2008 · Cité 7 fois — 4 U S Department of State, Occupation of Germany: Policy and Progress, 1945- 1946 Abenheim, Reforging the Iron Cross: The Search for Tradition in the West the heart of the problem: German militarism
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STRIKING AT THE ROOTS OF GERMAN MILITARISM - CORE
2008 · Cité 7 fois — 4 U S Department of State, Occupation of Germany: Policy and Progress, 1945- 1946 Abenheim, Reforging the Iron Cross: The Search for Tradition in the West the heart of the problem: German militarism
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"STRIKING AT THE ROOTS OF GERMAN MILITARISM": EFFORTS TO DEMILITARIZE GERMAN SOCIETY AND CULTURE IN
AMERICAN-OCCUPIED WÜRTTEMBERG-BADEN, 1945-1949
Kathleen J. Nawyn
A dissertation submitted to the faculty of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of History.Chapel Hill
2008Approved by:
Advisor: Konrad H. Jarausch
Reader: Christopher R. Browning
Reader: Karen Hagemann
Reader: Richard H. Kohn
Reader: Jay M. Smith
ii©2008
Kathleen J. Nawyn
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
iiiABSTRACT
KATHLEEN J. NAWYN: "Striking at the Roots of German Militarism": Efforts to Demilitarize German Society and Culture in American-Occupied Württemberg-Baden, 1945-1949 (Under the direction of Konrad H. Jarausch) Most scholars interested in cultural change in western Germany after World War II have focused onthe issue of "democratization." This dissertation looks instead at social and cultural "demilitarization,"
examining efforts initiated by the Americans during their postwar occupation aimed at eliminating the sources
and symptoms of militarism from German society and culture in hopes of preventing another war. Ultimately,
it argues that, by late 1949, life in the state of Württemberg-Baden was characterized far less by militarism than
by "civilianism" and maintains that this transformation was neither solely a spontaneous German reaction to the
horrors of war, nor an unchallenged development. Rather, despite troublesome flaws in their thinking and
sometimes inconsistently applied regulations, the Americans perceptibly influenced the character andparameters of tangible change. In addition to making concrete demands, such as requiring the removal of
militaristic books from libraries, they monitored personnel appointments and policed German educational and
youth programs, thereby preserving the public sphere for sympathetic native voices and enabling and nurturing
a discourse condemning war and militarism. At the same time, American efforts were facilitated andstrengthened by the many Germans who also wished to see "German militarism" eradicated, even when they
did not always agree with their occupiers regarding methods or exact objectives. Although social and cultural
demilitarization as a basic goal was widely supported by the Germans, its nature and extent remained contested
throughout the occupation, with individual views determined in part by concerns regarding the time and costs
involved in making substantive changes and in part by personal beliefs regarding Germany's past and the causes
of the country's recent descent into war. ivIn memory of William E. Nawyn
vACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
When I started my doctoral work, I had no idea what the Germans had done with their militaryuniforms or street signs after World War II. I now know a great deal. And there are many people and
organizations who have helped me acquire that knowledge and for whose assistance I am exceedingly grateful.
My research was made possible by in part by funding from the Foreign Language and Areas Studiesprogram of the United States Department of Education and from the History Department of the University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill. In addition, a Doris G. Quinn Fellowship awarded by the History Department
supported the final stages of the writing of this dissertation.In the United States, the archivists and technicians at the U.S. National Archives facility in College
Park, Maryland, helped to make my repeated visits to that institution both productive and enjoyable. The staffs
of the Library of Congress, Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, and the M.E. Grenander Department of
Special Collections and Archives at the University at Albany, State University of New York, also provided able
assistance. In Germany, I benefited from the knowledge and practical help of the archivists and support staffs
of the Stadtarchiv Heidelberg, Stadtarchiv Karlsruhe, Stadtarchiv Stuttgart, Stadtarchiv Ulm, Hauptstaatsarchiv
Deutsches Tagebucharchiv. I would like to give special thanks to the Landesdenkmalamt Baden-Württemberg,
Aussenstelle Karlsruhe, for allowing me access to their postwar records on North Baden, to Dr. Mechthild
Ohnmacht for facilitating my work there, and to Dr. Konrad Krimm at the Generallandesarchiv Karlsruhe for
his assistance in arranging my access to these materials. I am also grateful to Dr. Michael Wettengel, director
of the Stadtarchiv Ulm, for kindly sharing his knowledge of Ulm with me and helping to make my visits to Ulm
so pleasant. Finally, I must express my appreciation to the late Walter Kempowski and his wife for their
gracious hospitality during my trip to Nartum. I will always remember their warmth and thoughtfulness as a
highlight of my dissertation research. The University of North Carolina has been a good intellectual home. My advisor Konrad Jarausch hasbeen a steady source of encouragement since I first arrived in Chapel Hill. I am grateful for his support,
viresponsiveness, good counsel, and good-natured acceptance of my penchant for using metaphors. Without his
assistance, I would never have been able to slay the beast. The members of my committee, Christopher
Browning, Karen Hagemann, Richard Kohn, and Jay Smith have given me thoughtful feedback on my work to
date and armed me with ideas for the future, while Michaela Hoenicke-Moore offered much appreciated support
and enthusiasm during the early stages of this project. My colleagues Michael Allsep, Marco Dumančić, Ben Pearson, Adam Seipp, and Philipp Stelzelprovided advice, moral support, and amusement. Brandon Hunziker commented on sections of my dissertation,
Marina Jones cheerfully helped with exceptionally pesky translations, and Anne Berler and Susie Meghdadpour
just let me complain. Paul Harris, a stray musicologist I discovered on the J bus, periodically lured me away
from my scholarly endeavors with cat stories and hockey games. I am grateful to all of them for their
contributions to my intellectual and physical survival.It is no exaggeration to say that this dissertation would not have been possible without the assistance of
my friends living in the Washington, DC, area. For house- and cat-sitting jobs, for guest rooms and meals, for
interest and encouragement, I must thank especially Janet and David Holsinger, David Goldman and Susan
Roy, Parker Jayne, Mike Reis and Cheryl Polydor, Cathy Smith and Rocky Hoopengardner, and Sharon andScott Thompson. In addition, Jon Brandt rented me a room for a pittance and made sure I ate more than bagels
and salads. Jeff Flanzenbaum regularly gave me a couch to sleep on and, more importantly, did countless
things to keep my spirits up. John Kinzie was always willing to provide timely, insightful comments regarding
any writing I sent his direction. Even more, he has been a source of unflagging encouragement from the first
day I considered embarking on this adventure.Lastly, I am extremely grateful for the support of my family. In particular, my parents, William and
Esther Nawyn, offered me financial assistance, practical help, useful advice, and their unwavering faith that I
would somehow make my way to the end of this difficult road. My deepest regret and greatest sadness is that
my father did not live to see this dissertation completed. viiTABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF FIGURES..............................................................................................................ix
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.....................................................................................................x
Chapter
I. INTRODUCTION.............................................................. .................................................1
The Problem.............................................................................................................2
Conceptual Approach.................................................................................................12
Geographic Focus and Sources........................................................................................28
Organization and Overview.............................................................................................31
II. "BEETHOVEN IN THE TRENCHES": AMERICAN CONCEPTIONSOF GERMAN MILITARISM.......................................................................................................34
Making Policy: The Apparatus and the Efforts.....................................................................36
Defining Militarism....................................................................................................46
III. "BEETHOVEN "GAMBLING WITH THE VERY DESTINY OF CIVILIZATION":POLICIES FOR OCCUPIED GERMANY........................................................................83
Identifying a Solution..................................................................................................84
Constructing a Regulatory Framework.............................................................................87
IV. MILITARISTS IN THEIR MIDST................................................................................117
Removals and Restrictions........................................................................................118
Militarists at Nuremberg........................................................................................155
The Law for Liberation from National Socialism and Militarism............................................173
Militarists and German Society: Concluding Thoughts.....................................................211
viii V. CARRYING THE IRON CROSS: THE AMERICANS, THE ALLIES, AND THE GERMAN OFFICER CORPS....................................................................215The Allies and the Fate of the Officer Corps.................................................................228
The Return of Germany's Military Elites........................................................................256
VI. GETTING THE UNIFORM OUT OF THE GERMAN....................................................285Making Policy....................................................................................................286
The Official Response.............................................................................................295
Views From Outside of the Bureaucracy.....................................................................313
VII. EXPURGATION................................................................................................335
Flags, Salutes, and Marching...................................................................................336
Street Signs and Monuments...................................................................................351
VIII. FROM DYING FOR THE FATHERLAND TO LIVING FORA PEACEFUL DEMOCRACY...............................................................................420
German Schools.................................................................................................424
Organized German Youth Activities............................................................................448
IX. CONCLUSION..........................................................................................................485
Stages of Demilitarization.......................................................................................489
A Joint Enterprise..................................................................................................495
The Ironies of Rearmament.......................................................................................508
APPENDIX A. Enrollment in Institutions of Higher Learning in Württemberg-Baden............................514
APPENDIX B. Excerpts from the Law for Liberation from National Socialism and Militarism..................515
APPENDIX C. Sampling Procedure for Denazification Case Files....................................................519
ixLIST OF FIGURES
Figures 1 - 8 German and American soldiers in uniform................................................332
Figures 9 - 11 Monuments and Memorials Not Covered by ACC Directive No. 30..................416Figures 12 - 16 Images Submitted for Review Under ACC Directive No. 30...........................417
Figure 17 Monument Altered Under ACC Directive No. 30........................................418
Figures 18 - 22 Monuments and Memorials Not Altered Under ACC Directive No. 30.................419 xLIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
ACA Allied Control Authority
ACC Allied Control Council
ASkS Amtsblatt für den Stadtkreis Stuttgart
AU Amtsblatt der Stadt Ulm und des Landkreises UlmBICO Bipartite Control Office
CCS Combined Chiefs of Staff
CORC ACA Coordinating Committee
BNN Badische Neueste Nachrichten
DIAC ACA Internal Affairs and Communications DirectorateDJW Das junge Wort
DMIL ACA Military Directorate
DOCS ACA Combined Services Directorate
DPOL ACA Political Directorate
DTA Deutsches Tagebucharchiv
EAC European Advisory Commission
E&CR Education and Cultural Relations
FDRL Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library
FRUS Foreign Relations of the United States
GLA Generallandesarchiv Karlsruhe
HStA Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart
IAC Internal Affairs and Communications
ICG Interdivisional Committee on Germany
ICD Information Control Division
IPCOG Informal Policy Committee on Germany
JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff
LDAK Landesdenkmalamt, Aussenstelle Karlsruhe
LoC-MD Library of Congress Manuscript Division
xiMG Military Government
NA U.S. National Archives
NYT New York Times
NYTM New York Times Magazine
OMGUS Office of Military Government (U.S.)
OMGWB Office of Military Government Württemberg-BadenRG Record Group
RNZ Rhein-Neckar-Zeitung
SHAEF Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary ForceStAH Stadtarchiv Heidelberg
StAK Stadtarchiv Karlsruhe
StAL Staatsarchiv Ludwigsburg
StAS Stadtarchiv Stuttgart
StAU Stadtarchiv Ulm
SZ Stuttgarter Zeitung
USGCC U.S. Group Control Council
WSC Working Security Committee
Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Bracing themselves against the sides of the trucks, the men looked out blankly as the convoygrumbled, hissed, and wheezed its way through the narrow streets of yet another south German village. Ahead,
a black automobile led the noisy procession, its uniformed occupants sitting silent and unmoving, their hands
folded, chins up, shoulders back, boots polished, and pistols holstered. Defeat in Italy at Allied hands was now
far behind; prisoner-of-war cages awaited further to the west. In the meantime, Wehrmacht military discipline
prevailed. Rounding the corner, the vehicles paused briefly as an MP cleared the way, motioning the women
and children in front of the shops away from the edge of the road. The men in trucks strained to see the cause
of the delay, then adjusted frayed collars, smoothed stained shirtsleeves, and began to wave. On both sides of
the street, those assembled waved back, accompanying the flurry of handkerchiefs with a shower of rose, daisy,
and iris bouquets. Watching this scene and others like it in late May 1945, New York Times correspondent RaymondDaniell was less than impressed. He later recounted his observations of Germany's "bedraggled" enlisted men
and their "neatly pressed" officers who "stare[d] arrogantly" and complained, "It is quite clear from the attitude
of the people, that, whatever they think of Hitler and nazism, the German Army is still the idol of the
countryside." Frustrated that Allied regulations permitted scenes like these, Daniell also recalled the previous
evening when men in a large convey had been singing as they moved slowly through a city at dusk. "Several
hundred voices were raised, incongruously but defiantly, in singing "Wir Fahren Gegen Engelland" [We Go
Against England]. To a casual visitor unacquainted with recent events," he added, "it would be hard to tell from
outward appearances who had won the war." 1 For Daniell, it seemed self-explanatory that Germans would idolize soldiers, disheveled and dirtythough they might be. He intimated, too, that the stereotypically haughty German officers were not only still
1 Raymond Daniell, "Germans Hail Own Army," New York Times [NYT], 28 May 45.
2 impeccably dressed, but also somehow refusing to take responsibility for the defeat of the dirty and disheveled
men who accompanied them. Critical of persistent German military trappings and protocol, Daniellnevertheless seemed to concede that the German soldiers were proceeding in an orderly and obedient, if defiant,
fashion. Wehrmacht discipline might be dangerous, but it was also effective. If all of this was true, moreover,
it was vitally important that the Germans be reminded exactly who had just defeated whom. The handkerchiefs
must be stilled, the officers humbled, and the Germans made subject to the victors. If the Germans could be
soundly defeated and still hold their noses high and worship the uniform, there were presumably more serious
problems to correct as well.The Problem
Clearly, fluttering handkerchiefs and daisy nosegays are not incontrovertible proof of unhealthy hero-
worship and may simply have reflected German affection for long-absent fathers, sons, and husbands. And
suspect American policies undoubtedly had less to do with inadequate military attention to residual German
delusions of victory than with the sudden and overwhelming need to transport and control several million
German soldiers.
2 Yet Daniell's observations are instructive, for they reveal certain basic assumptions about
the German people and an interpretation of what he was seeing that was rooted in beliefs shared by many
Americans.
For the second time in less than 30 years, the United States had helped to achieve a decisive victory in
Europe after being drawn into a military conflagration that was not of its own choosing, nor of its own making.
Blaming Germany for foolishly and arrogantly instigating both world wars, many Americans sought the origins
of this bellicosity in a past that stretched beyond Adolf Hitler. For some, this search led to the German Empire
or to Frederick the Great's Prussia; for other less historically grounded observers, the wellspring of German
militarism lay in the murky reaches of early Germanic history. Regardless of its starting point, the history of
German militarism had culminated in the Third Reich. America's enemies were inveterate militarists,2 In the weeks immediately following Germany's surrender on May 8, 1945, American forces had in their custody more than
3 million German prisoners of war and disarmed troops. Between the surrender and mid July 1945, U.S. troops handled
some 7.7 million German military personnel "including Volkssturm and other paramilitary groups, camp followers, and
prisoners returned from Norway, Italy, and camps in the United States and England." Earl F. Ziemke, The U.S. Army in the
Occupation of Germany, 1944-1946 (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1975), 291n60, 291.3 congenitally or culturally prone to regimentation, obedience, and war. Born to goose-step, they were
excessively deferential to soldiers, too proud of their army machine, and overly influenced by their military.3
Expressed with varying degrees of firmness, virulence, and condemnation, these ideas held widespreadcurrency. More importantly for Germany, most influential American policymakers shared them, either in part
or in full, and worried about what they meant for the world's future. How to prevent Germany from launching a
third world war became a fundamental concern of American postwar planning. And the role that Germanmilitarism played in the thinking of the United States and its Allies was no secret. "When Hitler and the Nazis
go out," President Franklin D. Roosevelt told the U. S. Congress in September 1943, "the Prussian military
clique must go with them. The war-breeding gangs of militarists must be rooted out of Germany - and out of
Japan - if we are to have any real assurance of future peace. . . ."4 Eighteen months later, just two months
before the war's end, he reported to Congress on Allied discussions at Yalta, emphasizing the Allies'
commitment to Germany's unconditional surrender. Unconditional surrender, he stressed, meant "thetermination of all militaristic influence in the public, private, and cultural life of Germany." It meant total
disarmament, the end of weapons production, the dissolution of the armed forces, and "the permanent disbandment of the German General Staff which has so often shattered the peace of the world."5 The preservation of world peace thus required not only demobilizing Germany's Wehrmacht anddismantling its munitions factories, but also destroying the militarism pervading all of German life. And
eliminating the military's revered position in German society and excising militarism from German culture
became key objectives of U.S occupation policy. Regulations accordingly deprived officers of their pensions,
banned unauthorized parades, prohibited the flying of German flags, and outlawed the wearing of Wehrmacht
gray uniforms, while mandating the removal of war-glorifying monuments, the confiscation of militaristic
books, and the disbanding of sports clubs. American officials left no symptom or potential source of militarism
untouched.3 For typical expressions of these attitudes, see Lawson G. Lowrey, "To Make the Germans Men of Peace," New York Times
Magazine [NYTM], 17 Jun 45, and Letters to the Editor, NYT, 25 Aug 46. Raymond Daniell was a particularly loud critic of
the Germans in this regard. See, for example, "'At Our Knees - Or at Our Throats,'" NYTM, 27 May 45, and "Speed of
Demobilization Adds to German Problem," NYTM, 21 Oct 45.4 U.S. Department of State, Occupation of Germany: Policy and Progress, 1945-1946 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. G.P.O.,
1947), 2.
5 Samuel I. Rosenman, ed., The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Vol. 13, Victory and the Threshold
of Peace (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950), 575.4 The breadth of American concerns meant that demilitarization measures interfered in some way with
myriad aspects of German everyday life. Teachers, mayors, librarians, journalists, policemen, coaches,
veterans, and housewives faced military government rules that influenced what they taught, what they wrote,
what they wore, and what they did. German local and Land (state) officials almost immediately received
responsibility for publicizing, implementing, and enforcing military government instructions, while also
providing feedback and, on occasion, voicing demands of their own. At the same time, German voices, often
calling from the left of the political spectrum, proffered their own critique of Germany's militaristic past and
pleaded for and planned initiatives to address problems they identified. Significantly, already by the early 1950s the Germans seemed to have evolved from dangerouslyaggressive targets of American demilitarization policies into stubbornly resistant opponents of West German
rearmament. In fact, the striking aspect of the rearmament debate was not that the Germans could not rearm
because their generals were selling stationery and their machine tools were humming in the Urals, but rather
that when the question of rearmament arose, most Germans did not want to rearm. More importantly, it is now
apparent that there was a permanent shift in German attitudes toward war and the military during the middle of
the twentieth century. Looking at the Federal Republic of Germany's postwar defense and security policies, as
well as at the political culture that birthed, nurtured, and shaped them, political scientist Thomas Berger has
gone so far as to assert that West Germany developed a "culture of antimilitarism."6 Yet even scholars who have taken note of this change have asked very few questions about theinfluence of American social and cultural demilitarization measures.7 In truth, they have asked very few
questions about social and cultural demilitarization as a whole, neglecting not only the American program's
scope and significance, but the sometimes strongly expressed opinions of the Germans as well.6 Thomas U. Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1998), x.
7 Berger, for instance, points to the "strong antimilitarist sentiments" - "strictly at odds with" Germany's "martial
traditions" - that appeared in Germany after its World War II defeat and notes that not only did they "fundamentally
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