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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

EYVINE HEARN and NASHALA

HEARN, a minor, suing through her

next friend, EYVINE HEARN,

Plaintiffs,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Intervenor,

v.

MUSKOGEE PUBLIC SCHOOL

DISTRICT 020; et al.,

Defendants.

C.A. No.: CIV 03-598-S

____________________________________)

UNITED STATES' MEMORANDUM OF LAW

IN SUPPORT OF ITS CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT At issue in this case is whether a school district can bar a Muslim student from wearing a religious headscarf, known as a hijab, under the district's dress cod e. As a matter of equal protection, free exercise of religion, and free speec h, the school district cannot do so because the undisputed facts show: (1) the dress code is not a generally applicable policy, and the distr ict has reserved for itself the right to make exceptions to the dress code on a case-by-case basis, and in fact has permitted other students to wear head coverings for various non-religious re asons; (2) Nashala has worn her hijab throughout the 2003-2004 school year without any material disruption; (3) the district permitted Nashala to wear her hijab until September 11, 2003; and (4) the district permits non-Muslim students to wear religious clothing and accessories. Thus, the United States moves for summary judgment on its Fourteenth Amendment claim, and opposes

Defendants' motion for summary judgment.

STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS

1

The Parties

1. Defendant Muskogee Public School District, Independent School District No. I-20

of Muskogee County, Oklahoma ("district"), is a public school district created and existing

2. Individual defendants are administrators employed by the district and are sued in their

3. Plaintiff Nashala Hearn is a sixth grade student at Benjamin Franklin Science Academy

4. Plaintiff Eyvine Hearn is Nashala's father. (Id.)

5. The United States is a plaintiff-intervenor. (Minute Order (Apr. 12, 2004).)

Defendants' Dress Code Policy

6. The district has adopted a dress code policy for Franklin and other ele

mentary schools which states, in relevant part, "[s]tudents shall not wear . . . hats , caps, bandannas, plastic caps, or hoods on jackets inside the building . . . ." (Defs. Br., Ex. A at 4.)

7. The dress code does not state that hijabs are prohibited. (Id.)

8. The dress code does not provide for exceptions for religious garb. (Id.)

9. The purposes of the dress code are to preserve safety and discipline at

the school and to Gleichman Dep. 67:22-70:21, 76:16-77:25 (Ex. 2); Pls.' Response to Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J., 1 The United States' Response to Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Material Facts is attached as Exhibit 1. 2 [hereinafter N. Hearn Aff.].)

10. The district's dress code gives principals discretion to interpret particular provisions and

to make exceptions for students on a case-by-case basis. (Hallum Dep. 53:8-54:8 (Ex. 3).)

11. The district has in the past granted, and would grant in the future, exc

eptions to the dress code for head coverings for students with medical problems resulting in hair loss, in recognition that such students may want to do so to deflect attention away from themselves. (Letter from Hayes to Kassabian of 12/9/03, at 2 [hereinafter Hayes Ltr.] 2 (Ex. 4); Gleichman Dep. 60:20-

61:13; (Defs. Br. at 19).)

12. The district reserves the right to make exceptions to the policy in order to respond to

exigencies that arise from time to time. (Defs. Br. at 19.)

13. The district has granted exceptions to the dress code for costumes worn during school

plays held in school buildings. (Gleichman Dep. 59:15-60:19; Hallum Dep. 31:18-32:2.)

14. The district has granted exceptions to the dress code to permit students to wear

"Cat in the Hat" hats in school buildings on Dr. Seuss's birthday during Read Across America Week. (Hallum Dep. 32:3-32:11; Gleichman Dep. 59:18-60:19.)

15. The district has permitted students to wear hats in school buildings during "hat days"

in

16. The district has permitted students to wear head coverings on Halloween. (Gleichman

Dep. 61:14-61:22.)

Nashala's Religious Practice

2 The Hayes Letter also is attached as Exhibit A to Defendants' Respon se to the United States' Motion to Intervene and Memorandum of Law in Support of that Motion to Intervene. 3

18. Adherents of the Islamic faith, known as Muslims, share a belief in Allah as the sole

deity

620-21 (10th ed. 1993).)

19. As a demonstration of modesty and respect for Allah, Muslim girls and women wear

head

3, 4; The Institute of Islamic Information and Education,

The Question of Hijab: Suppression or

Liberation?, at www.iiie.net/Brochures/Brochure-23.html [hereinafter "III&E website"] 3 (Ex. 5).)

Interpreting Veils, (2001), at

http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/news/nation-world/crisis/theregion/veils.html (Ex. 6).)

21. In June 2003, Nashala began wearing a hijab as part of her Muslim faith. (E. Hearn Aff.

3.) 3 "[A] district court may utilize the doctrines underlying judicial notice in hearing a motion for summary judgment substantially as they would be utilized at trial. Thus, a court may consider stipulations, concessions of counsel, transcripts, exhibits and other papers . . . ." St. Louis Baptist Temple v. FDIC, 605 F.2d 1169, 1171-72 (10th Cir. 1979) (citations omitted). The Court may also take judicial notice of information in the public record.

See, e.g., Laborers'

Pension Fund v. Blackmore Sewer Constr., 298 F.3d 600, 607-08 (7th Cir. 2002) (taking judicial notice of website); Ieradi v. Mylan Labs., 230 F.3d 594, 598 n.2 (3d Cir. 2000) (taking judicial notice of newspaper article). 4

22. Nashala has worn a hijab every day that she has been permitted to attend Franklin. (N.

23. At all times while attending Franklin, Nashala has worn a hijab that leaves her fa

ce

The District's Reaction to Nashala's Hijab

24. In August 2003, Eyvine Hearn advised Diane Walker, Nashala's home room teacher, that

25. Walker informed Mr. Hearn that Nashala would be permitted to wear a hijab during

school. ( Id.)

26. Principal Hallum, although aware that Nashala was wearing a hijab to school, did not ask

Nashala to remove it or advise her that she was violating the district's dress code . (Hallum Dep.

8:5-8:18, 38:1-38:22; Hayes Ltr. at 015.)

27. From August 18, 2003 to September 10, 2003, Nashala wore a hijab to Franklin, without

015 ("The first two headdresses [Nashala] wore did not [create a disruption].").)

28. On September 11, 2003, the second anniversary of the 2001 terrorist attacks, Walker and

another teacher were discussing the attacks and spotted Nashala wearing her hijab. (Hayes Ltr. at 014.)

29. Walker approached Nashala and told her that she should not be wearing a hi

jab and sent

30. During that meeting, Hallum informed Nashala for the first time that her hijab was

5

31. On September 29, 2003, Superintendent Gleichman informed the Hearns that, pursuant to

the district's dress code, Nashala would no longer be permitted to wear a hijab at school. (Defs.

Br. at 5.)

32. Nashala declined to remove her hijab, and as a result, on or about October 1, 2003, the

13.)

33. When Nashala returned to Franklin, she again wore her hijab. As a result, on or about

34. Prior to each of these suspensions, Nashala's father informed Hallum that Nashala's

35. On October 15, 2003, the district and the Hearns reached an interim agreement, which

allowed Nashala to return to school wearing her hijab until a determination could be made as to the constitutionality of the district's dress code. (Defs. Br. at 6.)

36. Nashala has since worn her hijab to Franklin every day without any incid

ent or disruption

The District's Exceptions to the Dress Code

37. The district either granted an exception to the dress code for Nashala a

t the beginning of the school year or interpreted the dress code policy as not prohibiting hijabs. (Hallum Dep. at

38:1-39:1; Hayes Ltr. at 015.)

38. The district granted an exception to the dress code for Nashala as a res

ult of the interim agreement reached between the district and the Hearns. (Defs. Br. at Ex. G.) 6 The District's Justifications for Prohibiting Nashala's Wearing of Hijab

39. The district offers several justifications for prohibiting Nashala from wearing her

hijab to school: (1) to further school safety and discipline; (2) to promote a learning environment free of "unnecessary" disruption; (3) to maintain a "religion-free zone" in schools; and (4) because the district believes it is required to do so under a set of 1998 U.S. Department

Gleichman Dep. 67:22-70:21, 76:16-77:25;

Religious Expression in Public Schools, U.S. Dep't of Educ. (1998), available at http://www.ed.gov/Speeches/08-1995/religion/html [hereinafter

1998 Guidelines] (Ex. 7).)

40. The district has not provided any evidence regarding safety- or gang-rel

ated concerns

41. The district has not provided any evidence regarding crime or criminal activity at

Franklin

or any other school in the district. ( Id.)

42. The only "disruptions" caused by Nashala's hijab were "comments by students and

teachers" regarding the hijab, and one incident during which another student pulled off Nashala's

43. Gleichman and Hallum stated that these students reported being "frightened" or

"concerned " by Nashala's hijab. (Gleichman Dep. 53:22-55:4; Hallum Dep. 16:6-18:12.)

44. The district permits Franklin students to wear religious clothing and accessories,

45. The 1998 DOE guidelines state that a school district may not discriminate against

7 religion in general or a particular religion in applying student dress codes: "Students generally have no Federal right to be exempted from religiously-neutral and generally applicable school dress rules based on their religious beliefs and practices; however, schools may not single out religious attire in general, or attire of a particular religion, for prohibition o r regulation." (1998

Guidelines at 7.)

ARGUMENT

The core legal dispute on summary judgment is the appropriate level of judicial scrutiny applicable to Defendants' enforcement of a no-headwear rule against Nashala Hearn. Defendants contend that their dress code is a neutral, generally applica ble rule, and rational basis review therefore should apply. As set forth below, however, the dress code being applied to Nashala is neither neutral nor generally applicable, and strict scrutiny applies for any one of several reasons. First, the dress code does not apply equally to all students, and thus is not generally applicable. Defendants have reserved for themselves the prerogative of making case- by-case exceptions to the policy, and have indeed made many such exceptions, including exceptions for students suffering hair loss due to chemotherapy treatment. Thus, a student, like Nashala, who seeks to wear a head covering for reasons of modesty based on religious reasons like Nashala cannot do so, but a student who seeks to wear a head coveri ng for reasons of modesty based on secular reasons can. This is not a generally applicable rule, and Defendants thus must show a compelling interest, pursued in a narrowly tailored fashion, for failing to extend the same exemption to Nashala's religious request that is given to others.

See Argument

at 11-14, infra. Second, Nashala's claim involves free exercise rights coupled with expressive 8 rights, and therefore heightened scrutiny is warranted under the case la w of the Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit. See id. at 14-16. Third, the undisputed facts show that Defendants' actions were not neutral toward religion, but rather singled out Nashala based on her Muslim faith, and strict scrutiny therefore applies to her Free Exercise and Equal Protection claims for this reason as well. See id. at 16-17. Finally, strict scrutiny is also warranted under the Free

Speech Clause.

See id. at 21-23.

Accordingly, Defendants must show that their conduct toward Nashala advances interests of the highest order and is narrowly tailored in pursuit of those intere sts. They cannot do so. As set forth below, Defendants' various rationales posited for enforcing the no-headwear policy against Nashala are not compelling; indeed they are so lacking in factual support that they would not even meet the minimal requirement of rational basis scrutiny. They also are not narrowly tailored. See id. at 16-19. Therefore, summary judgment for Plaintiffs and the United States is warranted. I.

Legal Standard

Summary judgment is proper when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In the context of Rule 56, the court's function is not to decide disp uted questions of fact, but only to determine whether genuine issues of fact exist.

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986). The movant bears the burden of showing the propriety of summary judgment, and the court "must view the evidence and any inferences that may be drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party."

Gray v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,

9

858 F.2d 610, 613 (10th Cir. 1988).

As shown below, the United States is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on its Fourteenth Amendment claim because there are no genuine issues as to any material facts. II. The District's Conduct Violates The Equal Protection Clause The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, upon which the United States' complaint-in-intervention is premised, has been violated by Defendants in two ways. First, the district has violated Nashala's right to freely exercise her religion, a "fundamental constitutional right" under the Equal Protection Clause.

Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361 n.14

(1974) ("Unquestionably, the free exercise of religion is a fundamental constitutional right."). The Supreme Court has considered claims alleging a burden on the fundamental right of religious exercise in violation of the Equal Protection Clause by looking to whether the plaintiff's rights under the Free Exercise Clause were violated.

See id.; see also Locke v. Davey,

- U.S. -, 124 S.Ct. 1307, 1313 n.3 (2004). Cf. Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 715 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[T]he Free Exercise Clause . . . and the Equal Protection Clause as applied to religion - all speak wi th one voice on this point: Absent the most unusual circumstances, one's religion ought not affect one's legal rights or duties or benefits."); West v. Derby Unified Sch. Dist. No. 260, 206 F.3d 1358, 1365 (10th Cir.

2000) ("[Plaintiff's] equal protection claim is more properly considered together with his First

Amendment challenge.").

Second, the district, in singling out Nashala because of her Islamic faith, has intentionally discriminated against her. See Buckley Constr. v. Shawnee Civic & Cultural Dev. Auth., 933 F.2d 853, 859 (10th Cir. 1991) (a violation of equal protection occurs "when the government treats someone differently than another who is similarly situated"). 10 A.The District Impinged Nashala's Fundamental Right To Practice Her Religion in Violation of the Equal Protection Clause The First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause, made applicable to the States by incorporation through the Fourteenth Amendment, see Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,

303 (1940), provides that "Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise [of

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