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Unclassified
Unclassified
1Operation IRAQI FREEDOM - By The Numbers
Assessment and Analysis Division
30 April 2003
T. MICHAEL MOSELEY, Lt Gen, USAF
Commander
Unclassified
Unclassified
2 Operation Iraqi Freedom - By The Numbers
Purpose
To establish a single source of aggregated facts about Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) from the Combined Forces Air
Component Commander's (CFACC) perspective. This report is based on information collected during operations at
the Combined Air Operations Center, Prince Sultan Air Base, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Additional reach-back
support elements contributed to refinement of the data and tracking. We have consolidated numerous sources of
information, cross-referencing each to select a single set of usable numbers. While our goal was to select the actual
number wherever possible, in some cases the "best" number available from the most credible source was selected.
OIF By the Number's Outline
· CFACC
o C1: Personnel o C2: Intelligence o C3: Operations o C4: Logistics o C5: Plans o C6: Communications o C7: Engineering o C8: Financial Management o Special Staff· COMAFFOR Information
· Significant Events
· Airpower Firsts
Caveats
1. This is an initial report based on the "best available" data in the closing days of Operation IRAQI
FREEDOM. It is not an analytic review, but a listing of facts as collected.2. The scope of this report is 0300Z 19 March 2003 (ATO M/D-Day) until 0259Z 18 April 2003 (ATO
P1/D+29), a total of 720 hours inclusive.
3. All numbers are reported to the nearest level of certainty.
4. Members of all US services, the United Kingdom, Australia and Canada contributed to the collection
and collation of this data.5. Future research may (and likely will) improve upon the data presented here.
6. "Total" figures presented represent peak numbers employed in the operation.
7. In some cases, multiple sensors or aircraft were used simultaneously in slightly overlapping areas or
methods; this is represented by indicating "hours of coverage/24 hour period." In these cases, the "total coverage" could exceed 24 hours in a given day due to the number of sensors available during that time period.This is a Unites States Air Force Product. Produced at CENTAF-PSAB, KSA for the Commander, Central Air Forces.
For further information, contact the Commander's Action Group, 9AF, Shaw AFB, S.C.Unclassified
Unclassified
3 2,400
3,2001,700Hours of SIGINT
CoverageHours of Full Motion
VideoHours of Moving
Target IndicatorC1: PERSONNEL
Personnel from all United States services, including 30% of all active-duty US military personnel, and several other
countries deployed to support this combined operation. An Air Force Stop-Loss went into effect 2 Mar 03 affecting 43
officer AFSCs and 56 enlisted AFSCs.DEPLOYED PERSONNEL FOR OIF
· Total Personnel Deployed 466,985
o USAF (10 Apr 03) 54,955§ Reserve 2,084
§ National Guard 7,207
o USMC (20 Apr 03) 74,405§ Reserve 9,501
o USN (5 Apr 03) 61,296 (681 are USCG)§ Reserve 2,056
o USA (17 Apr 03) 233,342§ Reserve 10,683
§ National Guard 8,866
o Coalition 42,987§ British 40,906
§ Australian 2,050
§ Canadian 31
OTHER FACTS
· Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) Personnel Pre-OIF 672· CAOC Personnel (21 Mar 03) 1,966
· ~43% of CAOC Personnel received formal AOC trainingC2: INTELLIGENCE
The initial Iraqi air threat consisted of an Integrated Air Defense System incorporating early warning radars, visual
observers, surface to air missiles and fighter/attack aircraft. Overall operational capability of Iraqi aviation was low
while the surface-to-air threat was assessed as medium to high. Primary concerns were concentrated strategic SAMs
around Baghdad and large numbers of unlocated tactical SAMs and AAA throughout the AOR.