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The Carter Center

International Election Observation Mission to

Democratic Republic of Congo 2006

Presidential and Legislative Elections

Final Report

One Copenhill

453 Freedom Parkway

Atlanta, GA 30307

(404) 420-5188

Fax (404) 420-5196

www.cartercenter.org 2

CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ..........................................................................................................5

POLITICAL BACKGROUND ...................................................................................................15

CONFLICT IN THE DRC ................................................................................................ 15

INTERNATIONAL ACTORS ............................................................................................. 18

SELECT INTERNATIONAL NONGOVERNMENTAL ACTORS ............................................. 20

ELECTION SECURITY .................................................................................................... 21

LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR ELECTIONS ................................................................................ 24

CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUM .................................................................................. 24

GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS ....................................................................................... 25

ELECTION ADMINISTRATION ........................................................................................ 26

ELECTORAL SYSTEM .................................................................................................... 26

POLITICAL PARTIES ...................................................................................................... 29

POLITICAL FINANCE ..................................................................................................... 30

ELECTORAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION .............................................................................. 30

HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS .................................................................................... 32

PRE-ELECTION OBSERVATION .............................................................................................33

ELECTION PREPARATIONS ............................................................................................ 33

POLITICAL PARTIES ...................................................................................................... 42

SELECTED PARTY PROFILES ......................................................................................... 42

PRE-CAMPAIGN POLITICAL TENSIONS .......................................................................... 44

POLITICAL COALITIONS ............................................................................................... 46

ELECTION CAMPAIGN .................................................................................................. 47

CHALLENGES TO THE CREDIBILITY OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS ............................... 49

CAMPAIGN FINANCE .................................................................................................... 50

MEDIA ......................................................................................................................... 51

DOMESTIC OBSERVERS ................................................................................................ 52

POLLING OBSERVATION: JULY 20 PRESIDENTIAL AND LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS ................54

FIRST-ROUND TABULATION ......................................................................................... 54

FIRST-ROUND ELECTION RESULTS ............................................................................... 58

VIOLENCE FOLLOWS ANNOUNCEMENT OF RESULTS .................................................... 59

PRE-ELECTION OBSERVATION, SECOND ROUND .................................................................61

POLLING OBSERVATION: OCT. 29 PRESIDENTIAL RUNOFF AND PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS ...69

SECOND-ROUND ELECTION RESULTS ........................................................................... 70

POSTELECTION VIOLENCE IN KINSHASA ...................................................................... 71

ELECTORAL DISPUTES ................................................................................................. 71

PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS .............................................................................................. 74

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................................75

ELECTION ADMINISTRATION ........................................................................................ 75

POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS ................................................................................................ 76

POLITICAL PARTY FINANCE ......................................................................................... 77

VOTING ........................................................................................................................ 77

3

COUNTING ................................................................................................................... 79

TABULATION ................................................................................................................ 80

ELECTION-DAY SECURITY ............................................................................................ 80

ANNOUNCEMENT OF RESULTS ..................................................................................... 80

MEDIA ......................................................................................................................... 81

CIVIC EDUCATION ........................................................................................................ 81

CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY ....................................................................................... 82

ELECTION DISPUTE RESOLUTION ................................................................................. 83

DOMESTIC OBSERVATION ............................................................................................ 83

APPENDICES ........................................................................................................................85

APPENDIX A ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

APPENDIX B DELEGATION MEMBERS, FIRST ROUND²JULY 30, 2006 APPENDIX C DELEGATION MEMBERS, SECOND ROUND²OCT. 29, 2006

APPENDIX D TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

APPENDIX E LETTER OF INVITATION²ENGLISH

APPENDIX F LETTER OF INVITATION²FRENCH

APPENDIX G COMPOSITION OF TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT

APPENDIX H CARTER CENTER OBSERVER DEPLOYMENT, FIRST ROUND APPENDIX I CARTER CENTER OBSERVER DEPLOYMENT, SECOND ROUND

APPENDIX J DRC PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES 2006

APPENDIX K PRESIDENTIAL AND LEGISLATIVE ELECTION RESULTS,

FIRST AND SECOND ROUNDS

APPENDIX L CARTER CENTER STATEMENTS

APPENDIX M OBSERVATION FORMS

APPENDIX N LIST OF ORGANIZATIONS THAT OBSERVED THE ELECTIONS 4 5

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The 2006 presidential and legislative

elections in the Democratic Republic of

Congo (DRC) represent a milestone in

both Congolese and African history. The area and fourth largest in population, emerged in the late 1990s from 30 years of brutal dictatorship only to fall into what the United Nations referred to as crisis.´ A civil war, involving a half- dozen armies from neighboring countries, left millions dead in the last decade. The 2006 elections marked the formal culmination of a transitional peace process underway since 2003 and real chance for peace and democracy since independence in 1960.

These elections were the last and best

hope for maintaining the current tentative peace in the DRC, the consequences of which reach beyond its borders to the subregion and even impact the continent as a whole. The consequences are also economic. A successful electoral process is a necessary step in the long road of building a stable and prosperous economy in Central Africa. The Congo has tremendous natural resources but they have not been managed to the benefit of the population. The presidential and legislative elections held on July 20 and Oct. 29, 2006, produced leaders in 40 years. Incumbent President

Joseph Kabila was elected following a

runoff election against Jean-Pierre

Bemba.

If well governed and successful at

bringing about peace in its eastern regions, the DRC has the potential to become an economic powerhouse and serve as a catalyst for the development of Central Africa and the entire continent.

FRAGILE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS

Despite remaining pockets of armed

conflict in the eastern part of the country, the Congolese peace process made dramatic strides as citizens prepared for their first multiparty democratic elections in 2006. Many ex- combatants demobilized and concrete, though insufficient, advances were made toward establishing an integrated national army. Monetary stability returned as well and inflation, which stood at 630 percent in 1998, was down to less than three percent by early 2004.

Although the Sun City Peace Accord

called for elections by June 2005, a provision enabled up to two delays of six months each. In a swirl of uncertainty and political suspicion, the government invoked these delays, citing the postponed adoption of the electoral law by the National Assembly and the challenges of establishing an election commission capable of conducting an election in the conditions of the DRC.

Once the legislative framework was

adopted, election authorities registered more than 25 million voters between

June and December 2005 and held a

constitutional referendum Dec. 18±19,

2005, which resulted in a new

6 constitution approved by 83 percent of voters. The registration of presidential and legislative candidates was successfully completed in early 2006, followed by the recruitment and training of poll workers and a major logistical exercise to equip approximately 50,000 polling stations across the country.

Ballot papers were printed in South

Africa and airlifted by the South

Africans to multiple drop-off points in

the DRC.

This report illustrates only some of the

challenges of running elections in a country the size of Western Europe with little to no national infrastructure or experience conducting democratic elections, continued violence, large numbers of displaced people, and rampant corruption. The international community mobilized its largest-ever electoral support effort in which the

United Nations provided significant

technical assistance and massive logistical resources to help with the deployment of electoral material and the collection of results. The United Nations

Mission in Congo (MONUC) was the

nearly 20,000 combined uniformed and civilian personnel. The Independent

Electoral Commission (CEI, or

Électorale Nationale

Indépendante) strengthened its

institutional capacity after the voter registration process and constitutional referendum revealed serious shortages in the quality and quantity of resources dedicated to training polling staff and providing civic and voter education.

However, features of the electoral

system (open-list proportional representation) posed their own challenges, such as a complex and, in some cases, multipage ballots in large urban areas such as Kinshasa where some 10 percent of the simple yes/no ballots from the constitutional referendum were spoiled due to incorrect marking by voters.

To compound the already tremendous

technical challenges of these elections, an extremely volatile political environment threatened to drag the democratic process once more into violence. The transitional government established by the Sun City Accord was an uneasy power-sharing arrangement between former belligerent parties, some of which were accused of war crimes.

Several of these same parties, whose

strength was military and who lacked popular support at a national level, faced a likely loss of much of their power as a result of these elections. Other political leaders called the election preparations seriously flawed and threatened to undermine the process unless they received negotiated assurances about the transparency of the process and a commitment that the elected representatives would be able to form a new government.

The Carter Center launched its

international election observation mission in full recognition of the fact that even without premeditation bitter and possibly violent disputes over the results were likely as well as vehement accusations of fraud by the losers. The destructive forces of xenophobia and nationalism were among the dangerous cards that some political actors played, capitalizing on the (well-deserved) distrust of the international community, 7 more recent interference in neighboring countries.

Carter Center observers witnessed

constant reminders of the violence throughout the country, and the

Congolese people knew that the

integration of former combatants into the national armed forces was far from irreversible. The Center received many reports of human rights abuses committed by various military subgroups, and there were frequent outbreaks of fighting between military groups along the lines of their original loyalties, some involving Joseph private security of Jean-Pierre Bemba.

CARTER CENTER OBSERVATION

METHODOLOGY

Following invitations from President

Joseph Kabila and the president of the

electoral commission, Abbé Apollinaire

Malumalu, The Carter Center conducted

two assessment visits in 2005. In April

2006, the Center established a field

office in Kinshasa to coordinate election observation activities. Through a combination of long- and short-term election monitoring, the Center monitored election preparations and political developments and was able to provide feedback to election authorities, political parties, and domestic observers throughout the mission. The Center issued multiple public reports and conducted many private meetings to share its findings. international election observation mission to the DRC was to contribute to a credible electoral process that met international standards and facilitated a democratic and peaceful political transition in the DRC through the following activities:

Conduct an impartial assessment of

the transitional election processes and, where relevant, make recommendations for improvement

Collaborate with local Congolese

play a constructive role in the electoral process, including strengthening their capacity to mount credible observation efforts observation activities with the government of the DRC, electoral authorities, political parties, and civil society actors in order to contribute to improved electoral processes

Provide tools for Congolese parties

to resolve peacefully election disputes and discourage violence related to the electoral process, possibly through the establishment of effective monitoring by Congolese civil society organizations, civic dialogue, and liaison structures where the electoral authority, political parties, and civil society organizations could discuss issues of mutual interest

Demonstrate international support

for the Congolese transition and, if necessary, facilitate mediation of electoral and other disputes among

Congolese leaders

The Center provided an impartial and

independent assessment of the 2006 electoral process through the deployment of long-term observers (LTOs) from

April to September and organized a 60-

8 person international delegation for the

July 30 elections. As a result of logistical

and transport challenges in the DRC, the

Center deployed most of the delegation

for approximately one month rather than the 10-day deployment associated with typical observation delegations. A limited number of short-term observers arrived several days before the election for deployment in the Kinshasa area.

The delegation included political

leaders, electoral and country specialists, representatives from civil society groups, election authorities, and others.

Building on the pre-election efforts of

the LTOs the observer delegation achieved good geographic coverage across the country and coordinated its deployment with other international and domestic observer groups.

The Center maintained a postelection

presence to observe vote counting, tabulation, the announcement of results, and the processing of electoral complaints. The Center organized a second 60-person international delegation for the presidential runoff election on Oct. 29, 2006. Upon arrival in Kinshasa, all Carter Center observers were briefed on the political situation in the DRC and received orientation on specific aspects of election observation, including the use of checklists, deployment logistics, reporting requirements, and security guidelines.

Based on established methodology, the

Center deployed observers in teams of

two. Owing to the logistical challenges infrastructure, air and ground transport was often unreliable, expensive, and subject to frequent delays or breakdowns. The demanding conditions of multiple deployments by each LTO team to different areas of the country proved challenging. LTOs visited most parts of the country, including Kikwit in

Bandundu province, Mbandaka in

Equateur province, and Lubumbashi in

Katanga province. Subsequent

deployments covered Bukavu,

Kisangani, Gemena, Uvira, Mbuji Mayi,

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