PRESENTA TION 157 - UAB Barcelona

Colonel Tejero held the Cortes hostage at gunpoint in an attempt to overthrow the democracy which had emerged under King Juan Carlos Then, four years ago, my Spanish publisher, Gonzalo Pontón, persuaded me to rewrite the book completely The idea was to use all the research carried out so painstakingly by

No 275 Anti-SovietWar Budget Targets Blacks, Poor

Colonel Tejero and fellow putschist General Milans de Bosch have maintain a "safety net" belowthe "truly needy " But who is "truly" needy and who is "untruly" needy? The "untruly needy" typically include a welfare mother with'a couple of kids or an elderly couple living in a big city on about $500 a month Thebudgethits the

PRESENTA TION 157 - UAB Barcelona

ledby Lieutenant-Colonel Tejero Nevert- heless this pnceless historic testimony was not broadcast live, but was recorded and put on the air only afer many hours'de- [ay An analysis of the conditions ofpro- duction and broadcasting of the docu- ment, together with the structure of its discourse, forms the subject of this report

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its"leader~ Lieutonant Colonel Tejero • The reasons foi its failure have often been laid at the door of tl~è king • Both insidJ Spain and ab:i'oad i t ia accepted' tha't by appearing • v aQd denouncing the coup , king Juan Carlos saved the infant Spanish democracy • The

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by Colonel Tejero and his thugs This is a well-known fact, at least in Spain Why, then, one might ask, should it be made the subject of a novel? And, maybe even more importantly, how – in which form – should it be narrated? The answers we seek come from the theoretical Prologue to the novel: it is necessary to recount

I La lente progression des idées démocratiques modernes au

communiste, la liberté syndicale En décembre 1978, une constitution démocratique est adoptée Le Colonel Tejero tente en 1981 un coup d’état qui échoue, montrant le soutien de l’armée au nouveau régime La victoire des socialistes en 1982 permet l’alternance L’entrée de l’Espagne dans la CEE en 1986 permet l’enracinement des

Un bouleversement des équilibres économiques

démocratique est adoptée Le Colonel Tejero tente en 1981 un coup d’état qui échoue et la victoire des socialistes en 1982 permet l’alternance L’entrée de l’Espagne dans la CEE en 1986 confirme l’enracinement des principes démocratiques, malgré les tensions autonomistes au Pays Basque avec l’ETA

PRESENTA TION

Present-day research into communication

provides one of the princzpalpolitical and epistemological challenges of communica- tion.

The tendency is discovered to confuse

effective partzcipation in politicd life with token particzpation, and the observation is mude that the apparent prolzyeration of broadcasting stations is c~ncelled out by the concentration of communicative pro- duction.

The functions of the mass media in un

emergency situation such as the 23rd. Fe- bruaty 1981 should be explained in accor- dance with their own peculiar structurd conditions, conditions which will abow of no fundamental changes.

THE MASS MEDIA IN AN EMERGENCY

SITUAnON

Both the political situation on the 23rd

Februaty in Spain, and the afermath of

the kidnapping of

Aldo Moro in Italy al-

most three yearspreviously are beyondany doubt analogous as far as the reaction of the masJ media is concerned. Shortly afer

Moro 'S kidnapping, un investigation was

canied out in Rome into the role of infor- mation services in an emergency situation. The acentralityu a~sumed by the media in such situations was venfied, as well as the appearance of a new awareness of moral, politicd and professional responsabilities with regardto the work of the professional informant in un extreme situation. Becau- se of its undoubted interest, in this num- 157 ber of ANALISI we ofer a sample of the re- sults o f this investigation.

ECONOMIC POWER AND POWER OF

COMMUNICA TING

There is a close relation between the cost

of evety fom of technology communica- tion and the size ~f the audience reahed by each medium. Grouping the media a- cora'ing to their scale o f audiences they can be divided into four categones of increa- sing costs: microcommunication, meso- communication, macrocommunication and megacommunication. The low-cost and socially poweflul FM radio stations show an interesting exception to this rule.

The socid productivity of the economic

investments in the media technologies is moderate for the micromedia, poor for the mesomedia, good for the macromedia and vety good for the most expensive electro- nic megamedia (TV and radio networks, satellites) .

RESPECT FOR THE PERSON IN

THE SPANISH CONSTITUTlON

The Spanish Constitution of 1978 establis-

hes the maintenance of personal freedom and nghts solidly andf2rmly protected by the Law. Spanish laws muy not transgress the universai phciple of human rights, which are placed at the pinnacle of Spa- nish Justice, above the Constitution itself: 158

The fieedom o f information is limited

by those nghts recognised in the Constitu- tion itse& especially the nght of honour, of pnbacy, of one's own image, and the protection of young people and infants.

Ptiwcy and information are two con&-

ting concepts, both defended by the

Constitution. The human person is often

i/l-treated in the interest o f in formation.

Those who consider that their pnvacy

has been invaded may have recourse to the

Constitutional Tn'bunal and even to the

European Commission for Human Rights.

WE MEDIA AND THE 23rd

FEBRUARY

The live broadcast of the attack on the

Spanish Parliament brought the media in-

to action as events developed. The media had their share both in isolating the at- tempted coup as wel/ as forming public opinion.

The radio was the outstanding commu-

nication medium on the night of the

23rd February. Taken as a whole, it pro-

ved to be of vital importance in keeping open the communication channel bet- ween a society and its democratic institu- tions.

The press was irregular in

its reactions.

Some dailies, such as El País and Diario

16 came out on the very night of the at-

tempted coup, while others followed their normal publication schedule. The press canied offan impressive feat of collecting and collating information. Thanks to pho- tographs taken of the Spanish Parliament by EFE Agency reporters, dailies were able to publid thej7rstpictures of the coup at- tempt.

Television was not gp to the communi-

cation requhements of Spanish society in such a situation. The democratic overhaul of Spanish television 2s still in its early sta- ges. Television 's cscoopw was to record the assault on the Spanish Parliament.

ELEVEN NOR TH-A lL4NnC

VERSIONS OF THE 23rd.

FEBR UAR Y

Eleven general-information weeklies from

sLu Nortb-Atlantic states provide, with their versions immediately after the at- tempted coup on the

23rd. February, the

confirmation of the prevailing common production model in present-day journa- lism which was designed by the US indus- tial machine. Within its guidelines, Time provides the best report, and Der Spiegel -by means of an interview- the most plausible explanation. A structural analy - sis and the study on comparative polihcs which Europeo and L' Espresso respectively publish later on, cannot be made using this hegemonic model. ?HE AUDIOVISUAL DOCUMENT OF

THE 23rd, FEBRUARY

Spanish Television sspontaneouslyv pro-

duced the best docgmentary in its history on the 23rd Februasy, when its cameras installed in the Spanish parliament buil- ding in

Madrid were witness to the assault

ledby Lieutenant-Colonel Tejero. Nevert- heless this pnceless historic testimony was not broadcast live, but was recorded and put on the air only afer many hours'de- [ay. An analysis of the conditions ofpro- duction and broadcasting of the docu- ment, together with the structure of its discourse, forms the subject of this report.

STATE, ORDER(S) AND INFORMA

TTON SER VICES

The operation known as 23-F in Spain,

-i.e. the attempted coup d'état on the

23rd February 1981, led by Generals Mi-

lans del Bosch, Amada, by Lieutenant- 159

Colonel Tejero ~nd other high-ranking

amy oficers- fiiled as a classic military takeover. It would be quite a dzfferent matter to anaíyse its political neffective- nessu, and therefore its dissuasive -persua- sive sucess as an integral part of a majbr operation of reform of the previous dicta- tod State and the consolidation of the new model, comparable to those already emsting in Western Europe. The main aim of this paper is to show how the events of the

23rd. Februaly represent the cLimax of

the transfomation of the Spanish state, but maintaining the hypothesis that it was allpossibíe due to the new type of control exercised on the main channels and flow o f in fomation charactenitic o f indust&zii- sed societies.quotesdbs_dbs8.pdfusesText_14

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