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Survey
The Applicationof Article 102TFEUby the
European Commissionand theEuropean Courts
RomanoSubiotto QC,and David R.Little*
I. Introduction
Atthe endof 2012,ther ew ere atotalof30 active
Article102 TFEUdossiers. We includein thiscount
fivecases thatwer eat apreliminary stage,w ithda wn raids conductedbutappar entlyno furtheractionye t taken. 1Of ther emaining25casesin whichformal pro-
ceedingshad beenopened, aStatement ofO bjections had beenissued infiv epro ceedings. 2The Commission
closed anumber ofAr ticle102 investigationsin 2012, including thoseinto protection andindemnityinsur - ancein themarine sector, 3 and intopurported individ- ual orjoint actionto delay mark etentryof generic medicines (AstraZeneca/Nycomed 4 andSynthon/GlaxoS- mithKline 5 ). Ac omplaintintoallegedabusiv econd uct byN umericablewasformallyr ejected inter aliabecause the Commissioncons ideredthatcertain ofthe impugned practiceswere theresultof technicaloutages rather thanex clusionaryconductand/orwer eamatter for contractlaw ratherthancompetition law . 6The Commissionmaintainedits recent trend of
using theAr ticle9,Regulation 1/2003c ommitments mechanism toinformally resolv einvestigations,includ- ing thoseinto ReutersIn strumentCodes7 andRioT intoAlcan.
8A setof commitments offeredby theincumbent
electricity providerinthe Czech Republic, CEZ,to addressc oncernsrelatingtoac cesstothe Czech whole- sale electricitymark ethavebeen sentoutformark et testing. 9Google andthe Commissionha veenter edinto
discussions withav iewto developingaset ofAr ticle9commitmentsthatw ouldbring toanendthe Commis-sion'songoingin vestigation intothecompany, whichwas openedformally inN ovember 2010.Vice-PresidentAlmunia recentlystatedthatthe two parties had' sub-
stantially reduced[their] differences' overthecourse of these discussions.This surveyfocusesonrulings handeddown by the
General Courtandthe Court ofJ ustice(theCommis-
sion didnot issuean yArticle 102prohibitiondecisions * RomanoSu biottoQCisapar tnerin theBrussel sand Londonoffices,
and DavidLittle isan associatein theLondon office,of Cleary Gottlieb , Steen &Hamilton LLP. Theauthorswish tothank theirc olleaguesEsther Kelly,SophieSahlin, CatherineFielden, andCaroline Petit fortheir assistance inpreparing thisartic le.1 CaseN os.39493 - CPUs/PC Retailers;Case39442 - Frenchelectricit y
wholesale market(EDF); andthe Commission 's investigationsintothe truck sector(see MEMO/11/29), therailfreightsector (seeMEMO/11/152), andcontainer linershi pping. (MEMO/11/307).
2 Case37985 - PO/DB GVG/SJ(Deutsche Bahn)(SO issuedon October15,
2001); Case37663 - B2/Telia(SO issuedon December19, 2003);Case
39612 - Perindopril(Servier) (SO issuedon 30J uly2012); Case39523 -
Slovak Telecom(andDeutsche Telekom) (SO issuedon 8Ma y2012); Case39939 - Samsung (enforcementof UMTSstan dardsessential patents)
(SO issuedon 21December 2012).3,http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-873_en.htm?locale=en. (last accessed26Mar ch2013). (last accessed26Mar ch2013).5 COMP/38.574.Thecase wasclosed foradministrative reasons,as
confirmed ina briefnote postedon theDG COMPwebsi te.Little is known aboutthe investigation, althoughithas beenreportedthatSynthon withdrewitscomplaint.
6 CaseN oCOMP/39.892 - Numericable-Luxemb ourg.
7 CaseN oCOMP/39.654 - Reuters InstrumentCodes .
8 CaseN oCOMP/39.230 - Rio TintoAlcan .
9 CaseCOMP/39.727 - CˇEZ andothers . Thenon-confidential textof the
proposed commitmentsisavailableat ,http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39727/39727_1734_9.pdf.(last accessed26 March2013). JournalofEuropean CompetitionLaw &Practice , 2013SURVEY1of9The Author2013.Pu blishedby OxfordUniversityPr ess.All rights reserved.ForPermissions, pleaseemail:journals.permissions@oup .comKeyP oints
Whilethe Commissiondid notadopt any Article
102 prohibitiondecisionsin 2012,c ommitment
proceedingsunderArticle 9of Regulation 1/2003 and publicstatements bysenior officialsshed some lightonits likely analyticalappr oachandfutureenfor cementpriorities.The GeneralCourt and/orCour tof Justiceupheld prohibitiondecisionsin several import- ant judgments,including inAstraZeneca,which
establishes anew category ofabuseconsisting in the exclusionarymisuseof regulatorypr oceed- ings.The Courts'rulingsare broadly consistentwith previouscasela wand/or theanalyticalappr oachdescribed inthe Commission' sGuidancePaper ,
Journal of European Competition Law & Practice Advance Access publishedMay 10, 2013
at Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP on May 13, 2013http://jeclap.oxfordjournals.org/Downloaded from
in 2012).Ho wever,anotablefeatureof Ar ticle102 enforcementduring2012 wasthe Commission' suse of informalchannels andnon-abuse proc eedingsto developits thinkingon issuesrele vantto future Article102 cases.M ostnotably,in itsGoogle/Motorola
Mobility
10 merger investigation,theCommissionc on- sideredat lengthho wholders ofstandard-essential patents mightusetheir IPRto exclude rivals.The theme wassubsequentlyexplor edin severalpresenta- tions bysenior officials. 11In thesec ommunications,
the Commissionhas statedthat anSEP holderma yr e- strict competitionwhere itusesinjunctions orthe threatof injunctionsto extracthig herrates ora broadercr osslicence fromawillinglic enseethan wouldother wisehavebeenpossible (ortootherwise excludethat willing licensee). 12There maybecir cum-
stanceswher etheright holdercan entirelylegitimately refuseto license itsrights,such aswher ethelicensee is not negotiatingingood faith.Ha ving developed its thinking inthis area, theCommissionin December issued aStatement ofO bjectionsto Samsungconcern- ing allegedinfringements of Article102 inenforcing patents essentialto theUMTS standard. TheCommis- sion hasindicated informallythat itis lookinginto severalfur thercomplaints relatingtotheexclusionar y use ofIPR by patentholders.Thisis likely tobe a focus forthe Commission 'sworkoverthe comingyear .The casessummaris edbelowinclude: twoprelimin-
aryrulings onissues referr edb yMemberStatecour ts (PostDanmark ,Compass-Datenbank); twoECJrulings dismissingappeals intheirentirety( Tomra,AstraZeneca); andthe Genera lCourt'sjudgme ntdismissingT elefonica's appealagainst theCommissio n'sd ecisioninWanadoo Espana/Telefonica. Asin20 11, thecasesc over arangeof theoriesofha rm:pric inganddiscri minationinPost Danmark;rebatesinTomra, marginsqueeze inTelefonica, misuseofr egulato ryproceedingsinAstraZeneca,and refusaltosupplyi nCompass-Datenbank. Although thec asesaddresse ddifferenttheo riesofharmandvery differentfactualc ontexts,somerecurr ingthemesand issuesemerge .Beforesumma risingeachofth esecases,wem akeanumber ofob servationsonth ese commonthemesandon theco ntr ibutio nofthejudgmentstotheArticle102c asela wmoregen erally.
The Commission's2009Guidance Paper hasbeenre-
ferredto ,althoughnotal ways followed, inseveralCommission decisions,Cour trulings,andA GOpi-
nions. 13WheretheG uidance Paperhasbeencitedbut
not followedthisis becauseit wasissued afterthe initi- ation ofCommission proc eedingsortheadoptionof the contestedCommissiondecision. Similarly, inTomra, theECJ followed astrictanalysisof loyalt y
rebatesthat isnot consistent with the'effects-based' analysis proposedinthe Guidanc eP aper.AstheECJ explained, '[although] theGui danceprovidesfor acom- parativeanalysis ofpr icesand costs...the Guidance, published in2009, hasno relevance tothe legalassess- ment ofa decision, suchasthecontested decision, which was adoptedin 2006'.Ther eisafur thertension between theG uidancePaperand2012 caselawin Tele- fonica. Althoughthe Guidanc ePapergroupedmargin squeeze andrefu saltosupplyin thesame section (implyingthat marginsqueeze isa variety ofc onstruct- iver efusaltosupply),in Telefonicathe GeneralCour t stated explicitlythat' it isthe margin squeeze[notthe excessive upstreamorpredator ydow nstreamprice] that, in theabsence ofan yobjective justification,is initself capable ofc onstitutinganabuse' (emphasisadded). This isc onsistentwiththe ECJ's2011rulings inTelia-SoneraandDeutsche Telekom. Whetherthereis an
abusivem arginsqueezeisdetermined byrefer ence to the spreadbetweentw ov erticallyrelated prices,regard- less ofwhether eitheror bothpric eswer ethemselv es excessive,discriminatory, orpredatory. Thetension seems formalrather thansubstantiv e.The Guidance Paperand TeliaSonera/DeutscheTelekom/T elefonicaline of casela wbothprov idethat incertainspecificcases (eg wherethedominant compan y's positionupstream resultsfr omspecialorex clusive rights) thereisnoneed to showindispensability inorder toestablishamargin squeeze, despiteit beinga necessar yelement ofan abusiveref usaltosupply.Measuringantic ompetitiveeffectsandharmto con-
sumers isan areaof somec ontentionin Article 10210 CaseN oCOMP/M.6381 - Google/MotorolaMobility , Commission
decision of13 February2012.11 See,for example, thefollowingspeechesby Vice-P residentAlmunia:
'Competition Enforcementinthe Knowledge Economy' (Fordham,20 September 2012);' AntitrustEnforcement:ChallengesOld andNew' (St. Gallen,8 June 2012);CompetitionPolicy forthe Post-Crisi sEra' (WashingtonDC,30 March 2012).See alsoDirectorGeneralItalianer , 'Innovation andCompe tition'(Fordham,21Septembe r2012)and 'Innovation andCompe titionPolicyin theITSector:the EuropeanPerspective'(Beijing,26 June2012).
12 CaseN oCOMP/M.6381 - Google/Motorola Mobility, para.107. 13 See,eg ,CaseCOMP/39.402 - RWEGas Foreclosure , Commission
Decision of18 March 2009;CaseCOMP/C-3/37.990 - Intel, Commission Decision of13 May 2009;CaseCOMP/39.530 - Microsoft (Tying), Commission Decisionof 16December 2009;Case C-549/10P ,Tomra Systems andOthers vCommission , Judgmentofthe Court of19 April2012; CaseC-52/09, KonkurrensverketvT eliaSoneraS verigeAB, Opinion
of AdvocateGeneralMaza´k of2 September2010; CaseC-109/10 P, Solvay
SA vEuropean Commission, OpinionofA dvocateGeneral Kokottof14 April 2011;Case C-549/10,TomraSystems andOthers vCom mission,Opinion ofA dvocateGeneralMaza
´k of2 February 2012.
JournalofEurop ean CompetitionLaw&Practice, 20132of9SURVEYat Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP on May 13, 2013http://jeclap.oxfordjournals.org/Downloaded from
theoryand casela w. Whileitiswell-established that actual orpotential anticompetitiv eharmissufficient (a factthat thec ourt inTelefonicaconfirmed),it isless clear whetherthis assessmentis subjectto ade minimis/materialitythreshold. Consistentwithan effects-based analysis,the Guidanc ePaperdoesnot stipulate athr esholdatwhichfor eclosure isdeemed anticompetitive,insteadlisting factorsr elevantto asses- sing themagnitude ofalleged foreclosur eeffects (eg,per centageoftotalsalesaffected bythe conduct).Although theG uidancePaperwasnot applicablein
Tomra, theECJ inthat casealso declinedto establisha threshold.Instead, theECJ confirmed theGeneral Court'sandCommission 's reasoningthat'by foreclosing a significantpart ofthe market,the To mra grouphad restrictedentr ytooneorafew competitorsand thus limited theintensity ofcompetition onthe marketas a whole.' Onthefacts, 40per cent ofthe market wascon- sidereda substantial portion.Butthe ECJ'semphasis on thefr eedomofcustomersto benefitfro mw hatever degreeof competition ispossibleleav esopen thepossi- bility thatantic ompetitiveforeclosurec ouldbefound at am uchlowerthr esholdondifferent facts.Consistentw iththeove rridingc ompetitionlawaim
of promotingefficiency, therulesonabuse ofdomin- anceha vebeendeveloped with aviewto prohibiting conductthat might enableacompan yto exclude an equally ormor eefficientrival.The consideration of the 'asefficientc ompetitor'test inTelefonicaandPostDanmark is consistentwith the2011judgmentsin
TeliaSoneraandDeutche Telekom, confirmingthat:
Notev eryexclusionaryeffect isnecessarilydetrimen-tal toc ompetition.Competitiononthe meritsmaylead tothe marginalisationof lessefficient competi- tors (PostDanmark , para.22).
In assessingan allegedpricing abuse,c ompetitionauthorities mayusethe dominantc ompany' sc ostsas abenchmark butnot thec ostsof itsc ompetitors(Telefonica, para.190), althoughother factorssuch
as thedominant compan y'sstrategyarealsor elevant (PostDanmark , para.28).Wherethe dominant company'spric escoveritscostsin largepart,anequ ally effic ientcompeti torwillbeableto com petewithoutsufferin glossesthatar eun-sustainableinthelon gte rm(PostDan mark, para.38).
Article102 doesnot definewhat constitutes anabuse
and theECJ' srulinginDeutsche Telekomconfirmedthat thefour categoriesof abuseslisted therein are notexhaustive.N evertheless,whileArticle102cases neednot bepigeon-hol edintoanexisting category ofabuse, previouscasesha ve tendedtofallwithinone ofthe established groups.Major expansionsofthec oncept ofabuse havebeeninfr equent.The AstraZenecaruling is
thereforesignificantin confirming theCommission 's and GeneralCour t'sidentificationofa distinctform of abuse consistinginthe misuseof regulator ypro ceed- ings byproviding 'objectively misleading' statementsto applicable regulatorybodiesinord erto exclude rivals.The ECJc onfirms,further, thatitisnotnecessar yto
showfraud orintent todec eive onthe partofthe dominant companyinorder toestablish thisabuse. It willbeinter estingto seehowthe authoritiesat theEU andM emberStatelevels, andc omplainants,seekto
apply thistheor yofharmboth within andoutside the contextof pharmaceutical proceedings.Weha venotincludedin thissur vey theGeneral
Court'srecent rulinginMicrosoft,
14 on thegr oundthat it focusesprincipally onpro cedural issues.Theappeal arosefr omtheperiodicpenalty paymentimposed by the Commissionon Microsoft underArticle24of Regulation1/2003, forfailur eto complywith arem edy imposed inan earlierpro hibitiondecision (thefirst time theCommission hadmade useof thispo wer).In its judgment,the GeneralCour tupheld theCommis- sion'sdecisionbut reduc edslig htlythefineimposedon Microsoft.The rulingc onfirmsthat significantfinancial penalties maybeimposed fornon-c ompliance even wherether ecouldin theoryhave beensome reasonable disagreementas tothe precise meaningof theremedy's terms (inthis case,the meaningof 'reasonable rates').On thefacts, theGeneral Court heldthat Microsoft
couldha veassessedcorr ectlyitself thereasonableness of theterms onw hichit providedac cess toitsin- dispensable interoperabilityinformation. Contraryto Microsoft'sassertions,the Commissionwasnotr equired to specifyan acc essfeeinitsremedy andMicr osoft couldnot relyon theappointment ofa monitoring trustee aspro ofthatany remuneration paidbylicensees under therem edywouldha vebeenreasonable.II. Summaryof casela w
This Sectionpro videsachronological rev iewofthe
rulings handeddo wnbytheGeneralCour tand Court of Justiceconcerning theenforcementofArticle 102TFEU duringthe calendarye ar2012.
14 CaseT -167/08 - Microsoft Corp.v Commission, Judgmentofthe Court of
27 June2012.
Romano Subiottoand DavidR. Little.The Applicationof Article 102TFEUbythe European Commission andthe Europ eanCourts SURVEY3of9
at Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP on May 13, 2013http://jeclap.oxfordjournals.org/Downloaded from