[PDF] Safety Checking of Machine Code





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Safety Checking of Machine Code

Abstract

untrusted machine code to be loaded into a trusted host system. specified on the host side.

UltraSPARC machine.

1 Introduction

essential. properties that are specified on the host side. host. states.Forexample,itissafetowritetoalocationthatstoresanZhichen XuBarton P. MillerThomas Reps

Computer Sciences Department

University of Wisconsin

Madison, WI 53706-1685

{zhichen,bart,reps}@cs.wisc.edu

ThisworkissupportedinpartbyDepartmentofEnergyGrantDE-FG02-93ER25176,NSFgrantsCDA-9623632,EIA-9870684,CCR-9625667,CCR-9619219,U.S.-IsraelBinationalScienceFoundationgrant96-0037,aVilasAssociateAwardformtheUniversityofWisconsin,andDARPAcontractN66001-97-C-8532.TheU.S.Governmentisauthorizedtoreproduceanddis-tributereprintsforGovernmentalpurposesnotwithstandinganycopyright notation thereon.

assessing whether a security violation might be possible. invariants. The main contributions of this paper are as follows: typestate information and linear constraints. typestates to track pointers. ness. ally make the task of safety checking easier. discusses the limitations of our technique.

2 Safety Properties and Policies

violations. code are provided by the host. by the host. functions (methods) that can be called. in terms of the types of the memory locations and their contents.

1.Instructions such asadd andld are overloaded; for exam-

ple,add can be adding two integers or adding the base address of an array and an array index. byx andf. address space in a linked list defined by the structurethread struct thread { int tid; int lwpid; struct thread * next; threads is stored): [H :thread.tid,thread.lwpid :ro] [H :thread.next :rfo] does not make any changes to the untrusted code.

structure, by allowing the untrusted code to modify pointers.Whatwehavepresentedhereisasimplifiedviewofasafety

is returned to the host.

3 Overview of Safety-Checking Analysis

abstract location. safety policy, and the invocation specification. and%g3. the typestates of the inputs. Untrusted CodeHost TypestateSafety PolicyInvocation

1:mov %o0,%o2!move%o0 into%o2

2:clr %o0!set%o0 to zero

3:cmp %o0,%o1!compare%o0 and%o1

4:bge 12!branch to 12 if%o0³%o1

5:clr %g3!set%g3 to zero

6:sll %g3, 2,%g2!%g2 = 4x%g3

7:ld [%o2+%g2],%g2!load from address%o2+%g2

8:inc %g3!%g3=%g3 + 1

9:cmp %g3,%o1!compare%g3 and%o1

10:bl 6!branch to 6 if%g3 <%o1

11:add %o0,%g2,%o0!%o0 =%o0 +%g2

12:retl

13:nope:

arr: {n³1}V = {e,arr} [V : int : ro] [V : int [n] : rfo]%o0¬ arr %o1¬ n arrisanintegerarrayquotesdbs_dbs3.pdfusesText_6
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