[PDF] National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and

View - Download National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and

Previous PDF

Next PDF

ii

Deepwater Horizon

Jason Anderson

Aaron Dale Burkeen

Donald Clark

Stephen Curtis

Gordon Jones

Roy Wyatt Kemp

Karl Dale Kleppinger, Jr.

Blair Manuel

Dewey Revette

Shane Roshto

Adam Weise

Dedication

ii We wish to acknowledge the many individuals and organizations, government officials and agencies alike that offered their views and insights to the Commission. We would especially like to express our gratitude to the Coast Guard's Incident Specific Preparedness Review (ISPR) for allowing Commission staff to participate in its inter views and discussions, which was invaluable to the preparation of this report. (A copy of the Coast Guard's ISPR report can be found at the Commission's website at www.oilspillcommission. gov). We would also like to thank Chevron for performing the cement tests that proved so critical to our investigation into the Macondo well blowout. We also thank the Department of Energy, which served as our supporting agency, and all of the Department employees whose assistance was so essential to the success and functioning of the Commission. In particular, we would like to thank Christopher Smith, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Oil and Natural Gas, who acted as the Commission's Designated Federal Officer, as well as Elena Melchert, Petroleum Engineer in the Office of Oil and Gas Resource Conservation, who served as the Committee Manager. But most importantly, we are deeply grateful to the citizens of the Gulf who shared their personal experiences as Commissioners traveled in the region, providing a critical human dimension to the disaster and to our undertaking, as well as the many pe ople who testified at the Commission's hearings, provided public comments, and submitted statements to our website. Together, these contributions greatly informed our work and led to a better report. Thank you one and all.

Copyright, Restrictions, and Permissions Notice

Except as noted herein, materials contained in this report are in the public domain. Public domain information may be freely distributed and copied. However, this report contains illustrations, photographs, and other information contributed by or licensed from private individuals, companies, or organizations that may be protected by U.S. and/or foreign copyright laws. Transmission or

reproduction of items protected by copyright may require the written permission of the copyright owner.

When using material or images from this report we ask that you credit this report, as well as the source

of the material as indicated in this report.] Permission to use materials copyrighted by other individuals,

companies or organizations must be obtained directly from those sources. This report contains links to many Web sites. Once you access another site through a link that we provide, you are subject to the use, copyright and licensing restrictions of that site. Neither the Government nor the National Commission on the BP/Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling

(Commission) endorses any of the organizations or views represented by the linked sites unless expressly

stated in the report. The Government and the Commission take no responsibility for, and exercise no control over, the content, accuracy or accessibility of the material contained on th e linked sites. iiiiii

Deep Water

National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon

Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling

January 2011

iv

Bob Graham, Co-Chair

Cherry A. Murray

Donald F. Boesch

Fran Ulmer

Frances Beinecke

William K. Reilly, Co-Chair

Terry D. Garcia

vv

Foreword

PART I: The Path to Tragedy

Chapter 1

“Everyone involved with the job...was completely satisfied...." The Deepwater Horizon, the Macondo Well, and Sudden Death on the Gulf of Mexico

Chapter 2

“Each oil well has its own personality"

The History of Offshore Oil and Gas in the United States

Chapter 3

“It was like pulling teeth."

Oversight—and Oversights—in Regulating

Deepwater Energy Exploration and Production in the Gulf of Me xico

PART II: Explosion and Aftermath:

The Causes and Consequences of the Disaster

Chapter 4

“But, who cares, it's done, end of story, [we] will probably be fine and we'll get a good cement job."

The Macondo Well and the Blowout

Chapter 5

“You're in it now, up to your neck!"

Response and Containment

Chapter 6

“The worst environmental disaster America has ever faced."

Oiling a Rich Environment: Impacts and Assessment

Chapter 7

“People have plan fatigue . . . they've been planned to death"

Recovery and Restoration

PART III: Lessons Learned:

Industry, Gover

nment, Energy Policy

Chapter 8

“Safety is not proprietary."

Changing Business as Usual

Chapter 9

“Develop options for guarding against, and mitigating the impact of, oil spills associated with offshore drilling." Investing in Safety, Investing in R esponse, Investing in the Gulf

Chapter 10

American Energy Policy and the Future of Offshore Drilling

Endnotes

Appendices

Appendix A: Commission Members

Appendix B: List of Acronyms

Appendix C: Executive Order

Appendix D: Commission Staff and Consultants

Appendix E: List of Commission Meetings

Appendix F: List of Staff Working Papers

Index vi xiii 1 21
55
87
89
129
173
197
215
217
249
293
307
356
358
359
362
365
366
368
vi

The explosion that tore through the

Deepwater Horizon

drilling rig last April 20, as the rig's crew completed drilling the exploratory Macondo well deep under the waters of the Gulf of Mexico, began a human, economic, and environmental disaster. Eleven crew members died, and others were seriously injured, as fire engulfed and ultimately destroyed the rig. And, although the nation would not know the full scope of the disaster for weeks, the first of more than four million barrels of oil began gushing uncontrolled into the Gulf—threatening livelihoods, precious habitats, and even a unique way of life. A treasured American landscape, already battered and degraded from years of mismanagement, faced yet another blow as the oil spread and washed ashore. Five years after Hurricane Katrina, the nation was again transfixed, seemingly helpless, as this new tragedy unfolded in the Gulf.

The costs from this one industrial accident ar

e not yet fully counted, but it is already clear that the impacts on the region's natural systems and people were enormous, and that economic losses total tens of billions of dollars. On May 22, 2010, President Barack Obama announced the creation of the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling: an independent, nonpartisan entity, directed to provide a thorough analysis and impartial judgment. The President charged the Commission to determine the causes of the disaster, and to improve the country's ability to respond to spills, and to recommend reforms to make offshore energy production safer. And the President said we were to follow the facts wherever they led. This report is the result of an intense six-month effort to fulfill the President's charge. viivii

Deepwater Horizon

Deepwater Horizon

viii “Complex Systems Almost Always Fail in Complex Ways"

Deepwater Horizon

Deepwater Horizon

ixix

Deepwater Horizon

Deepwater Horizon

Deepwater

Horizon

Exxon Valdez

*The chief counsel's investigation was no doubt complicated by the la ck of subpoena power. Nonetheless, Chief Counsel Bartlit did an extraordinary job building t he record and interpreting what he learned. He used his considerable powers of persuasion along with other tools at his disposal to engage the invo lved companies in constructive and informative exchanges. x

The Deepwater Drilling Prospect

Deepwater Horizon

xixi

The Commission and Its Work

Deepwater Horizon

Deepwater Horizon

xii

Our Thanks and Dedication

Deepwater Horizon

xiiixiii

Part I

The Path to Tragedy

On April 20, 2010, the 126 workers on the BP

Deepwater Horizon

were going about the routines of completing an exploratory oil well—unaware of impending disaster. What unfolded would have unknown impacts shaped by the Gulf region's distinctive cultures, institutions, and geography—and by economic forces resulting from the unique coexistence of energy resources, bountiful fisheries and wildlife, and coastal tourism. The oil and gas industry, long lured by Gulf reserves and public incentives, progressively developed and deployed new technologies, at ever-larger scales, in pursuit of valuable energy supplies in increasingly deeper waters farther from the coastline. Regulators, however, failed to keep pace with the industrial expansion and new technology—often because of industry's resistance to more effective oversight. The result was a serious, and ultimately inexcusable, shortfall in supervision of offshore drilling that played out in the Macondo well blowout and the catastrophic oil spill that followed. Chapters 1 through 3 describe the interplay of private industry and public oversight in the distinctive Gulf deepwater context: the conditions that governed the deployment of the

Deepwater Horizon

and the drilling of the Macondo well. xiii

Chapter One

The Deepwater Horizon, the

Macondo Well, and Sudden Death

on the Gulf of Mexico

At 5:45 a.m. on Tuesday, April 20, 2010, a

Halliburton Company cementing engineer sent

an e-mail from the rig

Deepwater Horizon, in

the Gulf of Mexico off the Louisiana coast, to his colleague in Houston. He had good news: “We have completed the job and it went well." 1 Outside in the Gulf, it was still dark—beyond the glare of the floodlights on the gargantuan rig, the four decks of which towered above the blue-green water on four huge white columns, all floating on massive pontoons. The oil derrick rose over 20 stories above the top deck. Up on the bridge on the main deck, two officers monitored the satellite- guided dynamic positioning system, controlling thrusters so powerful that they could keep the

33,000-ton

Deepwater Horizon centered over a well

even in high seas. The rig's industrial hum and loud mechanical noises punctuated the sea air as a slight breeze blew in off the water. The crew worked on

Chapter One

Pride of the Transocean fleet of offshore drilling rigs, Deepwater Horizon rides calmly on station 40 miles off the Louisiana coast. The $560-million-dol lar rig, under lease to BP, was putting the finishing touches on the oil company"s

18,000-foot-deep Macondo well when it blew out and escaping methane gas

exploded. Eleven workers died in the inferno. According to the governmen t"s estimates, by the time the well was sealed months later, over 4 million barrels of oil had spilled into the Gulf.

Photo courtesy of Transocean

National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore D rilling the well bore, aiming always to keep the pressure inside the well balancing the force exerted by the surrounding seabed. 2 By the time the Halliburton engineer had arrived at the rig four days earlier to help cement in the two-and-a-half-mile-deep Macondo well, some crew members had dubbed it “the well from hell." 3 Macondo was not the first well to earn that nickname; 4 like many deepwater wells, it had proved complicated and challenging. As they drilled, the engineers had to modify plans in response to their increasing knowledge of the precise features of the geologic formations thousands of feet below. Deepwater drilling is an unavoidably tough, demanding job, requiring tremendous engineering expertise. BP drilling engineer Brian Morel, who had designed the Macondo well with other BP engineers including Mark Hafle, was also on board to observe the final stages of work at the well. 5 In an April 14 e-mail, Morel had lamented to his colleagues, “this has been [a] nightmare well which has everyone all over the place." 6

BP and its corporate partners on

the well, Anadarko Petroleum and MOEX USA, had, according to government reports, budgeted $96.2 million and 51 days of work to drill the Macondo well in

Mississippi

Canyon Block 252.

7 They discovered a large reservoir of oil and gas, but drilling had been challenging. As of April 20, BP and the Macondo well were almost six weeks behind schedule and more than $58 million over budget. 8 The Deepwater Horizon was not originally meant to drill

Macondo. Another giant rig, the

Marianas, had initiated work on the well the previous

October.

9 Drilling had reached more than 9,000 feet below the ocean surface (4,000 feet below the seabed), with another 9,000 feet to go to “pay zone" ( the oil and gas reservoir), when Hurricane Ida so battered the rig on November 9 that it had to be towed in for repair. Both Marianas and Deepwater Horizon were semisubmersible rigs owned by Transocean, founded in Louisiana in 1919 as Danciger Oil & Refining Co. and now the world's largest contractor of offshore drilling rigs. 10 In 2009, Transocean's global fleet produced revenues of $11.6 billion. 11 Transocean had consolidated its dominant position in the industry in November 2007 by merging with rival GlobalSantaFe. 12

Deepwater Horizon, built for $350 million,

13 was seen as the outstanding rig in Transocean's fleet; leasing its services reportedly cost as much as $1 million per day. Since Deepwater Horizon's 2001 maiden voyage to the Gulf, it had been under contract to London-based BP (formerly known as British Petroleum). By 2010, after numerous acquisitions, BP had become the world's fourth-largest corporation (based on revenue) 14 producing more than 4 million barrels of oil daily from 30 countries.* Ten percent of BP's output came from the Gulf of Mexico, where BP America (headquartered in Houston) was the largest producer. But BP had a tarnished reputation for safety. Among other BP accidents, 15 workers died in a 2005 explosion at its Texas City, Texas, refinery; in 2006, there was a major oil spill from a badly corroded BP pipeline in Alaska. *A barrel equals 42 gallons. National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore D rillingChapter One Deepwater Horizon had arrived at the Macondo lease site on January 31, at 2:15 p.m. It was 55 degrees, chilly and clear—the night of a full moon. About 126 people were aboard: approximately 80 Transocean employees, a few BP men, cafeteria and laundry workers, and a changing group of workers contracted for specialized jobs. Depending on the status of the well, these might include Halliburton cementers, mud loggers from Sperry Sun (a Halliburton subsidiary), mud engineers from M-I SWACO (a subsidiary of Schlumberger, an international oilfield services provider), remotely operated vehicle technicians from Oceaneering, or tank cleaners and technicians from the OCS Group. The offices and living quarters were on the two bottom decks of the rig. Helicopters flew in and out regularly with workers and supplies, landing on the top-deck helipad, and service ships made regular visits.

At its new Macondo assignment,

Deepwater Horizon floated in 4,992 feet of water just beyond the gentle slope of the continental shelf in the Mississippi Cany on. 15

The seabed

far below was near-freezing, visible to the crew only via cameras mounted on the rig's subsea remotely operated vehicle. Another two and a half miles below the seabed was the prize BP sought: a large reservoir of oil and gas from the Middle Miocene era trapped in a porous rock formation at temperatures exceeding 200 degrees. 16

These deepwater

hydrocarbon fields, buried far below the seabed—not just in the Gulf, but in other oil-rich zones around the world, too—were the brave new oil frontier. The size of some deepwater fields was so huge that the oil industry had nicknamed those with a bill ion barrels or more

“elephants."

17 Drilling for oil had always been hard, dirty, dangerous work, combining heavy machinery and volatile hydrocarbons extracted at high pressures. Since 2001, the Gulf of Mexico workforce—35,000 people, working on 90 big drilling rigs and 3,500 production platforms—had suffered 1,550 injuries, 60 deaths, and 948 fires and explosions.quotesdbs_dbs48.pdfusesText_48

[PDF] alsa marrakech carte bus etudiant pdf

[PDF] altadis france distribution

[PDF] alternance 1981 definition

[PDF] alternance bac 3

[PDF] alternance bac+3 gestion

[PDF] alternance bordeaux

[PDF] alternance codique arabe/français

[PDF] alternance codique définition

[PDF] alternance codique en sociolinguistique pdf

[PDF] alternance codique pdf

[PDF] alternance comptabilité bac+3

[PDF] alternance ile de france

[PDF] alternance politique 5eme republique

[PDF] alternance politique def

[PDF] altice