ICAO Regional USAP-CMA Seminar Auditing Annex 17 Standards
15 Oct 2018 If the integrity of hold baggage is jeopardized the hold baggage shall be ... Reconciliation/authorization. 4.5.3 Each Contracting State shall ...
AVSEC/COMM/5-WP/06 International Civil Aviation Organization 31
31 Mar 2006 measures which meet or exceed the provisions of ICAO Annex 17 to be applied using a globally agreed. Risk Management Matrix
FAL/12-WP/41 FACILITATION (FAL) DIVISION — TWELFTH
19 Feb 2004 2.1. ICAO Annex 17 – Security Standard 4.4.8 states: “From 1 January ... This would include the baggage reconciliation system (BRS)
ICAO-Annex-17-Security.pdf
baggage; and amplification of the note to 5.2.4 (Annex 17 Chapter 5) on measures and procedures to prevent unauthorized access to specified areas on an
Reporting of Aviation Security Occurrences and Incidents
(including passenger baggage reconciliation) The chosen identifiers are already commonly used in ICAO Annex 17 and the Aviation Security Manual and are ...
Reporting of Aviation Security Occurrences and Incidents
baggage' or 'cargo/mail'. The chosen identifiers are already commonly used in ICAO Annex 17 and the Aviation. Security Manual and are expected to be easy ...
ICAO Regional USAP-CMA Seminar Auditing Annex 17 Standards
If the integrity of hold baggage is jeopardized the hold baggage shall be Reconciliation/authorization. 4.5.3 Each Contracting State shall ensure that ...
Annexes 1 to 18
22 Mar 1974 The Annex is based on Articles 17 to 20 of the Chicago Convention. The ICAO Council adopted the first Standards concerning this issue in ...
Recognition of Equivalence of Security Measures One-Stop Security
The verification process is premised upon the States involved complying at a minimum
Cyber-Resilience for Operators
Find the right resources! ICAO EUR/NAT DGCA 2022. Page 4. ICAO Annex 17
ICAO Regional USAP-CMA Seminar Auditing Annex 17 Standards
15 Oct 2018 Interpretation of certain Annex 17 Standards ... Transfer passenger/hold baggage ... Reconciliation/authorization.
MEETING THE 100 PERCENT HOLD BAGGAGE SCREENING
14 Oct 2005 percent hold baggage screening which is to be implemented by January 1
Doc 10047 Aviation Security Oversight Manual
2 Jan 2019 Annexes to the Chicago Convention (primarily Annex 17 — Security — Safeguarding International ... a) person and hold baggage reconciliation;.
GLOBAL AVIATION SECURITY PLAN
1.2 Improve training on risk assessment. 1.3 Review relevant ICAO Annex 17 provisions and guidance for highest risk areas. 1.4 Up-to-date framework established
National Civil Aviation Security Programme
18 Oct 2018 ICAO Legal Requirements and Guidance. Annex 17. ? Standard 2.1.1: “Each Contracting State shall have as its primary objective the safety of.
AVSEC/COMM/5-WP/06 International Civil Aviation Organization 31
31 Mar 2006 This would include the baggage reconciliation ... measures which meet or exceed the provisions of ICAO Annex 17 to be applied using a ...
AVSEC/FAL/RG/10 — WP/14 06/03/20 Tenth Meeting of the ICAO
6 Mar 2020 ICAO provides general principles (Annex 17) and guidance material ... is a failure in a reconciliation process and a baggage flights without.
Appendix 1
aircraft in flight) staff on another side and finally hold baggage
Reporting of Aviation Security Occurrences and Incidents
such as passengers crew and ground personnel as per Annex 17 requirements and in [7.2.8] process (including passenger baggage reconciliation).
AVSEC/COMM/5-WP/04 International Civil Aviation Organization 27
27 Apr 2006 Mr. David Flores Regional Officer
Scalable Baggage Reconciliation System
The Mach-SmartBRS system offers a rich baggage reconciliation solution that satisfies the requirements of International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Annex 17 reconciliation services and interfaces to airport departure control systems (DCSs) as well as SITA and ARINC standards
Annexes 1 to 18
maintenance areas and other restricted areas and security measures for transit operations baggage cargo mail and catering Consequently commercial aircraft operators should develop security procedures that comply with Annex 17 provisions and NCASPs
Security - Foundation for Aviation Competence (FFAC)
This edition supersedes on 3 August 2017 all previous editions of Annex 17 Safeguarding International Civil Aviation Against Acts of Unlawful Interference Tenth Edition April 2017 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation Security International Standards and Recommended Practices
AVSEC/COMM/5-WP/06 International Civil Aviation Organization
IATA supports development of effective efficient and operationally manageable ground security measures which meet or exceed the provisions of ICAO Annex 17 to be applied using a globally agreed Risk Management Matrix on the basis of the level of risk as assessed by the appropriate national authority Passenger and Baggage Security Controls:
Security - WordPresscom
Annex 17 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation This edition incorporates all amendments adopted by the Council prior to 1 December 2005 and supersedes on 1 July 2006 all previous editions of Annex 17 For information regarding the applicability of the Standards and Recommended Practices seeForeword
Searches related to icao annex 17 baggage reconciliation filetype:pdf
Annex 17 to the Convention with the title “Standards and Recommended Practices — Security — Safeguarding International Civil Aviation against Acts of Unlawful Interference” Table A shows the origin of subsequent amendments together with a list of the principal subjects involved and the dates on
What is the ICAO Annex?
- These are but two of the questions answered in the briefest ICAO Annex, which deals with aircraft nationality and registration marks, and, in a separate table, classifies aircraft by how they maintain sustained flight in the air. The Annex is based on Articles 17 to 20 of the Chicago Convention.
What are the annexes of the aircraft regulations?
- Annex 1Personnel Licensing. Annex 2Rules of the Air. Annex 3Meteorological Service for International Air Navigation. Annex 4Aeronautical Charts. Annex 5Units of Measurement to be Used in Air and Ground Operations. Annex 6Operation of Aircraft. Annex 7Aircraft Nationality and Registration Marks. Annex 8Airworthiness of Aircraft.
What are the annexes of the Air Traffic Control Act?
- Annex 1 Personnel Licensing Annex 2 Rules of the Air Annex 3 Meteorological Service for International Air Navigation Annex 4 Aeronautical Charts Annex 5 Units of Measurement to be Used in Air and Ground Operations Annex 6 Operation of Aircraft Annex 7 Aircraft Nationality and Registration Marks Annex 8 Airworthiness of Aircraft Annex 9 Facilitation
What is Annex 16?
- ANNEX 16 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation Environmental Protection. (Volumes I and II) Annex 16 (Volumes I and II) deals with th e protection of the environment from the effect of aircraft noise and aircraft engine emissions - two topics hardly thought about when the Chicago Convention was signed.
NACC/DCA/2-IP/07
International Civil Aviation Organization 22/09/05 North American, Central American and Caribbean Office Second Meeting of North American, Central American and Caribbean Directors ofCivil Aviation (NACC/DCA/2)
Tegucigalpa, Honduras, 11 - 14 October 2005
Agenda Item 4. AVSEC
4.2 Regional AVSEC Activities
MEETING THE 100 PERCENT HOLD BAGGAGE SCREENING
REQUIREMENT IN JANUARY 2006
(Presented by the United States of America)SUMMARY
Among the critical aviation security issues facing States is the quickly approaching deadline for 100
percent hold baggage screening, which is to be implemented by January 1, 2006. The requirement is a result of Amendment 10 to Annex 17 and the expectation is for countries to meet this requirement by employing realistic, reliable mechanisms for screening every bag that is loaded onto an originatinginternational flight. The challenge facing States is to ensure that the most effective means of baggage
screening is used to protect the traveling public. States should be encouraged to consider the probability of detection when evaluating the various means available to achieve 100 percent hold baggage screening.1. Introduction
1.1 A critical aviation security issue facing ICAO Member States is the fast approaching
deadline for 100 percent hold baggage screening that must be implemented by January 1, 2006. The U.S.
Government's international policy objective is to encourage States to provide the most robust systemavailable for screening hold baggage and to consider "probability of detection" as a critical factor to
achieving both a high level of security and a standard of equivalency for baggage screening. Annex 17
(Seventh Edition) Standard 4.4.8 reads: "From 1 January 2006, each Contracting State shall establish measures to ensure that originating hold baggage intended to be carried on aircraft engaged ininternational civil aviation operations is screened prior to being loaded into the aircraft." The challenge
facing States is to balance the conflicting demands of efficiency, cost, and passenger privacy against the
ultimate goal of security to provide or require the best baggage screening systems available to protect our
citizens.NACC/DCA/2 - IP/07
- 2 -1.2 The United States encourages States to meet this requirement by employing realistic,
reliable mechanisms for screening every bag loaded onto an originating international flight. The challenge facing all States is to provide the most effective means of baggage screening available to protect our citizens.2. Discussion
2.1 When the aviation community first began to screen hold baggage with conventional x-
ray, we quickly recognized the shortfalls of technology, human performance, and vigilance in addressing
this difficult job. We, therefore, proceeded to develop a variety of automated technologies to screen
baggage with minimal human intervention. The screening of checked baggage is a challenging processrequiring a high commitment of manpower and resources to detect a small quantity of explosives that may
be well concealed among the millions of checked bags that are flown daily. Below is an overview of the
various options available to States with a discussion of their respective strengths and weaknesses.2.2 Physical Search: The initial approach taken in the early years of aviation security was
hand inspection. This approach is slow, labor intensive and, if conducted thoroughly, may raise passenger privacy concerns. The concealment of a bomb within a common article of commerce means that either the bomb will escape detection or the screener may be forced to destroy the passenger'sproperty to conduct an inspection. Hand inspection is widely used to resolve an alarm (often by a bomb
squad), but is more effective when used in combination with information derived from other technological approaches.2.3 Canine: Our first trace explosive detectors were trained explosive detection dogs (often
referred to as K-9s). Although currently canines are only used to evaluate suspect items for aviation, U.S.
Customs and the U.S. Department of Agriculture also use them for routine detection of prohibited contraband or food. The routine use of dogs to screen checked baggage poses several problems. Theeffectiveness of the dog team is dependent on a number of variables, including the following: the training
and readiness of the handler and the dog, the care used for handling and storing training aids, and the
frequency of recurrent training. Additionally, high training and maintenance overhead costs, and short
duty cycles plague canine programs. Although many handlers periodically use training aids to maintain
their dog's interest, the process can be flawed if training aides become contaminated with otherrecognizable scents such as the handler's scent, the scent of the explosive storage bunker, or even the
scent of the rubber gloves sometimes used to handle the training aides. For this reason, training aides are
often substituted to mitigate this effect. Dog teams may be better suited to perform airport or aircraft
searches than the routine screening of bags.2.4 Trace Detection: In the late 1990s, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States
conducted tests on the expected contamination levels when a careful terrorist builds a bomb, conceals it in
an object designed to evade visual inspection, and places the object in a hold bag. Based on lessons
learned from these tests and situations in which trace detection is used for primary screening, the United
States devised a strategy that requires a certain number of bags be inspected on the following: exterior
only; both the exterior and interior; and, another number requiring a complete screening of all objects
large enough to conceal a bomb. Passengers identified as "Selectees" (meaning they are selected formore thorough inspection) are directed to a full search. High labor costs and slow processing times of
trace detection limit this mixed strategy. The challenge is not the speed of the equipment, which provides
detection and the identification of the explosive in ten seconds, but rather in bag handling and sample
acquisition by the screener. U.S. experts have found that if the sampling process is not donesystematically, detections will be missed. Currently, it is the smallest of the 450 airports in the United
States that primarily use trace for screening hold baggage. The transition from a trace-based checked
NACC/DCA/2 - IP/07- 3 -
baggage clearing system at smaller airports to the use of explosives detection systems (EDS) at all U.S.
airports will take years and billions of dollars due to the number of airports to be transitioned.2.5 Conventional X-Ray: The use of conventional x-ray inspection to screen checked
baggage continues and is much improved from its development in the 1970s. The original systems were fluoroscopes with poor penetration, resolution and dynamic range, and a high radiation dose to the baggage and possibly the human screener. Systems have since improved and can now provide thescreener with information (via dual x-ray energy) of the composition of the contents of the bag. The x-
ray identifies organic materials like explosives, and most other items in the bag, in one color. Metallic
objects are identified to the screener in a second color. Although advances in technology make it easier to
separate metallic clutter from the subtler image of a bomb, the task remains a difficult one. Unlike
weapons, bombs have no pre-determined shape. The challenge facing regulators is that the process isdependent on the training, motivation, perception, and vigilance of the screener. Performance of the
system is difficult to measure, and unannounced, random testing often reveals that the system does not
attain a level of effectiveness needed to detect explosives.2.6 Advanced Technology: Equipment manufacturers have developed advanced technology
(AT) x-ray systems that process bags at a high rate and make explosive detection decisions. Several equipment manufacturers have attempted to achieve automated detection with AT. Some of the AT systems employ multiple transmission views and dual energy to help with the explosive detectiondecisions. Several States have deployed these AT systems as the first level of checked baggage screening
followed by on-screen alarm resolution and certified EDS Computed Tomography-based technology.The United States has repeatedly tested this technology and determined that it does not meet the detection
standards adopted by ICAO for all threat explosive categories. The vulnerability created by undetected
critical threats leaves an exploitable gap in explosive detection. A system relying on AT as the first stage
contains this vulnerability.2.7 Explosive Detection Systems: Several States have adopted Computed Tomography (CT)
based automated EDS as the primary method of screening hold baggage. EDS provides a high level ofdetection across the total ICAO threat base coupled with an operationally manageable false alarm rate.
Since September 11, 2001, the United States has deployed over 1,300 EDS systems for hold baggagescreening and is aiming to reach the goal of 100 percent hold baggage screening using EDS. The rapid
deployment of a large number of these systems has been a challenge in the United States. The systems
are heavy, large, expensive (more than US$800,000), and require integration into the baggage handling
system to operate most efficiently. Regardless, the deployed systems have been operating reliably and do
provide the highest level of protection to the traveler. Some States include certified EDS technology
within their baggage screening systems to resolve un-cleared alarms from AT and screener on screenalarm resolution. The problem with this approach is that the level one technology will have any number
of missed detections, which will then proceed to the aircraft. Several States are conducting research and
testing to identify more effective and efficient approaches to screening hold baggage and to expand the
list of threats addressed. They are exploring combinations of innovative and new technologies.NACC/DCA/2 - IP/07
- 4 -3. Conclusion
3.1 Ensuring that a robust system for screening hold baggage is used for international flights
is the challenge faced by all States as the ICAO 100 percent deadline approaches. While many States will
reach the 100 percent requirement through a combination of methods described above, States shouldconsider that the probability of detection is critical to our quest for achieving a high level of security, a
standard of equivalency for baggage screening, and, in the long-term, a global aviation network that is as
fully and effectively protected as technology or methods allow. - END -quotesdbs_dbs22.pdfusesText_28[PDF] icao annex 17 price
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