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Passive radicalisation without mobilisation

A narrative analysis of collective identities and emotions as driving forces of online radicalisation

Ida Lewenhaupt

Thesis, 30 ECTS (hp)

Political Science with a focus on Crisis Management and Security mme in Politics and War

Autumn 2020

Supervisor: Maria Hellman

Word count: 20 000

Abstract

Scholars often consider ideology a crucial factor for radicalisation, but some groups appear radical even though they have been described as lacking clear ideologies. This thesis will a rigid ideology. I explore this through a narrative analysis focusing on collective identities and emotions as narrated and potential driving forces of radicalisation. My study has identified two narratives, the incel as inferior and the incel as superior. The analysis shows that radicalisation is more prominent in the second narrative. In the first narrative, the victimhood and hopelessness serve as a foundation for the expressions of violence found in the second one based on perceived injustices. My findings suggest that the narration of collective identities and emotional dimensions is crucial for the radicalisation of members of the incel community since collective identities create a sense of belonging to the community and guide actions based on emotional batteries. Keywords: radicalisation, identity construction, narratives, emotions, collective identities, incels, online communities

Content

Glossary ............................................................................................................................ 1

1. Introduction .............................................................................................................. 2

Research problem ............................................................................................. 2

Aim and research question ............................................................................... 5

2. Previous research and theory ................................................................................... 6

The concept of radicalisation ............................................................................ 6

.................................................................. 7 Understanding the world through narratives .................................................. 10

2.3.1. Collective identities role in radicalisation .................................................. 11

2.3.2. Emotions role in radicalisation ................................................................... 12

3. Methodology .......................................................................................................... 14

Narrative analysis ........................................................................................... 14

Material ........................................................................................................... 16

Narrative framework ....................................................................................... 17

4. Analysis .................................................................................................................. 21

The incel as inferior ........................................................................................ 21

4.1.1. Overview of the main narrative .................................................................. 21

4.1.2. Narrative parts of the incel as inferior ........................................................ 22

The incel as superior ....................................................................................... 29

4.2.1. Overview of the main narrative .................................................................. 29

4.2.2. Narrative parts of the incel as superior ...................................................... 29

Results ............................................................................................................ 35

5. Discussion .............................................................................................................. 39

Conclusions .................................................................................................... 39

Limitations ...................................................................................................... 41

Suggestions for further research ..................................................................... 41

Bibliography ................................................................................................................... 43

Literature ..................................................................................................................... 43

Empirical material ....................................................................................................... 48

Appendix ......................................................................................................................... 56

Glossary

Term Definition

-pill Refers to embracing a type of philosophy. ascend When an incel moves on to get laid [have sex] or gain a relationship.

Beta male an average male

Chad A physically attractive male, typically white. cuck A man with an unfaithful girlfriend/wife.

ER Elliot Rodger, the Isla Vista Killer.

foid A derogatory term for female. Stemmed from female and -oid (as in android or humanoid). Used to suggest that females are not fully human. IT inceltears, a virgin-shaming terrorist group on Reddit JBW Just be white. [Being white is enough if the woman has another ethnicity] juggernaut law even girls that are AVERAGE and BELOW still have guys hitting on them. You can't stop a woman's dating potential. She is like The Juggernaut. Landwhale An obese human female, often morbidly so. normie An average everyday boring person.

Cited from Incels.wiki (2020a).

1. Introduction

Research problem

This thesis will explore how a friendly space for lonely people wondering why they struggled to find a partner turned into a foundation for violent extremist beliefs. Since 2009, perpetrators identifying themselves as incels have killed at least 53 people1 (Tomkinson et al., 2020). Incel is short for involuntary celibacy and is often described as an online community consisting of lonely and angry men who blame women determinism for their inability to find partners (Fernquist et al., 2020). The members celebrate those who have conducted violent attacks (Rosenblatt & Zadrozny, 2018) in an echo-chamber dynamic in different online spaces occupied with hate speech towards women primarily. Further, the group is considered a part of the manosphere, :638). Incels share features and differ from others within this bringing the man back-in"-community. There is no offline equivalent to the community (Blommaert, 2017). Thus, the internet has been vital in developing the community and has played a crucial role in both the formation and the radicalisation of it particular idiom t it with other like-minded people (Baele et al., 2019:20). However, the community was first started by a woman in her mid-20s who considered herself a late bloomer in dating and wanted to find others who were like-minded (Taylor, 2018). Today, members of the incel community share a nihilistic world view, and most of the community are probably more prone to self-harm than committing violent actions (Baele et al., 2019). Thus, to what extent incels should be seen as a threat to society has been debated. (Hoffman et al., 2020:568) and that securitisst (Tomkinson et al., 2020:152). However, others argue that the incel community should not be considered a movement or terrorist organisation. This argument is mainly founded on the idea of only a small fringe of the community being radicalised, statistically few attacks and the lack

1 It is probable that there has been attacks that have not been recognised as influenced by incel philosophy

before since the issue has not received attention until recently (Tomkinson, Harper, & Atwell, 2020).

3 of a clear-cut ideology (Cottee, 2020; Fernquist et al.2020). To this date, Canada is the only country to pursue terrorism charges against a perpetrator adherent to the incel community (Ling,

2020).

Feminist scholars have long argued that misogynist violence tends to be over-looked as terrorism since mainstream Terrorism Studies has excluded it (Gentry, 2020). This follows from what is considered political and not. Misogyny is often regarded as personal, a trait of the individual, and accordingly merely as a psychological phenomenon (Manne, 2017). As such, patriarchal or misogynist violence is excluded from the definition of terrorism, and consequently, the debate often stops at whether the attacks committed by incels should be categorised as terrorism or not. The preoccupation with focusing the terrorism debate on what is regarded political or not is mirrored onto understandings of radicalisation. Although the process of radicalisation is acknowledged to be individual, it focuses on the political by assum (Hoffman, 2017:307). Thus, it is tightly coupled with an ideology and clear interests, which the incel community as a whole is argued to lack (Fernquist et al., 2020). sation process has received little scholarly attention. Further, assuming that few attacks equal only a small fringe of the community being radicalised (Cottee, 2020) may mislead us. Research on sation process shows that those in supportive roles may be just as radicalised as individuals in more active operational roles (Davis, 2017). Thus, it is surprising that this has not received more scholarly attention. If we adopt a mainstream view of terrorism and radicalisation as concerned primarily with ideology and a clear end goal, incels do not seem radical. The same is true if we focus on actions as symptoms of radicalisation, rather than ideas. Nevertheless, at least 53 lives have been taken by members of this misogynist community, and as such, they appear radical. By adopting a feminist perspective and an understanding of misogyny as a political phenomenon, (Manne, 2017:33), our understanding of radicalisation is opened up to include the incel community as well. Thus, the incel community offers a unique opportunity to explore other driving forces of online radicalisation than interests and ideology. Even though exposure to extremist online content does not automatically lead to the adaption of radical beliefs (Archetti, 2017) content is associated with extremist online and offline attitudes, as well as higher risk of 4 (Hassan et al., 2018). The trend in attacks committed by incels has increased (Tomkinson et al., 2020), and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (2020) has identified gender-driven violence and incels as one of four violent extremism to watch. Therefore, to counter this threat, we must understand this community since previous research shows that the wrong response can negatively affect and increase radicalisation (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2017). To do so, it is necessary to understand radicalisation not only as action but as expressions of ideas and derogatory language.

In this thesis, radicalisation is, therefore,

of an extremist value system accompanied by approval, support for, or the use of violence and (Gasztold, 2020:85). Hence, a member of the incel community does not have to resort to violence to be identified as radicalised.

Radicalism

(Archetti, 2017:218). To capture these concepts, we need to understand the narratives behind them. By understanding the world as stories on an ontological level, we can understand how individuals come to know who they are, and what to do (Somers, 1994). Accordingly, we can increase our understanding of their radicalisation process. insight into how social ties shape the way individuals will interpret external information and (Archetti, 2017:239). On social media, there can be several contributors to the same narratives (Page, 2018), which constructs social identities (Somers,

1994). Hence, the shared beliefs held between the different narrators construct collective

identities, and imagined communities can thus emerge (Archetti, 2017; Page, 2018). Collective identities not only apply to the identities shared among those identifying themselves as incels. They can also provide insight into the identities subscribed to others by the community. The identities depicted to those outside the community serve as . Through imagined collective identities, feelings of solidarity are aroused for those in the community. This guides actions and defines morals boundaries against those outside the community (Jasper & McGarry, 2015). Accordingly, it seems like collective identities constructed through narratives are central in the radicalisation of the members of the incel community and specific narratives are what could lead and might have led to violent actions. Further, there is reason to argue that emotions

are central to this, especially the sense of belonging. Individuals identifying as incels often share

an intense experience of loneliness and exclusion (Witt, 2020). They have also been found to experience crises of masculinity since they believe that they lack attributes valued as masculine 5 traits (Vito et al., 2018). These alternative factors for radicalisation can only be captured if identity is acknowledged as constructed through shared stories online. Studying the incel community, therefore, not only provides us with valuable information about the community itself but also about the greater process of online radicalisation and the driving forces behind it.

Aim and research question

This thesis aims to question the common notion of ideology as necessary for radicalisation by exploring the role of identity construction in the radicalisation process of the incel community. It will do so by understanding collective identities as narrated and a potential driving force of radicalisation online together with emotions. By adopting a feminist perspective, I argue that violence against women should be understood as radicalisation and, thus, a threat to society. Accordingly, the question that this thesis will be dedicated to exploring is:

Why do members of the incel community

a rigid ideology? In order to explore my research question; I will focus my study around the following analytical questions:

How is the sense of belonging narrated?

How do emotions play into the narrative (in regard to belonging)? What underlying values and attitudes in regard to practices and actions play into the narrative? I will discuss the research ideas behind each question and what they may say about the role and function of collective identities and emotions for radicalisation in section 3.3. 6

2. Previous research and theory

This chapter will focus on developing the relationship between this study and the field of previous research to which this study speaks. First, I will briefly discuss the ubiquitous use of the term radicalisation. Second, I will present and discuss . Third, I will move on to my understanding of the world as narrated. I will then introduce collective identities and emotional aspects as narrated potential driving forces for radicalisation. These will serve as the theoretical point of departure in this thesis. Throughout this chapter, I will discuss how these factors relate to the incel community.

The concept of radicalisation

The term radicalisation is used ubiquitously, and hence it might appear as if there is a consensus about its meaning. However, this is not the case. Rather, the definition varies depending on context and agenda. Accordingly, it is a source of confusion (Sedgwick, 2010). As noted by

Mark Sedgwick (2010:483)

not define these terms, either relying on their relative meaning or assuming that their absolute Although acknowledging that individuals become radicalised in different ways, several definitions of radicalisation as a concept include references to ideology as a critical component (Hoffman, 2017). Further, research often regards Islam or Muslim radicalisation and combatting terrorism (Gentry, 2020; Sedgwick, 2010). This follows from a focus on radicalisation (Borum, 2011:1). Hence, what has been engaged with and considered radical follows from what has been considered terrorism. Terrorism is subjective (Hoffman, 2017) and feminist scholars have argued that the neglect and hesitancy of recognising violence against women as terrorism have to do partly with whom we identify as a terrorist and not. West means seeing those who are typically aligned with counter-terrorists as suddenly aligned (Gentry, 2020:104). The definition of radicalisation adopted in this thesis follows: adoption of an extremist value system accompanied by approval, support for, or the use of (Gasztold, 2020:85). Hence, it encompasses both radical ideas and radical action (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2017) since it 7 acknowledges not only violent actions as radicalisation but also approval and support of violence. sation The internet as a platform for radicalisation has received attention from scholars interested in cases stretching from jihadism to lone-wolf terrorism and right-wing extremists (Conway,

2017; Pantucci et al., 2016). In regard to lone actors, Raffaello Pantucci et al. (2016) argue that

social media creates a sense of belonging. Online forums facilitate the breeding and spread of extremist ideas and the normalisation of them. Therefore, online radicalisation has received a growing amount of attention over the last few years (Brynielsson et al., 2013; Gill, 2015). However, the amount of research looking into the specific factors contributing to the radicalisation process online is somewhat limited. The focus has instead tended to be on whether one can or cannot be radicalised online. While there is research suggesting that radicalisation do appear online (Bastug et al., 2020; Conway, 2017), there is also another strand arguing that the cases of (Schlegel, 2018:2) are slight to none due to a lack of empirical evidence. However, this strand still agrees on the importance of understanding it (von Behr et al., 2013; Schlegel, 2018). Thus, there is no surprise that there is also research arguing that the dichotomy between online and offline radicalisation may be false (Gill et al., 2017). In this section, I will present and discuss some fundamental driving forces of radicalisation in online communities.

Anonymity

The first driving force to consider in terms of online radicalisation is anonymity. Anonymity is an essential (Meleagrou-Hitchens et al., 2017:1238). Since those who are active in extremist online forums do not have to leave their homes, they tend to write more radical things, and they can also get a sense of acting in an extrajudicial space since what they say does not have the same consequences as it would offline (Koehler, 2014).

Ideology and interests

A second driving force of online radicalisation is ideology and interests. Ideology is regarded

as an essential aspect of radicalisation in general and in online radicalisation in particular. There

is no single definition of the term ideology and what it should entail. Some of the most common 8 who are radicalised online, it is common to spread propaganda. This is done either to signal the level of commitment one has for a cause or to convince others. Some create their own propaganda, while others simply spread the words of others. In this way, their beliefs are strengthened (Gill, 2015). Many violent extremist groups have an emancipatory agenda. Hence, they seek to change society by establishing a new state or disrupting the world order (Hoffman, 2017; Neumann & Smith, 2008). The agenda is communicated online, and it has been found that some have been unaware of the causes of a group before becoming members of it. Instead, they have stumbled upon the online community by chance, and after consuming much material, they start to share the beliefs of the ideology in question (Pearson, 2016). In online forums, participants become isolated in echo-chambers reinforcing their own beliefs, and as such, the extremist ideology becomes self-reinforcing (von Behr et al., 2013). A large amount of material on ideology available online means that members can educate themselves while also contributing to (Koehler, 2014:120). This, in turn, can intensify radicalisation (Schlegel, 2018). Scholars who have studied the incel community disagree on whether they have an ideology or not. Bruce Hoffman et al. (2020:567) argue that the two core beliefs shared by incels constitute an ideology. Others understand the continuous debates about different theories and philosophies within the community as a lack of a clear ideology (Fernquist et al., 2020). Even if we agree with Hoffman et al., the incel community's ideology is very thin compared to the ideology held by groups that are usually subject to research within terrorism studies such as Islamist or national socialist groups. Hence, if we assume that some members of the incel community are indeed radicalised, ideology does not seem to be the reason behind their radicalisation.

Leaders

Previous research suggests that a leader to be inspired by is an essential driving force of online radicalisation. This was evident in British university student Roshonara Choudhry, who was radicalised and stabbed her local Member of Parliament after watching videos on YouTube featuring Anwar al-Awlaki and Sheikh Abdullah Azzam, whom both had ties to al-Qaeda. In the beginning, Choudhry only watched videos of al-Awlaki, who argued that women have no active role in Jihad. However, after watching Choudhry understood that 9 women should take an active part in Jihad. She told the police that she believed that she had a duty to fight after watching these videos. Accordingly, Choudhry became radicalised due to her interpretation of radical leaders' messages online (Pearson, 2016) is similar to a finding by Paul Gill (2015), who argues that leaders can legitimise attacks. There are no leaders within the anonymous incel community (Fernquist et al., 2020). Members may be inspired by others' attacks, such as Rodger, but there is no one who guides the community in general or dictates the ideas or direction. Again, if we assume that some members of the incel community are indeed radicalised, leaders do not seem to be the reason behind their radicalisation.

Preparatory activities and recruitment

Several studies on online radicalisation engage with those involved in radical action, either by committing or planning attacks. Thus, there has been a focus on their preparatory activities. Studies have concluded that many have found information on making bombs, suicide vests,

surveillance advice, and other topics online (Gill et al., 2015; Gill et al., 2017). The internet has

also played a significant role in the recruitment process for several violent extremist groups. These groups can recruit from a wider audience through social media than through traditional methods, and online recruitment is also cheaper and faster. The tools within social media to target specific groups are also adopted by these groups, making the recruitment process even more efficient (Hunter et al., 2017). When turning to lone actors, it has been identified that lone actors often try to recruit others. Thus, they become lone actors after failing to do so (Gill,

2015).

How can we understand incels in relation to the previous research on radicalisation online? According to the literature, this group is not dictated by a common ideology. They do not strive for a new world order, and they do not have an emancipatory agenda. They have no leaders who can steer the group and dictate its premises. Factors that all are important for online radicalisation. This group is diverse, and the community is founded on the body, on biology rather than ideology. Further, the community's individuals are loners, yet they are part of some names. This begs the question of why members of the incel community appear radical. 10

Understanding the world through narratives

One way to explore why the members appear radical is by understanding the world as narrated. This thesis will use narratives, particularly the narration of collective identities and emotions as potential driving forces of radicalisation. relationships time and space, constituted by causal emplotment(Somers, 1994:616). As such, narratives are a way ofquotesdbs_dbs9.pdfusesText_15

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