[PDF] GAO-17-47, CORPORATE SHAREHOLDER MEETINGS: Proxy Advisory



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GAO-17-47, CORPORATE SHAREHOLDER MEETINGS: Proxy Advisory

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CORPORATE

SHAREHOLDER

MEETINGS

Proxy Advisory Firms'

Role in Voting

and Corporate

Governance Practices

Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee

on Economic Policy, Committee on

Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,

U.S. Senate

November 2016

GAO-17-47

United States Government Accountability Office

United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-17-47, a report to the

Chairman, Subcommittee on Economic Policy,

Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban

Affairs, U.S. Senate

November 2016

CORPORATE SHAREHOLDER MEETINGS

Proxy Advisory Firms' Role in Voting and Corporate

Governance Practices

Why GAO Did This Study

As institutional investment has grown

over the last 30 years, institutional investors increasingly have relied on proxy advisory firms. The proxy advisory industry in the United States consists of five firms two of which are the largest and most dominant proxy advisory firms. Some members of

Congress, industry associations, and

academics have raised issues about proxy advisory firms' influence on voting and corporate governance, the level of transparency in their methods, and the level of regulatory oversight.

GAO was asked to review the current

state of the proxy advisory industry.

This report discusses (1) the influence

proxy advisory firms may have on voting and corporate governance (2) how firms develop and apply policies to make vote recommendations, and (3) SEC's oversight activities. GAO reviewed literature; analyzed the proxy advisory firms' policies and SEC policies and examinations; and interviewed the

5 proxy advisory firms,

13 institutional investors, 11 corporate issuers, SEC officials, and industry stakeholders. GAO randomly selected corporate issuers from Standard and

Poor's indexes and judgmentally

selected institutional investors (based on size and type of investor) from industry association s' information.

GAO makes no

recommendations in this report. GAO provided a draft to

SEC for its review and received

technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.

What GAO Found

Institutional investors,

such as pension plans and mutual funds, hire proxy advisory firms to obtain research and vote recommendations on issues, such as executive co mpensation and proposed mergers that are addressed at shareholder meetings of public corporations (corporate issuers). Market participants and other stakeholders with whom GAO spoke agreed that with the increased demand for their services, proxy advisory firms' influence on shareholder voting and corporate governance practices has increased. But recent studies, market participants, and stakeholders had mixed views about the extent of the influence. For example, some said influence can vary based on institutional investor size (there is less influence on large institutional investors that often perform research in-house and have their own voting policies). Proxy advisory firms, specifically Institutional Shareholder Services and Glass Lewis & Company—the two largest firms—develop and update their general voting policies through an iterative process, involving analysis of regulatory requirements, industry practices, and discussions with market participants. Corporate issuers and institutional investors told GAO that unlike in the past, the firms have made more of an effort to engage market participants in the development and updating of voting policies, such as criteria for assessing the independence of board directors and executive compensation packages. According to the firms, they apply these general voting policies to publicly available company information to develop vote recommendations, which also are based on institutional investor voting instructions and criteria that firm analysts determine are applicable to the issue being voted on. Firms have taken steps to communicate with corporate issuers and allow review of data used to make vote recommendations before they are finalized. However, some corporate issuers told GAO that firms continue to apply policies in a one -size-fits-all manner, which can lead to recommendations not in the best interest of shareholders. Corporate issuers also stated that they often do not understand the rationale for some vote recommendations and would like to discuss them before they are finalized. Proxy advisory firms told GAO that to maintain objectivity and satisfy research reporting

timelines for clients, they limit the breadth of such discussions. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) oversight of proxy advisory firms

and the services they provide has included gathering information, issuing guidance, and examin ing proxy advisory firms and use of the firms by investment compan ies, such as mutual funds. In 2010, SEC summarized concerns that market participants raised about conflicts of interest, accuracy, and transparency of proxy advisory firms and requested comments on potential regulatory solutions. In December 2013, SEC held a roundtable to discuss issues facing the proxy advisory industry, and issued guidance in June 2014 on disclosure of conflicts of interest, among other things. According to SEC, it also has continued to address concerns surrounding proxy advisory firms through its examinations of investment advisers and investment companies that retain their services. SEC made these examinations a priority in 2015 and an area of focus in its ongoing initiative for registered investment companies that had not been examined by SEC.

View GAO-17-47. For more information,

contact Michael Clements at (202) 512-8678 or clementsm@gao.gov.

Page i GAO-17-47 Corporate Shareholder Meetings

Letter 1

Background 4

Several Factors Have Led to Increased Demand for and Influence of Proxy Advisory Firms, but Mixed Views Exist on the Extent of

Influence 13

Proxy Advisory Firms Have Increased Engagement with Market Participants and Stakeholders in the Vote Recommendation

Process 19

SEC Oversight Activities of Proxy Advisory Services Have Included Information Gathering, Guidance, and Examinations 31

Agency Comments 37

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 39

Appendix II GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 44

Tables

Table 1: Key Participants in Proxy Voting for Shareholder

Meetings 5

Table 2: Registration Status of Proxy Advisory Firms, as of June 2016
10

Figures

Figure 1: Examples of Communication Mechanisms Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) and Glass Lewis Used for Proxy Voting Policy Development, as of September 2016 22 Figure 2: Institutional Shareholder Services' (ISS) and Glass

Lewis's Review Processes for Proxy Reports, as of

September 2016 28

Figure 3: Secu

rities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Oversight Actions Related to the Proxy Voting System and Use of

Proxy Advisory Firms, 2007

-2016 32

Contents

Page ii GAO-17-47 Corporate Shareholder Meetings

Abbreviations

Advisers Act Investment Advisers Act of 1940

AUM assets under management

CEO chief executive officer

Dodd -Frank Act Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer

Protection Act

Egan-Jones Egan-Jones Proxy Services

Exchange Act Securities Exchange Act of 1934

Glass Lewis Glass Lewis & Co.

ISS

Institutional Shareholder Services

Marco Consulting

Marco Consulting Group

NASDAQ NASDAQ Stock Market

NYSE New York Stock Exchange

SEC Securities and Exchange Commission

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