parameters requested by the format string from the stack printf ("a has value d Overwrite return addresses on the stack, function pointers, etc – However, the
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[PDF] format string overwrite
22 mar 2017 · 20786c3631302520 16 bytes of stack after return address format string overwrite: GOT buffer starts 16 bytes above printf return address
[PDF] Format String Vulnerabilities and Exploitation - NCC Group Research
output This is done by substituting format specifiers in the format string for values or data For example, on Intel, they could overwrite a saved return address
[PDF] Format String Vulnerability printf ( user input ); - Syracuse University
parameters requested by the format string from the stack printf ("a has value d Overwrite return addresses on the stack, function pointers, etc – However, the
[PDF] Exploiting Format String Vulnerabilities - CS155 Computer and
1 sept 2001 · In normal buffer overflows we overwrite the return address of a function frame on the stack As the function that owns this frame returns, it returns
[PDF] Format String Attacks
6 ABSTRACT The cause and implications of format string vulnerabilities are discussed Overwrite a return address to point to some buffer with shell code in it
[PDF] 05 - Format Strings, Double-Free
Parameters Return Address Saved Frame Pointer Local Variables Saved Registers Page 7 › Arguments are pushed to the stack in reverse order › snprintf copies data from the format string until it Overwriting the Return Address
[PDF] Format String Exploitation
Format strings vulnerability exists in most of the printf family below is some Notice that the items the program returns are values and addresses saved on the the second half of the address from the first same as the single byte overwrite
[PDF] Blind Format String Attacks - TUM
tion, we show a way to exploit format string vulnerabilities on the heap, where we can not overwrite everything between this buffer and the return address
[PDF] Format Strings, Shellcode, and Stack Protection - CSE 127
Format String Vulnerabilities: Writing ▫ Value that we really want to overwrite is likely a pointer (like the return address) – How to write a large 4-byte integer
[PDF] Attacking the stack
Format string attacks were only discovered (invented?) in 2000, after people 2 overwriting the return address on the stack to this place where the shell code is
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Lecture Notes (Syracuse University)Format String Vulnerability: 1Format String Vulnerability printf ( userinput );
The above statement is quite common in C programs. In the lecture, we will find out what can go wrong
if the program is running with privileges (e.g.Set-UIDprogram).1 Format String
What is a format string?
printf ("The magic number is: %d\n", 1911); The text to be printed is "The magic number is:", followed by a format parameter '%d", which is replaced with the parameter (1911) in the output. Therefore the output looks like: The magic numberis: 1911. In addition to %d, there are several other format parameters, each having different meaning.
The following table summarizes these format parameters:Parameter Meaning Passed as %d decimal (int) value %u unsigned decimal (unsigned int) value %x hexadecimal (unsigned int) value %s string ((const) (unsigned) char *) reference%n number of bytes written so far, ( *int) referenceThe stack and its role at format strings The behavior of the format function is controlled by the format string. The function retrieves theparameters requested by the format string from the stack.printf ("a has value %d, b has value %d, c is at address: %08x\n",
a, b, &c); Lecture Notes (Syracuse University)Format String Vulnerability: 2Address ofFormat StringValue of aValue of bAdress of c
printf()"s internal pointerMoving in this direction
StackStack grows in this directionWhat if there is a miss-match between the format string and the actual arguments?printf ("a has value %d, b has value %d, c is at address: %08x\n",
a, b); -In the above example, the format string asks for 3 arguments, but the program actually provides only two (i.e.aandb). -Can this program pass the compiler? The functionprintf()is defined as function with variable length of arguments. There- fore, by looking at the number of arguments, everything looks fine. To find the miss-match, compilers needs to understand howprintf()works and what the meaning of the format string is. However, compilers usually do not do this kind of analysis. Sometimes, the format string is not a constant string, it is generated during the execution of the program. Therefore, there is no way for the compiler to find the miss-match in this case. -Canprintf()detect the miss-match? The functionprintf()fetches the arguments from the stack. If the format string needs3 arguments, it will fetch 3 data items from the stack. Unless the stack is marked with a
boundary,printf()does not know that it runs out of the arguments that are provided to it. Since there is no such a marking.printf()will continue fetching data from the stack. In a miss-match case, it will fetch some data that do not belong to this function call. -What trouble can be caused byprintf()when it starts to fetch data that is meant for it?2 Attacks on Format String Vulnerability
Crashing the program
printf ("%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s");Lecture Notes (Syracuse University)Format String Vulnerability: 3-For each%s,printf()will fetch a number from the stack, treat this number as an address,
and print out the memory contents pointed by this address as a string, until a NULL character (i.e., number 0, not character 0) is encountered. -Since the number fetched byprintf()might not be an address, the memory pointed by this number might not exist (i.e. no physical memory has been assigned to such an address), and the program will crash. -Itisalsopossiblethatthenumberhappenstobeagoodaddress, buttheaddressspaceisprotected (e.g. it is reserved for kernel memory). In this case, the program will also crash.Viewing the stack
printf ("%08x %08x %08x %08x %08x\n"); -This instructs the printf-function to retrieve five parameters from the stack and display them as8-digit padded hexadecimal numbers. So a possible output may look like:
40012980 080628c4 bffff7a4 00000005 08059c04
Viewing memory at any location
-We have to supply an address of the memory. However, we cannot change the code; we can only supply the format string. -If we useprintf(%s)without specifying a memory address, the target address will be ob- tained from the stack anyway by theprintf()function. The function maintains an initial stack pointer, so it knows the location of the parameters in the stack. -Observation: the format string is usually located on the stack. If we can encodethe target address in the format string, the target address will be in the stack. In the following example, the format string is stored in a buffer, which is located on the stack.int main(int argc, char *argv[]){ char user_input[100]; *other variable definitions and statements*/scanf("%s", user_input); / *getting a string from user*/printf(user_input); / *Vulnerable place*/return 0; -If we can force the printf to obtain the address from the format string (also on the stack), we can control the address. printf ("\x10\x01\x48\x08 %x %x %x %x %s"); -\x10\x01\x48\x08are the four bytes of the target address. In C language,\x10in a string tells the compiler to put a hexadecimal value0x10in the current position. The value will take up just one byte. Without using\x, if we directly put"10"in a string, the ASCII values of the characters"1"and"0"will be stored. Their ASCII values are49and48, respectively.Lecture Notes (Syracuse University)Format String Vulnerability: 4-%xcauses the stack pointer to move towards the format string.
-Here is how the attack works ifuserinput[]contains the following format string: "\x10\x01\x48\x08 %x %x %x %x %s"....Address of user_input [ ]0x10014808
user_input [ ] %s %x %x %x %xPrint this
for the 1st %x Print this for the 4th %x For %s: print out the contents pointed by this addressPrint out the contents at the address 0x10014808 using format-string vlunerability-Basically, we use four%xto move theprintf()"s pointer towards the address that we stored
in the format string. Once we reach the destination, we will give%stoprint(), causing it to print out the contents in the memory address0x10014808. The functionprintf()willtreat the contents as a string, and print out the string until reaching the end of the string (i.e. 0).
-The stack space betweenuserinput[]and the address passed to theprintf()function is not forprintf(). However, because of the format-string vulnerability in the program, printf()considers them as the arguments to match with the%xin the format string. -The key challenge in this attack is to figure out the distance between theuserinput[]and the address passed to theprintf()function. This distance decides how many%xyou need to insert into the format string, before giving%s. Writing an integer to nearly any location in the process memory -%n: The number of characters written so far is stored into the integer indicated by the corre- sponding argument.int i; printf ("12345%n", &i); -It causesprintf()to write 5 into variablei. -Using the same approach as that for viewing memory at any location, we can causeprintf() to write an integer into any location. Just replace the%sin the above example with%n, and the contents at the address0x10014808will be overwritten.Lecture Notes (Syracuse University)Format String Vulnerability: 5-Using this attack, attackers can do the following:
Overwrite important program flags that control access privileges Overwrite return addresses on the stack, function pointers, etc. -However, the value written is determined by the number of characters printed before the%nis reached. Is it really possible to write arbitrary integer values? Use dummy output characters. To write a value of 1000, a simple padding of 1000 dummy characters would do. To avoid long format strings, we can use a width specification of the format indicators.