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Tous droits r€serv€s 'tudes internationales, 1998 This document is protected by copyright law. Use of the services of 'rudit (including reproduction) is subject to its terms and conditions, which can be viewed online. This article is disseminated and preserved by 'rudit. 'rudit is a non-profit inter-university consortium of the Universit€ de Montr€al, promote and disseminate research.

https://www.erudit.org/en/Document generated on 10/06/2023 3:20 p.m.€tudes internationalesMaintien de la paix et diplomatie coercitive : le cas de la BosnieMichel Li€geois

Volume 29, Number 4, 1998URI: https://id.erudit.org/iderudit/703957arDOI: https://doi.org/10.7202/703957arSee table of contentsPublisher(s)Institut qu€b€cois des hautes €tudes internationalesISSN0014-2123 (print)1703-7891 (digital)Explore this journalCite this article

Li€geois, M. (1998). Maintien de la paix et diplomatie coercitive : le cas de la

Bosnie.

€tudes internationales 29
(4), 867"887. https://doi.org/10.7202/703957ar

Article abstract

This article seeks to show how the theory of coercive diplomacy can help advance the conceptual debate over the continuity or discontinuity existing between peacekeeping and peace-enforcement. The lessons learned after the operations in Somalia and Bosnia have clearly drawn a conceptual fine line between "traditional peacekeeping" and peace-enforcement. Many questions still remain about the possibility of using more coercive strategies in circumstances where there is neither a cease-fire in place nor consent from the parties to the conflict, as normally required by traditional UN peacekeeping doctrine. By studying the case of the use of air strikes to maintain a UN "safe area" in Bosnia, the article illustrates the great difficulties - at the political, strategic and operational levels - in combining "power strategies" and "co-operative strategies." The article concludes that the conceptual fine line must be drawn between these two types of strategies. it becomes difficult to combine "power strategies" and "co-operative strategies" to the extent that the political context and operational constraints cause the two of them to weaken - instead of strengthen - each other.

Maintien de la paix et diplomatie

coercitiv e : le cas de la Bosnie Miche l LIÉGEOIS*

RÉSUM

É : Nous voulons démontrer comment la théorie de la diplomatie coercitive peut faire avancer le débat conceptuel sur la continuité ou la discontinuité qui existe entre le maintien de la paix et l'imposition de la paix. Les leçons apprises la suite des opérations somalienne et bosniaque ont clairement

établi

la césure conceptuelle entre le maintien de la paix dite "traditionnelle» et l'imposition de la paix.

Cependant,

beaucoup de questions demeurent concernant la possibilité d'utiliser des stratégies plus coercitives dans des circonstances où il n'existe ni cessez-le-feu préalable ni consente ment des parties, comme l'exige normalement la doctrine ONU du maintien de la paix. En

étudiant

le cas de l'utilisation de frappes aériennes pour maintenir une zone de

sécurité désignée par I'ONU en Bosnie, nous offrons une illustration des grandes difficul

tés - aux niveaux politique, stratégique et opérationnel - de combiner les " stratégies de

puissance» et les "stratégies coopératives». Nous concluons que c'est entre ces deux types de stratégies qu'il faut situer la césure conceptuelle. Il est difficile de combiner les "stratégies de pouvoir» et les "stratégies de coopération» dans la mesure où le contexte politique et les contraintes opérationnelles les amènent non pas s'appuyer l'un sur l'autre, mais bien s'affaiblir mutuellement. ABSTRACT : This article seeks to show how the theory of coercive diplomacy can help advance the conceptual debate over the continuity or dïscontinuity existing between peacekeeping and peace-enforcement. The lessons learned after the opérations in

Somalia

and

Bosnia

hâve clearly drawn a conceptual fine Une between "traditional peacekeeping" and peace-enforcement. Many questions still remain about the possibility ofusing more coercive stratégies in circumstances where there is neither a cease-fire in place nor consent from the parties to the conflict, as normally required by traditional UN peacekeeping doctrine. By studying the case of the use of air strikes to maintain a UN "safe area" in

Bosnia,

the article illustrâtes the great difficulties at the political, stratégie and operational levels in combining "power stratégies" and "co-operative stratégies." The article concludes that the conceptual fine Une must be drawn between thèse two types of stratégies. ït becomes difficult to combine "power stratégies" and "co- operative stratégies" to the extent that the political context and operational constraints cause the two of them to weaken instead of strengthen each other.

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