Cryptography Engineering: Design Principles and Practical
Cryptography Engineering: Design Principles and Practical Applications Published by Wiley Publishing, Inc 10475 Crosspoint Boulevard Indianapolis, IN 46256 www wiley com
Cryptography Engineering - GBV
Cryptography Engineering Design Principles and Practical Applications Niels Ferguson Bruce Schneier Tadayoshi Kohno WILEY Wiley Publishing, Inc
Cryptography Engineering: Design Principles and Practical
Cryptography Engineering: Design Principles and Practical Applications, Niels Ferguson, Bruce Schneier, Tadayoshi Kohno, John Wiley & Sons, 2012, 1118502825, 9781118502822, 384 pages The ultimate guide to cryptography, updated from an author team of the world's top cryptography
Cryptography Engineering - Startseite
Cryptography Engineering: Design Principles and Practical Applications Published by Wiley Publishing, Inc 10475 Crosspoint Boulevard Indianapolis, IN 46256 www wiley com
Cryptography Engineering Design Principles And Practical
^ Cryptography Engineering Design Principles And Practical Applications ^ Uploaded By Laura Basuki, cryptography engineering design principles and practical applications ferguson niels schneier bruce kohno tadayoshi 8601300284644 books amazonca cryptography engineering discusses building cryptographic systems from the
Cryptography Engineering Design Principles And Practical
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Cryptography Engineering Design Principles And Practical
cryptography engineering design principles and practical applications Dec 27, 2020 Posted By Louis L Amour Public Library TEXT ID 1690ded7 Online PDF Ebook Epub Library cryptography engineering design principles and practical applications ebook written by niels ferguson bruce schneier tadayoshi kohno read this book using google play
Cryptography Engineering Design Principles And Practical
cryptography engineering design principles and practical applications Dec 25, 2020 Posted By Penny Jordan Library TEXT ID 1690ded7 Online PDF Ebook Epub Library and practical applications by bruce schneier niels ferguson tadayoshi kohno the ultimate guide to cryptography updated from an author team of the worlds top cryptography
Section 5 Public Key Crypto Topics - University of Washington
Cryptography Engineering: Design Principles and Practical Applications Wiley Publishing 2010 Exercise 6 3 p 97) Exercise: CBC-MAC collision vulnerability a b E K E
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Section 5 Public Key Crypto TopicsCalculating RSA, Cryptanalysis, and Crypto EthicsEric Zeng, Keanu VestilOctober 29, 2020
AdministriviaLab 1 due date extended to Friday, October 30 @ 11:59pm○Please do not make any further changes to files after submittingHomework 2 out now -due Friday, November 6 @ 11:59 pm○Written exercises about cryptography conceptsFinal project checkpoint #1 -due Friday, November 13 @ 11:59pm○Group members' names + NetIDs and brief description of the presentation topic
Calculating RSA:Key generation, encryption, and decryptionPublic Key Cryptography ReviewScenario: Alice wants to send Bob a message on the internet○Goal: confidentiality of data○Problem: people eavesdropping on network ➞can't share symmetrickeys secretly
Public Key Cryptography ReviewSolution: public key cryptography (aka asymmetriccryptography)○Bob generates a key pair: one private key (secret), and one public key that is safe to share with anyone○Alice encrypts a message using Bob's public key○Bob decrypts with Bob's private key
RSA -a public key cryptosystemRSA can:Generate public/private key pairsEncrypt plaintextDecrypt ciphertextRSA is based on computing modular exponentiation with large primesEasy to compute, hard to reverse (without the private key)
RSA Algorithm ReviewKey GenerationSelect two large primes, pand qLet n= p~qLetϕ(n)= (p -1)(q -1)Select a random prime e such that eand ϕ(n)are relatively primeCompute d such thate~d≡1 mod ϕ(n)(equivalent to solving 1 = (e~d) mod ϕ(n))Notation:Public Key: (e, n)Private Key: dMessage: m(no common factors other than 1)Encrypting m: c = memod nDecrypting c: cdmod n = (me)dmod n = m
RSA Activity (Canvas Quiz)Q1. Given these RSA parameters: p = 5, q = 7, e = 5n= p~qϕ(n)= (p -1)(q -1)e~d≡1 mod ϕ(n)1 = (e~d) mod ϕ(n)Encrypt: c = memod nDecrypt: cdmod n = (me)dmod n = mEncrypt 16Decrypt 12What is n?What is ϕ(n)?What is d?(https://canvas.uw.edu/courses/1396608/quizzes/1331770)
Encrypt 16165mod 35 = 11Decrypt 12125mod 35 = 17What is n?n = 5~7 = 35What is ϕ(n)?ϕ(n) = (5 -1)(7 -1) = 24What is d?5~d ≡1 mod 241 = (5~d) mod 24d = 5RSA Activity (Canvas Quiz)Given these RSA parameters: p = 5, q = 7, e = 5n= p~qϕ(n)= (p -1)(q -1)e~d≡1 mod ϕ(n)1 = (e~d) mod ϕ(n)Encrypt: c = memod nDecrypt: cdmod n = (me)dmod n = m
How to calculate decryption key on homework without trial/error?Extended Euclidean Algorithm....Or WolframAlpha :)
RSA Primitive versus Real Life
Demonstration: finding vulnerabilities in CBC-MAC with cryptanalysisIs encryption (confidentiality) enough?"Final!!!KNE 110Monday 2:30PM"franzi@csAES 128-bit key,CBC modeokIn this case, an adversary doesn't gain anything important by learning the content of this message.Scenario: Franzi wants to send out an email about exam times -and a hacker has learned the encryption key
Is encryption (confidentiality) enough?"Final!!!KNE 110Saturday 12:30AM"484 Student????Tampers with message in transitBut, the attacker could tamper with the message during transmission, and the recipient would not know -so we need to ensure integrity
MAC (Message Authentication Code)Provides integrity and authentication: only someone who knows the KEY can compute correct MAC for a given message.
When do we MAC?The good:Encrypt-then-MACMAC-then-encryptNot as good as Encrypt-then-MACThe bad (& ugly):Encrypt-and-MACMAC is deterministic! Same plaintext →same MAC
How do we create a MAC? CBC-MAC: Encrypt the message in CBC mode, use the last block as the MACk = secret key Last block of ciphertext used as MACInitialization vector is 0*CBC-MAC is not the only MAC algorithm -today most use HMAC; we'll show why next
Is CBC-MAC vulnerable?How could we find out?Cryptanalysis: using mathematical analysis to rigorously reason about a cryptographic systemLet's use cryptanalysis to find a collisiontwo different inputs leading to the same MAC tag(violating collision resistance)
Exercise: CBC-MAC collision vulnerabilitySuppose aand bare both one block long, and suppose the sender MACs a, b, and a || bwith CBC-MAC. An attacker who intercepts the MAC tags for these messages can now forge the MAC for the message b || (MK(b) ⊕MK(a) ⊕b)which the sender never sent. The forged tag for this message is equal to MK(a || b), the tag for a || b. Justify mathematically why this is true.abEKEKTAG(Ferguson, Schneier, & Kohno. Cryptography Engineering: Design Principles and Practical Applications. Wiley Publishing 2010. Exercise 6.3 p. 97)
abEKEKEK(EK(a)⊕b)MK(a) =EK(a)MK(b) = EK(b) (not shown)MK(a || b) = EK(EK(a)⊕b)EK(a)EK(a)⊕bExercise: CBC-MAC collision vulnerability(Ferguson, Schneier, & Kohno. Cryptography Engineering: Design Principles and Practical Applications. Wiley Publishing 2010. Exercise 6.3 p. 97)Prove: MK(b || (MK(b) ⊕MK(a) ⊕b))= MK(a || b)
bEK(b)⊕EK(a)⊕b EKEKEK(EK(a) ⊕b) EK(b)EK(a) ⊕bMK(b|| (MK(b) ⊕MK(a) ⊕b)) = MK(b|| (EK(b) ⊕EK(a) ⊕b)) = EK(EK(b) ⊕EK(b) ⊕EK(a) ⊕b)= EK(EK(a) ⊕b)This is the same as MK(a || b)!Exercise: CBC-MAC collision vulnerabilityThese terms cancel outProve: MK(b || (MK(b) ⊕MK(a) ⊕b))= MK(a || b)
So what?We can prove, just using the specification of CBC-MAC, that the messages b || (M(b) ⊕M(a) ⊕b) anda || bshare the same tag. This approach is a common method used in cryptanalysis.We broke the theoreticalguarantee that no two different messages will never share a tag.If you were to use CBC-MAC in a protocol, it provides information about specific weaknesses and how not to use it.
Safer CBC-MAC for variable length messagesFor a message mof length l:1.Construct s by prepending the length of mto the message: s = concat(l, m)2.Pad s until the length is a multiple of the block size3.Apply CBC-MAC to the padded string s.4.Output the last ciphertext block, or a part of it. Don't output intermediates.Warning: Appending to end is just as broken as what we showed!Or encrypt output with another block cipher under a different key (CMAC). Or use HMAC, UMAC, GMAC.Follow latest guidance very carefully! l + padEKEKb1TAGEKbl......
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