[PDF] Vertical Merger Guidelines - Federal Trade Commission



Previous PDF Next PDF














[PDF] que veut dire vertical

[PDF] double marge définition

[PDF] hierarchie verticale et horizontale

[PDF] géométrie dans l'espace terminale s methode

[PDF] relation intergénérationnelle définition

[PDF] organisation de la protection sociale en france

[PDF] retrosocialisation definition

[PDF] direction de la sécurité sociale organigramme

[PDF] relation interspécifique entre les animaux

[PDF] protection sociale en france schéma

[PDF] directeur de la sécurité sociale

[PDF] relation trophique def

[PDF] organisation lvmh

[PDF] relations intraspécifiques facteur biotique

[PDF] organigramme maison dior

Vertical Merger Guidelines - Federal Trade Commission

Vertical gerger duidelines

WMzM wPpErtmPnt oL 5usti;P

s -NP vP6PrEl -rE6P )ommission

June 30, 2020

7able of contents

1 A 3 R R ROa R ROb AE P AE x AA S U.S.D"#$%&'"(& )* J+,&-." $(/ &0" F"/"%$1 T%$/" C)''-,,-)(

V"%&-.$1 M"%2"% G+-/"1-(",

1. O3"%3-"4

These Vertical Merger Guidelines outline the principal analytical techniques, practices, and enforcement polic ies of the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission (the "Agencies") with respect to a range of transactions often described as vertical mergers and acquisitions. sS >4::*&&*43"A+)8"!J"KGHG>G"LPJG".4&)"5,()*+1-,(-68"H%+)*43" I"49")$%">-,6)43"A+)"5(4$*E*)&",36" )4")%32")4"+(%,)%",":43454-6GB"#$*&"5(4F*&*43",55-*%&")4"F%()*+,-" :%(/%(&8",&">43/(%&&":,2%"5-,*3" %2"@15&)(%,:GB"

W4(*S43),-" .%(/%("01*2%-*3%&

eS ,32" )$%"'%()*+,-" .%(/%("01*2%-*3%&" *3")$%*(" %F,-1,)*43"49" ," +4 :5%)*)*43" 9(4:"," 54)%3)*,-"%3)(,3)8" 1&*3/")$%" :%)$42&"2%&+(*E%2" *3")$%" W4(*S43),-".%(/%("

01*2%-*3%&G"

*3+(%,&*3/" )$%")(,3&5,(%3+6" 49")$%" ,3,-6)*+,-"5(4+%&&" 132%(-6*3/" )$%"A/%3+*%&Y" %394(+%:%3)" 1 EPARA TMNOAFNUAR RMSAIRAOACPA ADCHUCSLICNLUR LGCP A VASHICWAUC LGKMRCN6 A7R89:; ?PN6P HIA UL? ?NCPOIH?U HUO RMSAIRAOAO NU CPANI AUCNIAC@A EPA@ IAGFA6C CPA LU=LNU= H66MWMFHCNLU LG ADSAINAU6A HCCPA B =AU6NARAEPARA TMNOAFNUARW H@ CA IADNRAO GILWCNWA CL CNWA HR UA6ARRHI@ CL IAGFA6C RN=UNGN6HUC 6PHU=AR NU AUGLI6AWAUC SLFN6@> CL 6FHING@ ADNRCNU= SLFN6@> LI CL IAGFA6C UA? FAHIUNU=A 2 EAFA!3$,7.125'%. (6$G H$)A!"-0)$!I1447+>! J1- (K1+.0*<$-=$-!&'()$*(+$%LMN8NOA! 1 decisions. They may also assistthecourtsin developing an appropriate framework for interpreting and applying the antitrust laws to the types of transactions discussed herein. eh #$%&% 01*2%-*3%&&$41-2" E%(%,2"*3"+43[13+)*4 3"D*)$")$%W4(*S43),-.%(/%("01*2%-*3%&G".,36"49" )$% 5(*3+*5-%&,32" ,3,-6)*+9(,:%D4(Z&1&%2")4" ,&&%&&$4(*S43),- :%(/%(&,55-6")4"F%()*+,-:%(/%(&G" =4("%X,:5-%8"H%+)*43"!"49")$%W4(*S43),-.%(/%("01*2%-*3%&\2%&+(*E*3/"*3" /%3%(,-")%(:& )$%"

51(54&%&" ,32"-*:*),)*43&" 49")$%" W4(*S43),-".%(/%(" 01*2%-*3%&",32" )$%"/4,-&" 49":%(/%("

%394(+%:%3)\*& ,-&4"(%-%F,3))4")$% +43&*2%(,)*43"49"F%()*+,-":%(/%(&G" ])$%(")45*+&,22(%&&%2"*3" )$% W4(*S43),-.%(/%(" 01*2%-*3%&8"E1)34),22(%&&%2"$%(%*3O &1+$",& )$%,3,-6)*+9(,:%D4(Z"94("

%F,-1,)*3/"%3)(6"+43&*2%(,)*43&8")$%)(%,):%3)49")$% ,+71*&*)*43"49" ,9,*-*3/"9*(:"4(" *)&,&&%)&8",32"

)$% ,+71*&*)*43"49",5,()*,-4D3%(&$*5"*3)%(%&)" O,(%" (%-%F,3))4")$%%F,-1,)*43"49")$% +4:5%)*)*F%" %99%+)&"49"F%()*+,-":%(/%(&",&"D%--G" '%()*+,- :%(/%(&8"$4D%F%(8",-&4"(,*&%2*&)*3+)+43&*2%(,)*43&8"D$*+$")$%&% 01*2%-*3%&,22(%&&G =4(" %X,:5-%8" F%()*+,-":%(/%(&" 49)%3"E%3%9*)" +43&1:%(&")$(41/$" )$%"%-*:*3,)*43" 49"241E-%" :,(/*3,-*S,)*438 D$*+$")%32&)4"-%&&%3" )$%(*&Z&"49"+4:5%)*)*F%$,(:G"U$*-% )$%,/%3+*%&:4(%"

49)%3" %3+413)%("5(4E-%:,)*+" $4(*S43),-":%(/%(&" )$,3"5(4E-%:,)*+" F%()*+,-":%(/%(&8" F%()*+,-"

:%(/%(& ,(%"34)*3F,(*,E-6"*334+141& G#$%&%01*2%-*3%&2%&+(*E%)$%"9(,:%D4(Z" ,55-*%2"E6" )$%" A/%3+*%&" *3"2*&)*3/1*&$*3/" ,3)*+4:5%)*)*F%"9(4:" 5(4+4:5%)*)*F%" ?,32"+4:5%)*)*F%-6" 3%1)(,-C"

F%()*+,-":%(/%(&G"

A& D*)$"$4(*S43),-:%(/%(&8")$% A/%3+*%&"34(:,--6"%X,:*3%%99%+)&" 43")$%,+)1,-",32"54)%3)*,-"

2*(%+) +1&)4:%(&"49")$%:%(/*3/"5,()*%&8",328" *9"2*99%(%3)8")$%9*3,-+43&1:%(&"49"9*(:&)$,)1)*-*S%"

)$%" /442&"4(" &%(F*+%&"49" )$%":%(/*3/" 5,()*%&G" #$%"A/%3+*%&" ,(%"+43+%(3%2" D*)$"$,(:")4" +4:5%)*)*438"34))4" +4:5%)*)4(&GU$%3",:%(/%(" *3F4-F%&"5(421+)&,)2*99%(%3) -%F%-&"49",&155-6"

24D3&)(%,:"5(421+)&G"AE&%3)+43F*3+*3/"%F*2%3+% )4")$%+43)(,(68)$% A/%3+*%&"5(%&1:%)$,)"

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

54)%3)*,- E%3%9*)&")4"+4:5%)*)*43G""

S

"#$%$&'() $*(+$%0-$+1. (+.$+)$).1)$%6-(C$ #1 ?.#$B=$+6($% ?(** 61+) '6. .# $ *(.(=0.(1+12 60%$% .#$@

)$6()$ .1 C-(+=AB*.#1'=# -$* $D0+.(+ .#0. 61+.$/.>.#$%$ &'()$* (+$%+$(.#$-)(6.0.$ +1- $/#0'%..#$ -0+=$ 12

$D()$+6$ .#$ B=$+6($%40@ (+.-1)'6$ (+ *(.(=0.(1+A 2 2. E

DrxTitT dl AxDTspT CduhTGrGrDT EllTtGp

The Agencies consider any reasonably available and reliable evidence to address the central question of whether averticalmerger may substantially lessen competition. Thetypesof evidence described in Section 2.1 of theHorizontalMerger Guidelinescan also beinformative aboutthe effects of vertical mergers, including actual effects observed in consummated mergers, direct comparisons based on experience, and evidenceaboutthedisruptiverole of a merging party. The Agencies may also consider evidence about the disruptive role of non-merging firms - for example, when evaluating atheory thata verticalmerger may allow themerged firmto discipline disruptive rivals. TheAgenciesmay also consider market sharesand concentration in relevant markets ( see Section 3), and may rely on evidence of head-to-head competition between one merging firmand rivalsthattradewith theother merging firm when evaluating unilateral effects see Section 4). Thesourcesof evidenceon which theAgenciesrely arethesameasthoseset forth in Section 2.2 of theHorizontalMerger Guidelinesand include documents and statements of the merging parties, their customers, and other industry partic ipants and observers. 3. M esJTG DTlrirGrdi,RToeGTx PsdxntGp,MesJTG SaesTp,eix CditTiGseGrdi In any merger enforcementaction involving a verticalmerger, theAgencieswillnormally identify one or more relevantmarketsin which themerger may substantially lessen competition. Many of the generalpurposes and limitations of marketdefinition described in Section 4 of theHorizontal Merger Guidelinesare also relevant when theAgenciesdefine markets for verticalmergers, and the Agenciesgenerally usethemethodology set forth in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 of theHorizontal Merger Guidelines to define relevant markets for vertical mer gers. When theAgencies identify a potentialcompetitiveconcern in a relevant market, they will also specify one or morerelated products. A related productisa productor servicethatissupplied or controlled by themerged firm and ispositioned vertically or is complementary to theproductsand services in the relevantmarket. For example, a related product could bean input, ameans of distribution, accessto asetof customers, or a complement. Thesametransaction can giveriseto more than one vertical concern, and different concerns may affec t different relevant markets. Example 1: Relevant markets can be upstream or downstream

Situation

A retail chain buys themanufacturer of Brand A cleaning products.

Discussion

: In thisexample, the merged firm'ssupply of BrandAcleaning products (the related product) could affect downstream competition between retailers in a given geographic area (the relevant market). The Agencies may also consider whether the merged firm's retailing of cleaning products in a given geographic area (the related product) could affectcompetition between manufacturersof cleaning productsin thatarea (the relevant market). The Agenciesmay consider measures of marketsharesand market concentration in a relevant market in their evaluation of competitive effects. The Agencies evaluate market shares and 3

3"+4:5%)*)*43G"

#$% A/%3+*%&1&% )$%:%)$424-4/6" &%)"41) *3"H%+)*43"J"49")$%W4(*S43),- .%(/%("01*2%-*3%&)4" aX*&)*3/"-%F%-&49" +43+%3)(,)*43":,6"343%)$%-%&&E%(%-%F,3)G"=4("%X,:5-%8"$*/$" +43+%3)(,)*43"*3" )$%" (%-%F,3)":,(Z%)" :,6"5(4F*2%" %F*2%3+%",E41)" )$%"-*Z%-*$4428" 21(,E*-*)68"4(" &+45%"49" 4. U (-13524311E**2.5,1 A verticalmerger may diminish competition between onemerging firmand rivalsthattradewith, or could tradewith, the other merging firm.This section discussescommon types of unilateral effects arising fromvertical mergers. Section (a) discusses foreclosureand raising rivals' costs. Section (b) discussescompetitively sensitive information. Theseeffects do notexhaustthetypes of possible unilateral effects. a. Foreclosure and Raising Rivals' Costs A vertical merger may diminish competition by allowing themerged firmto profitably useits control of the related productto weakenor remove thecompetitiveconstraint from one or more of its actual or potential rivals in the relevant market. For example, a merger may increase the

vertically integrated firm'sincentive or ability to raiseits rivals' costsby increasing theprice or

lowering thequality of therelated product. Themerged firmcould also refuseto supply rivalswith the related products altogether ("foreclosure"). In identifying whether averticalmergermay diminishcompetition dueto unilateralforeclosure or raising rivals' costs, 53
)$%" A/%3+*%&"/%3%(,--6" +43&*2%("D$%)$%(" )$%"94--4D*3/" +432*)*43&",(%" &,)*&9*%2_" ?!C"Ability: By altering theterms by which itprovidesarelated productto oneor moreof itsrivals, the merged firmwould likely beable tocause thoserivals (a) to losesignificantsalesin the relevant market(for example, if they are forced outof themarket;if they aredeterred from innovation, entry, or expansion,or cannotfinance thoseactivities;or if they have incentivesto pass on higher coststhrough higher prices) or (b) to otherwisecompetelessaggressively for customers' business. 4

HLI AHRA LG ADSLRNCNLU>CPA SIN U6NSHFONR6MRRNLU NR HCLMCN USMCGLIA6FLRMIA HUO IHNRNU= INDHFR7 NUSMC 6LRC R

GLFFL?NU= H WAI=AI CAC?AAU DAICN6HFF@ IAFHCAO GNIWR> ?PAIA CPA 6LU6AIU NR CPHC CPA WAI=AO GNIW 6LMFO

SILGNCHCF@ MRA NCRRMSSF@ LG HU NUSMCLCPA IAFHCAO SILOM6CO CL? AHPAUCPA6LWSA CNCNDA6L URCIHNUC NC GH6AR GILW

INDHFR NUCPAO L?URCIA HWWHIPACLCPAIAFADHU C WHIPACOA QDHWSFARNUCPNR RA6C NLUONR6M RRCPA HUHFL=LMR

HUHF@RNRGLIG LIA6FLRMI A LIIHNRNU= INDHFR7 6LRC RCPHCIHNRA CHIINAIRCL AUCI@> 6MRCLWAIGLIA6FLRMI A HUO IHN RNU=

INDHFR7 ONRCINCMCNLU 6LRCR> HUO WAI=AIR LG 6LWSFAWAUCRA 4 This elementwould notbesatisfied, and in turn amerger would rarely warrantclosescrutiny for itspotential to lead to foreclosure or raising rivals' costs, if rivalscould readily switch purchases to alternativesto the related product, including self-supply,withoutany meaningful effect on the price, quality, or availability of products or services in the relevant market. The Agencies' reviewof the merged firm'srivals' ability to switch to alternatives to the related product may include, butis notlimited to, thetypes of evidencetheAgenciesuseto evaluate customer switching when implementing the hypothetical monopolisttest, listed in Section 4.1.3 of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines.quotesdbs_dbs2.pdfusesText_3