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Surveillance by intelligence services: fundamental rights safeguards
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Surveillance by intelligence services:
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More information on the European Union is available on the internet (http://europa�eu)� Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2017 FRA - print: ISBN 978-92-9491-766-9 doi:10�2811/15232 TK-04-17-696-EN-C FRA - web: ISBN 978-92-9491-765-2 doi:10�2811/792946 TK-04-17-696-EN-N © European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2017 Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged�For any use or reproduction of photos or other material that is not under the European Union Agency for Fundamental
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P ????? ?? ? ????? ??? ???- ?? ????? ??? (PCF)
This report addresses matters related to the respect for private and family life (Article 7), the protection of personal
data (Article 8) and the right to an effective remedy and afair trial (Article 47) falling under Titles II 'Freedoms'
and VI 'Justice' of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.Surveillance by intelligence services:
fundamental rights safeguards and remedies in the EUVolume II: field perspectives
and legal update fiForeword
Intelligence services perform vital work, and the growing threats of terrorism, cyber-attacks and sophisticated criminal
networks have rendered more urgent their efforts to protect our security� Technological advancements have also
made their work more complex, and the transnational nature of today's threats has made it ever more challenging�
But intelligence work to counter these threats, particularly large-scale surveillance, can also interfere with fundamental
rights, especially privacy and data protection� As this report underscores, effective oversight and remedies can help
minimise the risk of such interference�The report is the second publication addressing a European Parliament request for in-depth research on the impact
of surveillance on fundamental rights� It updates FRA's 2015 legal analysis on the topic and supplements that analysis
with field-based insights gained from extensive interviews with diverse experts in intelligence and related fields,
including its oversight�With technological advances constantly introducing both new threats and new ways to fight those threats, legislators
have been kept busy� Many of the legislative changes enacted since 2015 have increased transparency� But legal
frameworks remain diverse and, according to some interviewees, too complex and imprecise� Moreover, while
safeguards have in some cases been strengthened, room for improvement remains - particularly in the context of
international intelligence cooperation� Similarly, remedies are available where individuals' rights have been infringed,
but remain inherently limited�Clarifying the applicable legal requirements, introducing solid safeguards and giving teeth to remedies would all help
ensure that intelligence work is conducted in a rights-compliant manner� This, in turn, would reinforce the credibility
of the information obtained by intelligence services - bolstering trust amongst the public, encouraging effective
cooperation, and - ultimately - strengthening national security�We are extremely grateful to the key partners and individual experts who took the time to participate in our interviews,
providing invaluable real-life perspectives on the continuing effort to protect fundamental rights and national security�
Michael O'Flaherty
Director
Country codes
Country codeCountry
ATAustria
BEBelgium
BGBulgaria
CYCyprus
CZCzech Republic
DEGermany
DKDenmark
EEEstonia
ELGreece
ESSpain
FIFinland
FRFrance
HRCroatia
HUHungary
IEIreland
ITItaly
LTLithuania
LULuxembourg
LVLatvia
MTMalta
NLNetherlands
PLPoland
PTPortugal
RORomania
SESweden
SKSlovakia
SISlovenia
UKUnited Kingdom
Acronyms and abbreviations
Acronym/
abbreviationNameEnglish translation
AIVDAlgemene Inlichtingen en Veiligheidsdienst
General Intelligence and Security Service
(theNetherlands) BNDBundesnachrichtendienstFederal Intelligence Service (Germany) BNDGBundesnachrichtendienst GesetzLaw on the Federal Intelligence Service (Germany)CIVDGerman Federal Intelligence Service
CJEUCourt of Justice of the European Union
CNCTR Commission nationale de contrôle des services de renseignementNational Commission of Control of the
Intelligence Techniques (France)
CNILCommission nationale de l'informatique et des
libertésFrench Data Protection Authority
COPASIR
Comitato parlamentare per la sicurezza della
Repubblica
Parliamentary Committee for the Intelligence
and Security Services and for State SecretControl (Italy)
CTIVDDe Commissie van Toezicht op de Inlichtingen- en
Veiligheidsdiensten
Oversight Committee for the Intelligence and
Security Services (the Netherlands)
DGSEDirection générale de la sécurité extérieureGeneral Directorate for External Security (France)
DPAData Protection Authority
ECHREuropean Convention on Human Rights
ECtHREuropean Court of Human Rights
FDNFrench Data Network
GCHQGovernment Communications Headquarters
GDPRGeneral Data Protection Regulation
GISSGeneral Intelligence and Security Service
(Belgium) IOCCOInterception of Communications Commissioners
Office
IPAInvestigatory Powers Act
IPCInvestigatory Powers Commissioner
IPTInvestigatory Powers Tribunal
ISCInternet Systems Consortium
NCNDNeither confirm nor deny
OCAMCoordination Unit for Threat Analysis
PKGrParlamentarisches KontrollgremiumParliamentary Control Panel (Germany) PKGrGParlamentarisches Kontrollgremium GesetzParliamentary Control Panel Act (Germany)PNRPassenger Name Records
QPCQuestion prioritaire de constitutionnalité
Priority preliminary ruling on the issue of
constitutionality (France)RIPARegulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000
SIGINTSignals Intelligence
SINCommission on Security and Integrity ProtectionSISSecret Intelligence Service
SIUNThe State Inspection for Defence Intelligence
Operations (Sweden)
SSEURSignals Intelligence Seniors Europe
TETTilsynet med EfterretningstjenesterneDanish Intelligence Oversight BoardContents
FOREWORD ������������������������������������������������������������������������
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ������������������������������������������������������������������������
FRA OPINIONS ������������������������������������������������������������������������
INTRODUCTION ������������������������������������������������������������������������
PART I: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR INTELLIGENCE ������������������������������������������������������������������������
1Intelligence services in the EU-28: a diverse landscape �����������������������������������������������������������������������
2Surveillance measures inthedigitalage �����������������������������������������������������������������������
3Interference with the right torespect for private life ������������������������������������������������������������������������
4Surveillance "inaccordancewiththe law" �����������������������������������������������������������������������
5Legality in case of internationalintelligence cooperation �����������������������������������������������������������������������
6Surveillance for alegitimate aim: need for 'national security' definition(s) ���������������������������������������������������53
PART II: ACCOUNTABILITY? ������������������������������������������������������������������������
7An imperative: control from within �����������������������������������������������������������������������
8Oversight framework ofintelligence services �����������������������������������������������������������������������
9Features of oversight bodies �����������������������������������������������������������������������
10Stages of intelligence serviceoversight �����������������������������������������������������������������������
11Oversight of international intelligence cooperation ������������������������������������������������������������������������
PART III: REMEDIES? ������������������������������������������������������������������������
12The remedial route �����������������������������������������������������������������������
13Raising individuals' awareness �����������������������������������������������������������������������
14Remedial bodies' challenges: access to classified information andnecessary expertise ��������������������������129
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS? ������������������������������������������������������������������������
REFERENCES ������������������������������������������������������������������������
INDEXES ������������������������������������������������������������������������
ANNEX ?: DATA COLLECTION AND COVERAGE ������������������������������������������������������������������������
ANNEX ?:
OVERVIEW OF INTELLIGENCE SERVICES IN THE ?? EU MEMBER STATES ����������������������������������������������������� ???
ANNEX ?:
KEY FEATURES OF EXPERT OVERSIGHT BODIES' ANNUAL REPORTS ������������������������������������������������������������ ???
ANNEX ?:
KEY FEATURES OF PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT COMMITTEES' REPORTS ������������������������������������������������� ???
Figures and tables
Figure 1:
EU Member States' legal frameworks on surveillance reformed since October 2015 ���������������������������������20
Figure2:
Intelligence cycle in the Netherlands �����������������������������������������������������������������������
Figure3:
Stages of control by ECtHR in the context of surveillance �����������������������������������������������������������������������
Figure4:
Different understandings of 'interference' (EU and US) �����������������������������������������������������������������������
Figure5:
Intelligence services' accountability scheme �����������������������������������������������������������������������
Figure6:
Parliamentary oversight of intelligence services in EUMember States ��������������������������������������������������������66
Figure 7:
DPAs' powers over national intelligence services, by Member State �������������������������������������������������������������81
Figure8:
DPAs' and expert bodies' powers over intelligence techniques, by EUMember State ������������������������������82
Figure9:
Implementing effective remedies: challenges and solutions ������������������������������������������������������������������������
�114Figure10:
DPAs' remedial competences over intelligence services �����������������������������������������������������������������������
Table1:
Oversight framework: main actors and scope of control �����������������������������������������������������������������������
Table2:
Expert bodies (excluding DPAs) overseeing intelligence services in theEU �������������������������������������������������68
Table3:
Effective oversight: legal standards and views of key actors �����������������������������������������������������������������������
��74Table4:
Binding authorisation/approval of targeted surveillance measures in the EU-28 ����������������������������������������95
Table5:
Approval/authorisation of general surveillance of communications in France,Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom �����������������������������������������������������������������������
�97Table6:
Non-judicial bodies with remedial powers in the context of surveillance, by EUMember State �������������112
Table7:
Non-judicial bodies' remedial powers in case of surveillance, byEUMember State ���������������������������������115
Executive summary
With terrorism, cyber-attacks and organised crime
posing growing threats across the European Union, the work of intelligence services undoubtedly remains vital� Technological advancements have introduced both new threats and means of fighting those threats, meaning such work has also become increasingly complex� In addition, the globalisation of con icts and the transnational nature of threats faced have made international cooperation between intelligence services both more common and indispensable- within and beyond the EU's borders�Digital surveillance methods serve as important
resources in intelligence efforts, ranging from intercepting communications and metadata to hacking and database mining� But- as the 2013 Snowden revelations underscored- these activities may also seriously interfere with diverse fundamental rights, particularly to privacy and data protection� This report constitutes the second part of aresearch effort triggered by aEuropean Parliament request for in-depth research on the impact of surveillance on fundamental rights� It updates FRA's 2015 legal analysis (Surveillance by intelligence services: fundamental rights safeguards and remedies in the EUfi- VolumefiI: Member States' legal frameworks)� In addition, it presents findings from over 70 interviews with experts- conducted largely in 2016- in seven EU Member States:Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands,
Sweden and the United Kingdom� The report focuses on large-scale technical collection of intelligence, referred to as general surveillance of communications�Intelligence laws remain
diverse and complexMuch has happened since 2015. New threats and new
technology have triggered extensive reforms across several Member States, particularly France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, and Finland is in the midst of an overarching reform�These intelligence law reforms have increased
transparency� Nonetheless, the legal frameworks regulating intelligence work in the EU's 28Member States remain both extremely diverse and complex� International human rights standards require defining the mandate and powers of intelligence services in legislation that is clear, foreseeable and accessible� But experts voiced concerns about apersisting lack of clarity as amajor source of uncertainty� According to both European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) and EU law, the mere existence of legislation allowing for surveillance measures constitutes an interference with the right to private life, and European courts consider the collection of data by intelligence services to amount to an interference� Such interference needs to be justified to be human rights compliant�Targeted surveillance- which applies to concrete
targets based on some form of individualised suspicion- is regulated in some detail by almost all EUMember States� By contrast, only five Member States currently have detailed legislation on general surveillance of communications� Safeguards do limit the potential for abuse, and these have been strengthened in some Member States - though less so in case of foreign-focused surveillance� Similarly, safeguards are generally weaker- and less transparent- in the context of international intelligence cooperation, suggesting aneed for more regulation of such cooperation�Oversight bodies ensure some
accountability, but room for improvement remainsVarious entities oversee the work of intelligence
services across the EU-28, including the judiciary, expert bodies, parliamentary committees and data protection authorities� In afield dominated by secrecy, such oversight is crucial: it helps ensure that intelligence services are held accountable for their actions, and encourages the development of effective internal safeguards within the services�The judiciary and expert bodies are most commonly
involved in overseeing surveillance measures�Specialised parliamentary committees generally
focus on assessing governmental strategic policies-21Member States have set up such committees for this
purpose� Data protection authorities have significant powers over intelligence services in seven Member States, but their powers are limited or non-existent in the rest of the EU- mainly due to an exception for national security matters enshrined in data protection law�Almost all interviewees from oversight bodies
maintained that they are able to resist external influence, but some lawyers, civil society, and academics questioned both their independence and their effectiveness� Interviewed experts emphasised that full access to all relevant data and information is key to effective oversight- as is the ability to benefit from such access� With oversight bodies largely staffed by legal specialists, the inability to do so sometimes boils down to limited technical capacities� Interviewees Surveillance by intelligence services - Volume II: field perspectives and legal update acknowledged that these pose aproblem- and that the sensitivity of the work can discourage individuals from seeking external expertise� The power to issue binding decisions is also vital� While all EUMember States have at least one independent body in their oversight framework, some lack such decision-making powers� The importance of public scrutiny was also highlighted, with some interviewees deeming insufficiently informative the reports issued by oversight bodies� In addition, the respondents underlined the importance of countering the fragmentation of oversight through cooperation among the various actors involved in the oversight process, both nationally and internationally� FRA's research revealed that oversight of international intelligence cooperation is less fully developed-17Member States do not require oversight of such
activity, while others limited its scope� Some Member States have introduced safeguards specifically tailored to international intelligence sharing, but only requiring prior approval from the executive has been embraced in significant numbers (27 Member States)�Towards accessible and
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