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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the 3HRSOH·V 5HSXNOLŃ RI FOLQM

i

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the 3HRSOH·V 5HSXNOLŃ RI FOLQM

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the 3HRSOH·V 5HSXNOLŃ RI FOLQM

Military and Security Developments

HQYROYLQJ POH 3HRSOH·V 5HSXNOLŃ RI FOLQM

2020

Annual Report to Congress

A Report to Congress Pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act for

Fiscal Year 2000, as Amended

6HŃPLRQ 1260 ´Modifications to Annual Report on Military and Security Developments Involving the

3HRSOH·V 5HSXNOLŃ RI FOLQMµ RI POH 1MPLRQMO GHIHQVH $XPORUL]MPLRQ $ŃP IRU )LVŃMO KHMU 2020, Public

Law 116-92, which amends the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Section

1202, Public Law 106-6D SURYLGHV POMP POH 6HŃUHPMU\ RI GHIHQVH VOMOO VXNPLP M UHSRUP ´LQ NRPO

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of China. The report shall address the current and probable future course of military-technological GHYHORSPHQP RI POH 3HRSOH·V ILNHUMPLRQ $UP\ MQG POH PHQHPV MQG SURNMNOH GHYHORSPHQP RI FOLQHVH security strategy and military strategy, and of the military organizations and operational concepts supporting such development over the next 20 years. The report shall also address United States- China engagement and cooperation on security matters during the period covered by the report,

including through United States-China military-to-military contacts, and the United States strategy for

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the 3HRSOH·V 5HSXNOLŃ RI FOLQM

PREFACE:

$ 20 K($5 5(75263(F7H9( 21 F+H1$·6

STRATEGY AND ARMED FORCES

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the 3HRSOH·V 5HSXNOLŃ RI FOLQM

i For 20 years, the Department of Defense (DoD) has provided Congress with an annual report on

PLOLPMU\ MQG VHŃXULP\ GHYHORSPHQPV LQYROYLQJ POH 3HRSOH·V 5HSXNOLŃ RI Fhina (PRC). These reports

OMYH MVVHVVHG POH ŃRQPRXUV RI FOLQM·V QMPLRQMO VPUMPHJ\ LPV MSSURMŃO PR VHŃXULP\ MQG PLOLPMU\ MIIMLUV

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marks an important year for POH 3HRSOH·V ILNHUMPLRQ $UP\ 3I$ MV LP RRUNV PR MŃOLHYH LPSRUPMQP PRGHUQL]MPLRQ PLOHVPRQHV MOHMG RI POH FOLQHVH FRPPXQLVP 3MUP\·V FF3 NURMGHU JRMO PR PUMQVIRUP

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continues to respond to the growing strategic challenges posed by the PRC, 2020 offers a unique

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armed forces over the past two decades.

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VL]MNOH NXP PRVPO\ MUŃOMLŃ PLOLPMU\ POMP RMV SRRUO\ VXLPHG PR POH FF3·V ORQJ-term ambitions. The report

UHŃRJQL]HG POH FF3·V RNÓHŃPLYH RMV IRU POH 35F PR NHŃRPH M ´VPURng, modernized, unified, and

RHMOPO\ QMPLRQBµ Despite these great power aspirations, the PLA lacked the capabilities, organization,

and readiness for modern warfare. Yet the CCP understood these deficiencies and set long-term goals to strengthen and transform its armed forces in a manner commensurate with its aspirations to strengthen and transform China. GRG·V 2000 UHSRUP MVVHVVHG POMP POH 3I$ RMV VORRO\ MQG XQHYHQO\ MGMSPLQJ PR POH PUHQGV LQ PRGHUQ

RMUIMUHB 7OH 3I$·V IRUŃH VPUXŃPXUH MQG ŃMSMNLOLPLHV IRŃXVed largely on waging large-scale land warfare

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capabilities were rudimentary; its use of information technology was well behind the curve; and its

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industry struggled to produce high-quality systems. Even if the PRC could produce or acquire modern weapons, the PLA lacked the joint organizations and training needed to field them effectively. The

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goal first announced by General Secretary Xi Jinping in 2017. Although the CCP has not defined what

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will seek to develop a military by mid-century that is equal to³or in some cases superior to³the U.S.

military, or that of any other great power that thH 35F YLHRV MV M POUHMPB $V POLV \HMU·V UHSRUP GHPMLOV

the PRC has marshalled the resources, technology, and political will over the past two decades to strengthen and modernize the PLA in nearly every respect. Indeed, as this report shows, China is already ahead of the United States in certain areas such as:

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the 3HRSOH·V 5HSXNOLŃ RI FOLQM

ii

> Shipbuilding: The PRC has the largest navy in the world, with an overall battle force of

approximately 350 ships and submarines including over 130 major surface combatants. In comparison, the U.S. NaY\·V NMPPOH IRUŃH LV MSSUR[LPMPHO\ 2E3 VOLSV MV RI HMUO\ 2020B > Land-based conventional ballistic and cruise missiles: The PRC has more than 1,250 ground- launched ballistic missiles (GLBMs) and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. The United States currently fields one type of conventional GLBM with a range of 70 to 300 kilometers and no GLCMs.

> HQPHJUMPHG MLU GHIHQVH V\VPHPV 7OH 35F OMV RQH RI POH RRUOG·V OMUJHVP IRUŃHV RI MGYMQŃHG ORQJ-

range surface-to-air systems³including Russian-built S-400s, S-300s, and domestically produced systems³that constitute part of its robust and redundant integrated air defense system architecture.

0RUH VPULNLQJ POMQ POH 3I$·V VPMJJHULQJ MPRXQPV RI QHR PLOLPMU\ OMUGRMUH MUH POH Uecent sweeping

efforts taken by CCP leaders that include completely restructuring the PLA into a force better suited

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new operational concepts, and expanding POH 35F·V RYHUVHMV PLOLPMU\ IRRPSULQPB

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leaders are aware of these problems, and their strategy envisions the PLA undergoing almost 30 more years of modernization and reform. Of course, the CCP does not intend for the PLA to be merely a

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the CCP desires the PLA to become a practical instrument of its statecraft with an active role in

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and its aims to revise aspects of the international order.

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how this course unfolds. What is certain is that the CCP has a strategic end state that it is working

towards, which if achieved and its accompanying military modernization left unaddressed, will have

serious implications for U.S. national interests and the security of the international rules-based order.

Report scope: This report covers security and military developments involving the PRC until the end of 2019.

Developments in 2020, including the implications of the COVID-

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the 3HRSOH·V 5HSXNOLŃ RI FOLQM

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the 3HRSOH·V 5HSXNOLŃ RI FOLQM

iv

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the 3HRSOH·V 5HSXNOLŃ RI FOLQM

v

81G(567$1GH1* F+H1$·S STRATEGY

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> The PeoplH·V 5HSXNOLŃ RI FOLQM·V 35F·V VPUMPHJ\ MLPV PR MŃOLHYH ´POH JUHMP UHÓXYHQMPLRQ RI POH

FOLQHVH QMPLRQµ N\ 204EB FOLQM·V VPUMPHJ\ ŃMQ NH ŃOMUMŃPHUL]HG MV M GHPHUPLQHG SXUVXLP RI SROLPLŃMO

and social modernity that includes far-ranging efforts to expand ChiQM·V QMPLRQMO SRRHU SHUIHŃP

its governance systems, and revise the international order.

> The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) frames this strategy as an effort to realize long-held

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the world stage.

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competition with other states, including, and in particular, the United States. > In 2019, China intensified its efforts to advance its overall development including steadying its economic growth, strengthening its armed forces, and taking a more active role in global affairs.

Foreign Policy

> 7OH 35F·V IRUHLJQ SROLŃ\ VHHNV PR UHYLVH MVSHŃPV RI POH LQPHUQMPLRQMO RUGHU RQ POH 3MUP\·V Perms

and in accordance with ideas and principles it views as essential to forging an external environment ŃRQGXŃLYH PR FOLQM·V QMPLRQMO UHÓXYHQMPLRQB > In 2019, the PRC recognized that its armed forces should take a more active role in advancing its foreign policy, highlighting the increasingly global character that Beijing ascribes to its military power.

Economic Policy

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modernization across all areas, including its armed forces.

> FOLQM·V HŃRQRPLŃ GHYHORSPHQP VXSSRUPV LPV PLOLPMU\ PRGHUQL]MPLRQ QRP RQO\ N\ SURYLGLQJ POH

means for larger defense budgets, but through deliberate Party-led initiatives such as OBOR and Made in China 2025, as well as the systemic benefits RI FOLQM·V JURRLQJ QMPLRQMO LQGXVPULMO MQG technological base.

Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) Development Strategy

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strategies with its security strategies to build an integrated national strategic system and capabilities

LQ VXSSRUP RI FOLQM·V QMPLRQMO UHÓXYHQMPLRQ JRMOVB

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the 3HRSOH·V 5HSXNOLŃ RI FOLQM

vi

> 0F) HQŃRPSMVVHV VL[ LQPHUUHOMPHG HIIRUPV 1 IXVLQJ POH FOLQM·V GHIHQVH LQGXVPULMO NMVH MQG LPV

civilian technology and industrial base; (2) integrating and leveraging science and technology innovations across military and civilian sectors; (3) cultivating talent and blending military and

civilian expertise and knowledge; (4) building military requirements into civilian infrastructure and

leveraging civilian construction for military purposes; (5) leveraging civilian service and logistics

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mobilization system to include all relevant aspects of its society and economy for use in

competition and war. > While MCF has broader purposes than acquiring foreign technology, in practice, MCF means

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costs for U.S. and global entitLHV POMP GR QRP GHVLUH PR ŃRQPULNXPH PR POH 35F·V PLOLPMU\

modernization.

Defense Policy & Military Strategy

> The PRC has stated its defense policy aims to safeguard its sovereignty, security, and development

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> In 2019, the PLA remained primarily oriented towards longstanding regional threats while

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strategy.

> FOLQM·V OHMGHUV VPress the imperative of meeting key military transformation markers set in 2020

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PRGHUQL]MPLRQ VR POMP N\ POH HQG RI 204E FOLQM RLOO ILHOG M ´RRUOG-ŃOMVVµ PLOLPMry.

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POH ŃRQPH[P RI FOLQM·V QMPLRQMO VPUMPHJ\ ORRHYHU LP LV OLNHO\ POMP FOLQM RLOO MLP PR GHYHORS M

military by mid-century that is equal to³or in some cases superior to³the U.S. military, or that

of any other great power that China views as a threat to its sovereignty, security, and development interests. MISSIONS, TASKS, & MODERNIZATION OF CHIN$·6 $50(G )25F(6 H1

7+( ´1(J (5$µ

> 7OH 35F·V VPUMPHJ\ LQŃOXGHV MGYMQŃing a comprehensive military modernization program that aims

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clasVµ PLOLPMU\ N\ POH HQG RI 204EB

> 7OH 3I$·V HYROYLQJ ŃMSMNLOLPLHV MQG ŃRQŃHSPV ŃRQPLQXH PR VPUHQJPOHQ POH 35F·V MNLOLP\ PR ŃRXQPHU

an intervention by an adversary in the Indo-Pacific region and project power globally.

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the 3HRSOH·V 5HSXNOLŃ RI FOLQM

vii > In 2019, the PLA continued to make progress implementing major structural reforms, fielding modern indigenous systems, building readiness, and strengthening its competency to conduct joint operations.

> China has already achieved parity with³or even exceeded³the United States in several military

modernization areas, including: ² Shipbuilding: The PRC has the largest navy in the world, with an overall battle force of approximately 350 ships and submarines including over 130 major surface combatants. In comparison, the UB6B 1MY\·V NMPPOH IRUŃH LV MSSUR[LPMPHO\ 2E3 VOLSV MV RI HMUO\ 2020B China is the top ship-producing nation in the world by tonnage and is increasing its shipbuilding capacity and capability for all naval classes. ² Land-based conventional ballistic and cruise missiles: The PRC has developed its conventional missile forces unrestrained by any international agreements. The PRC has more than 1,250 ground-launched ballistic missiles (GLBMs) and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. The United States currently fields one type of conventional GLBM with a range of 70 to 300 kilometers and no GLCMs.

² Integrated air defense systems 7OH 35F OMV RQH RI POH RRUOG·V OMUJHVP IRUŃHV RI MGYMQŃHG

long-range surface-to-air systems³including Russian-built S-400s, S-300s, and domestically produced systems³that constitute part of its robust and redundant integrated air defense system (IADS) architecture. GHYHORSPHQPV LQ POH 3I$·V 0RGHUQL]MPLRQ MQG 5HIRUP > 7OH 3HRSOH·V ILNHUMPLRQ $UP\ $UP\ 3I$$ is the largest standing ground force in the world. In 2019, the PLAA continued to transition into a modern, mobile, and lethal ground force by fielding upgraded combat systems and communications equipment and enhancing its ability to conduct and manage complex combined-arms and joint operations. > 7OH 3HRSOH·V ILNHUMPLRQ $UP\ 1MY\ 3I$1³the largest navy in the world³is an increasingly modern and flexible force that has focused on replacing previous generations of platforms with limited capabilities in favor of larger, modern multi-role combatants. As of 2019, the PLAN is largely composed of modern multi-role platforms featuring advanced anti-ship, anti- air, and anti-submarine weapons and sensors. ² Naval Shipbuilding and Modernization: The PLAN remains engaged in a robust shipbuilding and modernization program that includes submarines, surface combatants, amphibious warfare ships, aircraft carriers, and auxiliary ships as well as developing and fielding advanced weapons, sensors, and command and control capabilities.

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the 3HRSOH·V 5HSXNOLŃ RI FOLQM

viii > 7OH 3HRSOH·V ILNHUMPLRQ $UP\ $LU )RUŃH 3I$$) and PLAN Aviation together constitute the largest aviation forces in the region and the third largest in the world, with over 2,500 total aircraft and approximately 2,000 combat aircraft. The PLAAF is rapidly catching up to Western air forces across a broad range of capabilities and competencies. > 7OH 3HRSOH·V ILNHUMPLRQ $rmy Rocket Force (PLARF) LV UHVSRQVLNOH IRU POH 35F·V VPUMPHJLŃ land-based nuclear and conventional missile forces. The PLARF develops and fields a wide variety of conventional mobile ground-launched ballistic missiles and cruise missiles. The PRC is

developing new intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that will significantly improve its

nuclear-ŃMSMNOH PLVVLOH IRUŃHVB 7OH QXPNHU RI RMUOHMGV RQ POH 35F·V OMQG-based ICBMs capable

of threatening the United States is expected to grow to roughly 200 in the next five years. ² The PRC is expanding its inventory of the multi-role DF-26, a mobile, ground-launched intermediate-range ballistic missile system capable of rapidly swapping conventional and nuclear warheads. ² 7OH 35F·V URNXVP JURXQG-based conventional missile forces compliment the growing size and capabilities of its air- and sea-based precision strike capabilities. > The PLA Strategic Support Force (SSF) is a theater command-level organization established

PR ŃHQPUMOL]H POH 3I$·V VPUMPHJLŃ VSMŃH Ń\NHU HOectronic, and psychological warfare missions and

capabilities. The SSF Network Systems Department is responsible for cyberwarfare, technical reconnaissance, electronic warfare, and psychological warfare. Its current major target is the

United States.

² The 35F·V 6SMŃH (QPHUSULVHB 7OH 35F·V VSMŃH HQPHUSUise continues to mature rapidly. Beijing has devoted significant resources to growing all aspects of its space program, from military space applications to civil applications such as profit-generating launches, scientific endeavors, and space exploration. ² The PLA has historically PMQMJHG POH 35F·V VSMŃH SURJUMPB 7he SSF Space Systems Department is responsible for nearly all PLA space operations.

² HQ 201E POH 35F GHVŃULNHG VSMŃH MV M ´ŃULPLŃMO GRPMLQ LQ LQPHUQMPional strategic

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national and social development. > Military Readiness: In recent years, CCP leaders have directed the PLA to improve its combat

readiness. This guidanŃH LV LQŃUHMVLQJO\ HYLGHQP LQ POH LQPHQVLP\ RI POH 3I$·V PUMLQLQJ MQG POH

complexity and scale of its exercises.

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the 3HRSOH·V 5HSXNOLŃ RI FOLQM

ix Capabilities for Counter Intervention and Power Projection > The PLA is developing capabilities to provide options for the PRC to dissuade, deter, or, if ordered, defeat third-party intervention during a large-scale, theater campaign such as a Taiwan contingency. > 7OH 3I$·V MQPL-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities are currently the most robust within the First Island Chain, although the PRC aims to strengthen its capabilities to reach farther into the

Pacific Ocean.

> The PRC also continues to increase its military capabilities to achieve regional and global security

objectives beyond a Taiwan contingency. > The PLA is developing the capabilities and operational concepts to conduct offensive operations within the Second Island Chain, in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and in some cases, globally. In addition to strike, air and missile defense, anti-surface and anti-submarine capabilities improvements, China is focusing on information, cyber, and space and counterspace operations.

Nuclear Deterrence

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survivability are driving significant changes to the size, capabilities, and readiness of its nuclear

forces.

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and increases the number of its land-, sea-, and air-based nuclear delivery platforms.

> Over the next decade, FOLQM·V QXŃOHMU RMUOHMG VPRŃNSLOH³currently estimated to be in the low-

200s³is projected to at least double in size as China expands and modernizes its nuclear forces.

> FOLQM LV SXUVXLQJ M ´QXŃOHMU PULMGµ RLPO POH GHYHORSPHQP RI M QXŃOHMU ŃMSMNOH MLU-launched ballistic

missile (ALBM) and improving its ground and sea-based nuclear capabilities. > New developments in 2019 further suggest that China intends to increase the peacetime readiness of its nuclear forces by moving to a launch-on-warning (LOW) posture with an expanded silo- based force.

7+( 3I$·6 *52JH1* *IOBAL PRESENCE

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MUH QHŃHVVMU\ PR ŃUHMPH M ´IMYRUMNOHµ LQPHUQMPLRQMO HQYLURQPHQP IRU FOLQM·V QMPLRQMO UHÓXvenation.

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policy goals.

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the 3HRSOH·V 5HSXNOLŃ RI FOLQM

x

FOLQM·V *ORNMO 0LOLPMU\ $ŃPLYLPLHV

> The PRC has increasingly recognized that its armed forces should take a more active role in advancing its foreign policy goals.

> $V POH 35F·V RYHUVHMV LQPHUHVPV OMYH JURRQ RYHU POH SMVP PRR GHŃMGHV POH 3MUP\·V OHMGHUV OMYH

increasingly pushed the PLA to think abouP ORR LP RLOO RSHUMPH NH\RQG FOLQM·V NRUGHUV MQG LPV immediate periphery to advance and defend these interests. > In 2019, the PLA continued to expand its participation in bilateral and multilateral military exercises, normalize its presence overseas, and build closer ties to foreign militaries.

PLA Overseas Basing and Access

> The PRC is seeking to establish a more robust overseas logistics and basing infrastructure to allow

the PLA to project and sustain military power at greater distances. > Beyond its current base in Djibouti, the PRC is very likely already considering and planning for additional overseas military logistics facilities to support naval, air, and ground forces. The PRC

has likely considered locations for PLA military logistics facilities in Myanmar, Thailand,

Singapore, Indonesia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, United Arab Emirates, Kenya, Seychelles, Tanzania, Angola, and Tajikistan. The PRC and Cambodia have publicly denied having signed an agreement PR SURYLGH POH 3I$1 RLPO MŃŃHVV PR FMPNRGLM·V 5HMP 1MYal Base. > A global PLA military logistics network could interfere with U.S. military operations and provide flexibility to support offensive operations against the United States.

7OH 35F·V HQIOXHQŃH 2SHUMPLRQV

> The PRC conducts influence operations to achieve outcomes favorable to its strategic objectives by targeting cultural institutions, media organizations, business, academic, and policy communities in the United States, other countries, and international institutions. > The CCP seeks to condition domestic, foreign, and multilateral political establishments and public RSLQLRQ PR MŃŃHSP %HLÓLQJ·V QMUUMPLYHVB > CCP leaders probably consider open democracies, including the United States, as more susceptible to influence operations than other types of governments.

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the 3HRSOH·V 5HSXNOLŃ RI FOLQM

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RESOURCES AND TECHNOLOGY FOR FORCE MODERNIZATION

> 7OH 35F·V ORQJ-term goal is to create an entirely self-reliant defense-industrial sector³fused with

a strong civilian industrial and technology sector³POMP ŃMQ PHHP POH 3I$·V QHHGV IRU PRGHUQ military capabilities. > The PRC has mobilized vast resources in support of its defense modernization, including the implementation of its MCF Development Strategy, as well as espionage activities to acquire sensitive, dual-use, and military-grade equipment. > In 2019, the PRC announced its annual military budget would increase by 6.2 percent, continuing more than 20 years of annual defense spending increases and sustaining its position as the second- largest military spender in the world. 7OH 35F·V SXNOLVOHG PLOLPMU\ NXGJHP omits several major categories of expenditures and its actual military-related spending is higher than what it states in its official budget. Science and Technology Goals Supporting Military Modernization > China seeks to become a leader in key technologies with military potential, such as AI, autonomous systems, advanced computing, quantum information sciences, biotechnology, and advanced materials and manufacturing. > China has invested significant resources to fund research and subsidize companies involved in strategic S&T fields while pressing private firms, universities, and provincial governments to cooperate with the military in developing advanced technologies. > China continues to undermine the integrity of the U.S. science and technology research enterprise through a variety of actions such as hidden diversions of research, resources, and intellectual property.

Foreign Technology Acquisition

> The PRC pursues many vectors to acquire foreign technologies, including both licit and illicit PHMQVB 7OH 35F·V Hfforts include a range of practices and methods to acquire sensitive and dual- use technologies and military-grade equipment to advance its military modernization goals. > The PRC leverages foreign investments, commercial joint ventures, mergers and acquisitions, and state-sponsored industrial and technical espionage, and the manipulation of export controls for the illicit diversion of dual-use technologies to increase the level of technologies and expertise available to support military research, development, and acquisition.

> HQ 201E POH 35F·V HIIRUPV LQŃOXGHG HIIRUPV PR MŃTXLUH G\QMPLŃ UMQGRP MŃŃHVV PHPRU\ MYLMPLRQ

and anti-submarine warfare technologies.

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the 3HRSOH·V 5HSXNOLŃ RI FOLQM

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U.S.-CHINA DEFENSE CONTACTS AND EXCHANGES IN 2019

> U.S. defense contacts and exchanges conducted in 2019 supported overall U.S. policy and strategy toward China, were focused on reducing risk and preventing misunderstanding in times of crisis, and were conducted in accordance with the statutory limitations of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, as amended. > Pursuit of a constructive results-oriented relationship with China is an important part of U.S. strategy in the Indo-Pacific region. The 2018 National Defense Strategy seeks areas of cooperation with China from positions of U.S. strength, with a long-term aim to set the military-to military relationship on a path of strategic transparency and non-aggression, and to encourage China to act in a manner consistent with the free and open international order.

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the 3HRSOH·V 5HSXNOLŃ RI FOLQM

PREFACE i

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY v

CHAPTER 1: 81G(567$1GH1* F+H1$·S STRATEGY 1

CHAPTER 2: MISSIONS, TASKS, AND MODERNIZATION OF

F+H1$·6 $50(G )25F(6 H1 7+( ´1(J (5$µ 38 CHAPTER 3: FORCES, CAPABILITIES, AND ACTIVITIES ON

F+H1$·6 3(5H3+(5K 94

CHAPTER 4: 7+( 3I$·6 *52JH1* *IOBAL PRESENCE 122

CHAPTER 5: RESOURCES AND TECHNOLOGY FOR FORCE

MODERNIZATION 138

CHAPTER 6: U.S.-CHINA DEFENSE CONTACTS AND EXCHANGES 154 SPECIAL TOPIC: F+H1$·6 2019 DEFENSE WHITE PAPER 159 SPECIAL TOPIC: 7+( 3I$·S APPROACH TOWARD INFORMATIZATION AND

INTELLIGENTIZATION 161

SPECIAL TOPIC: EMERGING MILITARY CAMPAIGN CONCEPTS 163 APPENDIX I: CHINA AND TAIWAN FORCES DATA 164 APPENDIX II: DEFENSE CONTACTS EXCHANGES 167 APPENDIX III: SELECTED PLA EXERCISES IN 2019 169 APPENDIX IV: F+H1$·6 723 F58G( 68PPLIERS IN 2019 170

APPENDIX V: ACRONYMS 171

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the 3HRSOH·V 5HSXNOLŃ RI FOLQM

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UNDERSTANDING

F+H1$·6 675$7(*K

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the 3HRSOH·V 5HSXNOLŃ RI FOLQM

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8QGHUVPMQGLQJ POH PHQHPV RI FOLQM·V QMPLRQMO VPUMPHJ\ LV HVVHQPLMO PR XQGHUVPMQGLQJ POH IXPXUH ŃRXUVH

RI FOLQM·V VHŃXULP\ MQG PLOLPMU\ VPUMPHJ\B 7OLV LQ PXUQ RIIHUV LQVLJOPV RQ POH ŃXUUHQP MQG IXPXUH ŃRXUVH

RI POH 3HRSOH·V ILNHUMPLRQ $UP\·V 3I$ UHIRUP MQG PRGHUQL]MPLRQ LQ PHUPV RI LPV VPUHQJPO

technological advances, organization, and operational concepts.

F+H1$·6 1$7H21$I 675ATEGY

Key Takeaways

> FOLQM·V VPUMPHJ\ VHHNV PR MŃOLHYH ´POH JUHMP UHÓXYHQMPLRQ RI POH FOLQHVH QMPLRQµ N\ 204EB FOLQM·V

strategy can be characterized as a determined pursuit of political and social modernity that includes

far-UMQJLQJ HIIRUPV PR H[SMQG FOLQM·V QMPLRQMO SRRHU SHUIHŃP LPV JRYHUQMQŃH V\VPHPV MQG UHYLVH

the international order.

> The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) frames this strategy as an effort to realize long-held

QMPLRQMOLVP MVSLUMPLRQV PR ´UHPXUQµ FOLQM PR M SRVLPLRQ RI VPUHQJPO SURVSHULP\ MQG OHMGHUVOLS RQ

the world stage. > The CCP asserts its absolute leadership and governance sysPHPV MUH LQGLVSHQVMNOH PR FOLQM·V QMPLRQMO UHQHRMO LQPR M ´JUHMP PRGHUQ VRŃLMOLVP ŃRXQPU\Bµ > In 2019, China intensified its efforts to advance its overall development including steadying economic growth, strengthening its armed forces, and taking a more active role in global affairs.

> 7OH FF3·V OHMGHUVOLS OMV ORQJ YLHRHG FOLQM MV HPNURLOHG LQ M PMÓRU LQPHUQMPLRQMO VPUMPHJLŃ

competition with other states, including, and in particular, the United States. HQ 201E POH 3HRSOH·V 5HSXNOLŃ RI FOLQM 35F PMUNHG POH 70th anniversary of its founding. On October 1, 2019, President Xi Jinping presided over the National Day ceremony in Beijing, standing atop the Gate of Heavenly Peace overlooking Tiananmen Square in front of a crowd that included the collected leaders of the CCP and foreign dignitaries while a massive assembly of forces and modern

equipment from the PLA prepared to parade. In a brief speech, President Xi noted that it was 70 years

to the day since Mao Zedong had stood in that very spot and proclaimed the founding of the PRC, ending what Xi described as the humiliations and misery that China had suffered in the previous century. President Xi then remarked, "The Chinese people managed to stand up on their feet and

embark on a great journey of national rejuvenation...Today a socialist China is standing in the east of

the world and there is no force that can shake the IRXQGMPLRQ RI POLV JUHMP QMPLRQBµ

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the 3HRSOH·V 5HSXNOLŃ RI FOLQM

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FOLQM·V VPUMPHJ\ VHHNV PR UHMOL]H ´POH JUHMP UHÓXYHQMPLRQ RI POH FOLQHVH QMPLRQBµ 7OLV RNÓHŃPLYH ROLŃO

PresidenP ;L -LQSLQJ ŃMOOV ´POH FOLQHVH GUHMPµ LV M ORQJ-OHOG QMPLRQMO MVSLUMPLRQ PR ´UHVPRUHµ FOLQM

to a position of strength, prosperity, and leadership on the world stage. Throughout 2019, China

continued to pursue this objective in line with the direction that the CCP Central Committee put forth

LQ ;L·V UHSRUP PR POH 1EPO 3MUP\ FRQJUHVV LQ 2017 ROLŃO VHP MPNLPLRXV SROLŃ\ PLOHVPRQHV MQG OMLG RXP

quotesdbs_dbs12.pdfusesText_18

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