EN Horizon 2020 Work Programme 2016 - 2017 5.ii
24 ???. 2017 ?. The Commission considers that proposals requesting a contribution from the EU between. EUR 4 and 6 million would allow this specific challenge ...
EN Horizon 2020 Work Programme 2016 - 2017 12. Climate action
24 ???. 2017 ?. The objective of the Societal Challenge 'Climate action environment
EN Horizon 2020 Work Programme 2016 - 2017 8. Health
24 ???. 2017 ?. SC1-PM-11-2016-2017: Clinical research on regenerative medicine . ... Include a systematic approach and define key gate-criteria for ...
EN Euratom Work Programme 2016 - 2017 (European Commission
13 ???. 2015 ?. Conditions for the Call - Euratom fission 2016-2017 . ... constitutes a 5-year financing decision for both the EUROfusion joint programme ( ...
Final Report for the Evaluation of the application of the 2014-2020
Increased EIB involvement in the early stages of projects with climate part au cours des dernières années confirme l'engagement de la BEI à atteindre ...
The rise of green bonds - Financing for development in Latin
LAC green bond issuances in local markets 2016-2017 YTD . Agreement and the need to finance US$ 1 trillion a year in investments for renewable energy ...
EIB Investment Report 2018/2019: retooling Europes economy
19 ???. 2016 ?. investment in 2017 investing more than expected a year earlier. ... Investment growth in the EU
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4 ???. 2017 ?. Climate Finance and NDCs in Latin America: Guide ... Société de Promotion et de Participation pour la Coopération Economique (French.
The New EFSD+ and the EIBs External Lending Mandate
11 ????. 2021 ?. The European. Investment Bank (EIB) has a long experience starting in 1977
2017 Erasmus+ Programme Guide
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The New EFSD+ and the EIB's
External Lending Mandate
STUDYRequested by the BUDG Committee
Policy Department for Budgetary Affairs
Authors: Erik LUNDSGAARDE, María-Luisa SÁNCHEZ-BARRUECO, Andreea HANCU BUDUI
Directorate-General for Internal Policies
PE 729.264 - February 2022
ENThe EFSD+ and the EIB's
External Lending Mandate
Abstract
This study provides an overview of the EFSD+, a core part of the NDICI -Global Europe Instrument. The study situates the EFSD+ in the context of previous EU experiences with the use of blended finance and guarantees to address external action objectives, focusing on the EIB's External Lending Mandate (ELM) and the European Fund for Sustainable Development (EFSD). The study examines key challenges related to the accountability and performance of these instruments to inform oversight of EFSD+ implementation. This document was requested by the European Parliament's Committee on Budgets.AUTHORS
Erik LUNDSGAARDE, Independent Consultant
María-Luisa SÁNCHEZ-BARRUECO, University of DeustoAndreea HANCU BUDUI, Independent Consultant
ADMINISTRATOR RESPONSIBLE
Stefan SCHULZ
EDITORIAL ASSISTANT
Lyna PÄRT
LINGUISTIC VERSIONS
Original: EN
ABOUT THE EDITOR
Policy depar tments provide in-house and external expertise to support EP committees and otherparliamentary bodies in shaping legislation and exercising democratic scrutiny over EU internal policies.
To contact the Policy Department or to subscribe for updates, please write to:Policy Department for Budgetary Affairs
European Parliament
B-1047 Brussels
Email: Poldep-Budg@ep.europa.eu
Manuscript completed in February 2022
© European Union, 2022
This document is available on the internet at:
DISCLAIMER AND COPYRIGHT
The opinions expressed in this document are the sole re sponsibility of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position of the European Parliament.Reproduction and translation for non
-commercial purposes are authorised, provided the source is acknowledged and the European Parliament is give n prior notice and sent a copy.© Cover image used under license from
Adobe Stock
The New EFSD+ and the EIB's External Lending MandatePE 729.264 3
CONTENTS
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 5
LIST OF BOXES 7
LIST OF FIGURES 7
LIST OF TABLES 8
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 9
1. INTRODUCTION 13
2. BLENDED FINANCE AND GUARANTEES IN EU DEVELOPMENT POLICY 15
2.1.Definitions 15
2.1.1.Blended finance 15
2.1.2.Guarantees 17
2.2.Governance 18
2.3.Operational cycle 19
2.3.1.Blended finance 19
2.3.2.External action guarantees 20
2.4.Performance and Impact 22
3. PRECURSORS TO THE EFSD+: THE EIB'S EXTERNAL LENDING MANDATE AND THE EFSD 25
3.1.The EIB's External Lending Mandate 25
3.1.1.Rationale and Objectives 26
3.1.2.Governance and accountability 29
3.1.3.Implementation Profile 37
3.1.4.Assessment findings 45
3.2.The European Fund for Sustainable Development 51
3.2.1.Rationale and Objectives 52
3.2.2.Governance and accountability 55
3.2.3.Implementation Profile 59
3.2.4.Assessment Findings 64
4. THE EFSD+: FEATURES, PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES 67
4.1.Context and Rationale 67
4.2.Governance and accountability 68
4.3.Expected Implementation Profile 70
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4.4. Overview of Current Policy Concepts 72
4.5. Key Issues in Monitoring EFSD+ Implementation 74
5.CONCLUSION 77
REFERENCES 79
ANNEX 87
The New EFSD+ and the EIB's External Lending MandatePE 729.264 5
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
ACP Africa, the Caribbean and Pacific
AFD Agence Française de Développement
CPF Common provisioning fund
DFI Development Finance Institution
DCI Development Cooperation Instrument
ECA European Court of Auditors
EFSD European Fund for Sustainable Development
EFSD+ European Fund for Sustainable Development PlusEFSDr EFSD Regulation
EFSD-SB Strategic Board of the EFSD
EIB European Investment Bank
EIB-CM EIB's Complaints Mechanism
ELM External Lending Mandate
ELMd ELM Decision
ENI European Neighbourhood Instrument
EO European Ombudsman
EP European Parliament
EPPO European Public Prosecutor's Office
ESIF European Strategic and Investment Fund
FMO Financierings-Maatschappij voor Ontwikkelingslanden N.V.FR Financial Regulation
GFEA Guarantee Fund for External Actions
HIPC Highly Indebted Poor Countries
IFI International Financial Institution
KfW Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (German Development Bank)LDCs Least Developed Countries
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6 PE 729.264
MFF Multiannual Financial Framework
MoU Memorandum of understanding
MSME Micro, Small and Medium-sized enterprise
NDICI Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation InstrumentReM Results Measurement Framework
TAG Technical Assessment Group
SDGs Sustainable Development Goals
SME Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise
WA Working arrangement
The New EFSD+ and the EIB's External Lending MandatePE 729.264 7
LIST OF BOXES
Box 1: Grant elements
under EU blended development finance 16 Box 2: Examples of EIB financing non-specific for climate change adaptation and mitigation 43 Box 3: Examples of expected results indicators by sector for ELM financed operations 46 Box 4: Example of a Guarantee called under the ELM 48Box 5: Examples of EFSD Guarantee Agreements 60
Box 6: Examples of EFSD Blending Projects 61
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1: ELM
- Eligible countries per region 28 Figure 2: Signed financing per year under ELM (2014-2021, EUR millions) 37Figure 3: ELM
- Financed countries per region 38Figure 4: ELM Geographic Priorities 38
Figure 5: ELM Country Priorities 40
Figure 6: ELM Sectoral Priorities 41
Figure 7: Distribution of ELM Financing by Geography and Sector 41 Figure 8: ELM Climate-related Funding by sector (% of total climate-related funding) 42 Figure 9: ELM Climate-related Funding by Region 43Figure 10: EFSD
- eligible countries per region 54 Figure 12: Sectoral emphasis of EFSD Guarantees (EU Contributions, EUR Millions). 62 Figure 13: Distribution of EFSD Blending Projects by Sector. 62 Figure 14: EFSD Guarantee Implementers (Share of Total EU Contribution to 2021). 63 Figure 15: Implementers of EFSD Blended Finance as of 2021 64Figure 16: EFSD+
- Eligible countries per region 70IPOL | Policy Department for Budgetary Affairs
8 PE 729.264
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1: Calls made on the EU Guarantee during the 2014-2021 ELM (EUR million) 48 Table A.1: Evolution of ELM Financing 2014-2021 87 Table A.2: Regional Distribution of ELM Financing 87 Table A.3: Distribution of signed ELM Financing by Country 88 Table A.4: Distribution of ELM Financing by Sector 89 Table A.5: Distribution of ELM Financing by Region and Sector 90 Table A.6: Distribution of ELM Climate-related Financing by Sector 91 Table A.7: Distribution of ELM Climate Financing by Geography 91 Table A.8: Distribution of EFSD Blended Finance by Country (commitments). 92 Table A.9: List of Fragile and Conflict-Affected States, LDCs, and HIPC 93 The New EFSD+ and the EIB's External Lending MandatePE 729.264 9
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Background
Blended finance
and guarantees have attracted interest as tools to advance development goals becausethey promise to mobilise additional financing for development by using limited public funds to perform
a de-risking function. While guarantees create a contingent liability for the EU budget, blended finance
products combine payable and non-repayable elements, often through regionally-oriented umbrellafacilities. Both tools rest on an increased reliance on development finance institutions and private actors
in development policy implementation. The technically complex features of these instruments raise policy and governance concerns, widening the gap and increasing asymmetry between public (EU) institutions and implementing actors from the viewpoint of specialised financial expertise and monitoring capacities. Inserting adequate ex-ante safeguards and ex-post accountability arrangements is of paramount importance to ensure compliance with EU development policy goals duringimplementation. Hence the salience of concepts such as 'additionality' (linked to relevance) and 'results
measurement' (linked to performance), highlighted in literature. Within the framework of the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI -Global Europe ), the European Fund for Sustainable Development Plus (EFSD+) provides anumbrella for blended finance and guarantee operations in EU external action. The EFSD+ integrates and
brings together lessons from formerly separate blending and guarantee instruments. The EuropeanInvestment Bank (EIB) has a long experience, starting in 1977, as a manager of external action guarantees
within its External Lending Mandate (ELM). The ELM provided a guarantee to back EIB lending in Pre- accession and Neighbourhood countries, countries in Asia and Latin America, and South Africa. Bycontrast, EU experiences in blended development finance have centred on the regional blending facilities
that have expanded since 2007. Blending facilities have enabled the EU to provide innovative financing
for development and have been implemented by an array of multilateral and national actors. The original European Fund for Sustainable Development (EFSD) was the immediate precursor to the EFSD+. It was established in 2017 to facilitate investment in the European Neighbourhood and in Sub-Saharan Africa. Like the ELM, The EFSD also integrated geopolitical goals, such as tackling the root causes
of migration. The integration of instruments reflected in the NDICI-Global Europe instrument and the EFSD+ expandsthe financial and geographical scope for blended finance and guarantee operations, with an expectation
that financing priorities will follow the geographical emphasis on Sub-Saharan Africa and Neighbourhood countries outlined in the NDICI Regulation. The EFSD+ also aims to increase attention to investment needs in fragile states and LDCs.With the EFSD+ legislative framework in place, the focus now shifts to how expected changes in blended
finance and guarantee operations will be implemented. This study concludes that attention to building
the evidence base on the effectiveness of guarantees and blended finance and to the management needsof EU institutions to fulfil a stronger policy steering role are essential in monitoring the progress of EFSD+
implementation moving forward.IPOL | Policy Department for Budgetary Affairs
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Policy challenges
Managing a Diversified Development Finance Landscape Blending finance and guarantee instruments are implemented through indirect management. The ELM was an exclusive instrument for the EIB, while the EFSD has been impleme nted through a small set of DFIs, including the EIB. Even though the NDICI Regulation preserves an exclusive sovereign lending window for the EIB, the EFSD+ emphasises the promotion of an open investment architecture, implying that the selection of impleme ntation partners should be determined by their comparative advantages in advancing specific priorities. In a broader geopolitical context, the NDICI-Global Europe instrument signals an increased emphasis on mutually reinforcing cooperation among development financeinstitutions (DFIs), alongside the European Commission, EEAS, the EIB and the EBRD. The 'Team Europe'
approach mirrors this shift, while enhancing the visibility of the EU's development contributions.The Commission plays a gate-keeping role for DFI access to EU financing through the 'pillar assessment'
of eligible counterparts. The Financial Regulation depicts this examination as a technical shield to ensure
financial compliance and performance (thereby protecting the EU's financial interests). The inclusiveness
goal inherent in a commitment to an open financial architecture highlights challenges to expanding the
scope of participation in implementation of guarantees and blended finance beyond a relatively small group of DFIs. At ground level, preparatory work associated with blending and guarantee projectsstretches the resources of national financial institutions and agencies with more restricted mandates,
fewer resources and shorter experience. The 'European preference' principle whereby proje cts are primarily led by a European counterpart may consolidate a predominant position for traditionally stronger actors. At headquarters level, potential implementers may not have the same access to EUinstitutions. The implementation of an open investment architecture will therefore require transparency
in the elaboration of selection criteria and attention to how priorities are communicated to potential
counterparts. The European Parliament should scrutinise the implementation of the open investment architecture and review how the collaboration between EU delegations and DFIs can be stimulated and improved in the context of the 'Team Europe' approach. Defining the implications of the 'policy first' principleThe 'policy first' principle foresees a strengthened alignment of investment priorities with the EU external
action agenda through strategic guidance and the integration of the EFSD+ into country programmingprocesses. It strengthens the strategic role of the Commission, the EEAS (including EU delegations) and
the influence of the EP through its resolutions. The policy first principle can be interpreted as both a top-down concept, encouraging implementationto be strongly guided by an EU policy agenda or as a concept reinforcing locally determined priorities by
increasing the linkage of blended finance and guarantee operations to country-specific priorities. The EP
should remain vigilant in reviewing how the policy first approach addresses the second understandingof the concept, focusing on development concerns associated with local ownership. In particular, the EP
should scrutinise whether the mandatory local consultations of stakeholders and beneficiaries are systematically organised, both through its scrutiny on the Commission and through independent hearings. The New EFSD+ and the EIB's External Lending MandatePE 729.264 11
Budgetary challenges
Enhancing technical expertise
The European Parliament should review the institutional adaptation in the Commission and EEAS to theparadigm underpinning the EFSD+. This includes examining staff capacities or training needs on highly
technical matters linked to blended finance and guarantee instruments, in order to ensure that the EU
institutional actors are able to assume the increased management responsibilities concerning planning,
oversight and coordination that stem from the expansion of development finance operations throughthe EFSD+. While the 'Team Europe' approach implies an interest in drawing on existing capacities within
the broader European DFI community to address deficits in staffing resources and expertise, the Parliament should consider what resources are needed withinEU institutions themselves to effectively
guide and review EFSD+ implementation.Measuring additionality and performance
Assessments of blended finance point to challenges in measuring concepts that provide a rationale for
deploying these financing instruments. The concept of additionality, relating to the identification of
financial or development effects that would not have materialised in the absence of a given contribution,
has proven particularly difficult to operationalise. The regulatory framework for the EFSD+ emphasisesthe importance of additionality, defined in relation to addressing market failures and crowding-in private
sector funding, as a core justification for applying its financing approach. The Commission is expected to
supply data on additionality alongside other indicators as part of its EFSD+ reporting obligations.The experiences with the ELM and EFSD provide an indication of challenges in analysing the performance
of blended finance and guarantee operations. Difficulties stem not only from a lack of clarity on the
measurement of concepts such as additionality or leveraging effects but also from challenges indistinguishing the effects of different financing streams and reconciling reporting frameworks for DFIs
that are subject to varied accountability frameworks. With the implementation of the EFSD+, the Commission aims to generate more consistent information on blended finance and guarantee operations through a harmonised results measurement framework. The European Parliament should review thecontent and implementation of this framework to provide a foundation for substantive annual reporting.
Improving the quality of reporting for better scrutiny Our analysis of the precursors of the EFSD+ indicates that a strong regulatory framework exists thatenshrines sufficiently detailed reporting obligations. From that perspective, no major improvement is
needed. The implementation of these obligations faces practical challenges however, hampering effective oversight by the European Parliament and external observers. Reporting bodies tend to rely extensively on descriptive figures, expectations, and success stories. Obtaining a synchronous, relevant,balanced, consistent and comparable picture of actual results from financial and operational reports has
proved challenging in the past. While rules on confidentiality of financial information admittedly constrain the reporting capacity of the Commission, a balance should be struck with its responsibility in overseeing the financial counterparts involved in budget management. From that perspective, theParliament's initiative to associate the ECA with the evaluation of the EFSD results was helpful. The
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12 PE 729.264
Parliament might wish to ask for improvements in the quality of reporting by the Commission as regards
compliance, performance, and control systems.The study identifies
several areas for improvement that the EP might address through its scrutiny powers. A summary of relevant issues and recommendations is provided below.Proposed areas of interest for EP scrutiny
Scrutiny of Compliance
What reasons justify the choice among technical assistance, guarantees, and other financial instruments? How does flexibility in instrument choice affect the attainment of programme goals? What factors explain the uneven resort to different instruments by sector and by region?How can the framework to carry out systematic local consultations of stakeholders and beneficiaries be improved?
How does the Commission communicate expectations about calls on guarantees, report on calls and pursue the recovery of (at least a share of) calls on guarantees?
How can financial confidentiality and transparency requirements be reconciled to ensure fair project selection processes by DFIs?Scrutiny of Performance
What are the drivers of the Commission's asset management policy as regards provisioning funds for guarantees? Are provisions placed in an efficient and prudent way?
How does the Commission's risk management framework affect decision-making and how does it influence DFI implementation choices? How can the Commission improve its oversight of project selection by DFIs to verify that the focus is placed on programme goals rather than merely supporting DFIs activities? Can sector- or region-specific patterns of project success -and failure be identified? How does theEFSD+ facilitate learning about best practices?
How is the consolidated approach to blended finance and guarantees under the EFSD+ contributing to greater coherence and collaboration among EU institutions and European DFIs?How do blended finance and guarantee operations complement other approaches in the EU development toolbox, especially in fragile states and LDCs?
Governance arrangements
How is the respect for EU policy objectives and standards ensured throughout the implementation chain by DFIs and financial intermediaries?
Accountability arrangements
Does the Commission oversee project implementation (performance and EU visibility) in a sufficient manner? Request ECA to carry out designated performance audits over guarantees in external action. Foster investment dialogue hearings in a more systematic way. The New EFSD+ and the EIB's External Lending MandatePE 729.264 13
1. INTRODUCTION
The European Fund for Sustainable Development Plus (EFSD+) is a key component of the EU's new Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI), also referred to asGlobal Europe".
1 The EFSD+ builds on the EU's experiences with different development financing instruments, including blended finance and guarantees. These instruments aim to mobilise additionalinvestment for EU global development objectives by shaping the risk to return calculus for investors. They
are therefore considered to have a 'de -risking' function (Bayliss et al., 2020).The NDICI
-Global Europe instrument has several ambitions. On a broad level, it aims to strengthen theposition of the EU as a global actor following a geopolitical logic. To expand the EU's global role, the
instrument provides a common framework to consolidate ten previously separate instruments, promotes flexibility in programming, and seeks to align instruments with global development objectives (Roba,2021).
The current dynamic environment due to the COVID-19 pandemic provides an added stimulus for increasing the scale of the EU's development instruments and reorienting them to respond to new challenges (Bilal, 2020). Financing to support the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals(SDGs) lagged prior to the pandemic. However, the pandemic has given rise to a range of socio-economic
challenges globally that have resulted in added demands on strained financing sources (OECD, 2021).Beyond creating additional financing needs, the pandemic has highlighted funding gaps with respect to
specific priority areas (e.g., the health sector) and for particular economic actors (e.g., small and medium-
sized enterprises). The ability of the NDICI-Global Europe instrument to adapt to the financing context
created by the pandemic offers a test of its flexibility. As implementation of the NDICI-Global Europe instrument proceeds, there is ongoing reflection on how to adapt and strengthen the European Financial Architecture for Development (EFAD). Debate on the future EFAD centres on how to make EU actions to promote sustainable development more cohesive andimpactful. Additional strategic engagement from the Council and a larger policy steering role for the
Commission present one dimension of proposed change. Another dimension of change relates to theclarification of the respective strengths and future roles of diverse finance institutions that implement EU
programmes. This agenda raises questions about the division of labour between the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) as well as thepotential for improved coordination among national development finance institutions (DFIs) (Council of
the European Union, 2019; Council of the European Union, 2021).quotesdbs_dbs32.pdfusesText_38[PDF] Norme ISA 220, Contrôle qualité d un audit d états financiers
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