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INVESTIGATION REPORT
The BEA investigations are conducted with the sole objective of improvin g aviation safety and are not intended to apportion blame or liabilities.
November 2020
@BEA_Aero
Accident to the Robin - R2120 - U
registered F-GUXU on 1 August 2019 at Metz-Nancy-Lorraine (Moselle) TimeAround 15:10 (1)
OperatorAéroclub les Ailes Mosellanes
Type of flightCross-country
Persons on boardPilot and passenger
Consequences and damageAircraft substantially damaged This is a courtesy translation by the BEA of the Final Report on the Saf ety Investigation published in March 2020. As accurate as the translation may be, the orig inal text in
French is the work of reference.
(1)
Unless otherwise stated, all times
given in this report are in local time.
1 ? HISTORY OF THE FLIGHT
Note: the following information is based on the pilot's statement and the recording by the GoPro camera that was installed inside the aircraft on the day of the accident. The pilot, accompanied by a passenger who also held a pilot licence, too k off at about 14:30 from Chambley aerodrome (Meurthe-et-Moselle) for a private flight to the east of Metz (Moselle) to take pictures. During the flight, they d ecided to land at Metz Nancy-Lorraine aerodrome to swap places. The pilot aligned the aircraft on long final for runway 22 (2) On landing, after the nose gear had touched down, the aircraft deviated to the left with an angle of about 45° from the runway centreline. Despite the pi lot's inputs on the right rudder pedal, the plane veered off the runway. It struck a dra inage ditch parallel to the runway (3) , the nose gear failed, the propeller broke and the aircraft came to rest on its nose. 2 ? ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
2.1 Pilot statement
The pilot reported that, on final, the aeroplane was stabilized in its landing configuration with full flaps and at an airspeed of about 120 km/h (4) During the flare, the pilot explained that he felt a ground effect and s lightly increased power before the aircraft's main gear touched down. He added that, wh en the nose wheel touched the ground, he felt the aircraft suddenly veer about 45° to the left. He indicated that, although he applied the right rudder pedal quickly an d firmly, it seemed to have no effect. He indicated that it felt as though the nos e wheel was blocked and the tyre was skidding on the runway. (2)
3,050 m x 45 m
paved runwa. (3)
The ditch struck by
the aircraft is 75 m from the runway centreline, outside the runway safety area. The location of the ditch is in compliance with the regulatory requirements. (4)
The speed
recommended by the aircraft ?ight manual is 120 km/h.
Lateral runway excursion on landing,
collision with a ditch
2/3BEA2019-0459.en/November 2020
The pilot stated that the meteorological conditions were good on the day of the accident with a wind from 300° at 5 kt at the time of the landing.
2.2 Video analysis
The recording from the GoPro camera that filmed the approach and the acc ident from the cockpit shows the aircraft a few metres off-centre to the right as it touched down on the runway. Then, just after the nose gear touched down, the aircraft veered suddenly to the left, with a tyre screeching noise. The aircraft's ce ntreline was at that point at an angle of about 45° to the runway centreline. After the runway excursion, the aircraft's path was straight until it came to a stop.
2.3 Pilot information
The pilot held a LAPL (A) licence issued in April 2019. He had logged
117 flight
hours since 2016, including 45 hours on the Robin R2120. He had logged 1
5 flight
hours as pilot-in-command and 10 hours in dual-command on the R2120 in t he last three months.
2.4 Nose gear
The pilot examined the aircraft's nose gear after the accident. He indicated that the nose gear displayed significant wear and stated that this could have caused malfunctions, with the wheel not locking in the "in-flight" position and locking leftward on the ground (5) Based on photographs of the nose gear, the aircraft manufacturer confirmed that there was significant and unusual-looking wear (6) . However, it indicated that although the wear identified may indeed impede the nominal operation of the nose gear , it could not be the cause of the accident. By design, the nose-wheel can only loc k in a straight position. Furthermore, since the wheel is connected to the rudder pedals , if the wheel is not locked in the "in-flight" position, a left veer at the time of touchdown would be corrected by applying the right rudder pedal. The manufacturer also spec ified that the wheel has a maximum deflection of 20° to either side of the aircr aft's centreline.
Source: CEAPR
Figure 1: Diagram of the nose gear locking system
(5)
During normal
operation, the nose gear is designed so that the nose wheel is locked straight in ?ight and is connected to the rudder pedals on the ground. (6)
The aircraft
maintenance manual does not contain any part replacement criteria.
3/3BEA2019-0459.en/November 2020
Source: CEAPR
Figure 2: Diagram of the connection between the rudder pedals and the ru dder
Ground position - unlocking of nose gear
The compression of the nose shock absorber during the run causes the cam of the locking control rod to rise. This releases the locking pawl, which moves backwards and frees the centring cam plate attached to the engine mount, thereby r eleasing the nose gear.
In-flight position - locking of nose gear
When the shock absorber extends in flight, the cam of the locking control rod descends into its housing. It pushes the locking pawl back into the cent ring cam plate attached to the engine mount, which immobilizes the nose gear.
3 ? CONCLUSION
The conclusions are solely based on the information which came to the kn owledge of the BEA during the investigation. They are not intended to apportion blame or liability. The investigation was not able to determine the causes of the accident.
Although the
wear on the nose gear was significant, it does not appear that it could have caused the gear to block in an out-of-centre position.quotesdbs_dbs11.pdfusesText_17
Lateral runway excursion on landing, collision with a ditch