HYATT REGENCY HOTEL IN KANSAS CITY COLLAPSE – A CASE
the walkways. One hundred fourteen people were killed. • It was an accident that could have been prevented if a better coordinated engineering review had taken
Two Rods Dont Make It Right
the Hyatt Regency Hotel in Kansas City Missouri filled its lobby with guests participating in and walkways
The Kansas City Hyatt Regency Walkways Collapse
The Hyatt Regency Walkways Collapse provides a vivid example of the importance of accuracy and detail in engineering design and shop drawings (particularly
Investigation of the Kansas City Hyatt Regency walkways collapse
Nov 30 1981 Summary. 10. 3. DESCRIPTION OF THE WALKWAY SYSTEM PRIOR TO COLLAPSE. 11. 3.1. Introduction. 11. 3.2. General Layout of the Hyatt Regency ...
Using the Hyatt Regency Skywalk Collapse Case Study in
To this day the 1981 skywalk collapse in the Kansas City Hyatt Regency resulted in the worst loss of life from a structural engineering mistake in United
Investigation of the Kansas City Hyatt Regency walkways collapse
Nov 30 1981 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. On July 17
CODE OF ETHICS
KC Walkway Collapse. • On July 17 1981
Investigation of the Kansas City Hyatt Regency walkways collapse
area of the Hyatt Regency Hotel in Kansas City Mo.
Hyatt Regency Walkways: The Ethical Issues
Mar 12 2003 Summary of the Events. Technical Issues. Stakeholders ... The Hyatt Regency Tragedy ... "The Kansas City Hyatt Regency Walkways Collapse.
Ethical Issues from the Kansas City Hyatt Hotel Collapse (Live
interior walkways in the lobby atrium collapsed at the recently constructed Hyatt Regency Hotel in Kansas City with a resulting loss of 114 lives and
ENGINEERING ETHICS - Texas A&M University
The Hyatt Regency Walkways Collapse provides a vivid example of the importance of accuracy and detail in engineering design and shop drawings (particularly regarding revisions) and the costly consequences of negligence in this realm
Current Articles Archives Hyatt Regency Walkway Collapse - KSU
Hyatt Regency walkways collapse left 114 dead and in excess of 200 injured In addition millions of dollars in costs resulted from the collapse and thousands of lives were adversely affected The hotel had only been in operation for approximately one year at the time of the walkways collapse and
Hyatt Regency Walkways: The Ethical Issues - McMaster University
Summary of the Events Technical Issues Stakeholders Consequences of the Tragedy What About Software Engineering? The Hyatt-Regency Walkway Collapse 1997
TheStructuralEngineer May 2015 Hyatt Regency collapse Hyatt
the collapse They quickly discovered that the rods bolts and washers that supported the fourth-? oor skywalk were largely undamaged and still hanging from the lobby ceiling Inspection of the failed walkways con? rmed the cause of failure: the two channels that transferred the walkway loading into the steel
Searches related to hyatt regency walkway collapse summary filetype:pdf
Kansas City Hyatt Regency Hotel Walkway Collapse What caused the worst structural engineering disaster in the United States? The hotel was designed and built with an atrium lobby with walkways above the lobby floor The critical walkways were the 4thfloor walkway which was directly above the 2ndfloor walkway
Where were the Hyatt Regency Hotel walkways collapsed?
- Locations of the second and fourth story walkways which collapsed into the lobby of the Hyatt Regency hotel. The Hyatt Regency hotel walkway collapse occurred at the Hyatt Regency Kansas City in Kansas City, Missouri, United States on Friday, July 17, 1981.
How many people died in the Kansas City Hyatt Regency collapse?
- As the United States' most devastating structural failure, in terms of loss of life and injuries, the Kansas City Hyatt Regency walkways collapse left 114 dead and in excess of 200 injured. In addition, millions of dollars in costs resulted from the co l apse, and thousands of lives were adversely affected.
Who is responsible for building a Hyatt Regency walkway?
- As a result of the Hyatt Regency Walkways Collapse, the American Society of Civil Engineering (ASCE) adopted a report that states structural engineers have full responsibility for design projects. Both Duncan and Gillum are now practicing engineers in states other than Missouri and Texas.
Was the Hyatt Regency built in an era tainted by corruption?
- "Surfside condo built in era tainted by corruption | Fred Grimm". sun-sentinel.com. Retrieved July 15, 2021. ^ Spocchia, Gina. "Hyatt Regency walkway collapse: 40 years ago today one of America's deadliest structural collapses took place".
NBSIR82-2465
InvestigationoftheKansasCity
HyattRegencyWalkwaysCollapse
US.DEPARTMENTOFCOMMERCE
NationalBureauofStandards
Washington,DC20234
Feburary1982
- QC 100.056 j0» 'ARTMENTOFCOMMERCE
82-2^65bureauOFSTANDARDS
1982C.2
NBSIR82-2465
/o&SC ^iCTD mz. C.Z-INVESTIGATIONOFTHEKANSASCITY
HYATTREGENCYWALKWAYSCOLLAPSE
R.D.Marshall
E.0.Pfrang
E.V.Leyendecker
K.A.Woodward
CenterforBuildingTechnology
NationalEngineeringLaboratory
R,P.Reed
M.B.Kasen
T.R.Shives
CenterforMaterialsScience
NationalMeasurementLaboratory
US.DEPARTMENTOFCOMMERCE
NationalBureauofStandards
Washington,DC20234
February1982
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analyticalstudies. publishedasNBSIR82-2465A. walkway. iii IvEXECUTIVESUMMARY
duringtheconstructionprocess. thecollapse. V beamsandonthroughthesecondfloorboxbeams.Theboxbeams - madeupofa pairof8-inchsteelchannelswiththeflangesweldedtoetotoe - weretorest andarchitect.BuildingCode,
onthebasisoflaboratorytestresults, VI boxbeam-hangerrodconnections timeofcollapse. vil J viiiTABLEOFCONTENTS
PageABSTRACTill
EXECUTIVESUMMARYv
1.INTRODUCTION1
1.1Background1
1.2ObjectiveandScopeoftheInvestigation1
1.3OrganizationoftheReport2
2.1Introduction-5
2.2AccesstoDocuments5
2.4ArchitecturalandStructuralDrawings6
2.5ShopDrawings7
2.6DailyLogsandInspectionReports8
2.7OtherDocumentsandMaterialsReviewed9
2.8Summary10
3.1Introduction11
3.4ProbableSequenceofErection13
3.5DesignationofWalkwayComponents14
3.6Summary14
4.DESCRIPTIONOFTHEWALKWAYCOLLAPSE31
4.1Introduction31
4.3EyewitnessAccountsofCollapse32
4.5RemovalandStorageofWalkwayDebris35
4.6Summary35
5.SITEINVESTIGATION43
5.1Introduction43
5.2SurveyoftheHyattRegencyAtrium43
5.2.1EmbeddedPlatesandBearingSeats44
5.2.2FourthFloortoCeilingHangerRods44
5.2.3ImpactPointsonAtriumFloor45
IXTABLEOFCONTENTS(Continued)
Page5.3ObservationsofWalkwayDebris46
5.3.1General47
5.3.2HangerRodPull-through47
5.3.3BoxBeamLongitudinalWelds48
5.3.4BoxBeamtoClipAngleFilletWelds49
5.3.6DeterminationofSpanWeights51
5.4RemovalofSpecimens52
5.4.1CriteriaforSpecimenSelection52
5.4.2SpecimenRemoval52
5.4.4SpecimenStorageandHandling54
5.6Summary55
6.NBSSTRUCTURALTESTINGPROGRAM95
6.1Introduction95
6.2Background95
6.3Overview95
6.4TestSpecimenDescription96
6.4.1FullLengthBoxBeam96
6.4.2ShortBoxBeam96
6.4.3Fabrication96
6.5TestSetup98
6.6LoadingEquipment99
6.7Instrumentation100
6.8DataAcquisitionandReduction101
6.9LoadingSequence101
6.10NBSShortBoxBeamTests103
6.10.1Parameters103
6.10.2ShortBoxBeamSpecimens103
6.10.3WeldingProcess105
6.10.4WeldArea107
6.10.5OtherObservations108
6.10.6Summary110
XTABLEOFCONTENTS(Continued)
Page6.11NBSFull-LengthBoxBeamTestsIll
6.12TestsonWalkwayBoxBeamIll
6.12.1Full-LengthBoxBeamTestIll
6.12.2ShortBoxBeamTests112
6.14Conclusions113
7.NBSMATERIALSEVALUATIONPROGRAM155
7.1Introduction155
7.2InitialInspection155
7.2.1Visual155
7.2.2Radiography156
7.3.1NBSChannelSpecimens157
7.3.2WalkwayBoxBeams158
7.3.3WalkwayHangerRods158
7.3.4WalkwayBoxBeamLongitudinalWelds159
7.4.1BoxBeamWeldments159
7.4.2WalkwayHangerRods161
7.4.3Washers161
7.5ChemicalAnalysis162
7.6PropertiesofConcrete162
7.7Conclusions163
8.FRACTOGRAPHICANALYSIS193
8.1Introduction193
8.3WalkwayFractureReplicas194
TABLEOFCONTENTS(Continued)
Page8.3.1GeneralObservations194
8.3.2BoxBeamLongitudinalWelds194
8.3.3Washer/NutContactArea195
8.3.4Washers195
8.3.5ClipAngleFilletWelds196
8.4.1Procedures196
8.4.2Results197
8.5Summary.198
9.STRUCTURALANALYSIS219
9.1Introduction219
9.2Loads219
9.2.1DeadLoad219
9.2.2LiveLoads221
9.3.1General222
9.3.2BoxBeam-HangerRodConnections222
9.3.3HangerRods223
9.3.4SummaryofAnalysis223
9.5WalkwayDeflections224
9.6EffectsofDynamicExcitation225
9.6.2SourcesofDynamicExcitation226
9.7Summary228
10.1Introduction239
Capacities239
10.4ProbableSequenceofCollapse241
XllTABLEOFCONTENTS(Continued)
Page10.6QualityofMaterialsandWorkmanship242
10.7Summary243
11.SUMMARYANDCONCLUSIONS249
12.REFERENCES253
APPENDIXA-1
A6.10-A6.11A-2
A7.2-A7.5A-19
A7.6A-83
A9.2A-92
xiii I I I I XIV1.INTRODUCTION
1.1BACKGROUND
thesecondfloorwalkway. investigation.1.2OBJECTIVEANDSCOPEOFTHEINVESTIGATION
1 walkways1.3ORGANIZATIONOFTHEREPORT
Thisreportisorganizedin12chapters:
inspectionreports. surfaces connectionsinthefourthfloorwalkway. 2 washer/nutcontactareas. significanceofdynamicexcitation. workmanship. reachedbytheNBSinvestigativeteam.quotesdbs_dbs17.pdfusesText_23[PDF] hybrid implementation
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