[PDF] STRIKING AT THE ROOTS OF GERMAN MILITARISM - CORE

2008 · Cité 7 fois — 4 U S Department of State, Occupation of Germany: Policy and Progress, 1945- 1946 Abenheim, Reforging the Iron Cross: The Search for Tradition in the West the heart of the problem: German militarism



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STRIKING AT THE ROOTS OF GERMAN MILITARISM - CORE

2008 · Cité 7 fois — 4 U S Department of State, Occupation of Germany: Policy and Progress, 1945- 1946 Abenheim, Reforging the Iron Cross: The Search for Tradition in the West the heart of the problem: German militarism





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"STRIKING AT THE ROOTS OF GERMAN MILITARISM": EFFORTS TO DEMILITARIZE GERMAN SOCIETY AND CULTURE IN

AMERICAN-OCCUPIED WÜRTTEMBERG-BADEN, 1945-1949

Kathleen J. Nawyn

A dissertation submitted to the faculty of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in partial fulfillment of

the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of History.

Chapel Hill

2008

Approved by:

Advisor: Konrad H. Jarausch

Reader: Christopher R. Browning

Reader: Karen Hagemann

Reader: Richard H. Kohn

Reader: Jay M. Smith

ii

©2008

Kathleen J. Nawyn

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

iii

ABSTRACT

KATHLEEN J. NAWYN: "Striking at the Roots of German Militarism": Efforts to Demilitarize German Society and Culture in American-Occupied Württemberg-Baden, 1945-1949 (Under the direction of Konrad H. Jarausch) Most scholars interested in cultural change in western Germany after World War II have focused on

the issue of "democratization." This dissertation looks instead at social and cultural "demilitarization,"

examining efforts initiated by the Americans during their postwar occupation aimed at eliminating the sources

and symptoms of militarism from German society and culture in hopes of preventing another war. Ultimately,

it argues that, by late 1949, life in the state of Württemberg-Baden was characterized far less by militarism than

by "civilianism" and maintains that this transformation was neither solely a spontaneous German reaction to the

horrors of war, nor an unchallenged development. Rather, despite troublesome flaws in their thinking and

sometimes inconsistently applied regulations, the Americans perceptibly influenced the character and

parameters of tangible change. In addition to making concrete demands, such as requiring the removal of

militaristic books from libraries, they monitored personnel appointments and policed German educational and

youth programs, thereby preserving the public sphere for sympathetic native voices and enabling and nurturing

a discourse condemning war and militarism. At the same time, American efforts were facilitated and

strengthened by the many Germans who also wished to see "German militarism" eradicated, even when they

did not always agree with their occupiers regarding methods or exact objectives. Although social and cultural

demilitarization as a basic goal was widely supported by the Germans, its nature and extent remained contested

throughout the occupation, with individual views determined in part by concerns regarding the time and costs

involved in making substantive changes and in part by personal beliefs regarding Germany's past and the causes

of the country's recent descent into war. iv

In memory of William E. Nawyn

v

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

When I started my doctoral work, I had no idea what the Germans had done with their military

uniforms or street signs after World War II. I now know a great deal. And there are many people and

organizations who have helped me acquire that knowledge and for whose assistance I am exceedingly grateful.

My research was made possible by in part by funding from the Foreign Language and Areas Studies

program of the United States Department of Education and from the History Department of the University of

North Carolina at Chapel Hill. In addition, a Doris G. Quinn Fellowship awarded by the History Department

supported the final stages of the writing of this dissertation.

In the United States, the archivists and technicians at the U.S. National Archives facility in College

Park, Maryland, helped to make my repeated visits to that institution both productive and enjoyable. The staffs

of the Library of Congress, Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, and the M.E. Grenander Department of

Special Collections and Archives at the University at Albany, State University of New York, also provided able

assistance. In Germany, I benefited from the knowledge and practical help of the archivists and support staffs

of the Stadtarchiv Heidelberg, Stadtarchiv Karlsruhe, Stadtarchiv Stuttgart, Stadtarchiv Ulm, Hauptstaatsarchiv

Deutsches Tagebucharchiv. I would like to give special thanks to the Landesdenkmalamt Baden-Württemberg,

Aussenstelle Karlsruhe, for allowing me access to their postwar records on North Baden, to Dr. Mechthild

Ohnmacht for facilitating my work there, and to Dr. Konrad Krimm at the Generallandesarchiv Karlsruhe for

his assistance in arranging my access to these materials. I am also grateful to Dr. Michael Wettengel, director

of the Stadtarchiv Ulm, for kindly sharing his knowledge of Ulm with me and helping to make my visits to Ulm

so pleasant. Finally, I must express my appreciation to the late Walter Kempowski and his wife for their

gracious hospitality during my trip to Nartum. I will always remember their warmth and thoughtfulness as a

highlight of my dissertation research. The University of North Carolina has been a good intellectual home. My advisor Konrad Jarausch has

been a steady source of encouragement since I first arrived in Chapel Hill. I am grateful for his support,

vi

responsiveness, good counsel, and good-natured acceptance of my penchant for using metaphors. Without his

assistance, I would never have been able to slay the beast. The members of my committee, Christopher

Browning, Karen Hagemann, Richard Kohn, and Jay Smith have given me thoughtful feedback on my work to

date and armed me with ideas for the future, while Michaela Hoenicke-Moore offered much appreciated support

and enthusiasm during the early stages of this project. My colleagues Michael Allsep, Marco Dumančić, Ben Pearson, Adam Seipp, and Philipp Stelzel

provided advice, moral support, and amusement. Brandon Hunziker commented on sections of my dissertation,

Marina Jones cheerfully helped with exceptionally pesky translations, and Anne Berler and Susie Meghdadpour

just let me complain. Paul Harris, a stray musicologist I discovered on the J bus, periodically lured me away

from my scholarly endeavors with cat stories and hockey games. I am grateful to all of them for their

contributions to my intellectual and physical survival.

It is no exaggeration to say that this dissertation would not have been possible without the assistance of

my friends living in the Washington, DC, area. For house- and cat-sitting jobs, for guest rooms and meals, for

interest and encouragement, I must thank especially Janet and David Holsinger, David Goldman and Susan

Roy, Parker Jayne, Mike Reis and Cheryl Polydor, Cathy Smith and Rocky Hoopengardner, and Sharon and

Scott Thompson. In addition, Jon Brandt rented me a room for a pittance and made sure I ate more than bagels

and salads. Jeff Flanzenbaum regularly gave me a couch to sleep on and, more importantly, did countless

things to keep my spirits up. John Kinzie was always willing to provide timely, insightful comments regarding

any writing I sent his direction. Even more, he has been a source of unflagging encouragement from the first

day I considered embarking on this adventure.

Lastly, I am extremely grateful for the support of my family. In particular, my parents, William and

Esther Nawyn, offered me financial assistance, practical help, useful advice, and their unwavering faith that I

would somehow make my way to the end of this difficult road. My deepest regret and greatest sadness is that

my father did not live to see this dissertation completed. vii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES..............................................................................................................ix

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.....................................................................................................x

Chapter

I. INTRODUCTION.............................................................. .................................................1

The Problem.............................................................................................................2

Conceptual Approach.................................................................................................12

Geographic Focus and Sources........................................................................................28

Organization and Overview.............................................................................................31

II. "BEETHOVEN IN THE TRENCHES": AMERICAN CONCEPTIONS

OF GERMAN MILITARISM.......................................................................................................34

Making Policy: The Apparatus and the Efforts.....................................................................36

Defining Militarism....................................................................................................46

III. "BEETHOVEN "GAMBLING WITH THE VERY DESTINY OF CIVILIZATION":

POLICIES FOR OCCUPIED GERMANY........................................................................83

Identifying a Solution..................................................................................................84

Constructing a Regulatory Framework.............................................................................87

IV. MILITARISTS IN THEIR MIDST................................................................................117

Removals and Restrictions........................................................................................118

Militarists at Nuremberg........................................................................................155

The Law for Liberation from National Socialism and Militarism............................................173

Militarists and German Society: Concluding Thoughts.....................................................211

viii V. CARRYING THE IRON CROSS: THE AMERICANS, THE ALLIES, AND THE GERMAN OFFICER CORPS....................................................................215

The Allies and the Fate of the Officer Corps.................................................................228

The Return of Germany's Military Elites........................................................................256

VI. GETTING THE UNIFORM OUT OF THE GERMAN....................................................285

Making Policy....................................................................................................286

The Official Response.............................................................................................295

Views From Outside of the Bureaucracy.....................................................................313

VII. EXPURGATION................................................................................................335

Flags, Salutes, and Marching...................................................................................336

Street Signs and Monuments...................................................................................351

VIII. FROM DYING FOR THE FATHERLAND TO LIVING FOR

A PEACEFUL DEMOCRACY...............................................................................420

German Schools.................................................................................................424

Organized German Youth Activities............................................................................448

IX. CONCLUSION..........................................................................................................485

Stages of Demilitarization.......................................................................................489

A Joint Enterprise..................................................................................................495

The Ironies of Rearmament.......................................................................................508

APPENDIX A. Enrollment in Institutions of Higher Learning in Württemberg-Baden............................514

APPENDIX B. Excerpts from the Law for Liberation from National Socialism and Militarism..................515

APPENDIX C. Sampling Procedure for Denazification Case Files....................................................519

ix

LIST OF FIGURES

Figures 1 - 8 German and American soldiers in uniform................................................332

Figures 9 - 11 Monuments and Memorials Not Covered by ACC Directive No. 30..................416

Figures 12 - 16 Images Submitted for Review Under ACC Directive No. 30...........................417

Figure 17 Monument Altered Under ACC Directive No. 30........................................418

Figures 18 - 22 Monuments and Memorials Not Altered Under ACC Directive No. 30.................419 x

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACA Allied Control Authority

ACC Allied Control Council

ASkS Amtsblatt für den Stadtkreis Stuttgart

AU Amtsblatt der Stadt Ulm und des Landkreises Ulm

BICO Bipartite Control Office

CCS Combined Chiefs of Staff

CORC ACA Coordinating Committee

BNN Badische Neueste Nachrichten

DIAC ACA Internal Affairs and Communications Directorate

DJW Das junge Wort

DMIL ACA Military Directorate

DOCS ACA Combined Services Directorate

DPOL ACA Political Directorate

DTA Deutsches Tagebucharchiv

EAC European Advisory Commission

E&CR Education and Cultural Relations

FDRL Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library

FRUS Foreign Relations of the United States

GLA Generallandesarchiv Karlsruhe

HStA Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart

IAC Internal Affairs and Communications

ICG Interdivisional Committee on Germany

ICD Information Control Division

IPCOG Informal Policy Committee on Germany

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff

LDAK Landesdenkmalamt, Aussenstelle Karlsruhe

LoC-MD Library of Congress Manuscript Division

xi

MG Military Government

NA U.S. National Archives

NYT New York Times

NYTM New York Times Magazine

OMGUS Office of Military Government (U.S.)

OMGWB Office of Military Government Württemberg-Baden

RG Record Group

RNZ Rhein-Neckar-Zeitung

SHAEF Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force

StAH Stadtarchiv Heidelberg

StAK Stadtarchiv Karlsruhe

StAL Staatsarchiv Ludwigsburg

StAS Stadtarchiv Stuttgart

StAU Stadtarchiv Ulm

SZ Stuttgarter Zeitung

USGCC U.S. Group Control Council

WSC Working Security Committee

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

Bracing themselves against the sides of the trucks, the men looked out blankly as the convoy

grumbled, hissed, and wheezed its way through the narrow streets of yet another south German village. Ahead,

a black automobile led the noisy procession, its uniformed occupants sitting silent and unmoving, their hands

folded, chins up, shoulders back, boots polished, and pistols holstered. Defeat in Italy at Allied hands was now

far behind; prisoner-of-war cages awaited further to the west. In the meantime, Wehrmacht military discipline

prevailed. Rounding the corner, the vehicles paused briefly as an MP cleared the way, motioning the women

and children in front of the shops away from the edge of the road. The men in trucks strained to see the cause

of the delay, then adjusted frayed collars, smoothed stained shirtsleeves, and began to wave. On both sides of

the street, those assembled waved back, accompanying the flurry of handkerchiefs with a shower of rose, daisy,

and iris bouquets. Watching this scene and others like it in late May 1945, New York Times correspondent Raymond

Daniell was less than impressed. He later recounted his observations of Germany's "bedraggled" enlisted men

and their "neatly pressed" officers who "stare[d] arrogantly" and complained, "It is quite clear from the attitude

of the people, that, whatever they think of Hitler and nazism, the German Army is still the idol of the

countryside." Frustrated that Allied regulations permitted scenes like these, Daniell also recalled the previous

evening when men in a large convey had been singing as they moved slowly through a city at dusk. "Several

hundred voices were raised, incongruously but defiantly, in singing "Wir Fahren Gegen Engelland" [We Go

Against England]. To a casual visitor unacquainted with recent events," he added, "it would be hard to tell from

outward appearances who had won the war." 1 For Daniell, it seemed self-explanatory that Germans would idolize soldiers, disheveled and dirty

though they might be. He intimated, too, that the stereotypically haughty German officers were not only still

1 Raymond Daniell, "Germans Hail Own Army," New York Times [NYT], 28 May 45.

2 impeccably dressed, but also somehow refusing to take responsibility for the defeat of the dirty and disheveled

men who accompanied them. Critical of persistent German military trappings and protocol, Daniell

nevertheless seemed to concede that the German soldiers were proceeding in an orderly and obedient, if defiant,

fashion. Wehrmacht discipline might be dangerous, but it was also effective. If all of this was true, moreover,

it was vitally important that the Germans be reminded exactly who had just defeated whom. The handkerchiefs

must be stilled, the officers humbled, and the Germans made subject to the victors. If the Germans could be

soundly defeated and still hold their noses high and worship the uniform, there were presumably more serious

problems to correct as well.

The Problem

Clearly, fluttering handkerchiefs and daisy nosegays are not incontrovertible proof of unhealthy hero-

worship and may simply have reflected German affection for long-absent fathers, sons, and husbands. And

suspect American policies undoubtedly had less to do with inadequate military attention to residual German

delusions of victory than with the sudden and overwhelming need to transport and control several million

German soldiers.

2 Yet Daniell's observations are instructive, for they reveal certain basic assumptions about

the German people and an interpretation of what he was seeing that was rooted in beliefs shared by many

Americans.

For the second time in less than 30 years, the United States had helped to achieve a decisive victory in

Europe after being drawn into a military conflagration that was not of its own choosing, nor of its own making.

Blaming Germany for foolishly and arrogantly instigating both world wars, many Americans sought the origins

of this bellicosity in a past that stretched beyond Adolf Hitler. For some, this search led to the German Empire

or to Frederick the Great's Prussia; for other less historically grounded observers, the wellspring of German

militarism lay in the murky reaches of early Germanic history. Regardless of its starting point, the history of

German militarism had culminated in the Third Reich. America's enemies were inveterate militarists,

2 In the weeks immediately following Germany's surrender on May 8, 1945, American forces had in their custody more than

3 million German prisoners of war and disarmed troops. Between the surrender and mid July 1945, U.S. troops handled

some 7.7 million German military personnel "including Volkssturm and other paramilitary groups, camp followers, and

prisoners returned from Norway, Italy, and camps in the United States and England." Earl F. Ziemke, The U.S. Army in the

Occupation of Germany, 1944-1946 (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1975), 291n60, 291.

3 congenitally or culturally prone to regimentation, obedience, and war. Born to goose-step, they were

excessively deferential to soldiers, too proud of their army machine, and overly influenced by their military.3

Expressed with varying degrees of firmness, virulence, and condemnation, these ideas held widespread

currency. More importantly for Germany, most influential American policymakers shared them, either in part

or in full, and worried about what they meant for the world's future. How to prevent Germany from launching a

third world war became a fundamental concern of American postwar planning. And the role that German

militarism played in the thinking of the United States and its Allies was no secret. "When Hitler and the Nazis

go out," President Franklin D. Roosevelt told the U. S. Congress in September 1943, "the Prussian military

clique must go with them. The war-breeding gangs of militarists must be rooted out of Germany - and out of

Japan - if we are to have any real assurance of future peace. . . ."4 Eighteen months later, just two months

before the war's end, he reported to Congress on Allied discussions at Yalta, emphasizing the Allies'

commitment to Germany's unconditional surrender. Unconditional surrender, he stressed, meant "the

termination of all militaristic influence in the public, private, and cultural life of Germany." It meant total

disarmament, the end of weapons production, the dissolution of the armed forces, and "the permanent disbandment of the German General Staff which has so often shattered the peace of the world."5 The preservation of world peace thus required not only demobilizing Germany's Wehrmacht and

dismantling its munitions factories, but also destroying the militarism pervading all of German life. And

eliminating the military's revered position in German society and excising militarism from German culture

became key objectives of U.S occupation policy. Regulations accordingly deprived officers of their pensions,

banned unauthorized parades, prohibited the flying of German flags, and outlawed the wearing of Wehrmacht

gray uniforms, while mandating the removal of war-glorifying monuments, the confiscation of militaristic

books, and the disbanding of sports clubs. American officials left no symptom or potential source of militarism

untouched.

3 For typical expressions of these attitudes, see Lawson G. Lowrey, "To Make the Germans Men of Peace," New York Times

Magazine [NYTM], 17 Jun 45, and Letters to the Editor, NYT, 25 Aug 46. Raymond Daniell was a particularly loud critic of

the Germans in this regard. See, for example, "'At Our Knees - Or at Our Throats,'" NYTM, 27 May 45, and "Speed of

Demobilization Adds to German Problem," NYTM, 21 Oct 45.

4 U.S. Department of State, Occupation of Germany: Policy and Progress, 1945-1946 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. G.P.O.,

1947), 2.

5 Samuel I. Rosenman, ed., The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Vol. 13, Victory and the Threshold

of Peace (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950), 575.

4 The breadth of American concerns meant that demilitarization measures interfered in some way with

myriad aspects of German everyday life. Teachers, mayors, librarians, journalists, policemen, coaches,

veterans, and housewives faced military government rules that influenced what they taught, what they wrote,

what they wore, and what they did. German local and Land (state) officials almost immediately received

responsibility for publicizing, implementing, and enforcing military government instructions, while also

providing feedback and, on occasion, voicing demands of their own. At the same time, German voices, often

calling from the left of the political spectrum, proffered their own critique of Germany's militaristic past and

pleaded for and planned initiatives to address problems they identified. Significantly, already by the early 1950s the Germans seemed to have evolved from dangerously

aggressive targets of American demilitarization policies into stubbornly resistant opponents of West German

rearmament. In fact, the striking aspect of the rearmament debate was not that the Germans could not rearm

because their generals were selling stationery and their machine tools were humming in the Urals, but rather

that when the question of rearmament arose, most Germans did not want to rearm. More importantly, it is now

apparent that there was a permanent shift in German attitudes toward war and the military during the middle of

the twentieth century. Looking at the Federal Republic of Germany's postwar defense and security policies, as

well as at the political culture that birthed, nurtured, and shaped them, political scientist Thomas Berger has

gone so far as to assert that West Germany developed a "culture of antimilitarism."6 Yet even scholars who have taken note of this change have asked very few questions about the

influence of American social and cultural demilitarization measures.7 In truth, they have asked very few

questions about social and cultural demilitarization as a whole, neglecting not only the American program's

scope and significance, but the sometimes strongly expressed opinions of the Germans as well.

6 Thomas U. Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins

University Press, 1998), x.

7 Berger, for instance, points to the "strong antimilitarist sentiments" - "strictly at odds with" Germany's "martial

traditions" - that appeared in Germany after its World War II defeat and notes that not only did they "fundamentally

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