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Afghanistan opium survey 2015

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Afghanistan MARCH 2016

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https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/Afghan_opiate_trafficking_southern_route_web.pdf

Afghanistan

Opium Survey 2015

Socio-economic analysis

Vienna International Centre, PO Box 500, 1400 Vienna, Austria Tel.: (+43-1) 26060-0, Fax: (+43-1) 26060-5866, www.unodc.org

AFGHANISTAN OPIUM SURVEY 2015

MARCH 2016

Banayee Bus Station, Jalalabad Main Road

9th District, Kabul, Afghanistan

Tel.: (+93) 799891851, www.mcn.gov.af

Research

Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

Ministry of Counter NarcoticsIslamic Republic of AfghanistanMinistry of Counter Narcotics

MCN/NSDNarcotics Survey Directorate

Afghanistan Opium Survey 2015: Socio-economic Analysis 1

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The Afghanistan Opium Survey 2015 was prepared by the Research and Trend Analysis Branch (RAB), Division for Policy Analysis and Public Affairs (DPA), United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, under the supervision of Jean-Luc Lemahieu, Director of DPA and Angela Me, Chief of RAB. The following organizations and individuals contributed to the implementation of the Afghanistan Opium Survey and to the preparation of this report:

Ministry of Counter-Narcotics

Prof. Salamat Azimi (Minister), Javid Ahmad Qaem (Deputy Minister Policy and Coordination), Mohammad Osman Frotan (Director General Policy and Planning), Sayed Najibullah Ahmadi (Acting Director of Narcotics Survey Directorate), Humayon Faizzad (Provincial Affairs Director), Saraj Ahmad (Deputy Director of Narcotics Survey Directorate), Nasir Ahmad Karimi (Deputy Director of Narcotics Survey Directorate) Mohammad Ajmal Sultani (Statistical Data Analyst), Mohammad Hakim Hayat (GIS & Remote sensing analyst ), Shabir Ahmad Taieb (GIS & Remote Sensing Analyst), Sayed Shahenshah Sadat (Quality Control and Digit Specialist), Ahmad Mustafa Safi (Database Analysis & Statistics Member), Najeem Alcozai (Database Analysis & Statistics Member), Karimdad Qadari (Database Analysis & Statistics Member) and

Hamida Hussaini (Administrative Officer).

Survey Coordinators: Sayed Eshaq Masumi (Central Region), Abdul Latif Ehsan (Western Region), Fida Mohammad (Northern Region), Mohammed Ishaq Anderabi (North-Eastern Region), Khalil Ahmad Noori (Southern Region), Abdullah Jan Daudkhail (Eastern Region).

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (Kabul)

Andrey Avetisyan (Regional Representative), Mark Colhoun (Deputy Representative), Devashish Dhar (International Project Coordinator), Abdul Manan Ahmadzai (Senior Survey Officer), Noor

Mohammad Sadiq (Database Developer).

Remote Sensing Analysts: Ahmad Jawid Ghiasee and Sayed Mehdi Sadat. Ziaulhaq Sidiqi (GIS

Associate), Asia Noory (Project Associate).

Survey Coordinators: Abdul Basir Basiret (Eastern Region), Sayd Ghawash Nayer (Western

Region), Rahimullah Omar (Central Region).

Provincial Coordinators: Mohammad Alam Ghalib (Eastern Region), Lutfurhaman Lutfi (Northern Region).

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (Vienna)

Chloé Carpentier (Chief, Statistics and Surveys Section), Coen Bussink (Programme Officer), Jaqueline Garcia-Yi (Research Officer), Irmgard Zeiler (Statistician). The implementation of the survey would not have been possible without the dedicated work of the field surveyors, who often faced difficult security conditions. The MCN/UNODC Illicit Crop Monitoring activities in Afghanistan were made possible by financial contributions from the Governments of Germany, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America. Afghanistan Opium Survey 2015: Socio-economic Analysis 2

Contents

Fact Sheet Afghanistan Opium Survey 2015 ........................................................... 3

1Executive Summary ............................................................................................ 6

2Introduction ....................................................................................................... 12

3The opiate economy in Afghanistan 2015 ....................................................... 13

3.1Value of the opiate economy 2015 ............................................................... 13

3.2Trend analysis .............................................................................................. 16

4Opium-poppy farmers in 2015: livelihood strategies and implications for

alternative development .......................................................................................... 22

4.1Who were the opium-poppy farmers in Afghanistan in 2015? ...................... 22

4.2To what extent did farmers depend on opium-poppy income in Afghanistan

in 2015? .................................................................................................................. 27

4.3What were the risks and vulnerabilities that prevented farmers from ceasing

opium-poppy cultivation in Afghanistan in 2015? ................................................... 42

4.4Summary and conclusions ........................................................................... 49

5Women's perspective on opium cultivation: attitudes, perceptions and

practices ................................................................................................................... 51

5.1Women's view on motivation for initiating and continuing opium poppy

cultivation ................................................................................................................ 52

5.2Women's awareness of the illicit nature of poppy ........................................ 52

5.3Participation in decision-making on opium cultivation and household

expenditure ............................................................................................................. 53

5.4Women's labour in opium poppy cultivation ................................................. 53

5.5Medicinal use of opium in rural households ................................................. 53

5.6Multiple uses of opium poppy ....................................................................... 54

5.7Summary and conclusions ........................................................................... 54

6

Outlook for new research ................................................................................. 56

6.1Understanding land use dynamics and crop rotation used by opium poppy

farmers .................................................................................................................... 56

6.2Cultivation of opium poppy as summer crop ................................................ 58

7Methodology ...................................................................................................... 60

7.1Village survey methodology ......................................................................... 60

7.2Average farm-gate price and farm-gate value of opium production ............. 61

7.3Estimating the value of the Afghan opiate economy .................................... 62

7.4Adjusting for inflation .................................................................................... 65

Afghanistan Opium Survey 2015: Socio-economic Analysis 3

Fact Sheet Afghanistan Opium Survey 2015

1 2014

Change from

2014
2015

Net opium poppy cultivation (after

eradication) 224,000 ha (200,000 - 250,500) -19% 183,000 ha (163,000 - 202,000)

Eradication 2,692 ha +40% 3,760 ha

Average opium yield (weighted by

cultivation) 28.7 kg/ha -36% 18.3 kg/ha

Potential production of opium

2

6,400 mt

(5,100 - 7,800) -48% 3,300 mt (2,700 - 3,900)

Average farm-gate price (weighted by

production) of dry opium at harvest time US$ 133/kg +29% US$ 171/kg

Farmers' gross income

3 from opium per hectare US$ 3,800 -18% US$ 3,100 GDP 4

US$ 21.2 billion -1% US$ 21.0 billion

Total farm-gate value of opium production US$ 0.85 billion -33% US$ 0.57 billion

In % of GDP 4% 3%

Potential gross value of opiates 2.84 billion

(2.3-3.2 billion) -45% 1.56 billion (1.2-2.2 billion)

In % of GDP 13.4% 7.4%

Potential net value of opiates 2.68 billion

(2.3-2.9 billion) -44% 1.49 billion (1-2.1 billion)

In % of GDP 12.6% 7.1%

1 Numbers in brackets indicate the upper and lower bounds of the estimation range. 2

Refers to oven-dry opium.

3

Income figures are indicative only as they do not include all expenditure and income components associated with opium

cultivation. 4

Relation to nominal GDP of the respective year. Source: Government of Afghanistan, Central Statistical Office. Figures for

2015 refer to the Solar Year 2014/2015 (1393).

Afghanistan Opium Survey 2015: Socio-economic Analysis 4 Afghanistan Opium Survey 2015: Socio-economic Analysis 5 Regional opium poppy cultivation and production change in Afghanistan, 2014 2015
Afghanistan Opium Survey 2015: Socio-economic Analysis 6

1 Executive Summary

Afghanistan enters an important phase in its modern history with the completion of the Transition (Inteqal) Process at the end of 2014 and the initiation of the Transformation Decade (2015-2024). This coincided with the inauguration of the new President of Afghanistan on 29 September 2014 as well as the establishment of a National Unity Government (NUG). The Government has stated that it is focusing on rebuilding the country and strengthening the foundations of sustainable peace and development and constitutional democracy. Priorities for Afghanistan for the Transformation Decade were identified in an important development strategic policy document 5 , with the goal of improving security and political stability, stabilizing the economy, advancing good governance, and promoting the rule of law and respect for human rights, particularly in relation to women and girls. An understanding of the impact that opium cultivation, processing and trafficking have in Afghanistan, particularly in certain provinces, is a prerequisite for guiding such policies. Afghanistan is the world's largest producer of illicit opium and heroin. For the past decade, the

country has accounted for an estimated 80 percent of global illicit opiates. The significant levels of

poppy cultivation and illicit trafficking of opiates have created multiple challenges for

Afghanistan, as it has fuelled instability, insurgency and terrorist groups, and drug consumption. It

has also made some rural communities economically dependent on the illicit market and prevents the implementation of sustainable social and economic development plans. The interconnected objectives of drug control, livelihoods, and security are challenging in a country like Afghanistan which is the poorest country in South Asia with over 30% of the population living below the poverty line. Many Afghans depend on the opium economy and are engaged in cultivation, labour on poppy fields or the illicit drug trade. The combination of insecurity, underdevelopment, weak governance, and illicit drug production and use has created a highly unstable environment in many communities.

There is also a shared international

responsibility for the opiate problem in Afghanistan with hundreds of metric tons of precursor chemicals being diverted from licit international markets and being smuggled into the country each year and billions of dollars made from onwards trafficking from Afghanistan to major consumer markets for example in Europe. This report, which is one of the outputs of the Afghanistan Opium Survey 2015, focuses on the analysis of the opiate economy in Afghanistan and the factors and determinants driving opium poppy cultivation. It looks at opium poppy cultivation from both an economic and social point of view, including information on household income, value of the country's opiate economy, and factors that influence opium poppy cultivation. The aim of the report is to provide evidence to support drug and development policies in Afghanistan. Opium poppy cultivation decreased by 19% in 2015 and opium harvest was at its lowest since the Taliban: a turning point? In 2015, the total area under opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan was estimated at 183,000 hectares, a 19% decrease from the previous year. All three main opium-poppy-cultivating regions saw a decrease in poppy-cultivation levels, with the largest relative decrease being in the Eastern region (-40%; mainly driven by decreases in Nangarhar), followed by the Southern (-20%) and Western (-10%) regions. There is ample evidence to support these decreases but it should be noted that part of these changes have been the result of an improved methodology. 6 The reduction in opium production was even more drastic. Potential opium production was estimated at 3,300 tons in 2015 (-48% from 2014), which is the lowest level since the Taliban opium ban in 2001. The low production is a result of a reduction in area under cultivation, but more importantly of a reduction in opium yield per hectare, which amounted to an unprecedented low 18.3 kilograms per hectare. 5 6 For details see MCN/UNODC 2015. "Afghanistan opium survey 2015 - Cultivation and Production". Afghanistan Opium Survey 2015: Socio-economic Analysis 7 With the multitude of possible reasons for changes in area under cultivation and the complexity of the factors driving opium poppy cultivation, the present reduction of cultivation cannot be related to a single factor or policy measure. Possible explanations may relate to the current economic profitability of opium. Opium poppy cultivation, as lucrative as it is, is costly. Harvest is labour intensive and requires paying lancers. In desert areas, poppies have to be irrigated, often by using irrigation pumps which need costly fuel to function. In the South, where most of the poppy is cultivated, farmers irrigate more often than in other regions and reported expenses for irrigation (US$ 132) are more than twice as high as in the West (US$ 47.3) and East (US$ 47.7). In times of high prices and good harvests, investments in making land arable and maintaining fields under unfavourable conditions were profitable. In the past four years, however, yields in the Southern and Western regions were below national average. In 2015, yields in these regions averaged at about 16 kilogrammes per hectare, a record low since the beginning of systematic yield surveys in 2006 (for comparison, in 2015 yields reached up to 41.5 kilogrammes per hectare in the Central and North-eastern regions, which is a level comparable to the nation-wide averages of 2008 or 2011). Four moderate to poor harvests in a row, together with moderate prices, may have led to a situation where making new land arable and keeping high-maintenance fields have become not highly profitable anymore. This explanation is supported also by the 38% of all farmers who named agronomic and ecological reasons (for example poppy diseases or bad yields) for choosing not to cultivate poppy in 2015. The climatic conditions, such as lack of water or soil degradation, that have affected yields in the South and West might have directly reduced land available for opium poppy cultivation. In Nimroz province, for example the land available for agriculture in general reduced by 19% between 2014 and 2015, which directly affected the area available for opium poppy cultivation. MCN/UNODC analysis have shown that in Nimroz and Farah provinces, more than 40% of the

2014 poppy fields were left fallow in 2015 indicating a large number of abandoned poppy fields.

This share was lower but still relevant in Hilmand (17%) and Kandahar (30%). Opium poppy cultivation thus may have reached a 'natural exploitation' peak in the main poppy cultivating provinces in 2014 or may have even exceeded it, providing a possible explanation for the poppy cultivation decrease in the Southern and Western regions. With this assumption, there is

a risk of an inner Afghan shift of cultivation. If conditions in the main poppy cultivating provinces

continue to deteriorate, cultivation might move to other provinces, where agriculture conditions are favourable. The increases in the Central and Northern regions, which coincided with a deterioration of the security situation, might foreshadow such a development which needs close monitoring and appropriate action to avoid cultivation from spreading. Reduced income from poppy cultivation has increased the vulnerability of farming households The farm-gate value of opium (US$ 0.57 billion), an important measure of the income generated in rural communities by the cultivation and harvesting of opium, decreased by 33% in 2015 to its lowest level since 2009 (US$ 0.25 billion; not adjusted for inflation). Per-hectare income from opium (gross) decreased to US$ 3,100 in 2015 (18% less than its 2014 value US$ 3,800), and was at its lowest levels since 2002 even without adjustment for inflation. In terms of purchasing power, opium poppy was significantly less profitable in 2015 than it was in the past 14 years. This brought a considerable reduction in income for households engaged in opium cultivation as sale of poppy and derivatives accounted for 40% of their annual income. The reduction of income from poppy went together with a general deterioration of economic conditions in rural Afghanistan. In 2015, all four daily wages monitored in rural communities (labour in construction, poppy lancing, poppy weeding and wheat harvesting) decreased from their

2014 levels by 1% to 21%. The largest reduction was observed for poppy lancing/gum collection,

which can be explained by a reduced demand due to reduced area under cultivation. On average, many if not most Afghan farmers live below the poverty line and a further reduction of disposable income can lead to a worrying deterioration of the socio-economic situation of rural Afghanistan Opium Survey 2015: Socio-economic Analysis 8 communities, regardless of their involvement in poppy cultivation. This is a precarious situation that may be taken advantage of by insurgent groups and may drive farmers to further rely on illicit activities - or to become migrant workers abroad, which would further weaken local rural communities. Opium poppy farming as part of the livelihood strategies of farmers Opium poppy cultivation is one of the options a farming household has to support its livelihood. With the changing needs and opportunities of a household, the decision to cultivate poppy can change from one year to the next. An absolute divide of farmers into poppy and non-poppy growers is an oversimplification: a farmer might cultivate opium poppy in one year and abstain from it in the next year - depending on the fluctuating economic needs and opportunities. In 2015, only 50% of all interviewed poppy farmers had cultivated opium poppy for five consecutive years (from 2011 to 2015). The vast majority of farmers (82%) had cultivated for three consecutive years (from 2013 to 2015); 9% took breaks in cultivation, and another 9% could be classified as newcomers/re-starters, as they cultivated in 2014 and 2015 only. Afghan farmers cultivated licit and illicit crops under a variety of land tenure modalities. Besides cultivating crops in their own land, they cultivated crops in rented land (land tenancy), and used land and returned a share of the crops produced on this land as payment to the owner (sharecropping). Different tenure arrangements may have allowed farmers in the Northern region to increase their areas under poppy cultivation since only 34% of the continuous poppy farmers there used exclusively their own land for cultivating crops. Economic needs and lack of alternatives as driving force of cultivation The decision to cultivate opium poppy in a given year is determined by a variety of factors. Most of the poppy growers in 2015 (71%) named economic reasons as major influencing factor for poppy cultivation (e.g., not enough income from other crops, poverty) and 28% suggested similar income-related reasons, but framed them under agronomic and ecological reasons such as good yield from poppy production or favourable ecological conditions for poppy cultivation. However, 38% of farmers who discontinued cultivation in 2015 also named agronomic and ecological conditions (e.g., poppy pests, diseases and bad yields) as reasons for their decision, which also shows how poppy cultivation may not be a highly profitable cash crop anymore. The majority of farmers who discontinued cultivation or who had never cultivated opium poppy named religious beliefs (54 and 84% of respondents, respectively) as reasons. Most of the farmers who discontinued poppy cultivation reported that they replaced the income from opium poppy with income from other crops. Mostly with wheat (50% of farmers) or vegetables (42%), but cannabis was also used as replacement (12% of famers), but mostly in the Southern and Central regions. Other sources of income than crops included livestock (5% of famers), daily wages (4% of farmers), or shop keeping (4% of farmers). Remittances replaced poppy income for only 3% of the farmers. If income from poppy were excluded, the livelihood strategies of poppy farmers in 2015 resembled the livelihood strategies of farmers who abstained from cultivation in terms of number of income-generating activities. Moreover, overall household income was similar across all farmers regardless of their involvement in opium cultivation. A note-worthy difference, however, was a significant lower proportion of poppy farmers benefitting from other crops and salaried labour. Opium poppy cultivation was associated with a lack of market access and low wages along with low agricultural assistance, no exposure to awareness campaigns, absence of access to basic facilities (boy and girl schools, medical clinics and electricity), and high levels of insecurity. In many cases farmers' dependency on poppy cultivation does not seem to be related to the income from poppy sales per se, but to the lack of continuous, reliable and sustainable market access to sell alternative products, and to the overall development of their villages in terms of social and economic opportunities, governance and security. Afghanistan Opium Survey 2015: Socio-economic Analysis 9 This has important policy implications as the mere substitution of opium with other crops (through projects which provide for example improved wheat seeds) is not a sustainable solution. Alternative development interventions need to support alternative livelihoods which are tailored to specific local needs and circumstances. Access to markets is a fundamental component of a diversified alternative development policy, but other issues need equal attention such as off-farm job opportunities, development of physical and social infrastructure and a strategy to reduce crisis and conflict.

Women's perspective on opium poppy cultivation

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