrequirethecreationofasubstantialtrustfund.Itcouldbefinancedb ycountriesthathave aparticularintere stinafunctioninginternationalinvestmentregimeandareina positiontoprovidet echnicalassistancefunds,aswellasone-timepaymentsbygovernmentsbecomingmembersoftheCentre.

11TheCentrecouldchargesomeofitsmembersmodestfeesforitsassistance,ifonlytomakesurethattheyareconscientiousinusingitsservicesandtosignalseriouscommitment.74Moreover,incasesinwhichtribunalsallocate(partof)thecostsofarbitrationand/ordefensetoclaimants,th esefunds shouldreverttothe trustfund.75Beyondthat,theCentr ewould needtoelicit voluntarycontr ibutions,includingfromfoundations.Finally,itmayalsobeworthwhiletoconsideralonger-termapproachintheframeworkofwhichIIAscouldstipulatethatinvestorswithclaimsaboveacertainsizeneedtopayasmallpercentageoftheirclaimsintotheACIIL'strustfund,contributinginthismannertothefinancingneedsoftheCentre.76Whilesuchanapproachraisesallsortsofquestionsandhencewouldneedtobefurtherthoughtthrough,77itcouldalsocontributetomoreconservativeclaims78andfurthermorediscouragefrivolousclaims.UnderlyingtheimportantquestionofhowtofinanceaCentreistheconsiderationthatawellfunctioningandbroadlyacceptedinternationalinvestmentregimeisintheinterestofStatesandinvestors.Summary,conclusionsandthewayforwardThereisundeniablyasubstantialneedforassistanceforunder-resourcedStatesonarangeofissuesrelatedtotheinternationalinvestmentlawandpolicyregime.Nowhereisthatneedgreaterthaninrelationtoitsdispute-settlementmechanism,theheartoftheinvestmentregime.Thecentralityandpotencyoftheregime'sdispute-settlementmechanismmakesitimportantthatallStateshavedefactoaccesstoitonthebasisofequalityofarms,todefendthemselvesinthebestpossiblemanner.Thisisallthemoreimportantinlightoftheriseofinternationalinvestmentdisputes(andthesubstantialpotentialforconsider ablymoredisputes)and thecostsoft hesedisputes.Yet,manydevelopingcountriessimplydonothavetheexperiencedpersonnelandfinancialresourcestodefendthemselvesadequatelyininternationalinvestmentdisputes.Itisaregi meflaw thatunderminesthecredibi lity - andhencele gitimacy - ofthe investmentregime.TheproposalforanAdvisoryCentreonInternationalInvestmentLawthatisnowontheagendaofUNCITRAL'sWorkingGroupIIIismeanttorectifythisdeficiency.TherearemanyissuesthatneedtobedecidedinestablishinganACIIL,79especiallyitsbeneficiaries,thescopeofitsservices,itsgovernance,anditsfinancing.GiventhatestablishingsuchaCentreiscostly(inlightofthecostsofinternationaldisputesettlement)andconsideringtheworkundertakenbyotherorganizations,itwouldbeadvisabletofocustheCentre'sworkonassistingunder-resourcedgovernmentsinthelegaldefenseininternationalinvestmentdisputes. Hence,andmorespecifically,thecoremandateofanACIIL - itscentralobjectiveandcompetenc e - couldconsistofprovidingunder-resourcedgovernments

12(throughitsownstaff,in combination withrepres entativesoftheresp ondentgovernments)withassistanceintheselectionofarbitrators,thedevelopmentoflegalarguments,theprepar ationofstatementsandevidence,andtherepresentationathearings.Itcouldalsoinclude providingalternativedispute-resolutionservicesandgivingl egal adviceonissues arising underinternationalinvestmentlaw.Thefocusof itsmandate couldfurthermo reincludetheinitia lassessmentandpreparationofcases,giventhatproperpreparationsarecrucialfortheactualhearingofcases.SuchanAdvis oryCentrewouldcomplementtheassistancep rovidedbyv ariousgovernmentalandnon-governmentalorganizationsinothermattersrelatedtotheinvestmentregime,especiallyregardingconflictavoidance(in cludingthenegotiationofIIAs)andconflictmanagementatthenationallevel.Overtime,withexperiencegained,dependingonneedandtheavailabilityofresources,andsubjecttotheavoidanceofduplication,theCentre'sservicescouldeventuallybeextendedtootherareasofassistance.IndeterminingtheservicesprovidedbyanACIIL,careneedstobetakenthatthescopeofitsworkdoesnotbecometoobroad:overloadingtheCentre'smandateattheoutsetcouldriskraisingthefinancialresourcesthatarerequiredtobringitintoexistence,jeopardizingtheentireproject.Byprovidingadministrativeandlegalassistancetounder-resourcedrespondents,anACIILwouldestablishalevelplayingfieldininternationalinvestmentdisputes.Itwouldprovidedefactoaccesstojusticeandequalityofarms.Inthismanner,theACIILwouldfillasignificantlacunaintheinternationalinvestmentregime,alacunathatisofgrea timporta nceforma nydevelopingcou ntriesandeconomiesintransitionand,morefundamentally,forthecredibilityandhencelegitimacyoftheregimeitself.Effortsleadingtoitsestablis hmentshouldbeinitia tedass oonas possible,inparalleltoothereffortstoimprovetheinternationalinvestmentlawandpolicyregime.Itisthe reforeti melyfortheUNCITRALWorkingG roupIIItoconsi derthedesirabilityofanAdvisoryCentreonInternationalInvestmentLaw,inlightofthequestionsraisedinthispaper.Perhapsaninformalinter-sessionalmeetinghostedbyinterestedgovernmentscouldthendevelop - onthebasisofbroadelementslaidoutbytheWorkingGroup - aconsideredunderstandingofthekeyissuesinvolvedinrelationtotheestablishmentofanACIIL,forconsiderationduringasubsequentsessionoftheWorkingGroup.Beyondthat,interestedgovernmentsmayalsowanttoconsultontheideaofanACIILatthemarginsofothermeetings,especiallyinaregionalcontext.Finally,andasapreparatorystep,theUNCITRALSecretariat - ortheISDSAcad emicForum - couldperhapsorganizeawebinarforinterest edgovernmentrepresentativestooutlin etheideaofanAdvisor yCentreon InternationalInvestmentLawand,inthismanner,c ontributetoreachin ganinformedunderstandingoftheidea.

131See,"WorkingGroupIII:2017topresent.Investor-StateDisputeSettlementReform",availableat2See,UNCITRAL,"ReportofWorkingGroupIII(Investor-StateDisputeSettlementReform)ontheworkofitst hirty-fourthsession(Vienn a,27November-1De cember2017)",documentA/CN.9/930/Rev.1of19December2017,availableathttps://undocs.org/en/A/CN.9/930/Rev.1,anditsAd dendum:UNCIT RAL,"ReportofWorking GroupIII (Investor-StateDispute SettlementReform)ontheworko fitsthi rty-fifthsession (NewYork,23-27Ap ril2018)",documentA/CN.9/935,availableathttps://undocs.org/A/CN.9/935;UNCITRAL,"ReportofWorkingGroupIII(Investor-StateDispute SettlementReform)onthe workofitsthirty-sixthsession(Vie nna,29October-2November2018)",documentA/CN.9/964,availableathttps://undocs.org/A/CN.9/964;andUNCITRAL,"ReportofWorkingGroupIII(Investor-StateDisputeSettlementReform)ontheworkofitsthirty-seventhsession(NewYork,1-5April2019)",documentA/CN.9/970,availableathttps://undocs.org/A/CN.9/970.3Forarecentcomprehensivediscussionoftheriseoftreaty-basedinvestmentdisputesandtheirsalientfeatures,see,RobertoEchandi,"Thedebateontreaty-basedinvestor-Statedisputesettlement:empiricalevidence(1987-2017)andpolicyimplications",ICSIDReview,2019,pp.1-30,andMalcolmLangford,DanielBehn andLauraLetourneau-Tremblay,"Empiricalperspect ivesoninvestmentarbitration:whatdoweknow?Doesitmatter?"ISDSAcademicForumWorkingGroup7Paper,15March2019,availableathttps://www.cids.ch/images/Documents/Academic-Forum/7_Empirical_perspectives_-_WG7.pdf.4See,UNCTAD,"UNCTADfactsheet:numberofnewinvestor-statedisputesettlementcasesin2018",IIAIssue sNote,is sue2(May2019), availableathttps://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcbinf2019d4_en.pdf,p.1.5See,UNCTAD,I nvestmentDisputeNavigat or,availableathttps://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-dispute-settlement.Fo rtheclass ificationof countries,seeUNCTAD,WorldInvestmentReport2019:SpecialEconomicZones(Geneva:UNCTAD,2019),annextable1.6See,ICSID,"Spot lightoncontract-baseddisputesat ICSID",availableathttps://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/resources/Spotlight-on-Contract-based-Disputes-at-ICSID.aspx.AsofDecember31,2018,ICSIDhadregistered706casesundertheICSIDConventionandAdditionalFacilityRules.Contract-basedcasesamountedto16%ofthetotal.See,ICSID,"TheICSIDcaseload - statistics(Issue2019-1),availableathttps://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/ICSID%20Web%20Stats%202019-1(English).pdf,p.7.7Ibid.,p.10.Inafewofthesecases,theinstrumentofconsentwasalsoatreaty.8Thesearepubliclyknowndisputesonly.9See,UNCTAD,"InvestmentDisputeNavigator",availableathttps://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-dispute-settlement.10See,ICSID,"Spotlightoncontract-baseddisputes",op.cit.Inafewofthesecases,theinstrumentofconsentwasalsoatreaty.11See,BrookeGuvenandLiseJohnson,"Thepolicyimplicationsofthird-partyfundingininvestor-statedisputesett lement"(NewYork:CCS I,2019),availableathttp://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2017/11/The-Policy-Implications-of-Third-Party-Funding-in-Investor-State-Disptue-Settlement-FINAL.pdf.Itisnotcleartowhatextent(ifatall)respondentshavehadaccesstothird-partyfunders.12See,UNCTAD,WorldInvestmentReport2019,op.cit.,p.216.13Itha sbeenobse rvedthat,"Asaco nseque nceofISDStribunals'permissiveap proachto SRL[shareholderreflectiveloss](the"pro-SRLinte rpretation"),investmenttreatiesexposetheStates partiestomultiple(potentiallylimitless)claimsinrelationtoasingledispute.Thefirm,aswellasitsindividualshareholders,mayallbringsuitoverthesameallegedtreatybreach.Andmosttreatiesrequireneitherthatsuchclaimsbejoinednorthattheybebroughtsimultaneously."See,JulianArato,KathleenClaussen,Jaemi nLee,andGiovanniZarra,"Re formingshareholderc laimsinISDS",

14UNCITRALAcademicFo rumonISDSWorkingPape r2019/9,availableathttps://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3433465,para.7.14!!"#$%$&'()(('"+,$(--,$."#$-/%012-,$3%45-#'+-$6'4',$72'-+$35%'((-,$8%#9"$7":%+":'),$!%)*+&"$;<#-=$Aznar,andGabrielBottini,"Excessivecosts&insufficientrecoverabilityofcostawards,"AcademicForumonISDS,14March 2019,availableathttps://www.cids.ch/images/Documents/Academic-Forum/1_Costs_-_WG1.pdf;seealsoLangfordetal.,op.cit.,pp.7-10,andSusanD.Franck,MythsandRealitiesinInvestmentTreatyArbitration(Oxford:OUP,2019).Moreover,thereareothercosts:asNicolasAngeletpointedout,thefinancingofinvestmentarbitrationdisproportionatelyaffectsthefinancingofpublicwelfareindevelopingcountries,suchashealthandeducation.;seehis"Financinginvestor-Statedisputesettlement:istherearolefortheAfricanDevelopmentBank?"ICCACongressSeries,no.19,pp.546-555.15MatthewHodgsonandA listairCampbell,"Damages andcosts ininvestmenttreatyarbitra tionrevisited,"Allen&Overy,1 4December2017,availableathttp://www.allenovery.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/14-1217_Damages_and_costs_in_investment_treaty_arbitration_revisited_.pdf.Th emeanavera gesaredistortedbythelargestclaims.16ExcludingYukosvs.theRussianFederation.17AgainexcludingYukosvs.theRussianFederation.18Ibid.19See,Langfordetal.,op.cit.,Echandi,op.cit.,Titietal.,opcit.,andLukeNottageandAnaUbilava,"Costs,outcomesan dtransparencyinISDSarbi trations:evi denceforaninvestmenttreatyParliamentaryInquiry,"SydneyLawSchoolResearchPaperno.18/46,August2018,availableathttps://ssrn.com/abstract=3227401.20Thus,ithasbeenclaimedthatthefilingofclaimsleadstosubstantiallossesinFDIinflows;see,ToddAlleeandClintPeinhardt,"Contingentcredibility:theimpactofinvestmenttreatyviolationsonforeigndirectinvestment",InternationalOrganization,vol.65(2011),p.414.ResearchbyShahryarMinhasandKarenL.Remmersuggeststhat,whiledisputesregisteredatICSIDbetween1984and2006didnothaveanimpactonthereputationofhostStatesrespondentsininternationalinvestmentdisputesandinvestmentflowstothem,thoseregisteredafter2006did.SeetheirFThereputationalimpactofinvestor:Statedisputes,"InternationalInteractions,vo l.44(2018) ,pp.862:887,availableathttps://www.tandfonline.com/doi/ref/10.1080/03050629.2018.1492384.21Op.cit.22Thesameissuecanberaisedforresourceconstrainedinternationalinvestors,especiallysmallandmedium-sizedenterprisesandnaturalpersons.Thisissueisnotbeingdiscussedhere.23See(asof31July2019),documentsA/CN.9/WG.III/WP.162-SubmissionfromtheGovernmentofThailand,para.26;A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.159/Add.1-SubmissionfromtheEuropeanUnionanditsMemberStates,para.38;A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.161-SubmissionfromtheGovernmentofMorocco,para18;A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.164-Submissionfromthe GovernmentofCostaR ica,An nexI(c);A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.173-SubmissionfromtheGovernmentofColombi a,p. 8;A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.174-SubmissionfromtheGovernmentofTurkey(advancecopy),sectionIII;andA/CN.9/WG.III/WP.179-SubmissionfromtheGovernmentoftheRepublicofKorea(advancecopy),section2,allavailableathttps://uncitral.un.org/en/working_groups/3/investor-state.24SeeinthiscontextthereportpreparedbytheUNCITRALSecretariatforthisagendaitem:UnitedNationsCommissionon InternationalTradeLaw,Workin gGroupI II(Investor-StateDispute SettlementReform),"Possiblereformofinvestor-Statedisputesettlement(ISDS):AdvisoryCentre.NotebytheS ecretaria t",Thirty-eighthsession,Vien na,14-18Oc tober2019,documentA/CN.9/WG.III/WP.168of25July2019,availableathttps://uncitral.un.org/sites/uncitral.un.org/files/wp168.pdf.Theremaybeothe rwaysinwh ichthisobjective couldbeachieved.Inpartic ular,onecouldes tablisha litigationfundonwhichcountriescoulddraw;onecouldsetuparevolvingfundintowhichsuccessfulrespondentscouldpayapartofthedamagesthattheydidnotneedtopay;andonecouldseektomobilizeprobonoorreduced-feeservices.

1525ForadiscussionofearliereffortstoestablishanACIIL,seeAnnaJoubin-Bret,"EstablishinganInternationalAdvisoryCentreonInvestmentDisputes?"(Geneva:ICTSDandWEF,2015),availableathttp://e15initiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/E15-Investment-Joubin-Bret-Final.pdf,an dRobertSchwieder,"Legalaidandinvestmenttreatydisputes:LessonslearnedfromtheACWLandinvestmentexperiences",availab leathttps://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3093651#.Seealso,EricGottwald,"Levelingtheplayingfield:Isittimeforalegalassistancecenterfordevelopingnationsininvestmenttreatyarbitration?"AmericanUniversityInter nationalLa wReview,vo l.22(2007),pp.238-275,LukeNottageandKateMiles, "'Backtot hefuture'f orinvestor-Statearbitration s:Re visingrulesinAustraliaandJapantomeetpublicinterests,"SydneyLawSchoolResearchPaperNo.08/62,June2008,avai lableathttps://ssrn.com/abstract=1151167,p. 21,KarlP.Sauva nt,"Theevolvi nginternationalinvestmentlawandpolicyregime:waysforward.E15TaskForceonInvestmentPolicy"(Geneva:InternationalCentreforTradeandSustainableDevelopmentandWorldEconomicForum,E15Initiative,2016),availableathttps://ssrn.com/abstract=2721465,ch.3.4,andFranck,op.cit.,pp.301-302.26ForadiscussionoftheACWL,seeNiallMeagherandLeahBuencamino,"TheAdvisoryCentreonWTOLaw('ACWL'),"MaxPlanckEncyclopediaofInternationalProceduralLaw(forthcoming2019)andtheliteraturecitedtherein,andNiallMeagher,"RepresentingdevelopingcountriesbeforetheWTO:therole oftheAdv isoryCentreon WTOLaw (ACWL)",availableathttps://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/35747/RSCAS_PP_2015_02.pdf.27See,ACWL,"Members",availableathttps://www.acwl.ch/members-introduction/.28ACWL,"Theservi cesoftheACWL ,"availableathttps://www.acwl.ch/download/ql/Services_of_the_ACWL.pdf,p.2.29Ibid.30Ibid.,p.5.31Ibid.,pp.8-26.32ACWL,"Reporton operations2018",av ailablea thttps://www.acwl.ch/download/dd/reports_ops/Final_Report_on_Operations_2018-for-website.pdf,p.1.33TheassociatememberstatuswasdesignedtofacilitatetheparticipationofinterestedgovernmentspendingratificationoftheACWLagreement.Associatemembershavealltheprivilegesofafullmember,excepttherighttovote(therehavenotbeenanyvotessofar).Currently,Germanyistheonlyassociatemember;itisintheprocessofbecomingafullmember.34See,ACWL,"Members",op.cit.,andACWL,"TheservicesoftheACWL",op.cit.,p.4.35Ibid.36Ibid.37Ibid.,pp.5-6.38See,ACWL,"Bud getfor2019: ProposaloftheManagement Board,"doc umentACWL/MB/W/2019/6of5October2018,available athttps://www.acwl.ch/download/general_assembly_mmeting_documents/11.12.2018/ACWL-MB-W-2018-6-Budget-for-2019.pdf,para.5.39See,e.g.,JamesRansdell,"Financialandtechnicalsupportforlitigantsininter-Statedisputes:theexampleoftheWT OandtheAd visoryCentrefo rWTOLaw ",1February2017,availableathttps://ssrn.com/abstract=2957476,GregoryC.Shaffer,"AssessingtheAdvisoryCentreonWTOLawfromabroadergovernanceperspective",29November2011,MinnesotaLegalStudiesResearchPaperNo.11-46,availableathttps://ssrn.com/abstract=1966251andChadBow n,Self-EnforcingTrade:DevelopingCountriesandWTODisputeSettlement(Washington:BrookingsInstitutionPress,2009).40ForoneconceptionofanACIIL,seeJeremySharpe,"Aninternationalinvestmentadvisorycenter:BeyondtheWTOmod el",EJIL:Talk!,26Ju ly2019,availableathttps://www.ejiltalk.org/an-international-investment-advisory-center-beyond-the-wto-model/.41Foranexhaustivediscussionoftheissues,see,CCSI,"Ascopingstudyonsecuringadequatelegaldefenseinproceedingsunderinternationalinvestmentagreements.PreparedfortheMinistryofForeignAffairsoftheNetherlandsbytheColumbiaCenteronSustainableInvestment",forthcoming.

1642Onecould alsoconsiderthe possibilityof grantingothermembersof theACIIL( includingdevelopedcountries)therighttoseekassistanceinspecificcircumstances,e.g.,torequestlegalopinionswhenanumberof(developedanddevelopingcountry)governmentsfaceclaimsarisingoutofthesamemeasures/circumstances,asthismayhelpclarifyissuesofrelevancetotheinvestmentregimeasawhole.43Andifthein-housecapacityisnottop-level,respondentsmaybeatadisadvantagewhendefendingthemselves.Moreover,if,becauseofinadequaterepresentation,respondentslosecases,unfortunateprecedents(evenifnotbind ing)maybeset forsubsequentcases,wi thpotentials ystemicimplications.44Foracomprehensivereview,seeCCSI,op.cit.45See,UNCTAD," UNCTAD'sReformPackagef ortheInternationalInvestment Regime(2018edition)",availableathttps://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/publications/1190/unctad-s-reform-package-for-the-international-investment-regime-2018-edition-.46See,UNCTAD,"ReviewoftechnicalcooperationactivitiesofUNCTADandtheirfinancing.ReportbytheSecretary -GeneralofUNCTAD",doc umentTD/B /WP/290/Add.1,availableathttps://unctad.org/meetings/en/SessionalDocuments/wpd290add1_en.pdf.47See,UNCTAD's"InvestmentPolicyHub",availableathttps://investmentpolicy.unctad.org.48See,OECD,"Th ePolicyFramework forInvestment,"availableathttps://www.oecd.org/investment/pfi.htm.49See,WorldBank ,"Investmentp olicyandpromotion", availableathttps://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/investment-climate/brief/investment-policy-and-promotion.50See,e.g.,IISD,"12thAnnualForumofDevelopingCountryInvestmentNegotiators",availableathttps://www.iisd.org/event/12th-annual-forum-developing-country-investment-negotiators.So metrainingsareprovidedtogetherwiththeSouthCentre.51See,CCSI,"Polic yandadvisor ywork+investmentl awandpoli cy",availableathttp://ccsi.columbia.edu/work/projects/?proj_type=policy-advisory&proj_area=investment-law-policy.52Fordetails,see,InternationalSeniorLawyersProject,"Ourwork",availableathttp://islp.org/our-work/.53Fordetail s,see,AfricanLegalSup portFacility,"What wedo",availableathttps://www.aflsf.org/tags/african-legal-support-facility.54Fordetails,CONNEXSupportUnit,"About",availableathttps://www.connex-unit.org/en/.55Fordetail s,see,IDLO,Investme ntsupportservic esforleastdevel opedcountries"availableathttps://www.idlo.int/Investment-Support-Programme-LDCs#Partners;theprogrammeisbasedonprobonoorreduced-feeservices.56Fordetail s,see,"ForeignInvestment Ombudsman,Aboutus",availableathttp://ombudsman.kotra.or.kr/eng/au/message.do.Foradiscussion,seeF.Nicolas,S.ThomsenandM.Bang,"LessonsfrominvestmentpolicyreforminKorea,"OECDWorkingPapersonInternationalInvestment,n°2013/02(2013).57Foradiscussion,seeUSAIDandAPEC,"Investor-Statedisputepreventionstrategies:selectedcasestudies"(Washington, DC:USAIDandAPEC,2013),availab leathttps://www.apec.org/Groups/Committee-on-Trade-and-Investment/~/media/Files/Groups/IEG/20130625_IEG-DisputePrevention.pdf.Seealso,APEC,BestPracticesGuidebook:CapacityBuildingtoEnsureAppropriateandPromptConsiderationofInvestors'ComplaintstoImprovetheI nvestm entClimatewithin APEC(Moscow:MinistryofEconom icDevelopment,2012),availableathttps://www.apec.org/-/media/APEC/Publications/2015/7/Best-Practices-Guidebook--CapacityBuilding-to-Ensure-Appropriate-and-Prompt-Consideration-of-Investo/IEG_Best-Practices-Guidebk-2015.pdf.58Thefactthatmanydisputesaresettledduringarbitralproceedingssuggeststhatthesedisputescouldpotentiallyhavebeensettlednationallybeforereachingtheinternationallevel:ofthedisputesbroughttoICSID,36%ofthecasesweredisputesthatweresettledorproceedingwereotherwisediscontinued.See,ICSID,"TheICSIDc aseload - statistics(Issue2019 - 1)",availabl eathttps://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/ICSID%20Web%20Stats%202019-1(English).pdf.

1759See,WorldBank,"Investmentpolicyandpromotion:productoffering"(Washington,DC:WorldBankGroup,n .d.),availableat http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/952171510251453291/IPP-Tools-booklet.pdf.60See,ICSID,"Pr acticenotesfor respondentsinICSIDarbitration ",availableathttps://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/Practice%20Notes%20for%20Respondents%20-%20Final.pdf.61See,ICSID,"In troductiontoICSIDco urse", availablea thttps://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/about/Introduction-to-ICSID-Courses.aspx.62See,PCA,"FinancialAssistanceFund",availableathttps://pca-cpa.org/en/about/structure/faf/.63See,ICJ,"Finan cialassistanc etoparties",availableathttps://www.icj-cij.org/en/financial-assistance-to-parties.64BloombergPhilanthropiessupportedUruguayinthiscase.See,SarahBoseley,"BloombergandGateslaunchlegalfundtohelpcountriesfightbigtobacco,"TheGuardian,18March2015,availableathttps://www.theguardian.com/society/2015/mar/18/bloomberg-gates-foundation-fund-nations-legal-fight-big-tobacco-courts.65InformationprovidedbyStephenR.Karangizi,DirectorandChiefExecutiveOfficer,ALSF.66Fordetails,see,IDLO,op.cit.67Inaddition,sincemostinvestment-disputecasesdonotinvolveaclearpublicinterest(as,e.g.,inPhilipMorrisvs.Uruguay),butratherareofapurelycommercialnature,thisreducestheappealofprobonoservices.68Foradiscussionoftheextenttowhichattorneyexperienceaffectsarbitrationoutcomes,see,SusanD.FranckandLindseyR.Wylie,"Predictingoutcomesininvestmenttreatyarbitration,"DukeLawJournal,vol.65(2015),pp.461-526.69See,AnaUbilava,"Amicablesettlementsininvestor-Statedisputes:empiricalanalysisofpatternsandperceivedproblems,"SydneyLawSchool,ResearchPaperno.19/17,March2019,availableathttp://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3352181.70Thiscouldbed one,forexample ,thro ughjointworksh opsininterestedcountries,inordertofamiliarizegovernmentswiththerangeofissuessurroundinginvestmentdisputes.71OneofthecomplexitiesconcernsthepossibilitythattheACIIL,inrepresentingStates,mayhavetotakedifferentpositionsonthesameobligation,dependingontheunderlyinginstrument.72However,ACIILlawyersw ouldrequireadif ferentskillsetthant hoseworkingint heACWLbecauseadvocacyinWTOdisputesisdifferentfromadvocacyinISDS,whereextemporaneousoralpleadingsandwitnessexaminationareessential.73See,ACWL,"Staff",availableathttps://www.acwl.ch/staff/.74Thereisalsoth equestionofavoidi ngthata fewgovernment swithmany disp utesdefactomonopolizetheCentreonaccountofarelativelyhighnumberofarbitrationstheyface.Oneapproachtodealingwiththisissueistoconsideraprogressivescaleoffees.75ThiswouldrequiresettingupaninternalsystemforACIILlawyerstoaccountfortheirtimespentonaparticularcase.76AnideaadvancedbyPatrickPearsall.77Forexample:Wouldsuchanapproachleadtoinvestorsclaimingthatthedamagessufferedwereactuallyhigheronaccountofsuchaprovision?Wouldtribunalscompensateforthisindetermingingawards?Should(partof)suchapaymentbereimbursedifinvestorsprevail?78See,NottageandUbilava,op.cit.,,whosestatisticssuggestthatclaimsmaybeoverstated.79Foranexhaustivediscussionoftheissuesinvolved,seeCCSI,"Ascopingstudy",op.cit.

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[PDF] An Advisory Centre on International Investment Law: Key Features